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Australia is a federation with a mixed private-public system.  Public hospitals and community health 
care are the responsibility of states and territories.  Private fee-for-service clinicians and 
pharmaceuticals is subsidised by the Commonwealth government via the Medicare Benefit Schedule 
(MBS) and Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS).  As with other countries, issues of efficiency and 
equity are key considerations, with equity issues in Australia confounded by large geographical area 
and population distribution.   
 
This study presents a quantitative tool to improve resource distribution for state public health 
systems that provide public hospital and community services.  The goal is to enable improvements in 
health outcomes, promote allocative efficiency and improve equity between geographical regions.  A 
Health Outcomes Resource Standard (HORSt) is a new population needs-based funding tool that can 
inform resource distribution from Australian states to Local Health Networks (LHNs).  The aims of the 
HORSt are to:  
1. Have a parsimonious, measurable and consistent benchmark of desirable health outcomes 
approximated by health status for states’ LHNs’ populations relative to funding inputs across the 
continuum of care. 
2. Identify and incorporate measures of local geographical population health needs into resource 
allocation decisions. 
3. Identify the share and quantum of taxpayer resources provided by the state to geographical 
populations to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care. 
The HORSt identifies what the relative share of state health funding should be from the state health 
budget for each local population on the basis of need, after Medicare and Pharmaceutical benefits 
(Commonwealth public subsidies) are considered.  The HORSt is a tool of outcomes-based 
commissioning.  The HORSt is intended to be the first step in a broader state health funding model 
to inform resource distribution to LHNs, utilising activity-based funding (ABF) as it is presently used 
for purchasing facility outputs and a driver of technical efficiency as the second step.  This study uses 
NSW as a case study.   
 
The HORSt utilises age-standardised Potential Preventable Hospitalisations (PPHs) within 
populations as a marker of population health status and proxy of the wellbeing and health outcomes 
of the local populations.  The HORSt utilises Two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to first 
assess the allocative efficiency of the main publicly provided resources across the continuum of care 
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amongst 88 small population areas across NSW, to produce benchmarked low (desirable) levels of 
age-standardised PPHs.  Regression analysis is utilised in the second stage in order to explain the 
allocative efficiency for each small population via considering populations’ social determinants of 
health. 
 
Predicted allocative efficiency scores for each small area population and the LHNs that they reside 
within are then calculated from the regression equation.  Health need indices are developed from 
these predicted scores relative to their distance from the benchmarked level of allocative efficiency.  
The need indices applied to the pool of publicly subsidised funding across the continuum of care 
then inform the share of state health funding that ought to be provided to each LHN, to act as a 
financial enabler to address populations’ needs arising from social determinants that influence 
populations’ health status.   
 
HORSt DEA produces meaningful results for each region’s measured allocative efficiency of health 
outcomes taking into account the use of MBS, PBS and state health resources.  Populations with the 
best and worst health outcomes are amongst those with the highest and lowest rates of allocative 
efficiency respectively.  The findings from the regression stage successfully predict the measured 
allocative efficiency of the DEA, indicating that the most advantageous and disadvantageous social 
determinants give rise to the best and worst levels of allocative efficiency of health outcomes.  
Significant predictors of each population’s allocative efficiency of health outcomes are: 
socioeconomic status; the proportion of the population who are indigenous; and the proportion of 
the population who pay out-of-pocket costs (proxy for private service utilisation). 
 
HORSt represents a departure from the standard approach of population needs-based funding 
models that have sought to use predictors of utilisation for informing resource distribution, adopting 
a risk capitation approach to health needs.   Whilst these models do have their place, the HORSt 
demonstrates a viable alternative where enabling equity and improving health outcomes is the key 
goal for resource distribution.  Population health needs in this context can be better assessed via 
considering the measurement of allocative efficiency of a suitable proxy of health outcomes and by 
considering the productivity of resource inputs across the continuum of care.  Traditional models 
make no attempt to consider the productivity of the resource inputs across the continuum of care 
and therefore make no attempt to measure allocative efficiency of health outcomes.  If the goal of 
all health systems is to ultimately improve health outcomes, funding acting as an enabler to do so is 
better served by a HORSt to guide resource distribution that makes allocative efficiency and the 
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This study presents the development of a Health Outcomes Resource Standard (HORSt), a resource 
allocation instrument and equity monitor designed to address health inequities evident in 
geographical populations’ health status and guide more equitable resource distribution of Australian 
states’1 public health funding to their Local Health Networks (LHNs)2, so as to improve health 
outcomes of populations.  This is a quantitative econometric study that uses the state of New South 
Wales (NSW) in 2015/16 as a case study to demonstrate the model.   
 
The current payment3 model employed by states to fund public health services at the local level is 
Activity Based Funding (ABF) (Independent Hospital Pricing Authority 2015a).  ABF by definition as a 
casemix / episode funding model that pays for hospital outputs, informs the comparative technical 
efficiency of facilities outputs across LHNs (Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001).  However, whilst all 
states have embraced ABF as a new payment currency for purchasing hospital activity since 
Commonwealth4 health reforms required it from 1 July 2012 (Council of Australian Governments 
2011, p. 64; Palmer & Short 2014, p. 108), ABF by its design, is an output-based funding instrument 
useful for driving technical efficiency.  By design, it does not aim to promote allocative efficiency or 
address health inequities that are evident in Australia, such as avoidable illnesses and premature 
deaths (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016b).   
 
                                                            
 
1 Throughout this thesis, the term ‘state’ means any Australian state or mainland territory of Australia.  
2 Regionalised Health Services in states have various different names. In New South Wales, they are known as ‘Local Health 
Districts LHDs’; in Queensland ‘Hospital and Health Services’; in South Australia ‘Local Health Networks’; in Victoria Local 
Hospital Networks and in Tasmania ‘Tasmanian Health Organisations’ (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a, p. 
26).  For brevity, this thesis uses the term ‘LHN’ to refer to states’ regional population area health service structures.   
3 In NSW the Ministry of Health (MoH) since the commencement of ABF describes the funding model as a “purchasing 
model”. However, for all intents and purposes the NSW MoH model is a funding model.  The MoH sets activity targets for 
every LHD that are ultimately then provided with funds to utilise on the agreed activity volume (Foley 2011, 2012). 
4 The term “Commonwealth” refers to the Commonwealth Government of Australia.  The Commonwealth is also known as 
the Australian Federal Government, or the Australian Government. 
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This position has recently been articulated by the Independent Hospitals Pricing Authority (IHPA) 
that governs ABF pricing determinations. i.e.: 
“Whilst Activity Based Funding models have been effective in driving technical efficiency in the 
delivery of public hospital services, the current pricing models designed by IHPA do not necessarily 
provide incentives to maximise allocative and dynamic efficiency” (IHPA 2019, p. 30). 
 
Consequently, resource distribution by states to LHNs is not determined by technical efficiency 
considerations alone.  This is evident by all states, whilst considering population growth, still relying 
somewhat largely on using historical determinants, typically previous years casemix activity, as the 
starting point in establishing funding distribution to LHNs so as to determine negotiated agreements 
with LHNs in relation to how much activity is to be funded (Department of Health and Human 
Services Victoria 2014; NSW ABF Taskforce 2013b; Queensland Health 2014; SA Department of 
Health and Ageing 2014; System Purchasing and Performance 2013; Western Australia Department 
of Health 2014).  In the case of NSW, minor equity adjustments, (where population health needs are 
expressed as predictors of utilisation) are also made to this starting point (NSW Ministry of Health 
2017, p. 50; 2018, p. 23).  Once activity targets are established for each LHN, ABF is then used as the 
purchasing / funding model within this largely historically determined envelope.   
 
The current funding model from state to regional / local area therefore is made up of two primary 
stages:  
1. Cost / historical activity adjusted for population growth factors determines the funding 
envelope (activity targets) distributed from the State to LHN; and  
2. ABF used to purchase facility-based services with the region/ local area. 
Both stages ultimately focus on funding and purchasing outputs within the state health system. In 
doing so they do not consider the productivity contributions and allocative efficiency of publicly 
subsidised funding inputs across the continuum of care within Australia’s mixed private / public 
health system for achieving desirable health outcomes.   
 
This thesis develops the HORSt not to be a comprehensive public health funding model for 
Australian states.  The goal is the development of a tool that can be used by states as the first step in 
a two-step funding model as a population needs-based resource distribution enabler to promote 




Specifically, the HORSt as the first step will identify the total share of public funding that should be 
provided to each LHN from the state budget with respect to:  
 the pool of public resources consumed by each LHNs populations across the continuum 
of care including state health public hospital funding and Commonwealth public 
subsidisation for private services and pharmaceuticals under the Medicare Benefits 
Schedule (MBS) and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS); 
 the productivity of the pool of these public resources to achieve allocatively efficient 
benchmarked health outcomes, approximated by variables of population health status; 
and  
 population health needs expressed by populations’ capacity to benefit from resourcing 
to achieve the benchmarked efficient outcomes. 
In this regard the HORSt as the first step replaces the reliance on historical funding and activity to 
allocate funds from the state to LHNs.  It also positions public funding between the state and LHNs 
as a residual needs adjusted public funding component of the continuum of care which promotes 
equity and allocative efficiency.   
 
The scope of this research only addresses step one.  It does not address issues relating to the ABF 
model that informs the second step.  Nonetheless the compatibility between the HORSt and ABF is 
examined and verified in the literature review in Chapter Two.  ABF is left unchanged in its role as 
the second step.  The funding shares from the first step can be expressed in either dollars or ABF 
volume.  Furthermore, the HORSt acting as the starting point in a broader funding model does not 
seek to incorporate supply side cost issues or adjust for patient flows between LHNs.  Both aspects 
are however important and a discussion of these issues in union with ABF is provided in the 
concluding chapter.  The HORSt also has the potential as a distribution tool for Commonwealth to 
the States with IHPA translating the HORSt quantum into NWAUs.  This is also discussed in the 
conclusion. 
 
Cognisant of the interactions of the continuum of care and social determinants that give rise to 
health outcomes, the HORSt uses measures of population health status that reflect burden of 
disease to proxy health outcomes at the population level.  As such, the HORSt is not specifically 
designed to inform equity adjustments for specific health program areas, or for specific health 
interventions, treatments, or procedures.   
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1.1 SUMMARY OF INNOVATIONS AND UNIQUE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
The HORSt is specifically designed to address health inequities by considering each LHN’s 
populations’ capacity to benefit from taxpayer funded health resources.  Uniquely it does so by 
examining the social determinants of health that give rise to health inequities evident in health 
outcomes (approximated by a measure of population health status) and by considering the 
interaction of these social determinants with the allocative efficiency of the bulk of taxpayer 
resources provided to local populations across the continuum of care.  This methodological 
approach is unique and thus the study makes an important contribution to knowledge.   
 
The resources included across the continuum of care are Australian Government funding of the 
Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS) and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) and NSW public 
state health resources (funded by the Australian Government and State Governments).  At the time 
of the study, according to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), these resources 
constituted $105.8 billion in 2016, representing 62% of total health expenditure in Australia and 92% 
of total governments tax payer funded health expenditure (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare 2017a, pp. 22-30).   
 
The HORSt represents a departure from mainstream health reform and state health funding models 
in Australia that have largely focused on improving the technical efficiency of hospital outputs 
(Bennett 2012; Paterson 2002, p. 313).  The HORSt places emphasis on the allocatively efficient and 
equitable achievement of improving health outcomes and does so by not violating any regulatory or 
constitutionally prescribed arrangements that exist under Australia’s federation.   
 
In terms of innovation, the development of the HORSt in this thesis makes a number of unique 
contributions.  In summary, the HORSt as a state public health funding tool is the first of its kind to: 
1. consider and enumerate the productivity of the bulk of taxpayer resources across the 
continuum of care;  
2. recognize in a mixed private / public system, state health funding as component of an 
integrated health care system and not a standalone silo of publicly provided services; 
3. measure and use the relative allocative efficiency of the main taxpayer provided and 
subsidised resources across the continuum of care to produce desirable health 
outcomes to represent a benchmark;  
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4. represent population health needs in the context of populations’ capacity to benefit to 
achieve benchmarked health outcomes; and 
5. enumerate what the state health system should distribute to local populations to 
achieve funding equity aligned to population needs and with respect to public 
subsidisation across the continuum of care. 
The methodology employed in developing the HORSt also represents a unique contribution to the 
literature of population needs-based funding models in health care.  The HORSt utilises Two-stage 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a linear programming econometric tool which assesses efficiency 
and then uses robust regression to assess variables that can best explain the efficiency (Fatimah & 
Mahmudah 2017, pp. 1,974).   
 
Contextualised to the HORSt, the DEA will measure for 88 small populations across NSW the 
allocative efficiency of taxpayer resources across the continuum of care to achieve desirable levels of 
health outcomes.  Populations that are found to be allocatively efficient determine the benchmark.   
 
Having established the benchmark, the second stage uses predictive regression techniques to 
develop need indices for populations across NSW.  The regression identifies social determinants of 
health that predict each population’s ability / inability to achieve the benchmark.  Need indices are 
informed by each population’s predicted allocative efficiency to that of the benchmark population.  
Need indices are an expression of vertical equity and are then used to inform shares of funding 
resources between the State and the LHNs with respect to the pool of resources (MBS, PBS and state 
health).  The State resource distribution to LHNs are a residual given that MBS and PBS resources are 
not distributable. 
1.2  STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS  
This thesis is organised into seven chapters.   
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Prior to outlining the specific aims and research questions for this study, the first chapter provides 
an overview of the rationale and background supporting the development of the HORSt.  This 
chapter also provides a broad overview of the Australian health care system in terms of health 
outcomes, health inequalities and health inequities.  An outline of the governance and funding 
distributions of public health funded and taxpayer subsidised health funding in Australia is provided.  
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The chapter concludes by outlining the study’s scope and contextual information about the NSW 
health system, used as a case study, relevant to the time of the study.  
 
Chapter 2 - Literature review 
The second chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to the development of the HORSt.  
Specifically, the concepts of equity and efficiency contextualised to theories of social justice and 
public health funding models and the Australian health care system are examined.  The effectiveness 
of public health funding models used in Australian states and their ability to promote equity and 
efficiency are reviewed and contextualised to the literature.   International approaches to 
regionalised resource allocation models are critiqued along with methodological approaches 
employed to represent population health needs and health outcomes.  Alternative resource 
distribution methodologies and measures of need from the education sector are also considered.  
The gaps and limitations of previous research are highlighted and examined in the context of 
opportunities for this study and summarised.  The chapter concludes by outlining the conceptual 
framework derived from the literature that supports the methodological design of the HORSt and 
the study’s research questions.   
 
Chapter 3 – Governance and funding arrangements review 
Chapter Three is a review of the governance and funding arrangements of the Australian Health Care 
system that were briefly introduced in Chapter One.  This chapter is important for the HORSt as it 
examines the extent to which equity and efficiency are promoted within each layer of publicly 
provided and subsidised health care in the Australian health care system.  Relevant legislative issues 
that bound the Australian federal system of government are outlined.   
 
Drawing upon the conceptual framework established via the literature review, each layer of funding 
is assessed for theoretical and practical inclusion in the development of the HORSt methodology so 
as to recognize the productivity contributions of resourcing across the continuum of care to the 
achievement of health outcomes.  In doing so, this chapter demonstrates that state health resource 
distribution not only has a role to provide public health services but can act as residual funding 
enabler to correct for inequities and allocative inefficiency that is exacerbated by Commonwealth 




Chapter 4 - Methodology 
Chapter Four outlines the methods applied in the development of the HORSt.  This chapter 
commences with detailing the ethics approval undertaken for the thesis.  Guided by the conceptual 
framework developed from gaps and limitations revealed in the literature review and issues 
surrounding the governance and funding arrangements, the methodology is justified and outlined in 
alignment with the thesis aims and research questions.   
 
The nature of the research construct and quantitative approach is then justified along with the 
specific econometric methodology used in this thesis being Two-Stage DEA.  This involves: 
1. DEA for establishing benchmarked allocative efficient health outcomes; and 
2. Robust regression as a predictive methodology for identifying social determinants / 
health needs that give rise to the allocative efficiency of health outcomes.  
The Two Stage DEA methodology employed represents the first two stages in the development of 
the HORSt.  A third stage is outlined for the HORSt being the process of developing from the DEA and 
regression results, health need indices for each of the 88 populations defined by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data structures of the 15 NSW LHNs.  The process for calculating LHN 
shares of resources and informing resource distribution to meet local health needs is then 
prescribed. 
 
Chapter 5 – Data sources 
Chapter Five outlines and justifies the data sources to be used with the methodology.  This chapter 
first describes and justifies the ABS 88 small area populations within the 15 NSW LHNs to be used in 
the analysis subject to data availability.  Variables to be included in the DEA are then presented and 
validated.  Finally, variables for assessment in the regression are examined and outlined.  This 
chapter also includes quality assurance processes undertaken for data extractions and provides 
descriptive data analysis of key variables to be included.  
 
Chapter 6 - Results 
The sixth chapter presents the results for each of the 88 NSW populations from the analysis.  First 
the results of the DEA are validated as meaningful representations of the benchmarked allocative 
efficient health outcomes.  The regression analysis results are then presented and are shown to 
demonstrate realistic predictors of the DEA results.  The derived health needs indices are then 
confirmed as understandable and logical indicators commensurate with relative health needs of the 
NSW population’s and LHN’s.  The results for each NSW LHNs health needs share of funding is then 
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calculated.  These show the funding adjustments required from the state with respect to the pool of 
resources included in this study across the continuum of care to enable equity improvements.  A 
comparison to current share of funding provided to LHNs for admitted and non-admitted activity in 
NSW is presented and examined.  
 
Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
The final chapter revisits the research questions of the thesis.  Each of the aims and research 
questions are answered.  The unique and significant contributions achieved in the research is 
outlined.  Strengths and limitations of the research are highlighted.  A discussion of the practical 
application for the HORSt is provided.  
 
1.3  RATIONALE / BACKGROUND 
The justification for developing a HORSt for Australian States is four-fold with evidence 
demonstrating that:  
1 Health inequities, much of which are socially determined, exist in Australia and can be 
addressed; 
2 The distribution of publicly funded and publicly subsidised health care in Australia is 
inequitable and can be improved;  
3 State health funding models, irrespective of ABF, still use elements of historical funding that 
does not advance equity or efficiency; and 
4 Previous resource distribution models seeking to address need emphasised horizontal equity 
(equality in funding access expressed by health system use) rather than vertical equity and 
health needs expressed in terms of capacity to benefit. 
These issues are now introduced.  A fuller examination of these issues in the development of the 
conceptual framework that underpins this research methodology is provided in the literature 
review in Chapter Two and in the review of governance and funding arrangements in Chapter 
Three. 
1.3.1  Health inequities in Australia  
In Australia significant health inequities exist for: people of lower socioeconomic status; the 
Indigenous population; people living with disabilities; rural and remote communities; and migrants 
with low levels of English.  Inequities take the form of preventable illnesses and premature deaths 
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(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016b, pp. 29-32; Turrell et al. 2006).  The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) defines health inequities as: 
“avoidable inequalities in health between groups of people within countries and 
between countries.  These inequities arise from inequalities within and between 
societies.  Social and economic conditions and their effects on people’s lives determine 
their risk of illness and the actions taken to prevent them becoming ill or treat illness 
when it occurs”  (Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008a, emphasis not 
added).  
 
The socially produced factors underpinning health status that give rise to health inequities are 
significant.  A large body of international literature considers that the social and economic conditions 
in which people are born, live and work are the single most important determinants of health status 
(Aberg Yngwe et al. 2003; Case et al. 2008; Case et al. 2007; Chan 2008; Choi et al. 2015; Commission 
on Social Determinants of Health 2008b; Khanam et al. 2009; Satcher 2010; Theodossiou & 
Zangelidis 2009).   
 
Sir Michael Marmot (2016) maintains that often in Australia there is a tendency to see health 
inequities as confined to the appallingly poor health of Indigenous Australians, whilst the reality is 
that people in the middle of the social hierarchy will have fewer years of healthy life than those at 
the top and those at the bottom have worse health than those in the middle.  Moreover, for many 
people who are socioeconomically disadvantaged, multiple combinations of the attributes that are 
associated with health inequities often apply (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a; 
Health Policy Analysis 2014b).  Problematically and somewhat compounding this issue in Australia is 
that a recent study of intergenerational mobility found that Australians have a restricted ability to 
improve upon the socioeconomic status of their family and that in an international context, Australia 
has a relatively low rate of socioeconomic mobility (Mendolia & Siminski 2015).  Given this, there is a 
risk that health inequities can become entrenched within lower socioeconomic segments of the 
Australian community. 
 
The study will explicitly target the improvement of health inequities, by considering the 
influence of measurable social determinants of health upon proxies of population health status.  
Variables representing population health status are examined and justified for inclusion in the 
HORSt in the literature review.   
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1.3.2  Inequitable distribution of and access to publicly funded and publicly subsidised 
health care in Australia.  
Outside of public hospitals, the availability, distribution and financial accessibility of medical services 
are dominated by private doctors free to set their own fees (Johar et al. 2016).  These fees are part 
taxpayer funded by Medicare rebates, with patients liable for any co-payments of fees that exceed 
the rebates (Department of Health and Ageing 2009, p. 7).  Private doctors’ rights of private practice 
are guaranteed by the Australian Constitution (Australian Senate 1946; Faunce 2009; Scully 2009). 
 
In Australia, the financial and geographical access to health services can create health inequities 
(Duckett & Griffiths 2016a, p. 4; Turrell et al. 2006)  and there is well established evidence that 
access to these services is more abundant in more affluent areas where doctors choose to live and 
work (Bickerdyke et al. 2002, p. 85; Eckermann & Sheridan 2016; McRae & Butler 2014, p. 281).  
There is also evidence of people forgoing treatment due to unaffordability of out-of-pocket costs 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018c, 2018e; Duckett et al. 2014; Scott 2016; Sweet 
2012).  A fairer distribution of taxpayer funded resources that seeks to consider the social 
determinants of health that give rise to inequities, is warranted, along with improving the financial 
access.  Reducing health inequities improves well-being and opportunity, promotes social cohesion 
and inclusion, increases workforce participation and productivity, helps to overcome other forms of 
disadvantage and reduces health system costs (Brown et al. 2012; Duckett & Griffiths 2016a, p. 4). 
 
In developing the HORSt, the study will consider the total taxpayer funded resources spent on 
per capita basis on people in each LHN across the continuum of care.  Adjustments to the state 
health budget allocation to each LHN will be guided by meeting the resourcing requirements to 
address health care needs in order to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of 
care. 
1.3.3  State health funding models reliance upon elements of historical funding  
Due to the large size of the physical geography of Australia, most states, commencing with NSW in 
1973, regionalised their public health care services to best provide care close to different regional 
populations (Eagar et al. 2001, p. 29; Palmer & Short 2014, p. 96).  Regionalisation is an important 
principle of empowering local populations for decision-making regarding their own health care.  The 
National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA) of 2011 made it mandatory for all Australian states to 
have LHNs by 1 July 2011 (Council of Australian Governments 2011, p. 5; Palmer & Short 2014, p. 
97).  Regionalisation of state health services requires states to utilise funding models to provide 




The basis of service level agreements between the state and LHNs is largely historically determined 
by previous years’ activity.  Once this funding envelope is determined, ABF is used to purchase 
services from facilities within LHNs (Department of Health and Human Services Victoria 2014; NSW 
ABF Taskforce 2013b; Queensland Health 2014; SA Department of Health and Ageing 2014; System 
Purchasing and Performance 2013; Western Australia Department of Health 2014).  Historical 
funding is regressive, stymies innovation and does not advance improvements in health outcomes 
(Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001; Hindle 2002). 
 
Output-basedfinding models, such as ABF, promote technical efficiency, but create incentives to 
overproduce in that they fund utilisation and not need (Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001, p. 78).  
As such they cannot be used to establish appropriate resource distribution.  The use of historical 
determinants to do so makes this evident.   
 
The HORSt seeks to inform per capita resourcing on a health needs basis of geographical 
populations.  Aggregated at the LHN level, this can inform resource distribution to meet 
population needs, ending the reliance on historical funding. 
1.3.4  Previous resource distribution models - equality in funding access 
Barr et al. (2014), Carr-Hill (1994), Carr-Hill and Sheldon (1992), Mooney (2009), Mooney et al. 
(1991) and Sheldon et al. (1993) find that the definition of health needs used in population needs-
based resource allocation models has been all too often described in terms of health care utilisation 
and equity is achieved via providing equal access for equal need.  These authors all concluded that 
these models have not sufficiently considered different populations’ capacity to benefit from 
different resources and underrepresents unmet need by those who do not / cannot access the 
health system.  Contrastingly, population health needs within the HORSt will be informed by vertical 
equity financial loadings, which reflect different geographical populations’ capacity to benefit from 
resources subject to how the social determinants of health for these populations affect comparative 
rates of health outcomes.   
1.4  AIMS OF THE STUDY 




1.  Develop the HORSt as a parsimonious, measurable and consistent benchmark of desirable 
health outcomes for states’ LHNs’ populations, relative to funding inputs across the 
continuum of care, so as to promote allocative efficiency and equity across populations. 
2. Identify and incorporate measures of local geographical population health needs that can be 
used in resource allocation decisions. 
3. Identify the share and quantum of taxpayer resources provided by the state to geographical 
populations to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care, in order to 
act as an enabler to improve equity of health outcomes. 
1.5  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions for this study are best organised under its aims. 
 
AIM 1: Develop the HORSt as a parsimonious, measurable and consistent benchmark of desirable 
health outcomes for states’ LHNs’ populations, relative to funding inputs across the continuum of 
care, so as to promote allocative efficiency and equity across populations. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 
1. What measures / data of health status can best represent an acceptable level of desirable 
health outcomes for populations that can inform a benchmark? 
2. What health service funding inputs should be included to represent the continuum of care? 
3. What methodology should be applied to derive the benchmark? 
 
AIM 2:  Identify and incorporate measures of local geographical population health needs that can be 
used in resource allocation decisions. 
RESEARCH QUESTION: 






AIM 3: Identify the share and quantum of taxpayer resources provided by the state to geographical 
populations to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care so as to act as an 
enabler to improve equity of health outcomes. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS:  
5. What share of funding is required for each geographical population to adjust for population 
health needs so as to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care? 
6. What quantum of funding is required to be adjusted by the state from the existing pool of 
resources used by each geographical population?   
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1.6  OVERVIEW OF THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
This section provides background to the Australian Health Care System, outlining an overview of the 
funding and governance arrangements of the governments, providers and consumers.  Health 
outcomes and health inequality in the Australian health care system are also discussed and 
contextualised to the rationale presented supporting the development of the HORSt.  A 
comprehensive critique of the specific funding and governance arrangements pertinent to the 
advancement of equity and efficiency and legislative issues that can affect the development of the 
HORSt is provided in Chapter Three. 
1.6.1  Overview of Funding and Governance arrangements  
The provision of health services in Australia is a mix of public and private arrangements (Eagar et al. 
2001, p. 26; Lairson et al. 1995, p. 475).  Medical practitioners, excluding salaried staff in state-run 
public hospitals and community public health services, are entrepreneurial private operators and are 
free to set their own charges (Gadiel 2015, p. 1) and their rights of private practice and location of 
practice are constitutionally protected (Australian Senate 1946; Faunce 2009).  Private services 
outside of state-run public hospitals and community-based services can attract out-of-pocket 
expenses to be paid by the user (Department of Human Services 2015).   
 
The complexity of health funding and provider arrangements in Australia is summarised in Figure 1 
(page 16).  The origins of the complexity of funding and the mixed public private health care system 
arise from the federated system of government established by the Australian Constitution in 1901 
and successive political reforms spanning from 1938 to the present day (Boxall & Gillespie 2013, pp. 
ix - x).   
 
The contemporary roles of the Commonwealth and states as a funder or provider of health care can 
be summarised as follows:   
 Commonwealth funding partially supports each state’s public system; subsidises drugs via 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) and subsidises the private sector via; Medicare 
Benefits Schedule (MBS) payments to medical practitioners; and via the Private Health 
Insurance (PHI) rebate. 
 States provide funding and administration to public hospitals and community health 
services. 
(Palmer & Short 2014, pp. 81-2) 
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Moreover, the Commonwealth and states share funding arrangements for the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme (NDIS) (National Disability Insurance Agency 2017).  Contributions are expected to 
be almost equal shares (Norman 2017). 
 
Universal public access via Medicare ensures that access to public hospitals is provided at no cost to 
public patients for Australian citizens and eligible residents.  Medicare provides universal insurance 
for full or partial reimbursement of medical practitioners’ fees, subject to:  
 the Medicare reimbursement schedule;  
 the type of practitioner; and 
 the modality of the service; and safety nets.    
The subsidisation of pharmaceutical costs through the PBS is provided for Medicare eligible patients 
(Department of Human Services 2015).   
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Figure 1   Structure of the Australian Health Care system and its flow of funds  




Private Health Insurance (PHI) is available for purchase to assist with the reimbursement of out-of-
pocket expenses in private hospitals and for other medical services not covered by Medicare.  
Premiums are subsidised by the Commonwealth government via a rebate according to individual 
incomes (Palmer & Short 2014, pp. 11-2). 
 
Commonwealth and state governments contribute taxpayer funds to public state health care 
services, predominantly public hospitals, with minor payments made by private health insurers and 
other revenue sources (Palmer & Short 2014, pp. 12-3).  The largest component of Australia’s health 
expenditure is state-run public hospitals, which represents approximately one third of the total 
Australian health expenditure(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016c, p. 41).  Of this 
expenditure, state governments contribute the majority of funding (54% in 2013-14), with the 
Commonwealth the next largest source of funding (37% in 2013-14) (Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare 2016a, p. 38).   
 
The nature of the health care system being either publicly funded by the taxpayer or taxpayer 
subsidised gives rise to questions of how funding is distributed for health care and whether or not 
this distribution is equitable amongst the population, so as to promote improvements in health 
outcomes.  The distribution of taxpayer funded, or taxpayer subsidised services happen at multiple 
layers in the health system.  For example: from Commonwealth to the states; from Commonwealth 
to private doctors; from Commonwealth to private health insurance holders; from Commonwealth 
to private individuals; and from states to regionalised areas (LHNs).  Determining an equitable 
distribution between state government and LHNs, with respect to the allocative efficiency of the 
main sources of government funding across the whole continuum of care to produce health 
outcomes is the focus of this thesis. 
1.6.2  Health outcomes, health inequality and health inequities in Australia 
The Australian health care system is one of the most effective health care systems in the world.  Life 
expectancy in Australia is higher than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) average.  Figure 2 on page 18 shows that the life expectancy at birth for children born in 
Australia in 2016 was the equal sixth highest amongst OECD nations, 82.5 years, equal to that of 
Israel and Norway, behind Luxembourg  82.8 years, Italy 83.3 years, Spain 83.4 years, Switzerland 
83.7 years and Japan 84.1 years (OECD 2019). 
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Figure 2   Life expectancy at birth 2016 
 
Figure 2 was constructed using data generated from the OECD online database OECD Health Statistics: Health status – life expectancy at birth indicator 




Figure 3   Life expectancy in years and health spending per capita 2016 
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Figure 3 was constructed utilising the data from OECD Health Statistics: Health status – life 
expectancy at birth indicator (OECD 2019) and published OECD statistics pertaining to health 
expenditure in the publication Health at a Glance 2017 (OECD 2017a, p. 30).   
 
In addition to superior life expectancy of Australians, the Australian health care system is also one of 
the most efficient systems in the world.  Figure 3 on page 20 shows that in 2016 using USD 
purchasing power parity (PPP) the cost per capita of health spending in Australia, correlated to life 
expectancy, is substantially lower than many other OECD nations that have higher costs and / or 
lower life expectancy (OECD 2017a, 2019). 
 
Whilst OECD statistics show that the average Australian enjoys comparative health outcomes that 
are the envy of many other nations, gains in health outcomes are not shared equally amongst the 
population.  In Australia significant health inequities exist for people of lower socioeconomic status; 
the Indigenous population; people living with disabilities; rural and remote communities; and 
migrants with low levels of English (Allan et al. 2007; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
2016a; NSW Department of Health 2004; Palmer & Short 2014; Turrell et al. 2006).  
 
Australia’s biennial report card “Australia’s Health 2016” (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
2016a, p. 518) highlights the following contemporary examples of health inequalities in Australia.  As 
per Marmot’s argument discussed (p9), these are not confined to the Indigenous population and 
most of these are in fact health inequities, meeting all definitional criteria of being socially produced, 
systematic in their unequal distribution across the population, avoidable and unfair.  Examples from 
the report card include: 
 “20% of Australians living in the lowest socioeconomic areas in 2014–15 were 1.6 times as 
likely as the highest 20% to have at least two chronic health conditions; 
 Australians living in the lowest socioeconomic areas lived about 3 years less than those living 
in the highest areas in 2009–2011; 
 If all Australians had the same death rates as people living in the highest socioeconomic 
areas in 2009–2011, overall mortality rates would have reduced by 13%—and there would 
have been 54,000 fewer deaths; 
 People in low economic resource households spend proportionally less on medical and 
health care than other households (3.0% and 5.1% of weekly equalised expenditure, 
respectively, in 2009–10); and  
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 People living in the lowest socioeconomic areas in 2014–15 were more than twice as likely 
to delay seeing—or not see—a dental professional due to cost compared with those living in 
the highest socioeconomic areas (28% compared with 12%)” 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a, p. 130). 
Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions (ACSCs) also known as conditions that are Potential 
Preventable Hospitalisations (PPHs) are further markers of health inequality.  PPHs5 are conditions 
that are deemed to be treatable in an ambulatory care setting.  When evident in hospital inpatient 
data, the literature has long considered them as a proxy of potentially preventable illness and 
avoidable hospitalisations (Ansari et al. 2006; Falster et al. 2016; Longman et al. 2011; Longman et 
al. 2015; Victorian Health Information Surveillance System 2016).  However, more contemporary 
Australian evidence has concluded that PPHs represent sicker patients (Falster et al. 2015; Falster et 
al. 2016). 
 
Whilst the social causes of poor health evident in Australia are beyond the remit of the health 
system alone, the challenge of addressing health inequities can be nonetheless influenced by the 
distribution of taxpayer provided and taxpayer subsidised health funding to enable improvements in 
health outcomes.  This study seeks to improve resource distribution to alleviate inequities and 
enable better health outcomes. 
1.6.3  Time Frame for the case study 
Population needs-based resource distribution tools typically use secondary data sources, such as 
census data, to develop need indices that inform resource distribution. These are designed to be 
stable enough to use for multiple years resource distribution and updates to need indices typically 
occur when new census / population data becomes available  (Inter-Government & Funding 
Strategies 2005b; Rice & Smith 2001).  The HORSt need indices that this research will develop using 
similar secondary data sources are also designed to be stable enough to inform multiple individual 
years resource distribution.  For the purposes of the developing this research, in addition to using 
the latest census data, the HORSt uses three years of hospital and expenditure data to 2015/16 and 
measures of central tendency justified in Chapter Five to demonstrate a proof of concept model for 
2015/16.  Some geographical data structures used are from earlier years using official Government 
sources.  However, these are still relevant and do not affect the outcomes of the model.  Chapter 
                                                            
 
5 For the remained of this thesis the term PPH will be used. 
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Five outlines and justifies all the data used in the model.  As a proof of concept, the HORSt can be 
applied to later years’ data.  A discussion of operationalising the HORSt to do so is included in the 
discussion in the final chapter. 
1.6.4  Regionalised health structures in Australian states at the time of the study 
The organisation of regionalised services within states is a significant factor for this study.  Aspects of 
physical and human geography in the context of resource distribution and the advancement of 
equity and efficiency require consideration.  A contemporary summary of the structure of 
regionalised services within states in 2016 is summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 exemplifies the diversity amongst states in regionalising health services.  To put this 
regionalisation into context, the human and physical geography size of each state is summarised in 
Table 2. 
Table 1   Regional organisation of health services in Australia in 2016 
State Networks / Districts / Services 
NSW 15 LHNs + 3 Speciality Networks + I Contracted Service Division 
Victoria 88 LHNs (Local Hospital Networks) 
Queensland 19 Hospitals and Health Services 
Tasmania 1 THS (Tasmanian Health Service) -2016 previously had Tasmanian Health 
Organisations (THOs) 
South Australia 5 LHNs (Local Health Networks 
Western Australia 5 Health Services + 1 Notional Local Health Network + 1 Speciality service 
Northern Territory  2 Health Services (Top End Health Service + Central Australia Health 
Service) 
Australian Capital Territory  1 Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Local Hospital Network Directorate 
Table 1 sources: (Administrator National Health Funding Pool 2016b; Department of Health and 

















Table 2 sources: (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016a; Geoscience Australia 2017). 
 
Comparing the data from both tables shows that ACT with the smallest physical geography and 
population has just one service, the NT the third largest in physical size with the second smallest 
population, spread the most sparsely, has two.  NSW has a third of the Australian population and 
10% of the land mass and 15 LHNs, whilst Western Australia has 11% of the population and a third of 
the land and 5 Health Services.  Seemingly an anomaly compared to other states regionalised health 
structures, Victoria with just 3% of the land mass is the most regionalised and decentralised with 88 
local hospital networks.  Hospital networks are an apt description for Victorian regionalisation where 
each ‘network’ is effectively just a hospital and community health services are separately managed 
(Administrator National Health Funding Pool 2016b).   
 
Given the literature demonstrating the differing effects of social determinants on health outcomes, 
it is logical to consider that differences in urbanisation, rurality, population size and socioeconomic 
composition and regionalised health structures between states, will likely result in a tool like the 
HORSt having different levels of relevance for regional resource distribution to improve health 
inequalities and inequities.  The HORSt is logically going to be more applicable in states and 
territories that face more dispersed and socioeconomically different populations, where inequalities 
and inequities are more apparent and where the supply of services are scarcer.   
 








% of Australian 
population 
NSW 800,642 10.41% 7,725.9 32.0% 
Victoria (VIC) 227,416 2.96% 6068.0 25.2% 
Queensland (QLD) 1,730,648 22.50% 4,844.5 20.1% 
Tasmania (TAS) 68,401 0.89% 519.1 2.2% 
South Australia (SA) 983,482 12.79% 1,708.2 7.1% 
Western Australia (WA) 2,529,875 32.89% 2,617.2 10.8% 
Northern Territory (NT) 1,349,129 17.54% 244.9 1.0% 
Australian Capital Territory 2,431 0.03% 396.1 1.6% 
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NSW has a large remote geographical area, one third of the Australian population and also has one 
third of the Australian Indigenous population (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2014a).  By 
contrast, Victoria has a mix of well-populated metropolitan and regional areas, little land classified 
as remote, no land classified as very remote and whilst having 25% of the Australian population, it 
has only 3% of the Australian Indigenous population (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
2014a).  
 
Figure 4 illustrates remoteness in Australia. NSW, Queensland, the Northern Territory, Western 
Australia and South Australia have areas of remoteness that are not evident in Victoria or Tasmania.   
Figure 4   Remoteness map of Australia  
 
Figure 4 is adapted from the 2011 Australian Statistical Geography Standard: Remoteness Structure 
Map (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011, p. 2). 
 
1.6.5  The NSW public health system at the time of the study  
According to the 2015-16 NSW Health annual report, the NSW Health is the largest health care 
system in Australia and one of the largest in the world with 111,000 staff servicing 7.7 million people 
and administering a $20.7bn budget.  The overarching key directions for the NSW public health 
system at the time of the study were: 
• keeping people healthy and out of hospital; 
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• providing world-class clinical care; and 
• delivering truly integrated care 
(NSW Ministry of Health 2016, p. 2). 
 
As discussed, the regionalised structure of NSW Health involves 15 LHNS which are depicted in the 
map in Figure 5.   
Figure 5   NSW LHNs at the time of the case study 2016 
 
Source: (Epidemiology and Evidence 2015). 
 
The NSW funding model for each region is expressed through individual service level agreements 
between the NSW Ministry of Health and each LHN.  The majority of each LHN’s operating revenue, 
(budget), is expressed in National Weighted Activity Units (NWAUs) which are multiplied by a state 
price per NWAU to determine the activity budget for Acute, Emergency Department, Sub Acute and 
Non-Acute Services, Acute Mental Health and Non admitted services.  The determination of each 
LHNs activity is by default the primary instrument of resource distribution between the NSW State 
Government and regional areas (NSW ABF Taskforce 2013b; NSW Ministry of Health 2017).   
 
The annual volume of services for each LHN (called an activity target) is largely determined on 
historical factors of the previous year’s activity and population growth subject to adjustors.  The 
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official NSW Ministry of Health statements to the Administrator of the National Health Funding Pool 
of how targets are to be formed confirm this, i.e. in the context of setting targets NSW reports: 
“Provisional estimates and historical activity measures provide the basis for discussions with 
individual LHNs and subsequent negotiations for approval or adjustment” (Administrator National 
Health Funding Pool 2016a). 
 
However, further statements provide a perspective that population health needs are more widely 
considered than history i.e.: 
“Ensuring access to health services for local populations is a key objective of NSW health policy. The 
Health Services Act 1997 stipulates that in determining LHN budgets, the Minister have regard to the 
size and health needs of the local population and provision of services to residents outside the local 
area.  Accordingly, targets are adjusted considering factors appropriate to each LHN and service 
type, rather than simple extrapolation from historical activity data. The factors considered are 
reviewed on an annual basis” (Administrator National Health Funding Pool 2016a). 
 
The emphasis of the latter statement regarding the importance of population health needs in setting 
LHN activity targets in NSW requires examination.  When the factors used for establishing NSW LHN 
activity target setting and their contributions to setting the target were assessed by the MoH, equity 
plays a minor role and is offset against performance negative adjustors.  In 2015/16 adjustors and 
their contributions to LHN activity targets were as follows:   
 Weighted population change -population growth component (44%); 
 Activity trend -historical activity (28%); 
 Readmission within 28 days -performance adjustment (5%); 
 Potentially Preventable Hospitalisations -performance adjustment (5%); 
 Expected Health Utilisation Index (EHUI / HNI) Health needs / equity adjustment only 
applied as a positive adjustor should the current relative utilisation (RU) rate is less than 
the HNI which itself is a utilisation index (16%); 
 LHN Specific adjustments (2%). 
(Foley 2012; NSW Ministry of Health 2017; Slater 2014). 
 
Higher rates of readmissions within 28 days of discharge; higher rates of Potentially Preventable 
Hospitalisations (PPHs); and higher rates of current relative utilisation that exceed the health needs 
index, are all negative adjustors in determining the target (NSW Ministry of Health 2017).  However, 
given the abundant literature on these adjustors being strongly influenced by social  determinants 
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(Kangovi & Grande 2011; Kansagara et al. 2011; Kirby, S et al. 2010; Kirby, SE et al. 2010; Mele et al. 
2018) and therefore beyond the control of health care facilities and LHNs, the use of these elements 
as a punitive measure is questionable.  In fact, it is logical considering the weight of this evidence 
and the linking of social determinants with health outcomes that doing so exacerbates inequity.  
 
Table 3 on page 28 demonstrates at the time of the case study, NSW Health reported that the 
volume and cost of activity for LHN populations across inpatient and non-admitted programs to be 
valued at $12.5 billion.  The table shows the majority of this activity (91%) was funded under ABF, 
however some small-scale facilities within some LHNs, primarily rural ones, were funded by block 
grants and other sources.  This table will be a component of the pool of resources to be redistributed 
to LHNs under the HORSt: 
 after the productivity of these resources in conjunction with resources from the MBS 
and PBS are assessed for their contributions to allocative efficiency of achieving 
benchmarked health outcomes; and 
 with respect to social determinants within the populations that influence the 




Table 3   2015-16 total costs of NSW LHN populations’ public admitted and non-admitted activity by LHN of residence 
 


















ABF 410 26 80 161 2 0 47 6 731
Block 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
Other 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4
Total 411 26 81 161 2 4 47 6 737
ABF 32 3 10 18 0 0 5 2 70
Block 2 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 9
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 33 3 11 23 1 0 5 2 79
ABF 869 63 185 232 0 5 58 7 1,419
Block 57 1 32 32 9 0 0 3 134
Other 0 0 0 157 0 3 0 0 160
Total 925 64 216 421 10 9 58 9 1,713
ABF 444 31 97 94 0 0 55 6 728
Block 8 0 8 29 18 0 0 0 64
Other 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 0 44
Total 452 32 105 166 19 0 55 6 836
ABF 286 23 64 59 0 0 14 2 449
Block 13 0 4 6 6 0 0 0 29
Other 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 0 42
Total 299 24 68 106 6 0 14 3 519
ABF 199 11 43 8 0 0 20 6 288
Block 53 1 36 7 12 0 0 0 109
Other 0 0 0 13 0 6 0 0 19
Total 252 12 79 28 12 6 20 6 415
ABF 327 26 68 130 1 0 29 1 581
Block 0 1 0 16 0 0 0 1 18
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 328 27 68 146 1 0 29 1 600
ABF 301 23 93 47 1 0 24 1 489
Block 4 0 3 5 0 0 0 1 14
Other 0 0 0 66 0 1 0 0 67
Total 305 23 96 119 1 1 24 2 570
ABF 562 52 124 216 1 1 62 0 1,018
Block 10 5 0 3 0 0 0 3 21
Other 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 0 37
Total 572 57 124 256 1 1 62 3 1,076
ABF 694 49 153 227 0 0 97 6 1,226
Block 2 1 0 6 0 0 0 0 9
Other 3 3 0 11 0 0 0 0 17
Total 698 53 153 244 0 1 97 6 1,252
ABF 159 14 46 25 1 0 21 2 269
Block 11 1 7 2 4 0 0 6 30
Other 0 0 0 32 0 1 0 0 32
Total 170 15 53 59 5 1 21 8 331
ABF 902 56 168 261 2 0 82 1 1,473
Block 0 1 0 8 0 0 0 0 10
Other 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 0 57
Total 902 58 169 326 2 0 82 1 1,540
ABF 508 45 100 110 0 0 54 0 818
Block 2 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 20
Other 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 0 55
Total 509 45 101 184 0 0 54 1 894
ABF 331 9 78 29 3 1 17 3 471
Block 43 19 20 1 5 0 0 1 89
Other 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 4
Total 374 28 97 31 8 4 17 4 564
ABF 774 40 152 295 1 0 65 6 1,334
Block 0 21 0 12 0 0 0 1 35
Other 1 2 0 1 0 3 0 0 7
Total 776 63 153 309 1 3 65 7 1,376
ABF 6,796 472 1,462 1,912 13 10 651 49 11,363
Block 205 52 112 152 56 0 0 16 595
Other 4 5 0 516 0 21 0 0 546











Clinical Stream costs in $Millions















1.7  PROJECT SCOPE 
The development of the HORSt as an instrument of population needs to inform resource distribution 
between state and the LHN is designed to be a component of a broader funding model rather than 
all-encompassing funding model.  Whilst the scope of this study is well defined within the stated 
aims and research questions (sections 1.4 and 1.5 pages 11 - 12), questions arise to the inclusivity of 
other factors or components that might logically be expected to be included in a population needs-
based funding model to support its functioning.  This section clarifies the scope of this thesis in 
anticipation of logical issues that may arise which are nonetheless beyond the remit of the HORSt 
research.  Table 4 is a summary of these issues which are out of scope for this thesis.  A discussion 
supporting the rationale for doing so follows. 
 
Table 4   Summary of out scope issues for this thesis 
Out of scope for thesis Rationale 
Informing shares of specific 
health programs 
Further research is required beyond the proof of concept stage and very 
broad approach taken by the HORSt in terms of the measurement of health 
outcomes and how this could translate the HORSt methodology to inform 
specific program areas.  Moreover, given the HORSt approach to including 
the productive capabilities of the continuum of care and given that health 
programs are components of that continuum, health program shares will not 
be informed by this research. 
Cost and supply issues Can be informed by ABF and other aspects of the payment model. 
ABF / Purchasing services 
(outputs) between LHN and 
facilities  
The HORSt complements and does not replace ABF.  The HORSt does not 
seek to alter the operation of ABF as a payment currency used for purchasing 
decisions between LHN and facilities.  ABF remains as key second step in the 
broader funding model after the HORSt has guided the resource distribution 
between the state and the LHNs.   
Patient flows adjustment 
between LHNs and to 
Speciality network services 
The HORSt is concerned with resource distribution between state and LHNs. 
Further research is required to develop policy for flows adjustment from 
LHNs to Specialty network services and between LHNs.   
Capital planning Further research is required for the applicability of the HORSt to assist with 
capital decision making.   
Resourcing distribution 
beyond recurrent 
distribution of state health 
funding to LHNs. 
The applicability of the HORSt methodology to other taxpayer funded / 
subsidised resource distribution issues that arise between governments and 




As per the aims of this study the development of the HORSt as a tool, seeks ultimately to inform 
resource distribution of shares of state health funding to LHNs that are required to enable 
maximisation of equity in funding to achieve improvements in health outcomes commensurate with 
a benchmarked level of desirable health outcomes.  Whilst the use of age-standardised PPHs, as a 
measure of population health status and proxy measure of health outcomes is critiqued and justified 
along with consideration of alternatives, the applicability of using this measure to individual program 
budget areas used by state health systems such as (Acute / Emergency / Non-admitted / Sub Acute / 
Mental Health / Teaching and Research etc), as per used in NSW (Inter-Government & Funding 
Strategies 2005b; NSW ABF Taskforce 2019) is not specifically assessed in this thesis.  This is because 
the focus of this research is to demonstrate the HORSt methodology as a proof of concept model of 
a broad top-level tool of resource distribution between geographic communities.  It does not seek to 
prescribe individual resource distribution for specific state health programs within those regions.  
Furthermore, there are conceptual differences of purpose between the HORSt, taking a health 
outcomes approach to health needs with respect to resourcing across the continuum of care and 
eliciting health needs of specific health programs which in themselves are components of the 
continuum of care.  
 
As an equity enabler and resource distribution component within a funding model, the HORSt is not 
designed to address the costs of health system facilities or supply issues.  These matters are 
important logical considerations within health funding models, nevertheless such factors are out of 
scope for this thesis.   Decision making around how to pay for facilities and services can be informed 
by ABF and other aspects of the current payment model after the HORSt is applied to guide budget 
shares to LHNs.  Moreover, the HORSt does not act as replacement to ABF as a payment model 
between LHNs and facilities.  The HORSt can be demonstrated to complement ABF.  Matters 
pertaining to the use of ABF as a payment currency for outputs are therefore out of scope for this 
study.   
 
The HORSt considers population needs in terms of the LHN of residence of the patient.  However, 
patient flows are an important determination for the funding model where patients living in one 
LHN can seek services from another or from a speciality network service and this situation is 
appropriate considering that it is not economically viable to have major tertiary and teaching 
hospitals for example in every LHN.  The state pool of funds shown on page 28 to be included as the 
state funding component in the HORSt pool alongside other taxpayer subsidised resources from the 
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Commonwealth government, represent state expenditure by LHN of residence including flows to 
other LHNs and speciality network services.  The HORSt as a broad tool of population needs-based 
funding considers each population’s health needs regardless of the location of supply of services.  
However, in operationalising a funding model, where the HORSt is a component tool being the first 
step outlining the distribution of state resources to LHNs at a macro level, flows adjustment will be 
necessary as part of the next stage in the funding model.  The methodology for flows adjustment is 
out of scope for the research agenda of this thesis.   
 
The HORSt methodology developed in this thesis is primarily concerned with guiding resource 
distribution of the recurrent state government funding between states and local populations.  
Capital works developed for the state health system, via either public or private partnership capital 
funding enterprises are therefore out of scope for this study.   
 
Notwithstanding these out of scope issues, the HORSt methodology can be considered for other 
resourcing decisions beyond that of recurrent health funding distribution between state and LHN.  
The applicability of the HORSt methodology with respect to other resource distribution decision 
making (including non-health applications) is discussed in the study’s concluding chapter.  
1.8  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the rationale for the study and provided an overview of the governance 
arrangements of the mixed private and public health system in Australia; the challenges faced in 
terms of health inequalities and inequities that are associated with poor socioeconomic 
determinants of health; and equity issues that arise from health system funding.  Specifically aligned 
to the study aims, the distribution of taxpayer subsidised health care amongst the mixed private / 
public system in Australia is not equitable and the state public health systems face a continuing issue 
of how to distribute resources to regionalised populations.  Background information pertaining to 
NSW, to be used as a case study has been provided, along with the study scope  
 
The unique and significant contributions made by the HORSt and the study aims have been justified 
and outlined.  The development of the HORSt shifts the focus at the state level from paying for 
outputs, to providing a funding enabler for outcomes and a new process for population needs-based 
assessment of resource distribution that considers the interactions of integrated care via the 
achievement of equity in funding for taxpayer subsidised resources across the continuum of care.
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0  INTRODUCTION 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the development of the HORSt seeks to recognise health 
inequities evident in geographical populations’ health outcomes so as to guide more equitable 
resource distributions to regional populations within states’ LHNs.  This chapter provides a high-level 
overview of the literature in this area and critique of the concepts of equity, efficiency and health 
needs, contextualised to public health funding models used in Australia and with respect to the main 
theories of social justice.  As NSW is to be used a case study for the HORSt and as NSW operated the 
longest running population needs-based funding model in Australia to address equity issues, the 
examination of this former funding model’s ability to promote equity and efficiency is reviewed.   
 
The methodology employed in this literature review purposely considered English language 
academic and policy literature surrounding Australian and international approaches to regionalised 
resource allocation models.  The most common theories of social justice are also evaluated and 
contextualised to the concepts of equity and efficiency for the development of the HORSt.  
Alternative measures of approximating population health status, needs and health outcomes within 
resource distribution instruments were also reviewed.   
 
School education in Australia faces similar challenges of public funding and similar governance 
arrangements under the Australian federated system of multiple public and private payers to that of 
state public health.  As such, the methodological approach recommended by the Gonski review for 
school education funding to improve equity of enabling better educational outcomes is also 
considered for its translatability to state health funding for inclusion with the HORSt.   
 
Each section of this literature review examines and critiques the gaps and limitations of previous 
research in the context of opportunities for this study.  A summary box of these salient findings is 
presented at the conclusion of each section.  The chapter concludes by synthesising each section’s 
findings to outlining the conceptual framework that supports the study’s research questions and the 
methodological design of the HORSt outlined in Chapter Four. 
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2.1  EQUITY IN HEALTH CARE  
In health economics, equity issues frequently arise in the literature in the context of fairness 
regarding resource allocation decision making for health care (Macinko & Starfield 2002; Whitehead 
1992).  Fairness issues arise as health systems are concerned not only with improving the health 
outcomes of society, but with the fair distribution of resources (Mcguire et al. 1994, p. 55; Steinbach 
et al. 2016).  Problematically, what constitutes fairness is a subjective moral decision and is guided 
by theories of social justice (Isuchiya & Dolan 2008; Singer & Mapa 1998).  Elements of differing 
theories and perspectives of social justice are evident in most nations’ healthcare systems and 
Australia in this regard contains a mix of different attributes of social justice (Marmot 2010).  Four of 
the most common theories of social justice pertaining to the problem of health care resource 
allocation decision making, Libertarianism, Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and Rawlsianism (Steinbach 
et al. 2016) are examined in this section and contextualised to the Australian health care system for 
their ability to promote equity issues pertaining to fair resource allocation in the context of this 
study.  These theories of social justice are then contextualised further to the study in a critique of 
the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity in the next section.  
2.1.1  Social justice in health care 
Libertarianism is based on the doctrine that individual’s rights to freedom are paramount over that 
of the state and that the state should not infringe upon those rights (Rajczi 2016; Roberts & Reich 
2002).  Libertarians believe in minimal state involvement for the protection against negative rights 
by allowing state interference to ensure that the actions of one individual minimise the impacts for 
harm of the rights of another.  Doing so positions the role of the state to safeguard individual 
freedoms and extend equity via equality for every member of society by guaranteeing legal 
protections (Andreescu 2015, p. 104).   
 
In the context of resource allocation for health care, libertarian views extend to considering the 
distribution of health care resources by the state to guard against negative rights to freedom.  
Whether or not a person has a right to health and healthcare provided by the state to address that 
right however is an area of conjecture in the libertarian literature (Goodman 2005; Lenchus 2017).  A 
less contentious example of where libertarian views would be in support of government provided 
care is vaccination programs, where negative rights of contagious preventable diseases may be 
guarded against (Roberts & Reich 2002, pp. 1056-7).  The literature also describes libertarianism 
extending to paternalism by government regulations or programs to limit the negative harm from 
poor choices made by individuals that can affect their own health (Rajczi 2016, p. 97).  However, 
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libertarianism tends to seek to restrict the degrees of government involvement in paternalist 
actions, supporting individual freedoms; libertarianism has a strong view that individuals take 
responsibility for their own actions (Cappelen & Norheim 2005).   
 
The importance of considering libertarian views of personal responsibility in health care is made 
clear by considering the concept of moral hazard.  Moral hazard occurs whereby if medical insurance 
pays for health care, the financial consequence of illness are not bound upon the individual and 
there is therefore less incentive to the individual to maintain good health (Arrow 1963, p. 961; 
Christophe 2001; Ehrlich & G. 1972; Pauly 1968).  Within universal publicly provided health systems 
and universal publicly provided health insurance schemes, there is policy and system design 
elements to encourage personal responsibility to address moral hazard.  Examples are: 
 in the United Kingdom (UK) clinical commissioning groups within the National Health Service 
(NHS) have recently adopted a policy of lifestyle rationing whereby it gives people who 
smoke or are obese a lower priority for publicly provided elective surgery, making them wait 
longer than those who do not smoke and are not obese (Pillutla et al. 2018; Shaw 2016); 
 in the Australian health care system, it has been argued that the co-payments Australians 
face in accessing private medical practitioners, on top of Medicare’s universal insurance 
reimbursement, acts as an instrument of encouraging personal responsibility (Barnes 2013; 
Rollins 2014).  However, research indicates that there is little evidence to support this 
incentive argument.  Co-payments are shown to reduce access to people whom are in need 
who then often end up in public emergency departments as ambulatory patients at great 
cost to the taxpayer (Eckermann 2014a, 2014b; Eckermann & Sheridan 2016). 
Notwithstanding these examples of libertarian elements within public health systems and the need 
for health systems to minimise wasted resources associated with moral hazard, as Breyer and Kliemt 
(2015, p. 137) argue: “libertarian views on rights tend to rule out coercive redistribution for purposes 
of public health care guarantees”.  Contextualised to this study, libertarian views are therefore not 
specifically related to ethically supporting state health public resource distribution.  Health funding 
at the population level cannot create incentives that impact on choices that individuals make, 
particularly in a mixed public private funding system like Australia.  Moreover, libertarian views are 
also problematic to the study as state health systems in Australia are required by the Medicare 
principles, discussed in Chapter Three (page 94),  to provide public hospital and community services 
free of charge on the basis of clinical need which does not consider individual actions that may give 




Utilitarianism is based on the principles of maximising benefits for the greatest number, where 
maximising benefits are measured by maximising society’s utility / welfare (Mill 2001; Mulgan 2007).  
With regards to relative scarcity of health care resources, utilitarianism principles prescribe that 
resources should be allocated to those that have the greatest ability to benefit via considering the 
concept of opportunity cost (Stein 2015).   Singer (1993, p. 25) uses an example to demonstrate this 
whereby an earthquake injures two individuals: one person has lost a leg and is in danger of losing a 
toe from her remaining leg; the other has a leg injury that can be saved but only if health care 
resources are not spent on saving the toe of the more injured person.  Utilitarianism says in this 
situation you save the leg of the person with the saveable leg injury and forgo treating the person in 
danger of losing toe, as saving the leg yields more benefits.  Doing so maximises benefits of scarce 
resources for society.  Principles of utilitarianism are therefore often seen in the context of rationing 
for health care, particularly in the area of assessing societal benefits in health care evaluations (Nord 
et al. 1995a; Singer & Mapa 1998).   
 
In terms of equity however, a key problem with utilitarianism is that in maximising societal benefits, 
individuals can be often viewed as means to others’ ends (Roberts & Reich 2002, pp. 1,056).  This is 
apparent in the case of Singer’s earthquake example where the person forgoing treatment 
potentially losing a toe affords a means to the person whose leg might be saved by freeing up 
resources.   
 
Egalitarianism is a form of social justice that treats all people equally and in terms of resources 
considers that people should get the same (Arneson 2013).  Egalitarianism is often viewed as a 
competitive theory of social justice to utilitarianism.  Stein (2015, p. 47) contends for example: 
“If the slogan of utilitarianism is ‘help those who can benefit the most’, the slogan of egalitarianism is 
‘help those who are worse off’”. 
Considering this statement, egalitarianism can be demonstrated to be in direct contrast to 
utilitarianism by reconsidering Singer’s earthquake victim’s example above.  Egalitarian principles 
would allocate resources to the more severely injured person with little or no benefit to that person 
and in doing so would create an opportunity cost of reducing the benefits available to the person 
who had a better chance with the resources to gain a benefit.  This example highlights what Stein 
(2015) claims is a key weakness with egalitarianism that it is “insensitive to relative benefits” (p. 48).  
It can be concluded that egalitarian principles are therefore not concerned with the effectiveness of 




Surveys of Australian’s attitudes to resource allocation to those in need, consistently demonstrate 
that egalitarian values tend to trump utilitarian values, whereby people still will want resources 
directed towards those in perilous situations even where the expenditure of resources is likely to 
achieve little to any benefit (Nord et al. 1995a, 1995b).  McKie and Richardson (2003) find:  
“several empirical studies have also revealed that people are often prepared to sacrifice health gains 
in order to ensure that the more severely ill are given priority over the less severely ill” (pp. 2,409).   
 
Jonsen (1986, p. 174) describes the rationale for these egalitarian attitudes within societies, 
although specifically contextualised to rescuing identifiable individuals facing avoidable death, as a 
“rule of rescue”.  This is where society’s rescuing actions that have little consideration to benefits are 
a moral imperative of a compulsion to act without considering rationality of the likely outcome and 
as McKie and Richardson (2003, pp. 2,407) state “without too much thought to the opportunity cost 
of doing so”. 
 
In the context of equity and resource allocation, by its definition egalitarianism implies that equity is 
achieved via equality of opportunity to access.  A worthy moral goal may well be that of equal health 
outcomes; however, egalitarianism is problematic for this study, as taking an equality approach does 
not consider that individuals are not equal in terms of their capacity to benefit from resources to 
achieve improvements in health outcomes.  
 
In the context of the Australian health care system aspects of utilitarianism and egalitarianism can 
both be observed through resource allocation policy for the assessment of new technologies.  Drugs 
and medical treatments are assessed for public subsidisation by considering how cost effective 
treatments are, often utilising measures such as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) and typically 
core criteria considers a utilitarian view whereby assessment is made against QALY maximisation 
from a societal point of view (Department of Health 2016, p. 65).  However, specifically in the case of 
access to publicly subsidised pharmaceuticals, egalitarian conditions labelled within policy as ‘rule of 
rescue’ apply for individuals facing premature / avoidable death.  In such cases resources are made 
available to individuals and these rules can circumvent QALY maximisation of societal benefits 
(Department of Health 2016, p. 123). 
 
Rawlsianism is based on the work of John Rawls that seeks to ethically solve problems of distributive 
justice by representing “justice as fairness” (Matson 2013, p. 1).  Rawls (1971, p. 266) states that 
society should be organised to allow the maximum amount of equal liberties upon its members and 
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importantly for matters or resource distribution, that social and economic inequalities are only to be 
allowed if the worst off will be better off than they might be under an equal distribution.  According 
to Ekmekci and Arda (2015) and Bommier and Stecklov (2002) the underlying moral theory 
purported by John Rawls is consistent with equity issues contextualised to health care resource 
distribution decisions of public monies. 
 
According to Matson (2013) Rawls “revives the social contract tradition of philosophers John Locke, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, in opposition to utilitarianism” (p. 1).  Specifically, 
Ekmekci and Arda (2015) and Bommier and Stecklov (2002) argue, that whilst Rawls theory did not 
specifically discuss a right to health care as Rawls believed that a person’s health is primarily an 
endowment of luck that one is born with, that Rawls theory can be nonetheless applied to the 
distribution of health care resources from the state in that Rawls identified that fairness in terms of 
distributive justice is “achieved when each and every individual has access to the services she needs” 
(Ekmekci & Arda 2015, p. 228).  Furthermore, Ekmekci and Arda (2015, p. 229) reason that a just / 
fair society has a role in the fair distribution of primary goods, which Rawls defines as elements that 
support welfare that can amend inequalities arising from individual endowments.  Similar to this 
view, the work of Daniels (1985) extended Rawls position to explicitly include distribution of health 
care, advocating that “the health care system should be designed so as to bring everyone as close as 
possible to a decent minimum level of health, which he refers to as normal species functioning" 
(Richard & Paul 2000, p. 328).   
 
In Australia the Medicare principles of the universality of public insurance regarding access to public 
hospital services and subsidised private care (discussed in further detail in Chapter Three, page 94) 
are aligned with distributive justice principles outlined by Rawls and Daniel and that also of 
egalitarianism in the context that all people should have equal opportunity of access (Harris & Harris 
1998; Harris et al. 2003; Spies-Butcher 2014).  The effectiveness of treatment and maximising 
societal benefits are not prescribed in the Medicare principles (Council of Australian Governments 
2011, p. 5).  As such, as discussed on page 36, utilitarianism principles in Australian health care are 
largely confined to the cost effectiveness and efficiency assessments of medical technologies and 
interventions.  
 
The HORSt is aligned with the distributive justice goals of Rawls theory in terms of seeking to afford 
an opportunity to improve upon health outcomes of populations on the basis of health care needs, 
via considering need in terms of capacity to benefit.  Moreover, the HORSt is more specifically 
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aligned to Daniel’s position whereby the HORSt seeks to identify the resources required for 
populations to achieve an acceptable level of health outcomes.  The following section explores this 
in further detail in the context of horizontal and vertical equity.   
2.1.2  Horizontal and Vertical equity and health care needs  
Addressing equity in terms of resource allocation decision-making, the health economics literature 
divides equity into two categories: (vertical equity) unequal resources for unequal health needs; and 
(horizontal equity) equal resources for equal needs (Mcguire et al. 1994; Mooney & Jan 1997; Morris 
et al. 2005).  The following image, Figure 6 by Maguire (2016) used with permission via referencing 
and annotation to the source, is based on a meme that has been used extensively to communicate 
differences between equality and equity (Froehle 2016).  Nonetheless this image can also illustrate 
the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity in the context of resource allocation for this study. 
 
Figure 6   Horizontal and Vertical Equity demonstrated by the Meme of Maguire (2016) 
 
In Figure 6, the three boys in the left side panel of the picture all have the same amount of 
resources, (one box each), to utilise to watch their sporting fixture.  We can see the two taller boys 
are able to use these resources well.  The tallest boy has a fantastic elevated view.  The boy of 
middle height finds his resource adequate for viewing the game, yet the smaller boy is afforded a 
view through a crack in the fence.   
 
As a starting point the height of the boys is what Rawls would describe as a natural endowment, 
factors that they were born with via a “natural lottery” (Resnik 1997, p. 427).  These factors affect 
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the boys’ capacity to benefit from the resources they have.  According to (Matson 2013, p. 1), 
“although the natural lottery is neither just nor unjust, societies that base distribution of goods on it 
are unjust: There must be redress for the undeserved inequalities of birth and natural endowment”.  
 
In the right-hand side of Figure 6, the resources have been redistributed.  The largest boy’s elevated 
view has been redistributed so that he still achieves the outcome of clearly being able to view the 
game, but the redistribution of the resources affords the smallest boy now with the same outcome 
as the other boys.  That is: there is no more squinting for the smallest boy through the hole in the 
fence; nothing changes for the boy of middle height; and all three now achieve an unobstructed 
view of the game.  The public provision of the distribution of healthcare in Australia can be 
considered metaphorically in similar terms.  For example, the need for healthcare could 
metaphorically be a need to access a view of the game without obstruction and the health outcome 
being successfully seeing the game.  
 
The literature reviews of Mooney and Jan (1997) and Macinko and Starfield (2002), find that health 
care needs have become a mainstay concept of defining equity with the majority of health 
economics literature focusing on needs within the context of horizontal equity.  That is, equity is 
almost always defined in terms of equal access for equal needs (Mooney 2009; Rice & Smith 2001, p. 
88), with the majority of health economics literature that has sought to define need has done so 
using health care utilisation as a measure of access to services as proxies of need  (Macinko & 
Starfield 2002; Mooney et al. 1991).  The rationale for doing so is that operationalising health care 
needs so as to define equity in the context of a workable resource allocation instrument is 
problematic, given that like equity, need is a value laden concept (Culyer 1995).  Need therefore 
requires some sort of defining concept or measure itself.  Guinness and Wiseman (2011, p. 253) 
state that there are three common conceptual definitions of health care need underpinning the 
definition of horizontal equity, being: 
 equal access to health care for equal need; 
 equal use of health care for equal need; and 
 equal expenditure of health care for equal need  
In the context of horizontal equity, if all three boys in Figure 6 on page 38 have the same need – to 
see the game, then the provision of the same resources, one box each, seems fair and equitable.  
After all, it could be argued that even the smallest boy can see the game via the crack in the fence, 
but just not as well as the other two.  In this context horizontal equity is about putting fairness on 
par with equality with needs addressed via all the boys being afforded the same resources to access 
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the game (the left-hand side of the picture).  This is congruent with the Australian Medicare 
principles (page 94) regarding equality of access.   
 
In the context of access within the definitions of health care need, the literature defines access via 
either the physical opportunity to use the health system, or to enter the health system, or in terms 
of financial barriers that affect the opportunity or entry of the system (Culyer & Wagstaff 1992).  As 
discussed, that access can give rise to inequities.  Strategies to address inequities purely around 
achieving equivalence of access would be aligned with the equality illustration of the left hand side 
of Figure 6 and would not consider need in terms of capacity to benefit and as per Matson’s view, 
this is unjust based on funding for equal access does not correct Rawls’ natural lottery of 
endowment through birth. 
 
Mooney’s explanation for the reliance of health utilisation as a proxy of need within funding models 
is because economics has an “obsession with quantification” (2009, p. 210) and utilisation 
represents ease of measurement.  However, it is not unreasonable for instruments that apply the 
distribution of taxpayer funded resources to be quantified and indeed the transparent allocations of 
public monies logically require it.  Moreover, it could be argued that utilisation which represents a 
key cost to the health system and is easily measurable through output-based funding mechanisms 
such as ABF, is a logical parameter for inclusion.  Notwithstanding Mooney’s criticisms, he concludes 
that the typical approaches to defining equity, equal access for equal needs where needs are proxied 
by utilisation, require new considerations.  Significantly he asserts that need is a concept that can 
never be practically equalised and should be expressed in terms of capacity to benefit (Mooney 
2009, p. 210).    
 
Policy approaches in Australia that have focused on output-based funding models such as ABF and 
Medicare’s fee for service and historical funding of inputs (Bennett 2012; Sansoni 2016) validates 
Mooney’s summary.  Furthermore, in Australia at the state level, both the former NSW Resource 
Distribution Formula (RDF) and the Queensland Resource Allocation Formula (RAF) were models that 
considered the health care needs of regional populations within their states.  The models were used 
to redistribute funding according to needs that were approximated by access, where access was 
measured by variables that best predicted health service utilisation (Inter-Government & Funding 
Strategies 2005b; Queensland Health 1994).  Importantly, however, the intent of both models was to 
tackle geographical inequities in funding, not health inequities (Ho 2001; Kirigia 2009).  These 
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models will be appraised in more detail in section 2.3 (page 46) which examines the effectiveness of 
different funding models to promote equity and efficiency. 
 
Returning to the sporting field metaphor image of Figure 6 (page 38) if we consider more closely 
what Mooney (2009) championed as the best way to describe need; as capacity to benefit, the three 
boy’s needs are quite different.  In the left hand panel of the image, the one box afforded to the 
middle boy to access the system is adequate, yet it is very questionable that the taller boy needs this 
resource, which represents an opportunity cost to the smaller boy who, given the same one box 
resource has an unmet need.  In other words, all three boys’ capacity to benefit from one box is not 
the same.  That is their need, which is to see an obstructed view of the game is very different.  In this 
context, the equity shown in the right-hand panel of the picture is that of vertical equity, where the 
resource distribution shows unequal access for unequal need, (different amounts of boxes supplied 
to people who have different capacities to benefit from these resources).  Importantly access is still 
available to all in the right-hand panel, yet the access is more allocatively efficient and equitable.  
The HORSt seeks to achieve this result for the distribution of public resources from states to LHNs 
and therefore in so doing so does not compromise the Medicare principles (page 94) regarding 
access.  Doing so would be considered just using the Rawlsian principles discussed and the explicit 
extension of Rawlsian theory to health care advocated by Daniels.  
 
Congruent to Mooney’s position, advocating need to be considered in terms of capacity to benefit, 
multiple reviewers of the health economics literature suggest that health inequities should have 
both an opportunity and a potential to be addressed (Culyer 1995; Starfield 2001; Whitehead 1992).  
Considering peoples’ capacity to benefit is therefore useful in considering the potential of improving 
health outcomes and tackling inequities and is demonstrated by the literature as better definition of 
health need than the reliance upon health utilisation.  As such, the HORSt frames population health 
need in the context of vertical equity and via considering populations’ capacities to benefit from 
resources.  The approach for doing so is discussed further in section 2.3.3 Population needs-based 




Summary of key findings section 2.1 – Equity in Health Care 
-HORSt as a resource distribution tool aimed at enabling improvements in health inequity and health 
outcomes is justified by theories of social justice of Rawls and Daniels and Egalitarian perspectives 
demonstrated by Australians. 
- Horizontal equity approximating health need as use, predominately used in resource 
allocation funding instruments, places equity in the context of equality.   
- Lack of use of vertical equity approaches to the problem represents a gap in the literature.  
- Defining need in terms of vertical equity and capacity to benefit is a just goal for the health 
system congruent with the work of Daniels that advocates a health system should bring “everyone as 
close as possible to a decent minimum level of health, which he refers to as normal species 
functioning" (Richard & Paul 2000, p. 328). 
 
2.2  EFFICIENCY IN HEALTH CARE  
Against a backdrop of the global financial crisis (GFC), the OECD (2013) observed that for many 
economies there has been a significant shift from funding growth to productivity growth in the 
health sector with countries most affected by the GFC making the largest cuts to health expenditure.  
Australia, whilst faring typically better than most OECD nations during the GFC, was not immune to 
this trend with the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014b) reporting that growth in real 
health expenditure in 2012/13 was at its lowest level since the mid 1980’s.  The implications of these 
health expenditure cuts have placed even more emphasis on efficiency. 
 
In health economics, efficiency can be defined by three areas: technical efficiency; dynamic 
efficiency; and allocative efficiency (Duckett 2008a, pp. 325-6; Mcguire et al. 1994, pp. 76-7).  All 
three efficiency types are interconnected.  These concepts are introduced in this section and 
critiqued with respect to the effectiveness of funding models discussed within this chapter and 
contextualised to the development of the HORSt and the advancement of equity. 
 
Technical efficiency, is concerned with the optimal production of health service outputs (Duckett 
2008a; Segal & Richardson 1994).  Dynamic efficiency is concerned with how well the health system 




Allocative efficiency is concerned with ensuring that goods and services are allocated so as to 
maximize the welfare of the community via the optimal mix of goods and services from the best 
allocation of resources (Drummond 1989, p. 60; Duckett 2008a; Eagar et al. 2001, p. 18; Mcguire et 
al. 1994, p. 76).  In public health care systems, the optimal mix of goods and services is also strongly 
interlinked with social justice pursuits of health care distribution as to whom and what type of 
services are supplied (Segal & Richardson 1994).  Accordingly, allocative efficiency is often 
represented in the literature as being promoted by concepts of equity (Carr-Hill 1994; Carr-Hill & 
Sheldon 1992; Mooney 1983).  Consequently, allocative efficiency involves taking into consideration 
three elements:  
1. the technical efficiency of the health resources used in the production of health outcomes;  
2. effectiveness of the outputs of health care to produce health outcomes; and  
3. efficiency of the distribution of the health outcomes 
(Duckett 2004b, pp. 226-8).  
It is important to consider that by their definitions, technical, dynamic and allocative efficiency can 
be pursued at many levels.  For example, the optimal mix of goods and services could apply narrowly 
to the outputs of a hospital or more broadly to the outputs of a regional health service within a state 
or further still to the state or national level.  The same can be said of a hospital’s, state’s or nations’ 
ability to innovate through technical change or to achieve optimal production of outputs at the least 
costs. 
 
The structural, funding and governance arrangements of the Australian health care system provide 
key challenges for efficiency strategies.  For example, if the goal of the health system is to improve 
health outcomes, the optimal mix of services (allocative efficiency) within a state health system 
dominated by public hospitals is unlikely to be a panacea.  This is because health outcomes are 
affected by the access to and interaction with all types of health services, not just to those found 
within the remit of the state public hospital system.  Evashwick (1989, p. 30) describes and 
demonstrates an array of different integrated health services, “a continuum of care”, as supporting 
the goal of optimising health care for populations.  Eagar et al (2011), emphasises that allocative 
efficiency gains cannot be achieved without effective investment across the continuum of care.  To 
this end the HORSt seeks to consider the tax payer funded and subsidised resources required for 
improving health outcomes across the whole continuum of care with the HORSt informing state 
resource distribution as a component within broader government funding, rather than trying to align 
health care needs to the confines of state budget resources alone.  In doing so the HORSt seeks to 
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promote allocative efficiency with respect to the definition of its three elements outlined by Duckett 
on the previous page. 
2.2.1  The compatibility between efficiency and equity 
The role of efficiency within a health system also needs to be considered as to where it fits in overall 
funding policy particularly with regards to equity.  Efficiency has been considered by segments of the 
literature for many years as a trade-off with equity (Bevan et al. 2010; Earl-Slater 1999; Okun 1975; 
Williams & Cookson 2006).  In particular, Williams and Cookson (2006), argue that health technology 
assessments all too often focus solely on efficiency gains at the opportunity cost of considering 
equity.  Outlining the potential for conflict Guinness and Wiseman (2011) state:  
“equity and efficiency are often conflicting objectives.  For instance, it may be efficient to fund 
services concentrated in a small number of large centres but more equitable in terms of access to 
services to fund a larger number of dispersed smaller services” (p. 17).  
 
Within the literature however, there is also a view that considers that the trade-off between equity 
and efficiency is “semantically bad” (Reidpath et al. 2012, p. 1).  This is based on the established 
definitions of efficiency contextualised somewhat narrowly to optimality amongst functional 
relationships of resource inputs to outputs (production) and not in the context of resource 
distribution.  In this regard the sort of efficiency that the conflict seeks to portray is of the technical / 
productive variety whereas, contrastingly, equity in the context of public health care funding as 
demonstrated in the literature is about fair resource distributions and or access associated with 
those distributions, typically to promote allocative efficiency.  It follows that equity and efficiency in 
health care funding models are actually complementary whereby equity decisions determining 
resource allocation (funding) to optimise improvements in health outcomes promote allocative 
efficiency and maximising technical efficiency becomes the strategy in the provision (production) of 
health care to deliver the outputs.   
 
Culyer (2006, pp. 1,155) describes the equity efficiency trade-off as “bogus” as the trade-off 
argument fails to acknowledge that the concepts of equity and efficiency are categorically different.  
Culyer affirms that:  
“As separate categories of ethical consideration each ought to be given its due and proper 
attention.  The suggested decision making context for combining equity and efficiency is a 
‘deliberative process’ rather than an algorithm: a procedure that focuses minds on the real 
conflict –  that between rival notions of what is to be regarded as equitable, which one may 
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conjecture is best resolved through consultation and deliberation.  A language that speaks of 
‘conflict’ between equity and efficiency is unhelpful since, appropriately – and entirely 
conventionally – conceptualized, there is no conflict between them.  Both are necessary 
ingredients in finding a satisfactory solution” (2006, pp. 1,158). 
 
Guinness and Wiseman’s previously quoted example of conflict between equity and efficiency is 
analogous to the public financing of small rural and regional health services in Australia.  However, 
rather than conflict, it can be shown that this is an example of deliberate decision-making regarding 
equity promoting allocative efficiency and technical efficiency of the production and / or delivery of 
health care services.  Due to scale, rural and or remote location and associated operating costs, small 
regional and rural services in Australia are known to be less efficient than larger and more urban 
services that can take advantage of economies of scale (Scuteri et al. 2011).  These facilities are 
known as community service obligations (CSOs).  CSOs comprise hospitals and/ or community health 
services and state and federal governments consider that states are obliged to provide them as in 
many cases no other health service such as private GPs for example, exist (Council of Australian 
Governments 2011).  The public financing of CSOs is consistent with Culyer’s argument of a 
deliberative process which to use words from Culyer’s previous quote, is required to find a 
‘satisfactory solution’ of providing access that would not exist in a private market.  Doing so 
promotes allocative efficiency and equity and so despite their known technical inefficiencies of 
services, CSOs are protected by national agreements between state and Commonwealth 
governments (Council of Australian Governments 2011).  
 
In the context of state health funding models, the literature support for the complementary and 
deliberate relationship between equity and efficiency are important considerations for the 
development of the HORSt as an equity tool of resource distribution and a first stage in the two-step 
funding model.  The second stage using ABF is an effective tool of technical efficiency.  The next 
section critiquing the effectiveness of state-based funding models in Australia illustrates the HORSt 
in this role and also provides further examples that verify the compatibility between equity and 





Summary of key findings section 2.2 – Efficiency in Health Care 
- Allocative efficiency is often associated with concept of equity.   
- Allocative efficiency requires considering technical efficiency of the health resources used in 
the production of health outcomes; effectiveness of the outputs of health care to produce health 
outcomes; and efficiency of the distribution of the health outcomes. 
- Siloed nature of the health system and its governance arrangements are a key challenge for 
allocative efficiency of health outcomes.  
- If the HORSt is to successfully be an instrument of equity, it will require being positioned as 
instrument of allocative efficiency and this itself will require considering the production of health 
system outputs across the continuum of care to produce health outcomes.  
- Equity and efficiency goals are not always in trade off.  Context and deliberate decision-
making matters.  The HORSt can work as a complementary tool of ABF. 
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2.3.  EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC HEALTH FUNDING MODELS  
There are three main types of funding models that Australian state governments have used for 
funding regions that operate public hospitals.  These are cost based, population needs-based and 
output-based(Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001; Hindle 2002).  These models are examined in 
terms of effectiveness for addressing equity and efficiency in subsequent sections considering 
Australian and International literature. 
 
Table 5, summarises Australian states’ approaches to funding and also makes apparent that at times 
these three models have been used in conjunction with each other.  Given this it may be more 
accurate to describe them as funding components rather than funding models per se.   












NSW pre 1990 1 / 
post 1990 elements remain12  
1990-2012 -Needs-
based model for 
allocating funding 
from state to area 
health services 1,2,3 
Casemix model between area health 
services and hospitals 20014 non 
mandated, made mandatory in 20085. 
 
ABF 20126. 
Queensland pre 19917 /  
post 1991 elements remain13 
1991-1995 -Needs-
based model for 
allocating funding 
from state to 
regions7,8 
Casemix model between regions and 
hospitals 1991-958 
 
Casemix from 19958, ABF 20126 
Victoria pre 19939 /  
post 1993 elements remain11 
 Casemix from 19939, ABF 20126 
South Australia pre 19949 /  
post 1994 elements remain14 
 Casemix from 19949, ABF 20126 
Western 
Australia 
Pre 19969 /  
post 1996 elements remain15  
 Casemix from 19969, ABF 20126 
Tasmania Pre 19969 / 
post 1996 elements remain16 
 Casemix from 19969, ABF 20126 
Northern 
Territory 
Pre 199710 /  
post 1997 elements remain10 




Pre 19979 / 
post 1997 elements remain8 
 Casemix from 19979, ABF 20126 
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Table 5 References 1-(Services Development Branch 1990), 2-(Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b), 3-(NSW Health 2005), 4- 
(Hindle 2002), 5-(Government Relations Branch NSW Health 2008), 6-(Council of Australian Governments 2011), 7-(Queensland Health 
1994), 8-(Commonwealth Department of Health and Family Services 1997), 9-(Duckett 1998), 10-(Beaver et al. 1998), 11-(Department of 
Health and Human Services Victoria 2014), 12-(NSW ABF Taskforce 2013a), 13-(Queensland Health 2016, p. 6), 14-(SA Department of 
Health and Ageing 2016, p. 40), 15-(Western Australia Department of Health 2014, p. 53), 16-(Department of Health and Human Services 
Tasmania 2016). 
 
Table 5 shows that with the exceptions of NSW and Queensland, all other states, commencing with 
Victoria in 1993, used casemix (episode or output-based) funding.  This was similar to ABF but with 
different payment rules within each state to pay for public hospitals (Duckett 1998).  Prior to 
casemix funding for these states, the funding model employed by all states was historical (Eagar et 
al. 2001).  
2.3.1  Costs / input-based models 
Cost based models are sometimes called historical funding because under this approach the funding 
arrangement is primarily based on the previous year’s costs of production / inputs.  Typically, the 
funder can make adjustments for population growth and other factors that may be considered 
relevant, but the underlying driver is the past year’s costs (Broadhead 1991).   
 
In preserving the status quo, historically determined models compromises dynamic efficiency, where 
innovation in health care can be stymied by the business as usual funding of inputs.  This in itself can 
create poor alignment between population health needs and services, compromising equity and 
allocative efficiency.  Furthermore, where historical payment is not linked to outputs, global 
historical budgets can encourage spending for the sake of maintaining budgets for inputs, 
compromising technical efficiency as well (Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001, pp. 72-3).   
 
Table 5 illustrates that cost-based models were very much the modus operandi for many years in 
Australia prior to the commencement of output-based and needs-based funding.  Importantly 
however, historical determinants still remain as necessary components within funding models that 
utilise output-based models.  The rationale for this is explained further in the following section 2.3.2. 
2.3.2  Output-based models (ABF / episode funding) 
Output-based models pay for outputs.  As described by Eagar, Garrett and Lin, (2001, p. 77): 
 “the idea of output-based funding is fundamentally simple.  It is based on the view that 
outputs of the health system can be quantified and costed and that all providers should 




Output-based models left unchecked with no resource allocation guidance constraint, where 
payment is based on output, have an incentive to overproduce.  Doing so does not advance equity or 
allocative efficiency.  The models can be regressive in that they fund utilisation and not need 
(Broadhead 1991; Eagar et al. 2001, p. 78). 
 
The National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA) required states to adopt ABF in 2012 as their 
funding model (Palmer & Short 2014).  ABF also known as casemix or episode funding is an output-
basedmodel and key efficiency reform (Independent Hospital Pricing Authority 2015a).   
 
The Independent Hospital and Pricing Authority (IHPA) defines ABF on their website as  
“a way of funding hospitals whereby they get paid for the number and mix of patients they 
treat.  If a hospital treats more patients, it receives more funding.  Because some patients are 
more complicated to treat than others, ABF also takes this in to account” [sic] (2015a).  
 
There have been indications in ABF documents that part of the rationale for ABF is that it will allow 
historical based funding to end (Health Policy Solutions et al. 2011, p. 12).  As discussed in the first 
chapter, these views do not however consider the operationalised evidence that ABF is used only 
after a budget constraint for regions is established.  As per illustrated in Table 5, the starting point 
for how much activity is to be funded is typically based on history, being the previous year’s activity 
(Department of Health and Human Services Tasmania 2016, p. 27; Department of Health and Human 
Services Victoria 2014; Department of Health Western Australia 2016, p. 53; NSW ABF Taskforce 
2013a; Queensland Health 2016, p. 6; SA Department of Health and Ageing 2016, p. 40).  
 
As defined by the IHPA, ABF is fundamentally a currency for paying for hospital activity.  Considering 
the extent of IHPA’s definition, it is logical to conclude that ABF does not solve decisions of how 
resources should be equitably allocated within state public hospital systems in order to meet the 
health needs of the population.  Consequently, it is not surprising to find state governments still 
relying on historical patterns of public hospitals’ activity to inform the quantity and distribution of 
public hospital outputs to be purchased using ABF.  As such, ABF should therefore be considered as a 
component of a broader funding model and not a state health funding model per se.   
 
Output-based funding models do encourage technical efficiency (Auditor-General of Victoria 1998; 
Duckett 2008b; Eagar et al. 2001) yet it is apparent from the experience of ABF in Australia that they 
require a resource allocation constraint to determine how many outputs should be purchased.  For 
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these reasons, as shown in Table 5, NSW and QLD attempted to combine equity objectives and 
efficiency measures as a deliberative process during the life of their population needs-based models.  
Resource allocation funding decisions to regions were guided by population needs-based formulas 
and purchasing decisions within regions directed by episode / casemix funding (Government 
Relations Branch NSW Health 2008; Queensland Health 1994).   
 
The current ABF model applies loadings in the payment calculations for each hospital service based 
on patient characteristics such as: people living in remote areas; people who identify as an 
Indigenous Australians; length of stay; and the type of service facility (type of hospital) (Independent 
Hospital Pricing Authority 2015b).  Whilst considering patient characteristics could be seen as an 
additional payment to tackle health inequalities, problematically the ABF loadings are paid to the 
treating hospital on a per case basis.  Given the highly mobile nature of flows of patients between 
regions, especially between rural locations to major city teaching hospitals, these additional 
payments can end up in regions where these inequalities are insignificant (Health Consult Pty Ltd 
2011). 
 
The effectiveness of output-based models, especially the casemix system in Australia that pre-dates 
ABF, has been well studied.  The Auditor-General Victoria (1998) report into casemix funding, found 
that the funding model (casemix) achieved its major efficiency objectives for Victorian hospitals.  
Interestingly, the report highlighted questionable findings for equity.  
“The majority of hospitals indicated that casemix funding had not improved access for 
socio-economically disadvantaged groups.  Most hospitals advised that this outcome 
cannot be achieved by changes to the funding formula” (p. 172).    
 
The international literature of the limitations of casemix models corresponds with Australian 
examples, finding that equity and allocative efficiency can be easily compromised and 
overproduction can be incentivised.  For example, Danish studies have provided evidence of casemix 
models that have led to overproduction with a focus on outputs rather than integrated care to the 
betterment of outcomes.  Moreover, there was evidence of facilities preferring to treat less complex 
patients that are potentially easier and cheaper to treat.  There was also incentives for facilities to 
perpetuate the status quo to preserve profit making and revenue streams at the opportunity costs 




In Norway there is evidence of casemix facilitating gaming on the part of health service providers to 
seek greater reimbursement, in spite of governance arrangements to mitigate this from occurring 
(Lægreid & Neby 2016).  In one of the largest international studies; a systematic meta review of 65 
studies since 1980 across 10 countries (Australia, Austria, England, Germany, Israel, Italy, Scotland, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United States of America) found that ABF was associated with higher 
rates of post-acute care hospitalisations and possible increases in readmissions (Palmer et al. 2014).   
 
Reviews of the ABF experience in England, Germany, France, Finland and Ireland finds that like the 
Australian experience, ABF requires a budget restraint and strong governance arrangements above it 
to restrict its tendency to overproduce or game reimbursement (Baxter et al. 2015; O'Reilly et al. 
2012).  Aligned to this view the Canadian Health Services Research Foundation (2013) contended 
that ABF ought to be part of a blended funding model.    
 
Summary of key findings section 2.3 - Effectiveness of Public Health Funding Models  
-2.3.1 Cost based and 2.3.2 Output-based Models 
Cost / historical based: 
- Funding based on previous years activity do not encourage technical, allocative, or dynamic 
efficiency; 
- Perpetuates status quo; 
- Still used as starting point for funding regions by Australian States; 
- Does not promote equity 
 
Output-based/ casemix / ABF 
- Purchasing tool that promotes technical efficiency of outputs 
- Encourages tendency to overproduce outputs 
- Does not promote allocative efficiency 
- Cannot inform resource distribution or regional budgets of how much activity is to be 
purchased 
- Requires a budget constraint / funding envelope – which has led to use in conjunction with 
Cost / historical models 
- Does not promote equity 
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2.3.3  Population needs-based models 
Population needs-based models seek to consider the health needs of populations.  They are 
primarily used to guide resource distribution amongst populations on the basis of population needs 
and therefore are intrinsically aligned to the promotion of equity and allocative efficiency in funding 
allocations amongst populations (Eagar et al. 2001, pp. 74-6; Segal & Richardson 1994).  Rice and 
Smith (1999, pp. 9-10) consider these models to be a form of risk-adjusted capitation scheme, to 
ensure equal funding for equal needs for all citizens within populations subject to risk characteristics 
of persons within populations that affect the demand and associated costs for health services.   
 
Population needs-based models inform resource distribution to individual populations by using 
mechanisms that weight each populations need’s characteristics relative to the whole population.  
Shares of funding from a central health authority to regions responsible for providing health care to 
regional populations are made on the basis of the weighted needs of each regional population (Eyles 
et al. 1991; McIntosh et al. 2010; Penno et al. 2013).   
 
The proposed HORSt is a population needs-based tool.  This section provides an overview of the 
literature for these models and in particular the former models used in Australia.  First the 
effectiveness of these models to promote equity and health outcomes is examined.  Second, the 
componentry within the models used to weight need is outlined.  Three important issues arising 
from the literature that are contextually important to the development of the HORSt are then 
critiqued.  These issues are that population needs-based models: 
 are not designed to ensure technical efficiency of health outputs;  
 rely upon utilisation as a default proxy of health need which is problematic for 
advancing equity and promoting allocating efficiency; and  
 claim to promote allocative efficiency although make little attempt to empirically 
measure if this is the case. 
 
2.3.3.1  Overview – the role and effectiveness of population needs-based funding models in 
improving health inequality 
There is evidence that health outcomes can improve through the improvement of equity in funding 
that these models prescribe.  For example in the UK, longitudinal ecological studies found that 
increases in funding to areas that had poorer social determinants of health resulted in closing gaps 
of mortality experienced by these populations compared to affluent areas (Barr et al. 2014).  
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However, that is not to say that greater funding under these models amongst populations facing 
adverse social determinants of health will always yield improvements in health outcomes.  In 
Australia using a targeted population program for example, where additional specific funding has 
been directed to closing the mortality gap and improving the health outcomes of the indigenous 
population that are known to face significant socially determined barriers of health, little progress in 
terms of health outcomes improvement has been made (Browne et al. 2012; Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health 2008b; Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2018). 
 
The literature indicates that due to the exogenous nature of health care expenditure, analysis of the 
role and effects of health care expenditures for specific programs on health outcomes remains 
problematic.  Often aspects of health program quality and effectiveness and accessibility are key 
issues that affect success (Barr et al. 2014; Bousmah et al. 2016; Crémieux et al. 1999; Martin et al. 
2008). 
 
Given the qualifiers in the literature pertaining to the effectiveness of funding related to outcomes 
for populations facing difficult social determinants of health, it is important to state that the role of 
population needs-based funding models is not seeking to cure the social determinants that give rise 
to poorer health outcomes or guarantee improvements in health outcomes.  Rather, improving 
funding equity to address social determinants can act as an enabler for improving health outcomes 
and allocative efficiency by aligning resources to population needs (NSW Department of Health 
2004; Sheridan et al. 2011).  Furthermore, aligned with the literature introduced in Chapter One 
regarding health inequities and how social determinants of health affect outcomes and the Rawlsian 
theories of social justice extended upon by Daniels critiqued in this chapter (page 37), population 
needs-based funding models are a just mechanism of resource allocation.  They can also provide 
transparency for taxpayers in ensuring that population needs are considered in the distribution of 
publicly funded resources (NSW Department of Health 2004, p. 32; Penno et al. 2013, p. 1).   
 
The success of funding per se as an enabler to contribute to improved health outcomes is however 
well established.  The OECD regularly monitors the contributing inputs for improved health 
outcomes and has found amongst OECD nations that health care expenditure growth over two 
decades between 1990 and 2010 contributed to the majority of the growth in life expectancy over 




The role of population needs-based funding models as an enabler to improve health inequities and 
health inequalities in the international literature however, is more often an implicit goal, with 
explicit statements of purpose contextualised as per the discussion in the previous equity section 
(page 39), as facilitating horizontal equity via equal funding access for equal need.  For example Ho 
(2001) and Kirigia (2009), find that the equity goal of the these models sought to equalise the same 
opportunity for financial access to state public health funding to regions based on factors that gave 
rise to health care utilisation.   
 
Wenzl et al. (2015) suggest that from the perspective of models used in England, it is not clear as to 
whether these models promote equity.  This is because the overarching goal is to more accurately 
predict the financial needs of providers (such as Clinical Commissioning Groups) to align budgets 
accordingly so that the capitation model is adequately financed for predictable demand for the 
population.  Implicitly doing so and risk adjusting for the population needs to inform resource 
distribution, however, is an implicit lever for improved equity of funding access amongst 
populations.   
 
Examples of purpose of the formulas from the international literature are as follows.  In:  
 New Zealand, the main goal of the original formula is to “assist in achieving equality of 
access to core personal health services according to need” (New Zealand Ministry of 
Health 1996, p. 6) 
 Finland, the main equity aim of the formula used is to ensure “that each municipality 
has an equal opportunity to allocate more resources to servicing population areas with 
greater needs and less to areas with fewer needs” (Häkkinen 2005, p. S108); 
 England, the foundational purpose of the formula was to “redress disparities in funding 
between poorer and more affluent areas” and to promote “equal access for equal 
needs” (Wenzl et al. 2015, p. 7);  
 France, the intention is to facilitate equal access to health care via minimising 
socioeconomic and demographic barriers to access (Jourdain 2000); and in 
 Australia in NSW, “the goal of the RDF is better equity in health funding. The RDF target 
share allocates funding required to meet the health needs of an Area Health Service’s 
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(AHS’s)6 population” (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales 
1998, p. 58) 
The enabling aspect of reducing health inequities and improving health outcomes can be reasonably 
deduced from these examples of models’ objectives to provide fairness in funding.  In support of 
this, Rice and Smith (2001, p. 88) from their own review of the international literature find that 
population needs-based funding models have largely had two inherent goals of “securing equity of 
health and to secure equity of access to health care” and that from an operationalised perspective 
models have sought to contribute to a reduction in health inequalities via creating the “potential for 
equal levels of care”, a horizontal equity approach. 
 
Given the explicit goals of these funding models tied to improving the financial distribution of equal 
access for equal needs amongst regions and the literature’s consensus on the difficulties of analysis 
to show effectiveness of these models in terms of reducing inequalities evident in improved health 
outcomes, it is not surprising to find that the literature regarding the effectiveness of these models 
has focused on demonstrating improvements in funding equity amongst regionalised areas.  In 
England for example, the NHS RAWP has been deemed to be a success for bringing down budgetary 
excesses of relative advantaged areas down to a needs-based target budget and similarly by 
boosting the budgetary shortfall of relatively disadvantaged areas to their needs-based target 
(Gorsky & Millward 2018, p. 75).  The Australian NSW RDF example now discussed also assessed 
effectiveness in this way.   
 
During the period of operation of the RDF, the model in its various forms never actually set the 
budgets for each NSW regional area, with the redistributive shares of funding computed under the 
RDF applied to growth funding (Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b; NSW Health 2005; 
Services Development Branch 1990).  Setting budgets to precise RDF shares was considered to be 
too disruptive for the health services in the short term and so the RDF was applied to growth funding 
on top of historically determined budgets.  Over time with the consistent application of growth 
funding guided by the RDF, the shares of funding of the AHSs were more closely aligned to 
population need than history and the RDF was considered to be effective in improving funding 
equity (Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales 1998, p. 58). 
                                                            
 
6 AHSs in NSW were the regional forerunners of LHDs.  In many cases the borders of the former NSW AHSs are identical to 




Identical to the approach used to assess the NHS RAWP success in England, the RDF’s effectiveness 
considered how far away each NSW AHS’s budget was from its targeted fair share of resources 
assigned under the formula.  Prior to any guiding action of the RDF on NSW AHS budgets, the 
average population weighted distance from the RDF target for all AHSs was nearly 14% in 1990 with 
some AHSs receiving more than their fair share and some less.  During its operational life up until 
2010, successive NSW State Governments of all political views actively supported the NSW RDF for 
equitably guiding growth funding to local regions (NSW Health 2005; Services Development Branch 
1990).  An RDF target was established in the late 1990’s so that the average population weighted 
distance from target for that all AHSs would be no greater than 2% of their equity share (NSW 
Department of Health 2003, p. 29).  With the RDF in operation much of this funding inequity had 
been addressed and by 2005 the average weighted distance had been reduced to 1.8% (Inter-
Government & Funding Strategies 2005b; Kirigia 2009; NSW Health 2005).  This is illustrated in 
Figure 7 on page 57.  
 
The change in the NSW AHSs budgets, illustrated in Figure 7 by the reduction in funding inequities to 
the distance from RDF target, does show that the RDF’s application to growth funding was able to 
influence cost based / historical funding.  Outside of the NSW government publications claiming the 
effectiveness of the RDF, only one external study, Kirigia (2009), sought to test its effectiveness.  
Kirigia’s thesis considered alternative measures of health need using socioeconomic, demographic 
and premature mortality data.  She found that funding inequities across regions nonetheless 
remained.  A further issue noted was that the RDF did not consider funding inequity within the AHSs.  
However, the RDF was never intended to do so. 
 
The overarching effect however, of the discontinuation of the RDF as an equity funding tool is also 
apparent in Figure 7.  The immediate years following its non-use show a ballooning of the distance 
from target to be more than three orders of magnitude away from the stated policy objectives of 
2%.  Independent external auditors found the primary reason for reversing much of the gains made 
in funding equity over the 20 years to 2010 was directly attributable to state government funding 
allocations made to LHNs in 2011 that had not considered RDF calculated needs-based shares 






Figure 7   NSW Area Health Service Weighted Average distance from RDF Target  
 
Figure 7 adapted from NSW Resource Distribution Formula Technical Paper (Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b, p. 9), which showed publicised 
Distance from target figures between 1989/90 and 2004/05.  2008/09 figures were publicised through the course of NSW State Parliamentary business 
(Garling 2008, pp. 7-8; Smith 2010).  2010/11 and 2011/12 figures were verified by an external audit of the RDF (Health Policy Analysis 2012).   
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The application of the HORSt to growth funding congruent with the operation of the former RDF is 
discussed in the concluding chapter.  As a funding enabler of reducing inequity and improving health 
outcomes, assessment of the HORSt’s effectiveness would face an identical set of challenges as 
described in the literature.  As such assessment of effectiveness logically should follow the RDF and 
RAWP methodology.  However, such assessment would involve a long-term commitment to utilising 
the HORSt.   
 
2.3.3.2  Overview of componentry and extent of population needs-based models  
The international literature pertaining to the construction and operation of population needs-based 
funding models demonstrate a high degree of variability in the componentry and 
comprehensiveness that makes up the models.  For example, the NSW former RDF by the time of its 
abandonment in 2012 was a very comprehensive model that developed health need indicators 
(HNIs) from socioeconomic determinants (all of which sought to explain utilisation) for a variety of 
health programs.  The health programs are not disease specific.  They satisfy core budget areas of 
state public health expenditure, predominately public hospital services. i.e. These are: 
 Acute;  
 Emergency Department (ED); 
 Rehabilitation;  
 Outpatients;  
 Community;  
 Mental Health Admitted and Ambulatory;  
 Renal, Palliative Care;  
 Teaching and Research; and  
 Population health programs.   
(Health Policy Analysis 2012; Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b) 
The HNIs differed for most of the programs.  The final needs-based shares of state health funding for 
each NSW AHS / LHN was computed considering each program’s HNI in conjunction with 
adjustments for cost related issues for facilities, speciality state-wide services, dental hospital and 
small hospital operating costs, HIV / aids costs, net patient flows between other states and NSW and 
net patients flows between NSW AHSs (Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b; Slater & 




In contrast to the NSW final model, the original model used in England commencing in 19767 which 
is widely accepted in the literature as the founding population needs-based model for allocating 
health resources amongst populations, utilised a simple standardised mortality ratio (SMR), (a health 
outcomes approach) to allocate funding to different areas on the basis of need (Gorsky & Millward 
2018; National Health System 1976).  All jurisdictions’ models have gone through evolutions.  For 
example, by 1997 the English model had become more sophisticated, utilising socioeconomic status 
variables in conjunction with SMRs and an additional health outcomes parameter consider long term 
illness, as the basis of a needs-based formula that explained differences in demand and costs for 
general and acute services.  Similar to the health program approach used in NSW, the later English 
model also used a separate multivariable model of SMRs and a different set of socioeconomic 
indicators as predictors of differing program service demand and costs (Diderichsen et al. 1997).   
 
Rice and Smith (2001, pp. 103-5) define the componentry of these formulas in the context of factors 
that give rise to necessary risk adjustment for population needs which give rise to health system 
utilisation and costs.  They summarise these risk components as: 
 demography (age, sex); 
 ethnicity (for example, indigenous status); 
 employment / disability; 
 geographic location; 
 mortality; 
 morbidity; 
 social economic factors (such as unemployment, marital status, housing quality, income, 
family structure).  
 
Rice and Smith’s categorisation is not however a quintessential list, where it could be argued that 
there is overlap between categories, for example aspects of disability could be considered 
socioeconomic and a more extensive or shorter list of categories could be contrived.  Penno et al. 
(2013, p. 4) state in the context of their own review of the international literature, that the 
construction of population needs-based formulae typically starts with the concept of:  
“aligning allocations with factors that explain differences in demand (utilisation); by implication that 
these factors reflect differential health need.  The factors are represented by variables that represent 
                                                            
 
7 This model is often referred to as the RAWP in reference to the Resource Allocation Working Party that recommended it.  
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components of health need that can be defined by two broad categories: demographic indicators 
which act as proxies for need and more manifest measures of need such as disease status.”   
 
As an example of the extent of variables that have been used as needs-based components that 
explain health system use, a summary overview of 10 international models variables is presented in 
Table 6 on page 62.  Most of the data applied as predictors of utilisation come from country’s official 
census statistics or official data collections.  Census statistics, whilst typically not collected annually 
are constructed for most countries to be relatively stable metrics overtime and can therefore be of 
use in models to inform prospective budgets (National Health System 1976; Rice & Smith 1999; 
Technical Advisory Group for Resource Allocation 2016).   
 
Sweden and England have considered methodologies that seek clinical person-level data to predict 
needs via utilisation (Andersson et al. 2011; Dixon et al. 2011).  The Nutfield Trust for example has 
developed a methodology for the English NHS and describes this approach as “Person-based 
Resource Allocation” (Bardsley & Dixon 2011) .  This data is usually of a diagnostic nature and 
examples are found in Table 6 in the column labelled ‘Clinical’.  There are some key limitations of 
this approach including;  
 that data may not be available on all members of the population or enough members of 
the population to be representative of health needs;   
 there are often significant delays in the availability of the data and 
 that they may not fully account for socioeconomic effects on need for health services  
(Andersson et al. 2000; Health Policy Analysis 2014b, p. 6) 
Table 6 provides a general overview of the type of variables that have been used in jurisdictions at 
various times.  It is not intended to show all of the nuanced details of variables which can vary within 
specific health program sub structures of population needs-based models and which are subject to 
constant revision by their jurisdictions.  
 
Operationalising variables like those shown in Table 6 to represent need within population-based 
formulas often involve statistical methods such as regression analysis which is used to consider 
correlations between variables and a proxy of health need (utilisation) (Asthana et al. 2004; Carr-Hill 
& Sheldon 1992; Health Policy Analysis 2013).  The correlation coefficients of variables from the 
regression that are found to explain variations in utilisation can be used to inform population needs-
based weightings with the funding formula to equalise the funding of health needs for each 
geographical area.  Applied to a budget the health need indices can provide a weighted population 
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needs-based share of funding for regions (Carr-Hill & Sheldon 1992; Inter-Government & Funding 






Table 6   Examples of needs-based components used to explain health system utilisation in population needs-based funding models  
Country / Jurisdiction Component factors used that correlate with health system demand / costs (utilisation)* 
Demography Socioeconomic  Geographic Ethnicity  Epidemiological / Health Outcomes 
 
Clinical 
Mortality Morbidity / other 
England   
Weighted capitation model - used 
for allocating to Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) 
(replaced Primary care trusts).   
Separate applications for different 
clinical programs. NB for brevity 
only the Acute program measures 
are shown in this table  
(NHS Analysis and Insight for 
Finance 2019; NHS England 
Strategic Finance 2014) 
5 yr age 










Persons without qualifications; 
Education retainment; 
Pension claimants; 
Income deprivation affecting 
children; and 








Numbers of GPs; and 
Accessibility scores 
for acute and 
outpatient provider 
capacity; 




  Age-standardised 










Not implemented – proposed 
(Dixon et al. 2011) 
 
Age Persons without qualifications 
aged 16-74; 
People living in social housing; 
Urban professionals 
Disability living allowance 
claimants. 




Weighted capitation model -
geographical / population-based 
with some person-based elements 
 
Separate applications for different 
clinical programs 
 
(Technical Advisory Group for 
Resource Allocation 2016) 
 
5 yr age 
bands 0 to 
90+ yrs 
Mental Health program: % of 
people living alone; and 
% living in social housing. 
 




  *NB. SMR used 
only for the 
Acute and GP 
prescribing 
programs does so 
without any 
direct linkage or 
correlation to 
utilisation. 
Acute and GP 
prescribing program: 
Standardised limiting 
chronic illness rate 






index – defined 




Country / Jurisdiction Component factors used that correlate with health system demand / costs (utilisation)* 
Demography Socioeconomic  Geographic Ethnicity  Epidemiological / Health Outcomes 
 
Clinical 
Mortality Morbidity / other 
Northern Ireland 
Regional capitation formula  
 
Separate applications for 9 
different clinical programs and sub 
programs.  NB For brevity only the 
Acute program measures are 
shown in this table:  
 
(DoH Statistics and Research 2014) 
 
5 yr age 
bands 0 to 
85+ yrs 
Proportion of 65+ not claiming 
Attendance Allowance;  
Northern Ireland Multiple 
Deprivation Measure Score; 
Standardised Birth Rate; 
Proportion of all households not 
owned outright; 
Proportion of households with 2 
or less children; 
Proportion of all females aged 
45-64; 
A separate rurality 
formula is applied 
across programs for 
rural areas 
   Standardised self-
reported not good 
health for all persons  
 
Standardised Limiting 
Long-Term Illness  
 
Standardised Cancer 







and only partially weighed. 
Intended for determining fair 
shares of funding equity across 21 
regions of Italy. As of 2014, not fully 
implemented due to political 
disputes amongst regions.  
 
(Caruso & Dirindin 2012; Ferré et al. 
2014; Poscia et al. 2018) 
 







to regions on 





 Rural areas  *NB Social 
deprivation and 
the health status 
of the population 
as assessed by 
the mortality rate 
and are not 
empirically 
correlated or 
linked to demand 
/ costs / 
utilisation 
  
Australia NSW RDF 
Population weighted model for 
allocating state heath funding to 
regional areas – made defunct in 
2012.  
 
(Inter-Government & Funding 




Age / sex; 
5 yr Age 
groupings to 
85+ yrs 
Acute program: SEIFA Index of 
Occupation & Education. 
 
Population Health, Primary & 
Community, Outpatients and 
Emergency Departments: 
SEIFA Index of Occupation & 
Education; and 
% Homeless people. 
 
Oral Health program: Health 
care card holders 
Acute, Population 




























deaths <70 yrs 
Oral Health program: 
caries in children 0-14 
years and adults. 
 
Maternity program 
only: Fertility rate 




Country / Jurisdiction Component factors used that correlate with health system demand / costs (utilisation)* 
Demography Socioeconomic  Geographic Ethnicity  Epidemiological / Health Outcomes 
 
Clinical 
Mortality Morbidity / other 
New Zealand 
Population weighted model for 
allocating state heath funding to 
regional areas 
(Penno et al. 2012; Penno et al. 
2013) 
 
Age / sex; 
5 yr Age 
groupings to 
85+ yrs 
Deprivation quintiles from 
Deprivation index 
 Maori, Pacific, 
Other 
   
Sweden Stockholm County 
Population weighted model for 
allocation to 9 Health Care 
Authorities.   
(Andersson et al. 2011; Andersson 
et al. 2000). 
Age / sex  
0, 1-15, then 





90 and 90+  
Marital status (single, living with 
children or married);  
Type of housing (small, other); 
Occupation; and  
Education (lowest education / 
upper secondary). 
    Considered but 
not yet 
implemented a 




Health Based Allocation Model – 
part of mixed funding model with 
casemix – applied to Local Health 
Integration Networks (LHINs) 
Person based activity informs 
Resource Intensity Weighting for 
LHINs population-based shares 
(Ontario Ministry of Health 2018; 





Socioeconomic status - income     Last three years 




Dutch Risk Equalisation Model - 
Risk-adjusted payment to insurers 
from employers and Government 
for population need characteristics 
(Douven 2004; Eijkenaar et al. 
2019; Ministry of Health 2008) 
20 Age 
categories 5 






Proximity of access 
per 1,000 pop within 







 Primary Care 
Cost groups; 





2.3.3.3  Populations needs-based funding models cannot ensure technically efficient health outputs 
A key limitation of population-based needs models is that whilst they can promote equitable funding 
distribution for population need, the models have no mechanism to ensure that the funding will be 
spent in a technically efficient manner to address population needs (Eagar et al. 2001, pp. 76-7; 
Hindle 2002; Kirigia 2009).  This criticism of the limits of population needs-based funding models 
could be viewed in support of the trade-off discussed in the preceding section between equity and 
efficiency.  However, as per Culyer’s arguments presented on page 44 to the contrary, alleviating this 
criticism involves deliberate positioning of a population needs-based funding tool as a first stage 
component of resource distribution within a broader funding model that also involves a secondary 
mechanism that promotes technical efficiency.   
 
As illustrated in Table 5 on page 47, both the RDF and QRAF were not always used in isolation as 
state funding models.  Cognisant of the limitations of population needs-based models with regards 
to not being effective instruments of ensuring technical efficiency of outputs, NSW and QLD 
employed them as the first step in a combined funding model.  Redistribution of resources under the 
first step afforded areas with higher population needs with higher shares of funding and vice versa.  
Casemix funding, called episode funding by NSW and QLD at the time, was used as the second step 
that informed each area’s hospitals technical efficiency (Government Relations Branch NSW Health 
2008; Hindle 2002; Ho 2001; Schneider 2005).  This demonstrates that the HORSt as an instrument 
of population needs-based funding can be operationalised as a first step in the funding model with 
ABF acting as the second. 
 
It is important to note that there is a body of Australian literature that is somewhat unaware of the 
two-step arrangement that combined RDF and episode funding in NSW.  Palmer and Short (2014, p. 
346), state for example in the context of casemix funding (the forerunner of ABF), that there was: 
“continuing opposition to the use of casemix funding in NSW Health Department.  Part of the 
reservations about the application of this new method of hospital funding stemmed from the fact 
that the department had devoted considerable resources to securing greater equity between 
geographical areas in the allocation of health service funding.” 
 
Not only does this view not acknowledge the use of episode funding alongside the NSW RDF since 
2001 (NSW Health 2005, p. 4), but it is reasonably possible to deduce from this view the falsehood 
that a state health funding model can only consist of needs-based or episode based funding, not 
both.  Such a view is in conflict with the international literature presented in the casemix funding 
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section on page 51.  Outside of Australia, Ontario Canada is a good example of where population 
needs-based funding and casemix funding are combined within a funding model.  The model utilises 
three components being: 
 Global Budgets – elements of cost / historical funding; and 
 Health Based Allocation Method (HBAM) – a population needs-based funding tool; and 
 Quality Based Procedures – quality adjusted form of casemix 
(Palmer et al. 2018). 
 
Whilst the RDF had successfully coexisted as the first step in a two-step funding model with episode 
funding since 2001, the NSW Ministry for Health in 2011 commenced ABF and promptly abandoned 
RDF.  There has never been any documented statement by the NSW Government as to the official 
decommissioning of the RDF (Slater & Marshall 2015).  In the absence of this it would be reasonable 
to deduce in NSW, that RDF was replaced by ABF, especially with the marketing of the new NSW 
Health funding model to the NSW health system being exclusively presented in terms of ABF (NSW 
ABF Taskforce 2013a, 2013b).   
 
At the cessation of using the NSW RDF and the commencement of ABF, health needs components 
known as the health need indices (HNIs) were reviewed and were retained in the NSW Health 
funding model for making minor adjustments to the historical volume of outputs to be purchased 
using ABF (NSW ABF Taskforce 2013a).  A former NSW Ministry of Health senior bureaucrat 
described these components as an “equity lens” (Bolevich 2013).  In reality these components have a 
negligible role and effect on resource distribution in the new model (Slater 2014) and as such they 
do not improve health inequities, nor do they act to steer funding away from historically determined 
resource distribution.  These components, a revised version of the former health need indices from 
within the RDF, are still based on variables that predict utilisation to represent need.  In fact, NSW 
Health aptly now calls these variables ‘Expected Health Utilisation Indices’ (EHUIs) (Health Policy 
Analysis 2014a, p. 1).   
 
The use nonetheless of the EHUIs further demonstrates the compatibility of use of an equity tool 
alongside ABF.  For successful operationalising of the HORSt, it will be necessary to emphasise the 





2.3.3.4  Utilisation is a problematic default proxy of population health need 
The concept of need is a value laden concept (Culyer 1995, p. 727).  As such, a key challenge for 
population needs-based funding models is developing a robust measure of relative population needs 
that can be operationalised into a funding formula.  As outlined in the preceding equity section 
(page 39), a summary of international literature find that there has been a prolonged use of health 
care utilisation within needs-based population funding models as a proxy of health need and 
utilisation expressed as equal access can give rise to inequities (Barr et al. 2014; Carr-Hill 1994; Carr-
Hill & Sheldon 1992; Mooney 2009; Mooney et al. 1991; Sheldon et al. 1993).  Problematically, 
defining health needs in terms of access to services and utilisation requires some sort of proxy 
measurement itself for it to be meaningful in terms of policy setting and resource allocation.  
Specifically, as shown in the examples provided in Table 6 (page 62), population needs have been 
largely approximated by access, where access, was measured in formative constructs by variables 
which include socioeconomic determinants of health that best predicted health service utilisation. 
 
Carr-Hill and Sheldon find that measures of social deprivation found to correlate to health needs 
through regression are “illusionary” (1992, p. 117).  Underlying this assertion is that as a proxy of 
health need; utilisation as the dependent variable in regression modelling is problematic, reflecting 
both patterns of available supply and satisfied demand and therefore not health need.  Unsatisfied 
demand, not visible within utilisation, can be representative of unmet needs and health inequalities.   
 
Carr-Hill (1994) and Rice and Smith (2001) also highlight in direct contrast to unmet need that 
supplier induced demand can be represented in utilisation statistics.  In such cases the utilisation is 
inefficient, unnecessary and contains over-servicing.  This too creates difficulty for population needs-
based formulas relying upon use as the measure of needs.  
 
The NSW former RDF made efforts to factor out influences of endogenous supply on utilisation so as 
to try and uncover underlying need factors that affect levels of demand for services (Health Policy 
Analysis 2013, p. 14).  To do so, the NSW RDF considered that private sector hospital activity to a 
varying degree, depending on the type of activity, is substitutable to public hospital services.  In 
developing the dependent variable in the regression for the HNIs which was based on standardised 
cost weights for inpatient activities, the NSW RDF applied a discount for private hospital activities 
(Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005b, p. 45).  The discount applied to the standardised 
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cost weights in the former RDF had the effect of reducing the relative health needs in populations 
where private services usage was higher.   
 
Notwithstanding the efforts made in the NSW RDF model to improve upon utilisation as a proxy of 
health need, it is clear from Mooney’s summation of the literature reviewed in the equity section of 
this chapter, that the over reliance of utilisation as this proxy represents a gap in the literature, 
whereby needs are contextualised in terms of horizontal equity and resource distribution amongst 
populations is about equivalence of access for equivalence of need.    
 
The gap in the literature described asserts that health needs are better represented by capacity to 
benefit, rather than utilisation.  Whilst this gap will inform the approach outlined for the HORSt, it is 
nonetheless important to contextualise utilisation’s use in these models to the models’ individual 
purposes.  To not do so would be to assume (incorrectly) that the utilisation approach to population 
health needs-based models is always lacking.  This is not necessarily the case.  These models’ 
primary use is to guide resource distributions from governments to regionalised areas.  The context 
of deliberate policy making to do so is crucially important.  For example, if the contextualised goal is 
to pursue vertical equity in funding shares to populations so at to enable improvement in health 
inequalities and health outcomes via considering populations capacity to benefit to achieve 
outcomes, a non-utilisation approach to health need in light of the gap in the literature can be 
justified.  However, if the goal is to best predict health system costs under a risk (needs) adjusted 
weighted capitation model so as to enable equal opportunity of access (horizontal equity) then an 
utilisation approach to health needs (representing access), congruent with the plethora of models 
that have set out to do so is satisfactory.   
 
In addition to context, practicality is important for operationalising these instruments.  The 
utilisation measure of health need approach is popular due to its simplicity and its relationship with 
funding driven by expressed demand.  Logically, given this simplicity and intuitive connection to 
health system costs, utilisation applied in such mechanisms affords governments with a degree of 
transparency that can support public accountability.  In contrast, a health outcomes approach for 
population needs-based modelling is not without difficulty.  Section 2.4 (page 72) outlines the 
alternative variables that could be used in establishing measures of population outcomes that are 
robust enough to support these instruments.  The HORSt will utilise a measure of population health 




The HORSt population-based shares of funding will be compared with the most recently used equity 
tool in NSW, the NSW EHUIs (Expected Health Utilisation Index).  Whilst the HORSt is a different 
approach, both models acknowledge via the literature the importance of considering social 
determinants as predictors of the proxied need variables.  The comparative resource distribution 
shares of both models applying social determinants that predict needs (however differently defined) 
therefore may produce similar results.   
 
2.3.3.5  Do population needs-based models actually improve allocative efficiency? 
As stated in the efficiency section (page 43), the literature indicates that population needs-based 
models promote allocative efficiency via improvements in equity aligned to a more appropriate mix 
of resources that can be applied to health needs.  However, in order to explicitly promote allocative 
efficiency, it is logical to consider a measure or estimate of allocative efficiency so as to guide the 
redistribution of population needs-based funding shares to do so.  None of the extensive 
international and Australian literature searched and examined for this literature review indicates any 
population needs-based funding models attempting to estimate or measure the underlying 
allocative efficiency of the production of health outcomes.   
 
Revisiting the axioms required for allocative efficiency outlined by Duckett (page 43), allocative 
efficiency involves consideration of three elements.  These are:  
1. technical efficiency of the health resources used in the production of health outcomes;  
2. effectiveness of the outputs of health care to produce health outcomes; and  
3. efficiency of the distribution of the health outcomes. 
Considering these definitional elements and the international literature’s critique of population 
needs-based funding models, the a priori view in the literature for the promotion of allocative 
efficiency is difficult to explicitly sustain.  As outlined, population needs-based funding models: 
 cannot control the technical efficiency of the health resources used in the production of 
health outcomes and require a secondary mechanism to work in union to promote 
technical efficiency such as ABF;  
 cannot influence the effectiveness of the outputs of health care to produce health 
outcomes; and 
 as an enabling instrument for improving funding equity, cannot guarantee efficiency of 
the distribution of health outcomes especially when these models tend to rely upon 
utilisation as a proxy of health care need.  
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Whilst there may be an implicit improvement, promotion, or enabling of allocative efficiency 
through these models’ redistributive action of resources to a more appropriate mix of resources to 
support needs (no matter how defined), the lack of formal measurement of allocative efficiency 
contextualised to health outcomes therefore represents a gap in the literature.  In response to this 
gap, establishing a population needs-based tool where the allocative efficiency of desirable level of 
health outcomes can be calculated is a more transparent approach to the problem.  Populations that 
are allocatively efficient in the production of desirable health outcomes could represent a 
benchmark.  Redistributing funding to populations that have poor allocative efficiency compared to 
the benchmark, due to poor social determinants of health that affect allocative efficiency, could act 
as a funding enabler to promote allocative efficiency of better health outcomes.  The HORSt seeks to 
achieve this, although to do so requires the development of a proxy representing health outcomes 
of populations that can be used as a proxy of population health needs.  The next sections in this 
literature review outline alternative proxies to utilisation for health needs and also consider a 






Summary of key findings section 2.3 - Effectiveness of Public Health Funding Models 
2.3.3 Population needs-based funding models: 
- implicitly act as funding enabler to promote equity and allocative efficiency; 
- in acting as a funding enabler, are not seeking to guarantee improvement in equity or outcomes; 
-are a just method of resource allocation aligned to social justice theories of Rawls and Daniels; 
-afford transparency of resource distribution for taxpayers; 
-cannot promote technical efficiency of health outputs; 
-can act in partnership with casemix funding (which can promote technical efficiency); 
-resource distribution best applied to growth funding to gradually align regional shares to population 
needs; 
-effectiveness is largely assessed by improvements in regional shares of funding distance from 
needs-based shares of funding 
-typically, have sought to measure need as health system use and have used variables that predict 
utilisation as population weights to inform regions shares of funding; and 
-have not sought to explicitly measure the allocative efficiency that they claim to promote.  
 
Specific gaps in literature:  
- utilisation approach to health needs in population needs-based funding models aligns to horizontal 
equity;  
- if the literature’s recommendation that need should be expressed by capacity to benefit (vertical 
equity) is pursued, alternative measures of need are required; 
- do not explicitly measure allocative efficiency –if allocative efficiency is to be promoted it ought to 
be measured / estimated and this will require contextualisation of allocative efficiency to the 
production of health outcomes.   







2.4  PROXY MEASURES OF HEALTH OUTCOMES THAT CAN BE USED AS MEASURES OF 
POPULATION HEALTH NEED FOR USE IN THE HORSt  
In order to advance the literature’s recommendations to position need in the context of vertical 
equity and define it via capacity to benefit, the HORSt will consider different health need proxy 
alternatives to utilisation.  This section now considers measures of health outcomes that may be 
useful for approximating need for health outcomes in the HORSt.   
 
In considering measures of population health needs, it is also useful to examine Bradshaw’s view of 
societal needs.  Bradshaw (1972) outlines four axioms of social need.  The more axioms that apply to 
measures of need, the stronger the need.   These axioms are: 
 Normative need – need defined by experts and evidence; 
 Felt need – need representing the perceptions and experiences by the individual; 
 Expressed need – demanded need (observed access of services); and 
 Comparative need – needs identified by comparison of services or comparison of access 
to services. 
In the context of the need for health care, expressed and comparative need are represented in 
utilisation statistics; however, felt need and normative need are not.  A health outcomes approach 
to need could ideally encompass more of these axioms.   
 
The importance of measuring health outcomes in the context of funding has become more 
important to health systems that have previously focused on improving the technical efficiency of 
the delivery of health interventions (outputs) and now wanting to ensure that interventions yield 
value in improving health outcomes (Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
2019; Colldén & Hellström 2018; Porter 2009).   
 
In Australia health outcomes are defined as: 
“a change in the health of an individual, or a group of people or population, which is wholly or 
partially attributable to an intervention or series of interventions” (Sansoni 2016, p. 7).   
 
Sansoni (2016, p. 8) identifies that health outcome measures can take the form of: 
“clinical/biomedical indicators, health outcome-related performance indicators, standardised clinical 
assessments and patient reported outcome measures (PROMs)”. 
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For developing a measure for the HORSt, it is important to recognize that these health outcome 
measures collected for individuals need to reflect the population.  In this situation Sansoni outlines 
with respect to the health outcomes definition, the change in health status of individuals can be 
aggregated at the population level and a health outcomes performance indicator such as  
“the rate of avoidable adverse events, hospital acquired infection rates, time to treatment rates, 
return to theatre rates and unplanned readmission rates” can be used.   
 
In moving towards the HORSt approach, measures that give an overall representation of the health 
status of the populations’ that can be then considered in the context of populations’ capacity to 
benefit from resources (health needs) so as to afford the opportunity to improve the health 
outcomes of the population are sought.  In other words, a health outcomes performance measure as 
measure of population health status will be used as proxy for population health outcomes and for 
representing health needs.  Such an approach is somewhat congruent with the epidemiological / 
health outcome measures used as needs based components of the population needs based formulas 
presented in table 6 on page 62.  However, as discussed, a distinguishing feature to that of the 
HORSt, is that those formulae used those components to explain utilisation as need.   
 
Health status is defined as; 
“a generic term referring to the health (good or poor) of a person, group or population in a particular 
area” (Segen's Online Medical Dictionary 2011).   
This is a holistic concept representing the wellbeing of a person and is often measured by life 
expectancy or self-assessed health status, degrees of functioning, illness and mental wellbeing 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2015c).  As a fundamental goal of providing health care is 
the improvement of the health status of the population (Palmer & Short 2014, p. 15), this is a 
suitable concept for the research.  Measurable differences in health status amongst geographical 
populations can inform equitable policy regarding resource distribution.  Furthermore, Eagar, 
Garrett and Lin (2001) consider that the health status of geographical populations is an important 
consideration of health care needs assessment.   
 
Four indicators of health status are considered.  They have been selected for consideration for use 
within the HORSt based on being well accepted and documented performance measures of health 
outcomes and or health status.  Measures were also considered because of practicality of collection 
for the case study, NSW.  These are as follows: 
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1. Self-reported health surveys; including Patient reported outcomes (PROMS) and Patient 
Reported Experience Measures (PREMS; 
2. Potentially Preventable Hospitalisations (PPHs);  
3. Charlson Co-Morbidities; and  
4. Standardised Mortality Ratios (SMRs). 
Each of these is critiqued in detail in the following sub sections.  
2.4.1  Self-reported health surveys  
There is broad consensus in the international literature that self-reported health (SRH) surveys are a 
valid and reliable measure of health-related quality of life (HRQoL).  International literature indicates 
that these instruments consistently demonstrate in cross sectional and longitudinal studies across 
populations of diverse socio economic backgrounds that self-appraisal of an individual’s health is a 
powerful predictor of future morbidity and mortality (Appels et al. 1996; Borawski 1996; Chu 2017; 
Idler 1997; Idler 1991; Moreira 2018).   
 
The attributes of SRH in the literature is particularly attractive to the HORSt as a performance 
measure of health outcomes.  Whilst SRH represents one axiom of Bradshaw’s social need (felt 
needs) it could be argued that as a generic performance measure of health outcomes per se that 
SRH is a product of interventions across the continuum of care.   
 
The NSW Ministry of Health has conducted the NSW Adult Population Health Survey annually each 
year (since 1997) and the Child Population Health Survey (since 2001).  This is an ongoing survey of 
the health of people in NSW using computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI).  The main aims 
of the surveys are to provide detailed information on the health of adults and children in NSW and 
to support planning, implementation and evaluation of health services and programs in NSW 
(Population Health 2016). 
 
For analysis, the survey sample was weighted to adjust for differences in the probabilities of 
selection among respondents. Post-stratification weights were used to reduce the effect of differing 
non-response rates among males and females and different age groups on the survey estimates. 
These weights were adjusted for differences between the age and sex structure of the survey 
sample. Population data based on Australian Bureau of Statistics estimates and population 
projections based on data from the NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure have been used 
to calibrate weights to the population within each health LHN and the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
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latest mid-year population estimates (excluding residents of institutions) for LHN (Population Health 
2016). 
 
Whilst the weights could inform the HORSt as a proxy of population health need, advice from the 
NSW Ministry of Health is that it is statistically problematic to determine accurate survey results for 
populations below the LHN level (Harrold 2017).  Given wide ranging variation in social determinants 
across LHNs, lower level geographies of population areas within LHNs (discussed in Chapter Five) 
would be required for the HORSt.  Unfortunately, this means this approach is not achievable for the 
study. 
 
2.4.1.2  Patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) and Patient Reported 
Experience (PREMs)  
Patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) and Patient Reported Experience Measures (PREMs) 
are measures of SRH.  Where SRH surveys, such as the one used in NSW, report on the general 
health of the population, PROMs are instruments that that report on Patient Reported Outcomes.  
PROMs are closely aligned to the definition of health outcomes as they seek to enumerate the 
change in health outcome directly attributable to a health intervention, requiring a survey measure 
to be taken before and after a treatment.  PREMs are instruments that report on the experience of 
the intervention and collected at a single point in time are used to report on aspects of quality and 
safety  (Dawson et al. 2010; Kingsley & Patel 2017; Weldring & Smith 2013).   
 
The HORSt requires a health outcomes performance measure that typifies what the overall health 
status is of the community which reflects the continuum of care.  Sansoni (2016, pp. 26-7) indicates 
that recent developments in the collection of PROMs in Australia have sought to apply generic 
instruments that are compatible with assessment of models of care.  These measures are compatible 
with considering the outcomes of interventions across the continuum of care.  However, in Australia 
the establishment of clinical registries and protocols to collect the data and other PROMs initiatives 
is still in its infancy.  Thompson et al. (2016, p. 3) describes the efforts to date as being “fragmented 
and often isolated”.  The implication for the HORSt is that for this study there is simply not enough 
data at this stage to make a realistic assessment for including PROMs as the measure of population 
health status.   
 
PREMS by virtue of measuring experience, rather than outcomes, precludes their inclusion in the 




2.4.2 PPHs as a proxy for population health status. 
As introduced in Chapter One (page 21), the literature has identified PPHs, evident within 
hospitalisation statistics as markers of health inequality (Falster et al. 2015; Falster et al. 2016).  
Duckett and Griffiths (2016a, p. 1), claim that where PPHs are persistent within geographical 
populations, to which they describe as “hot spots”, they represent entrenched health inequalities 
that without intervention are most likely to endure.   
 
A long standing theory surrounding PPHs was that their occurrence represented a lack of access to 
ambulatory care services, particularly primary care and preventative services (Ansari et al. 2006; 
Falster et al. 2016; Longman et al. 2011; Longman et al. 2015; Page et al. 2007; Victorian Health 
Information Surveillance System 2016).  Duckett and Griffiths (2016a) contemporary work on hot 
spots is congruent with this theory, highlighting populations that are most in need of primary care 
investment interventions and recommend Primary Care Networks (PHNs) develop interventional 
strategies (pp. 37-42).   The hypothesis surrounding PPHs and lack of access is that if appropriate 
access to primary services exists, these potentially avoidable hospitalisations would be minimised.  
“In theory at least, if the condition is treated and/or managed appropriately in the 
community (through public health interventions, in general practice or with other 
community support) the patient is less likely to end up in hospital.  Hospitalisations for 
ACSCs (PPHs8) are therefore considered to be potentially preventable” (Duckett & 
Griffiths 2016a, p. 6). 
However, contemporary Australian evidence refutes this hypothesis, finding that persons presenting 
to hospital with PPHs were found to not have limited access to primary care leading up to their PPH 
admission.  In fact, these patients were found to be prolific uses of multiple elements of the health 
system prior to their admission.  PPHs therefore are conditions associated with sicker patients 
(Falster et al. 2015; Falster et al. 2016).  A logical extension of this finding is that PPHs may not be as 
avoidable as first thought through primary care interventions, although this cannot be confirmed 
without consideration as to the effectiveness of the health care received prior to admission and the 
health of the patient which is not evident in the contemporary literature.  
 
                                                            
 
8 Duckett and Griffith use the term ACSCs.  
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Advocates in the literature for moving away from utilisation approaches to health needs have 
supported the development of morbidity measures to reflect need (Asthana & Gibson 2011; Asthana 
et al. 2004).  PPHs certainly do reflect on the basis of the evidence presented a generic morbidity 
metric of health status. 
 
Similar to the other data of health inequalities presented in Chapter One, PPHs are shown in the 
international and Australian literature to be strongly correlated with socioeconomic status with 
evidence showing a strong link between high rates of PPHs and socioeconomic disadvantage (Agabiti 
et al. 2009; Butler et al. 2013; Roos et al. 2005; Trachtenberg et al. 2014; Weeks et al. 2016).  
Consistent with this, high rates of PPHs are observed to be prolonged amongst socioeconomically 
disadvantaged communities (Duckett & Griffiths 2016a; Falster et al. 2015).   
 
Tackling health inequities is an ongoing priority for Commonwealth and state governments 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a; Holland 2014; NSW Department of Health 2004) 
and reducing PPHs are part of that challenge.  In Australia there are 22 categories of PPHs 
recognised within the National Health Care Agreement for action by Commonwealth and state 
governments, divided into three broad categories of Acute, Chronic and Vaccine Preventable 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017b).   These are listed in appendix 1.   
 
In the context of NSW, figures 8 and 9 (pages 78 and 79) illustrate the health inequalities within 
populations via standardised rates of PPHs.  Specifically, the example in Figure 9 shows the rate of 
PPHs for Acute, Chronic, Vaccine Preventable and All PPHs by NSW LHN in 2015/16 in number and 
by directly age gender standardised rate per 100,000 population.  The age gender standardised rate 
for all categories of PPHs is also shown by quintiles of socioeconomic disadvantage in Figure 9 
(Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).   
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Figure 8 Source: (Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).  
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Figure 9   2015-16 NSW PPHs, Acute, Chronic, Vaccine Preventable and Total by ABS Socioeconomic disadvantage quintiles 
  
  
Figure 9  Source: (Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).  
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Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate the wide-ranging differences in the rate of PPHs across the NSW Health 
Districts and concur with the literature’s findings that the most socioeconomically disadvantage 
quintiles within populations have much higher rates of age gender standardised PPHs than more 
socioeconomically advantaged quintiles.  
 
In summary the literatures findings regarding PPHs is that they:  
 are markers of health inequality (aligning with definitional criteria of health inequities 
presented in Chapter One);  
 are representative of sicker patients;  
 occur after the abundant consumption of resources across the continuum of care; and 
 correlate with socioeconomic status, a social determinant of health outcomes. 
Furthermore, PPHs represent three of the four categories of Bradshaw’s framework of social needs 
i.e.   
 PPHs reflected normative need; experts and evidence consider them health conditions that 
should be avoided.  As such they are required to be reported and used as performance and 
quality indicators for state health systems (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
2017b). 
 PPHs reflect comparative need; to reiterate they are considered in comparison across small 
population areas as markers of inequality (Duckett & Griffiths 2016a).  
 PPHs reflect expressed need.  “A community or person who uses a lot of services is assumed 
to have high need” (Marosszeky et al. 2006, p. 4). 
From this summary, it is reasonable to consider rates of age-standardised PPHs in small area 
populations as a proxy measure for poor population health status that can be used with the 
HORSt.  Chapters Four and Five explores in more detail how PPHs can be utilised within the 
HORSt so as to represent a desirable level of population health outcomes.  
 
2.4.3  Charlson comorbidity as a proxy measure for geographical population health 
status 
Valderas et al. (2009, p. 357) describes comorbidity as being: 




Comorbidities are evident within Australian public hospital administrative data sets (Quan et al. 
2011).  A measure of comorbidities may serve as a measurable proxy of geographical population 
health status.  Whilst there are many approaches for assessing comorbidities within administrative 
data sets, the Charlson index is the most widely applied and validated (de Groot et al. 2003; Hall 
2006; Nadathur 2011). 
 
Charlson’s index was initially used to predict mortality based on 19 predefined comorbidities, that 
were weighted 1,2,3 or 6, with weighting based on ratio of hazard / severity, with the higher score 
indicating a higher burden of disease (Charlson et al. 1987).  These are summarised in appendix 2.  
However, the use of the index has been varied over time, where it has been used to predict burden 
of disease, length of stay and health system costs (Charlson et al. 2014; Nadathur 2011).  Latter 
studies have utilised a set of ICD-10 codes (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems 10th Revision), which all Australian hospitals use, to identify hospital 
separations exhibiting comorbidities (Nadathur 2011). 
 
Similar to PPHs, the literature indicates that comorbidity is inversely related to socioeconomic status 
(Chang et al. 2016).  This makes their use as a proxy of geographical population health status 
attractive to the HORSt, whereby it would be expected that higher rates of observed comorbidity 
would exist where the social determinants of health care are poor.  However, the use of a 
comorbidity index, poses a number of challenges for the proposed HORSt, including isolating 
hospital acquired comorbidities (a measure of poor quality) and age gender adjusting the 
comorbidities as there is a known correlation in the literature between age and comorbidity 
(Naessens et al. 2007; Yurkovich et al. 2015).  Nonetheless, Charlson Co-morbidity rates from with 
state health hospital data collections can be utilised as a proxy measure of small area populations’ 
health status.  Methodology and data feasibility for including them within the HORSt in this context 
is explored in more detail in Chapters Four and Five.  
2.4.4  Standardised Mortality Ratios (SMRs) 
As outlined in the section on population needs-based funding models (page 52), the use of SMRs in 
these instruments is well established.  Typically, premature mortality is used for SMRs below an age 
limit.  The first version of the RAWP in England used this as sole indicator of health need and the 
many other models, including the former NSW RDF have at some stage used this measure (see Table 




An important issue that becomes apparent from the literature is that there is conjecture as to 
whether or not mortality actually represents need and if mortality is a need indicator itself, or as in 
the examples provided in Table 6, an indicator that explains utilisation where utilisation is the proxy 
of need.  The original English RAWP, Italian and Scottish models use mortality as needs adjuster with 
no reference to utilisation, whereas the former RDF formally made a link whereby utilisation 
representing morbidity would be associated with higher rates of mortality (Bedard et al. 2000; Rice 
& Smith 1999).  The RAWP model evolution from the SMR as the sole indicator of need to a model 
that reflected utilisation was because it was viewed that the SMR did not reflect the demand for 
health care associated with chronic disease and social deprivation (Asthana et al. 2004; Barr et al. 
2014; Carr-Hill & Sheldon 1992).   
 
Notwithstanding the literatures views on the use of mortality as a need indicator, mortality ratios 
are a population health outcome measure.  Sansoni (2016, p. 20) highlights that there are some 
important considerations for their use being:  
“they are not particularly responsive to the change in delivery of health care, as for many conditions 
it may take some years for the reduction in mortality, or increase in years of survival, to become 
apparent”.  
 
Contextualised to operationalising the HORSt as resource distribution tool and funding enabler to 
improve health outcomes and health inequities, the use of a premature SMR to do so is problematic.  
First there are strong arguments in the literature that the measure does reflect needs and social 
determinants of health outcomes.  Second, premature SMRs may not be the best measure for 
recurrent funding distribution or as an enabler for improving health outcomes that involve 
improving morbidity outcomes.  In light of these arguments and those in this literature review that 
champion an alternative method to utilisation of approximating need, the HORSt will not consider 
the SMR as the health outcomes proxy measure of need.  Although given the widespread use of the 
SMR as a predictor of utilisation, the SMR will be assessed for its predictive strength of the health 




Summary of key findings section 2.4 - Proxy measures of health outcomes that can be used as 
measures of population health need for use in the HORSt: 
-Population health status performance measures can be utilised as a proxy for population health 
outcomes. 
-Morbidity measures such as rates of PPHs and Charlson Comorbidities could be used in place of 
utilisation as measures of population health needs.  Higher rates would indicate higher rates of 
illness.   
-Higher rates of PPHs and Charlson-Comorbidities correlate with poorer social determinants of 
health and vice versa. 
-Rates of PPHs are well established health outcomes performance measures, utilised by the 
Australian Governments and states.   






2.5  USING BENCHMARKED OUTCOMES FOR ENABLING EQUITY IN AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC 
SCHOOL EDUCATION – THE GONSKI SCHOOL RESOURCING STANDARD  
Many of these issues identified in the Australian health care system are equally relevant to the 
funding provisions of other Australian state government responsibilities.  There are strong parallels 
between publicly provided health care and publicly provided school education in Australia.  Both are 
constitutionally prescribed under Australia’s federalism as a state government responsibility and 
both are a mix of public and private providers, whereby private providers are publicly subsidised by 
the taxpayer (Parliament of Australia 2015).  Furthermore, many of the social determinants of health 
that give rise to health inequities and poorer health outcomes are also observed to cause barriers to 
educational outcomes (Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008b, p. 57; Marmot 2005, p. 
1100).  Given this, in developing the HORSt, it is appropriate to consider funding models that have 
been developed for the equitable distribution of public funding for schools in Australia.  The 
following section discuss funding models developed for public funding distributions for schools’ 
education in the Australian context and critique these models for applicability to developing the 
HORSt. 
2.5.1 Gonski’s School Resourcing Standard 
Given the similar governance and funding arrangements and equity and efficiency issues in school 
education in Australia to that of the public health system, unsurprisingly similar challenges of public 
funding resource distribution occur.  In response to this in 2010 the Rudd Labor Government 
established a review of school funding chaired by David Gonksi (Gonski et al. 2011, p. xi).  
Analogously to health where Medicare benefits (taxpayer funds) are observed to be 
disproportionately used across locations to fund private doctors (Bickerdyke et al. 2002, p. 212; 
Eckermann & Sheridan 2016, p. 512), Gonksi observed that school funding in Australia is also 
disproportionate with some private schools getting more funding from taxpayers than needed 
(Gonski et al. 2011, p. xvi).  In terms of inequities of educational outcomes Gonski’s review of 
funding for schools found that:   
“The key dimensions of disadvantage that are having a significant impact on 
educational performance in Australia are socioeconomic status, indigeneity, English 
language proficiency, disability and school remoteness” (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 122). 
 
Whilst Gonksi et.al made forty-one recommendations, a key aspect of these is the development of a 
School Resourcing Standard (SRS).  This outlines a mechanism to redistribute resources to address 
social determinants that act as barriers to academic achievement (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 225; 
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Parliament of Australia 2015).  The Gonksi SRS has at its starting point, educational outcomes using 
the National Assessment Program—Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) assessment results (Gonski et 
al. 2011, p. 68).   
 
The Gonski et al (2011) SRS approach is only concerned with recurrent funding, not capital (p. 162).  
The SRS in Figure 10 shows the basic operation of the SRS.  This involves establishing references 
schools where NAPLAN results are considered to be at an acceptable level and where the social 
determinants to educational outcomes for these schools and their students are favourable and not 
considered barriers to academic achievement.  This is analogous to a benchmark.  Regression 
techniques are then used with all sources of school funding (public and private) to benchmark a 
reference cost per student for these outcomes (pp. 255-6).   Further regression analysis then 
prescribes loadings to be paid to schools where NAPLAN outcomes are below the reference level and 
the social determinants of educational outcomes are unfavourable (low socio-economic status, 
indigeneity, low level of English, disability and rural remote location).  These loadings are paid on top 
of the reference level (pp. 257-9).  These loadings constitute vertical equity adjustments; reflecting 
that greater resources should be applied to those who have a greater capacity to benefit, a greater 
need.  
 
Figure 10   The Gonksi SRS  
 
Figure 10 above is Figure 50 in the Gonski Review of School Funding (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 154).  The 
box on the left-hand side of Figure 10 reflects a benchmark level of resource per student from public 
and private resources to achieve a benchmarked level of educational outcomes that are desirable.  
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Where social determinants are observed in geographical areas to be a barrier to achieving the 
benchmarked outcomes, schools in these geographical areas financial receiving loadings (right-hand 
Figure 10) on top of the benchmarked resources identified. 
 
Making outcomes the focus is an attractive alternative approach to state health funding models that 
have heavily focused on efficiency of funding services rather than outcomes.  i.e.  
“The Gonski report provides a completely different lens through which to view, measure and fund 
service systems.  It is a view that is almost completely counter to the way governments and policy 
makers currently approach health systems.  The most fundamental difference is that Gonski 
begins with a focus on student achievement of real education outcomes. In health, we are still 
stuck trying to look at throughputs and costs – an almost entirely provider focused approach 
where actual health outcomes are not even measured.  We are trying to run the system more 
efficiently, but take no real account of health outcomes” (Bennett 2012). 
 
The principles of Gonksi for school education has been very popular with the public in Australia 
(Aston 2016).  However, criticisms do exist.  These are: the additional funding for schools 
recommended has been argued to be unaffordable; and the ability of schools receiving extra 
resources to spend the money efficiently has been questioned (Jensen 2013; Slater 2016).  However, 
using a Gonski approach to a state health resourcing tool like the HORSt, it is not envisaged that 
these criticisms would be sustained, given that the intent of the HORSt is to act as the first step in 
the funding model, utilising ABF as the second to promote technical efficiency. 
 
Given the similar challenges of resource distribution and similar social determinants that give rise to 
inequities in school education and health outcomes, the use of the Gonski SRS, with its benchmarked 
productivity approach of assessing a wide range of funding inputs and social determinants affects 
upon desirable and measurable outputs, is an attractive conceptual and methodological approach to 
developing the HORSt as a funding model that can promote allocative efficiency and equity of state 
health distributions to LHNs.  Setting a level of benchmarked outcomes for the whole population is 
congruent with the social justice views of Rawls and Daniel discussed in section 2.1 (page 37) 
whereby it is just that society affords each member the opportunity to have a decent minimum level 




Summary of key findings section 2.5  
Using benchmarked outcomes for enabling equity in Australian public-school education – The 
Gonski school resourcing standard  
-State public school funding faces similar governance and funding challenges and resourcing 
decisions as that of the state public health sector. 
-Gonski school education “school resourcing standard” uses an outcomes-based approach to assess 
students’ needs.  
- School resourcing standard (SRS) - applies a benchmark to outcomes 
- SRS utilises a broad approach to considering funding inputs to be included in the determination of 
the productivity of outcomes and the resourcing share of funding required by the state government 
- Recommends school resourcing shares of funding be based on social determinants that affect 
achievement of the benchmarked outcomes.  
 
Populations that are allocative efficient in the production of desirable health outcomes can serve as 
benchmark.  Resource distribution can be informed by redistributing funding to population’s that 
have poor allocative efficiency compared to the benchmark, due to poor social determinants of 
health that affect allocative efficiency.  Doing so represents a funding enabler on the basis of 
capacity to benefit and is congruent to social justice theories by Rawls and Daniels.  
 
2.6  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The Conceptual Framework for this study is presented in Figure 11 (page 88).  This shows the 
connections between the literature’s findings, the study aims and research questions and the 





Figure 11   Conceptual Framework for the study 
Literature – Findings / Gaps / Opportunities Aims Research Questions Methodology development / 
processes to address research 
questions 
Resource distribution to enable improvement in equity and 
outcomes justified by theories of social justice  
 
Need in health care best expressed in terms of capacity to benefit 
(vertical equity) rather than utilisation (horizontal equity). 
 
Efficiency (all types) can be improved by moving away from siloed 
approaches to funding and considering continuum of care  
 
Cost and ABF funding models do not advance equity or improved 
outcomes or allocative efficiency 
 
Population needs-based models implicitly enable equity and 
allocative efficiency yet can be improved to more transparently do 
so via measuring allocative efficiency of health outcomes.  Doing so 
involves establishing benchmark and considering resource inputs 
involved in the production of health outcomes across the 
continuum of care – not just from within the state health silo.  
Doing so ends a reliance of need being approximated by utilisation 
and is congruent with need expressed as capacity to benefit. 
 
Population measures of health status, using measures of morbidity 
(PPHs and Charlson rates) can be used as a health outcomes proxy. 
 
Gonski SRS – demonstrates in school education that a benchmark 
approach – placing outcomes at centre of the model and then 
considering social determinants that affect the benchmark to 
inform needs-based funding is viable.  
AIM 1- Develop the 
HORSt as a parsimonious, 
measurable and 
consistent benchmark of 
desirable health 
outcomes for states’ 
LHNs’ populations, 
relative to funding inputs 
across the continuum of 
care, to promote 
allocative efficiency and 
equity across 
populations. 
What measures / data of health 
status can best represent an 
acceptable level of desirable health 
outcomes for populations that can 
inform a benchmark? 
 
What health service funding inputs 
should be included to represent the 
continuum of care? 
 
What methodology should be applied 
to derive the benchmark? 
Identify data sources to best represent 
benchmarked outcomes (PPHs or Charlson 
rates) as per literature review. 
 
Identify / justify a benchmarking 
methodology. 
 
The benchmark should be a measure of the 
allocative efficiency of the outcomes 
variable and in doing so incorporate 
variables that represent the resourcing 
inputs across the continuum of care. 
AIM 2: Identify and 
incorporate measures of 
local geographical 
population health needs 
that can be used in 
resource allocation 
decisions. 
What are appropriate measures of 
population need that could be 
applied to support the HORSt? 
Identify / justify variables that best predict 
/ affect the populations’ ability to achieve 
allocative efficiency of desired health 
outcomes 
 
Identify / justify a predictive methodology 
 
AIM 3: Identify the share 
and quantum of taxpayer 
resources provided by the 
state to geographical 
populations to maximise 
equity of health funding 
across the continuum of 
care to act as an enabler 
to improve equity of 
health outcomes. 
What share of funding is required for 
each geographical population to 
adjust for population health needs to 
maximise equity of health funding 
across the continuum of care? 
 
What quantum of funding is required 
to be adjusted by the state from the 
existing pool of resources used by 
each? 
Developing health need indices from the 
need variables that can act as population 
weights to inform resource distribution. 
 
Identifying and justifying the pool of funds 
across the continuum of care that the need 
indices should be applied too. 
 
Calculating the state share of needs-based 




2.7  CHAPTER SUMMARY - GAPS, ISSUES, OPPORTUNITIES, WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED IN 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The literature critiqued in this chapter has illustrated several key issues and consistent findings that 
are pertinent to the development of the HORSt and the advancement of improving the equitable 
distribution of state health funding amongst LHNs, whilst supporting the efficiency goals of ABF.  
Gaps, issues, opportunities and weaknesses identified in the literature are presented in summary 
and examined in the subsections below.  As is apparent findings and implications from each of the 
literature reviews sections are interrelated and somewhat overlap.  For brevity this summary 
synthesises these issues.   
 
Vertical equity and need 
From a social justice perspective, the literature demonstrates that Daniel’s extension of Rawlsian 
views of just resource distribution for affording opportunities to improve equity in health outcomes 
are aligned to needs defined by capacity to benefit, which is how the literature describes the most 
appropriate way to consider need.  However, the practical approach to doing so in Australia under 
Medicare principles is more aligned to the promotion of equality via equal access.   
 
Funding models and tools employed at the state level in Australia are equally lacking in addressing 
population needs in terms of capacity to benefit which is consistent with the international 
literature’s findings that the majority of funding models that have sought to advance population 
need have done so via expressing need as health system use.  This represents a gap in the literature 
where vertical equity approaches within funding instruments to tackling just population needs-based 
resource distribution have been underutilised.  Hence there is scope to represent need in terms of 
capacity to benefit in the context of vertical equity within the HORSt. 
 
Efficiency and the continuum of care 
Segments of the international literature that purport a trade-off between equity and efficiency are 
unhelpful for policy makers, whereby the trade-off argument may convey views that population 
needs-based tools promoting equity may be doing so at the opportunity cost of compromising 
efficiency.  The literature review demonstrated that the trade-off argument needs qualification 
whereby the policy pursuit of equity and efficiency is a deliberative complementary process and that 




The structural funding and governance arrangements also can affect the pursuit of equity, where 
policy is set within demarcated areas to produce outputs.  The lack of attention for resource 
distribution funding instruments aligned to payment for the improvement of health outcomes 
represents a significant gap in the literature.  Developing funding models that consider the 
productive contributions of health service outputs to health outcomes across the continuum of care 
is essential for improving allocative efficiency.  
 
Gonski recognised that school outputs were a function of social determinants of education and the 
productivity of funding inputs from all sources of school funding (public and private).  Similarly, it is 
logical to represent the continuum of care in the HORSt in terms of social determinants of health 
and the productivity of funding inputs from as many measurable and reliable sources across the 
continuum of care of the multi-layer mixed public / private health system.  Gonski recognised the 
importance of this functional relationship in the school resourcing standard, via approaching the 
needs-based problem in the context of productivity via a benchmark.  The HORSt seeks to do the 
same.  
 
Funding models – Equity and Efficiency 
ABF can promote technical efficiency.  However, current cost based and ABF models cannot advance 
equity.  Cost models promote the status quo and ABF can, if left unchecked, overproduce.   
 
Population needs-based funding act as enablers to implicitly improve allocative efficiency of 
resource distribution and improve health outcomes.  However, need is almost exclusively expressed 
by utilisation, expressed demand and resource allocation is guided by weighting population shares 
according to variables that predict utilisation.  These models do not explicitly improve allocative 
efficiency and none of the literature seeks to measure allocative efficiency.   
 
Opportunities exist for the HORSt to consider measuring allocative efficiency.  This will require 
considering the productive inputs across the continuum of care to produce a desirable level of 
health outcomes.  Developing a benchmark for the HORSt as per the Gonski SRS is a sensible and just 
approach.  Doing so will involve considering a proxy measure for the health status of the population 
as proxy of health outcomes.  Resource distribution population shares can be weighted for variables 




Variables to approximate health system need via population health status 
The use of PPHs or Charlson Co-Morbidities from within state health inpatient statistics affords the 
use of a health outcomes approach.  Both metrics are shown in the literature to represent sicker 
patients and within populations are makers of poor health status. 
 
Benchmarking outcomes – Gonksi experience  
The similar issues that have arisen in publicly subsidised education in Australia, regarding fairness of 
resource distribution and the contemporary approach by Gonski, demonstrates an opportunity for 
the development of a HORSt as a resource distribution tool for health care with a focus on health 
outcomes.  Doing so would substantially differentiate the HORSt to previous population needs-based 
models in health that have approximated need by health system access (use).  Doing so would also 
promote vertical equity and define need by capacity to benefit.   
 
Given the public support for the Gonski SRS which has shifted the focus on educational outcomes, 
the HORSt designed upon similar conceptual and methodological underpinnings would make publicly 




CHAPTER THREE – REVIEW OF GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS OF 
TAXPAYER PROVIDED AND SUBSIDISED HEALTH CARE IN AUSTRALIA  
3.0  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One provided an overview to funding and governance arrangements of the mixed public / 
private Australian Health Care system.  This section provides a critique of the specific funding and 
governance arrangements that embody the Australian health care system, examining the origins and 
operation of the mixed public private system in the context of public funding and public 
subsidisation from the Australian and state governments.  Contextualised to the literature review 
and conceptual framework for developing the HORSt in Chapter Two, the advancement of equity 
and efficiency within each layer of publicly provided and subsidised health care is examined, along 
with relevant legislative issues that bound the Australian federal system of government.  
Characteristics of the funding and governance arrangements that are relevant to the development of 
the HORSt at the state level across the continuum of care are identified and appraised for their 
inclusion in the model’s methodology and for feasibility as data sources.  Discussion is organised 
under the following sections that consider taxpayer funding distributions between: 
 Commonwealth and states; 
 Commonwealth and private providers via the MBS; 
 Commonwealth and private insurers; 
 Commonwealth / states and clients of the NDIS; and 
 Commonwealth and private individuals for the PBS. 
Out-of-pocket costs paid by individuals are also examined.  
3.1  GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING DISTRIBUTIONS FROM COMMONWEALTH TO STATES 
The Australian Constitution came into effect in 1901 and established Commonwealth and state 
powers (Parliament Education Office 2015a, p. 4).  Prior to World War Two (WWII), both 
Commonwealth and states collected income taxes.  However, in 1942 due to the financial 
requirements of the war effort, the Commonwealth sought to become the sole collector of income 
tax, compensating states for their loss of tax revenue in the form of conditional funding grants.  The 
Commonwealth legislation sought was challenged in the High Court by four states but found to be 
constitutionally sound in what was called the “Uniform Tax case 1942” (Parliament Education Office 
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2015b; The Constitutional Centre of Western Australia 2015).  Whilst employed as a wartime 
measure for the duration of the war plus one year, this arrangement was sought by the Chifley 
government in 1946 to continue indefinitely and despite several high court challenges since this 
arrangement remains (Boxall & Gillespie 2013, p. 25; Burton et al. 2002, p. 15). 
 
The Commonwealth’s initial health responsibilities were limited to quarantine issues (Eagar et al. 
2001, p. 26).  However, an amendment to section 51 of the Australian Constitution in 1946 which 
allowed the Commonwealth to make financial provisions for social services, including health 
benefits, was achieved through referendum.  Specifically, the amendment sought:  
“The provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment, 
unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental 
services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription), benefits to students 
and family allowances" (Australian Senate 1946).  
The provision of public hospital services however, still resided thereafter with state governments 
with no explicit Commonwealth power to administer public hospitals or to make laws for public 
hospitals (Scully 2009).   
 
The ceding of income taxes in 1942 solely to the Commonwealth is considered to be a watershed 
moment for vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) in Australia (Burton et al. 2002).  VFI occurs whereby the 
Commonwealth government’s ability to raise revenues exceeds its spending responsibilities and the 
state governments have insufficient revenues from their own sources to finance spending 
responsibilities (Department of Finance 2014).  Mathews and Jay (1972, p. 191) described the 
impacts of the imbalance on the states in both fiscal and policy terms; 
“not only had the Commonwealth government, with its vast wartime powers, become 
used to taking unilateral action with respect to decisions affecting the prosecution and 
financing of the war, the control of the war-time economy and the arrangements for 
post-war reconstruction; its assumption of uniform income tax powers had given it the 
fiscal supremacy to pursue the centripetal policies.”   
This new power and fiscal might wielded by the Commonwealth government had the direct result of 
states becoming more dependent upon Commonwealth funding for all areas of state responsibilities, 
including the provision of public hospital services.  The Commonwealth’s desire to influence state 
policy, despite having no constitutional power to administer public hospitals, has increased with the 




The key instrument of Commonwealth influence in state health funding policy is the funding 
agreements with the states.  Known previously as the Medicare agreement, the Australian Health 
Care Agreement (AHCA) and more recently as the National Health Reform Agreement (NHRA), these 
agreements establish principles, standards and expectations of access, service and volume that 
states have to follow (Parliament of Australia 2014; Paterson 2002, p. 313).  The agreements ensure 
that states uphold Medicare principles, being: 
 “Medicare eligible persons are to be given the choice to receive, free of charge as public 
patients, health and emergency services of a kind or kinds that are currently, or were 
historically provided by hospitals; 
 access to such services by public patients free of charge is to be on the basis of clinical need 
and within a clinically appropriate period; and  
 arrangements are to be in place to ensure equitable access to such services for all eligible 
persons, regardless of their geographic location”  
(Council of Australian Governments 2011, p. 5). 
The Medicare principles are statements of equity to be adhered to by the states.  As introduced in 
the equity section of the literature review, these principles broadly align with the concept of 
horizontal equity, given the strong focus on equality of access.  However, the universality of 
Medicare in the context of clinical need is also aligned to vertical equity, as patients who have more 
severe illnesses are not denied access to greater resources, they require than those with lesser 
clinical need.  Consistent with Medicare’s strong focus on equity, Duckett (2000, p. 224) has 
described the Australian health care system’s “quest for equity” as being a pivotal issue since the 
1960’s.  He contends that equity of access has been the principal driver of reforms that has 
ultimately culminated in the contemporary Medicare system, which is; 
“designed to ensure that all Australians have equal access to care in public systems” (p. 
xxi). 
 
Up until 2012, the mechanism of distributing what constitutes an equitable share of Commonwealth 
funding to the states to address the VFI occurs via funding transfer agreements called Specific 
Purpose Payments (SPPs).  These cover: health; schools; housing; indigenous affairs; disability 
services; skills; and training development (Commonwealth Grants Commission 2015).  Funding 
transfers for SPPs are subject to negotiation between the Commonwealth and states, (including the 
health care agreements as discussed).  The quantity of the funds supplied, which are distributed 
amongst the states, are subject to recommendations by the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
(CGC).  The CGC considers the population needs of each state relative to the average need of the 
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population across all states.  Population need is largely assessed on per capita criteria 
(Commonwealth Grants Commission 2015).   
 
Negotiations between Commonwealth and states for the health funding agreements are often 
prolonged, political and at times acrimonious.  Common sources of conflict surround the size of the 
Commonwealth’s financial contribution to the states and attempts by both parties to actively “cost 
shift” patients and their costs between privately provided taxpayer subsidised Medicare services and 
that of public hospitals and vice versa (Duckett 2004a, p. 2; Maiden 2010; Milne 2010).  Cost-shifting 
has been described as a central cause of buck passing between jurisdictions, with the buck passing 
described as “the blame game” (Standing Committee on Health and Ageing 2006, p. 40).  Severe 
penalties in terms of withholding hundreds of millions of dollars of Commonwealth funding can and 
have been applied to state breaches of the Medicare principles underpinning these agreements 
(Auditor-General 2007, p. 49; Parliament of Australia 1998).  
 
Improved health outcomes are not the result of a siloed differentiated production line of health care 
from either Commonwealth or state responsibilities, however as identified in the literature review 
are affected by patient’s access and interaction with the continuum of care.  Therefore, it would be 
naïve to consider that all forms of cost shifting are undesirable.  Cost shifting, whilst being expedient 
to the bottom line of either state or Commonwealth budgets, can actually benefit improved patient 
outcomes and the overall efficiency of taxpayer funding considered in totality rather than in terms of 
demarcated Commonwealth and state budgets.  The continuum of care is logically independent of 
issues of who pays for what, but nonetheless impacted upon by the governance of payment 
arrangements.   
 
In the Australian context, within the continuum of care, primary care services delivered privately by 
general practitioners (GPs) and subsidised by the Commonwealth government are more cost 
effective than allowing for illness to progress to where it requires hospital interventions.  They are 
also more cost effective than the use of a hospital emergency department in lieu of access to a GP 
(Eckermann 2014a).   In response to this, state health systems have an incentive to work 
collaboratively with other levels of the health system outside of their control.  State health systems 
seek to engage the other parts of the continuum by strategies of “integrated care” (Kodner & 
Spreeuwenberg 2002, p. 1).   
 
Integrated care refers to:  
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“the provision of seamless, effective and efficient care that reflects the whole of a 
person’s health needs, from prevention through to end of life, across physical and 
mental health, in partnership with the individual, their carers and family and across 
public/private and Commonwealth/ State boundaries” (Office of the Secretary 2015, p. 
15).    
NSW Health for example, has made concentrated efforts in recent years to invest in hospital 
avoidance and integrated care strategies, culminating with its 2015 State Health Plan goal of 
“keeping people healthy and out of hospital” (Office of the Secretary 2015, p. 8).  However, doing so 
could also be branded as cost shifting by the Commonwealth, if the benefits of investing in the 
continuum of care are ignored.  
 
From 2012, the Rudd Labor Government replaced the CGC health funding distribution to states by 
using ABF.  All states and territories were required to be part of a NHRA whereby the 
Commonwealth’s contribution to states was linked to state public hospital activity based on an 
efficient price for hospital services determined by the Independent Hospital Pricing Authority (IHPA) 
(Council of Australian Governments 2011).  ABF’s key expected improvements were the coordination 
of a nationally transparent methodology for paying for public hospital outputs and the promoting 
and incentivising of technical efficiency through paying for outputs at a benchmarked price (Health 
Policy Solutions et al. 2011).  This provided the Commonwealth with an incentive to encourage 
states to shift patients into more cost efficient primary care and was sought therefore as a solution 
to ending the blame game (Duckett 2013, 2014).    
 
Eagar et al (2011) suggested that the ending of the blame game through National Health reform 
strategies encourages an environment of dynamic efficiency whereby there are opportunities for the 
innovation and integration of successful programs that cross the continuum of care.  From 2017 
onwards however, the Abbott / Turnbull Liberal Government dropped the link to activity for state 
hospital funding and essentially replaced it with similar principles of the previous CGC model.  
Funding from Commonwealth to states provides revenues that support the state’s budgets which 
include a provision for the state health budget (Parliament of Australia 2014). 
 
Implementing the HORSt as a tool to guide state distributions to LHNs does require being compatible 
with the Medicare principles governing Commonwealth funding to states.  Population needs-based 
funding models previously used in NSW and QLD (discussed in section 2.3 page 52) spanned some 22 
years and 4 years respectively (Ho 2001; Slater 2014).  During this time, they coexisted amicably with 
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the Medicare principles of the respective AHCAs without incurring any breach of the agreements 
and it follows that the HORSt acting as a similar mechanism does not require any regulatory reform 
between Commonwealth and states.   
3.2  TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES FROM COMMONWEALTH TO PRIVATE DOCTORS 
Private health care in Australia is dominated by General Practitioners (GPs) and Specialists.  Whilst 
publicly subsidised by the taxpayer through Medicare, the distribution of these private services, with 
the exception of incentivising doctors to work in locations of need such as the Rural Health 
Workforce Strategy (Department of Health 2013), has not been subject to a distributive equity 
mechanism.  The defining rationale for why this is so, relates back to the 1946 social services 
referendum.  
 
Apart from providing the Commonwealth with new powers to provide health benefits, the 1946 
amendment to section 51 of the constitution was also a significant step towards enshrining the 
mixed public / private Australian health care system, as it guaranteed (save for future changes to the 
constitution) the freedom of private practice of Australian doctors.  Sought by lobbying from the 
British Medical Association (BMA)9, the anti-conscription clause that was included in the amendment 
allowed for the Commonwealth to provide:  
“medical and dental services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription)” 
(Australian Senate 1946); 
was designed to; 
“avoid doctors being conscripted into government service” (Browning 2000).   
 
The high court has confirmed the purpose of the anti-conscription clause and the limits it places on 
the ability of the Commonwealth government to reform the public / private mixed system in the 
future.  i.e. In Wong v Commonwealth the high court found that in reference to section 51 xxiii of 
the constitution that: 
“A civil conscription guarantee should be construed widely and that it would invalidate federal laws 
requiring providers of medical and dental services (either expressly or by practical compulsion) to 
work for the federal government or any specified State, agency or private industrial employer.  This 
                                                            
 
9 The Australian Medical Association (AMA) was formed from merged branches of the BMA in 1962 (Australian 
Medical Association 2016). 
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decision is likely to restrict the capacity of any future federal government to restructure the 
Australian health care system, e.g. by implementing recommendations from the National Health 
and Hospitals Reform Commission for either federal government or private corporate control of 
presently State-run public hospitals” (Faunce 2009, p. 196, emphasis added). 
 
As a result of this seminal legislative protection from forced employment, private practitioners 
choosing their location and establishing their own fee structure can create financial and 
geographical barriers to people accessing primary and secondary care (McRae & van Gool 2017).  
The power of the medical establishment in avoiding controlling government influences in Australia is 
significant and a key challenge to reform and the advancement of a more equitably distributed 
health system (Boxall & Gillespie 2013; Palmer & Short 2014).   
 
Despite the significant power of the medical establishment in Australia, according to Boxall and 
Gillespie (2013, pp. 10-1), the medical workforce is not always aligned to the self-interested political 
directions taken by the medical establishment.  Furthermore, there is a long history in Australia of 
beneficent doctors actively price discriminating advantageously for patients of limited financial 
means (Johar 2012). 
 
The payment system to private practitioners via taxpayer subsidisation (Medicare) is also an 
important consideration of the advancement of equity and efficiency.   Medicare, as a fee-for-service 
model to pay for services of private practitioners (Department of Human Services 2015), is an 
output-basedmodel like ABF.  Therefore, as discussed, there are incentives to over produce.  
However, unlike an ABF model at the state level with the state budget acting as the ultimate 
resource constraint above it and the states allowed to ration services under the second Medicare 
principle on the basis of clinical need, the Medicare payment system for private practitioners is 
somewhat open-ended with physicians acting as gatekeepers to the volume of services delivered 
(Webber 2012).   
 
The information asymmetry between clinicians and patients, where clinicians are imperfect agents 
to their patients can also support the over production and commonly this situation in the literature 
is referred to as Supplier Induced Demand (Bickerdyke et al. 2002, p. 12; Eckermann & Sheridan 
2016, p. 512; Mcguire et al. 1994, p. 36).  As such, the fee-for-service model does not encourage 
allocative efficiency and combined with the freedom of practice in locations that suit the doctor, the 
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model does not advance equity.  Furthermore, as an episodic funding model, it is not designed to 
support improvements in integrated care (Boxall & Gillespie 2013, p. 175).  
 
Medicare pays private practitioners contributions towards each service via the MBS.  For non-
hospital services, Medicare covers services for doctors, specialists, optometrists and in specific 
circumstances, dentists and other allied health practitioners on a fee-for-service basis up to a 
schedule fee set out by the MBS.  Beyond the schedule fee the patient is liable for out-of-pocket 
charges set by the practitioner (Department of Human Services 2015).   
 
If the patient elects to be a private patient in a public or private hospital, Medicare covers 75% of the 
MBS fee for services and procedures.  Medical practitioner charges beyond this are the responsibility 
of the patient, as are hospital accommodation and items such as theatre fees and medicines.  PHI 
can reimburse the remaining 25% of the schedule fee and the accommodation and medical costs 
(Department of Human Services 2015).   
 
The MBS payments for each consultation, as the universal insurance component within private 
doctors’ fees acts to some degree as a transparent price floor (Johar et al. 2016, p. 528).  Further, it 
can encourage price competition amongst practitioners who charge fees and amongst those that 
bulk bill (charge no out-of-pocket costs).  Beneficent and entrepreneurial practitioners, price 
discriminate amongst patients, bulk billing (not charging out-of-pocket costs) to those with limited 
means, charging out-of-pocket costs to patients who are more socioeconomically advantaged (Johar 
2012, p. 597; Johar et al. 2016, pp. 530-2).   
 
Whilst medical beneficence by private practitioners to needy people could be seen to advance 
equity, the reliance upon private doctors in the marketplace to always do so is not guaranteed.  
Furthermore, recent studies indicate that the out-of-pocket costs that Australians face are rising 
(Scott 2016).  Where ambulatory patients cannot afford fees and are not able to access bulk billing, 
the alternative is using the public hospital system typically via emergency departments (Eckermann 
2014a). Using hospital for the treatment of illness that could otherwise be treated in primary care is 
allocatively inefficient, ultimately costing the taxpayer more.  In terms of equity, Eckermann et al. 
(2016, p. 7) find that supplier induced demand is likely to occur as a result of a reduction in bulk 
billing .i.e. 
“The under-servicing of ‘at need’ populations with reduction of bulk billing rates also 
leads to perverse incentives for GP discretionary over-servicing to fill patient lists and 
Page 100 
 
maintain their income by inducing demand in populations who remain able to afford 
services. Such over-servicing of populations typically manifests as over testing for rare or 
untreatable conditions and associated unnecessary treatment resulting from false 
positives, as well as over-treatment directly (e.g. over-medication)”. 
 
The funding and governance arrangements of Commonwealth taxpayer subsidisation of private 
medical services through Medicare discussed, demonstrate a number of issues for the development 
of the HORSt.  First, the Australian constitution has enshrined the freedom of private practice for 
private medical practitioners.  Combined with the episodic payment system for these practitioners, 
the MBS representing 28% in 2015-16 of Australian Government health expenditure (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare 2017a), these arrangements are unlikely to encourage on its own the 
efficient or equitable advancement of improved health outcomes that involve patients who require 
state hospital system care.  In establishing a benchmark level of health outcomes for populations at 
the state level, the HORSt needs to therefore consider the inclusion of Medicare funding as a crucial 
productive component of the resourcing of the continuum of care.  MBS data is available from the 
Commonwealth at small area population levels (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a; 
Department of Human Services 2016).  A discussion surrounding the extent and application of this 
data to the HORSt is contained within Chapters Four and Five.  
3.3  TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES FROM COMMONWEALTH TO PRIVATE HEALTH INSURERS 
Australians are encouraged to take out PHI in Australia via financial incentives being; 
 the PHI rebate, a taxpayer subsidised rebate, indexed to income level, to help cover the cost 
of the PHI premiums (Private Health Insurance Ombudsman 2017a);  
 the Lifetime Health Cover loading, a progressing loading applied to future PHI premiums for 
not taking out coverage prior to a person’s 30th birthday (Private Health Insurance 
Ombudsman 2017b); and 
 the Medicare Levy surcharge, an additional rate of taxation charged over and above the 
Medicare levy for incomes above a threshold (Private Health Insurance Ombudsman 2017c). 
The PHI rebate is paid directly to private health insurers.  Income tested, this reduces the cost 
individuals and families face in premiums payable to the insurer (Private Health Insurance 




The goal of these incentives is to boost the coverage of PHI in Australia.  In doing so it has long been 
purported by the Commonwealth Government that more Australians will use private hospitals for 
elective surgery, taking pressure off public hospitals (Boxall 2015).  Contemporary PHI industry 
statements that have vested interests champion this view (Eddy 2016). 
 
There is growing body of evidence, spanning many years, to suggest that these incentives however, 
have not relieved public hospital pressure (Boxall 2014, 2015; Duckett 2005; Duckett & Jackson 
2000; Eckermann 2014a; Eckermann et al. 2016; Menadue & McAuley 2012; Savage & Lu 2006).  
Moreover, the effectiveness of these incentives in terms of equity and efficiency and particularly the 
size of the taxpayer subsidy of the PHI rebate and the opportunity cost that it represents have been 
questioned.  i.e. 
“Cumulative evidence since the introduction of the rebate in 2000 shows that despite 
spending growing to $6.0 billion in 2013-14 and projected to grow to $7.2 billion by 
2017-18, the rebate has not taken pressure off the public health system.  Rich, young, 
healthy populations joined for tax breaks and to avoid later higher premiums when 
older” 
(Eckermann et al. 2016, p. 8). 
 
Russell (2015) argues that whilst PHI is incentivised and subsidised, it represents waste as there is no 
requirement for PHI to be used.  This represents allocative inefficiency, whereby taxpayer funding is 
used to purchase a contingency rather than to fund services.  Where it is not used, the subsidy 
supports PHI companies’ bottom line. 
 
In terms of the lack of use of PHI, Russell (2015) observes that around 25% of PHI holders choose to 
use the public hospital system.  This finding runs contrary to the government expectations that PHI 
coverage would remove pressure from the public system.  However, this finding can be somewhat 
expected, whereby patients face disincentives to use their PHI as electing to do so often involves 
significant out-of-pocket costs which in Australia can exceed US levels (Sivey 2016; Sweet 2012).    
 
Eckermann et al. (2016) and Mihm (2016) find a significant portion of PHI is purchased to avoid 
taxation.  Furthermore, Mihm (2016) finds that some low cost PHI policies are marketed by insurers 
as tax avoidance instruments rather than providing health benefits.  Mihm finds that these policies 
are effectively “junk policies” with little if any benefits that can be used in private hospitals with 
approximately 1% of private hospital services covered by them.  The implication of this is that by 
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their lack of private benefits, these policies direct patients who need hospital care towards public 
hospitals.  This is further evidence of allocative inefficiency and is diametrically opposed to 
contemporary industry views and that of Government that holding PHI takes pressure of the public 
system. 
 
Congruent with the previous quote by Eckermann, Sheridan and Ivers, Harris (2013) maintains that 
even after means testing, the PHI rebate significantly rewards the wealthy.  Menadue and McAuley 
(2012, p. 12) argue that this can create an inequitable demarcated health system of a private 
hospital system for the rich versus a public Medicare system for the poor.  Contemporary 
statements by former Liberal Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull referring to Medicare as ‘a safety 
net’, reinforce this view that Medicare is for the less well-off (Duckett 2016).  Duckett (2000, p. xxi) 
has long considered that labelling Medicare for the poor, damages social cohesion and weakens the 
equitable system of universality of Medicare whereby the rich do not see the value in contributing to 
a system that they view or are told is not for them.  
 
Menadue and McAuley (2012, p. 16) summarise PHI in Australia as being allocatively and technically 
inefficient and failing to promote equity. i.e. 
“To satisfy criteria of efficiency and equity, the best policy for the Government would be 
to withdraw all support for private health insurance.  It is administratively expensive 
(technically inefficient in economists' terms), distorts incentives and choices (allocatively 
inefficient) and does not satisfy any reasonable criteria of equity”.  
Additionally, Harris (2013) and Menadue (2017), argue that given that PHI is relatively 
expensive, that private hospitals could be better subsidised directly by taxpayers at an overall 
lower cost rather than via the taxpayer subsidies for the PHI rebate.   
 
The abundant evidence in this section has shown that the distribution of the PHI rebate is skewed 
towards more well-off members of the community and that this distribution is significantly 
inefficient and inequitable.  It follows that there is no evidence that the PHI rebate alleviates health 
inequities.  It could be argued based upon this evidence that the PHI rebate actually contributes 
towards perpetuating health inequities, via the enormous opportunity cost of tax payer funding that 
could be otherwise provided to support an expansion of the public health system at lower cost, 




The PHI rebate, as inefficient as the literature has shown it to be, was nonetheless considered for 
inclusion as an input in the development of the HORSt benchmark.  However, PHI data is not 
available at sufficiently low-level population structure to support its inclusion as a funding input 
within the HORSt and for this reason will not be included.   
3.4  TAXPAYER FUNDING TO SUPPORT THE NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE SCHEME 
(NDIS) 
The NDIS is a social insurance scheme that supports people with permanent and significant 
disabilities under the age of 65.  It commenced in 2016 and will be progressively implemented across 
Australia.  It was developed to directly provide people with individualised support to enhance their 
quality of life and done so in recognition that the disability system in Australia was inefficient and 
inequitable (Fawcett & Plath 2014; Foster et al. 2016).  The NDIS is an example of a person-based 
needs funding model, the type of which was discussed in the literature review.  
 
The goal of the NDIS is to provide a multifaceted approach to support, for improving the lives of 
people with permanent and significant disabilities and their carers, across health, education and 
community services (National Disability Insurance Agency 2017).  Whilst not a dedicated health 
program, taxpayers pay for the NDIS through a specific Medicare levy increase and consolidated 
revenue and both Commonwealth and states share funding contributions for the NDIS (Foster et al. 
2016, p. 30).  The National Disability Insurance Agency administers funding to individuals following 
assessment of needs (National Disability Insurance Agency 2017).   
 
The NDIS commenced at piloted locations in 2013.  The gradual roll-out across the country 
commenced in 2016 (National Disability Insurance Agency 2017).  Given this and the somewhat 
enormous task of assessing individual clients for the level of support required and eligibility, it is too 
early to assess the NDIS in terms of effectiveness of advancing equity or efficiency.  Nevertheless, 
disability has been identified as a significant determinant of health inequities, with people living with 
disabilities facing significantly poorer avoidable health outcomes (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare 2016a; Turrell et al. 2006).  The intent of the program could therefore assist in the longer 
term towards addressing these health inequities.  Moreover, of interest to this study, it is important 
to consider how the NDIS approaches equity and considers need.  For example,  
“Under the Scheme, (the NDIS) support is to be targeted to those with significant needs 
who require specialist rather than mainstream support and who are likely to benefit 
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most by way of improved independence and social and economic participation” (Foster 
et al. 2016, p. 30)  
This approach is aligned to the concept of vertical equity, where clients’ needs in terms of their 
capacity to benefit for specific financial support will be individually assessed.  This represents a 
departure from the Medicare principles approach of equality of access, horizontal equity and is more 
aligned, as discussed previously to what Mooney (2009) and (Culyer 1995) state as a more workable 
approach to need; that is need assessed in terms of capacity to benefit.   
 
As a multifaceted insurance model, beyond improving health alone, taxpayer funding of the NDIS is 
not suitable to be included within the development of the HORSt.  Disability however, as a significant 
predictor of health inequalities, is relevant to factors that can give rise to poorer health outcomes 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2010, 2016a).  As such, variables that represent disability 
at the population level will be examined for their use to inform vertical equity loadings in Chapter 
Five.  
3.5  TAXPAYER SUBSIDIES FROM COMMONWEALTH TO SUPPORT THE PBS  
The PBS provides Australians with taxpayer subsidised medicines to make them more affordable. 
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) assesses the cost-effectiveness of drugs to 
be listed for subsidisation on the PBS and recommends to the Commonwealth government drugs to 
be listed (Department of Health 2017). 
 
The PBS seeks to operate equitably based on the financial means of patients, whereby it currently 
operates with co-payments payable by the patient, with pensioners and concessional card holders 
paying $6.30 in 2017 for a prescription and non-concession patients paying a maximum of $38.80.  
Maximum expenditure annual safety nets also apply being $378 and $1494.90 respectively for 
concessional and non-concessional patients, with the cost of further prescriptions being respectively 
free or reduced to the concessional rate (Department of Health 2017).  However, Palmer and Short 
(2014, p. 139) find that people with chronic illness typically on lower incomes face significant out-of-
pocket co-payments irrespective of the safety net arrangements.   
 
The PBS, like the MBS, can be also characterised as an output-based model, where each script 
produced is an output.  Moreover, doctors also act as gatekeepers to the PBS, so the distribution of 




Aligned to the arguments made for including the MBS in establishing resourcing for a  benchmarked 
level of population health outcomes at the state level, the HORSt will also include PBS funding which 
representing 15% of the Australian Government expenditure on health care in 2015-16 (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare 2017a) and is therefore a crucial component of the resourcing of the 
continuum of care.  PBS data is available from the Commonwealth at small area population 
levels(Department of Human Services 2016).  A discussion surrounding the extent and application of 
this data to the HORSt is contained within in Chapters Four and Five. 
 
3.6  OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS 
In Australia out-of-pocket costs or co-payments occur whereby there is a gap between the 
reimbursement by Medicare (under the MBS) and the medical practitioner’s fee.  These costs are 
common and typify the nature of private medical practice in Australia dominated by general 
practitioners and specialists.   For private hospital patients the gap is between the private insurance 
benefit, Medicare reimbursement and the fee (Paris et al. 2010) .   
 
For a country that provides its citizens with universal access to publicly subsidised health insurance 
(Medicare), publicly subsidises prescription drugs (PBS), has one of the largest networks of public 
hospitals in the world that provide treatment free of charge and has punitive tax arrangements to 
encourage PHI coverage and publicly subsidies PHI premiums, it is puzzling that Australians face 
increasingly higher out-of-pocket costs as a proportion of household consumption, eclipsing that of 
the most expensive private system, the United States of America (USA) (Duckett et al. 2014, p. 4; 
OECD 2017a, p. 26).   Unsurprisingly however, these rising out-of-pocket expenses present a 
significant problem for health funding inequity and where timely access to private primary care is 
compromised due to unaffordability it can lead to inequity of health outcomes whereby delay in 
seeking care can exacerbate illness.  Out-of-pocket expenses have a significant impact on the most 
vulnerable members of society and the there is significant health inequalities evident in the data 
arising from people’s ability to pay these costs and access services (Duckett et al. 2014; Kraft et al. 
2009; Mollborn et al. 2005; Prentice & Pizer 2007). 
 
The OECD reported in 2017 that 16.2 medical consultations per 100 people in Australia were avoided 
due to cost (OECD 2017a, p. 26; 2017b).  In addition, at the time of this preparing this study, the 
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AIHW released data and a report on out-of-pocket costs in Australia.  This is the first time such data 
has been available to the public.  Summarising the data Russell (2018) found that: 
“seven percent of Australians (an estimated 1.3 million people) said the cost of services were the 
reason that they delayed or did not seek specialist, GP, imaging or pathology services when they 
needed them”. 
Furthermore, the AIHW data highlights significant inequities regarding costs barriers to treatment 
across locations, with a defining trend of a lower number of people delaying or avoiding treatment 
due to cost in metropolitan areas of NSW 6.7% compared to NSW regional and rural areas 8.3% 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018e). 
 
The practice of excessive fees and price discrimination by Australia’s private clinicians can be 
described as rent-seeking behaviour, whereby the financial extraction of such disproportionate fees 
is a non-compensated value relative to factor costs that contribute to production or the benefits 
received by the patients (Gross & Laugesen 2018, p. 771; Krueger 1974).  The rent-seeking behaviour 
is systematic of the market failure associated with the information asymmetry between clinicians 
and patients and is associated with monopolistic power which ultimately compromises technical and 
allocative efficiency (Dunn & Shapiro 2014, p. 160; Ghosh 2008, p. 269).   
 
Freed and Allen (2017) found that in Australia there is widespread differences in fees for service for: 
the same speciality / type of service; location; amongst states.  At an extreme level there was more 
than a 400% difference in fees charged for the same speciality.  This extreme range was found for 
multiple specialities.  The implication of this is that out-of-pocket expenses would be difficult to 
justify as a variable that productively contributes to the resourcing of benchmarked health outcomes 
and as such the HORSt will not consider it in establishing the resource pool for the benchmark.  
However, in so far as that out-of-pocket costs represents inequity through people’s inability to pay 
and consequently acts as a barrier to access, out-of-pocket costs will be considered in the HORSt as a 
variable that may contribute to explaining how social determinants influence health outcomes.  
3.7  CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter has examined the funding and governance arrangements of taxpayer subsidies within 
the mixed private-public health system in Australia.  Out-of-pocket expenses paid by individuals to 
health care providers were also examined.  The ability of these funding transfers to promote equity 
and efficiency were critiqued in terms of their applicability for inclusion in the development of the 
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HORSt.  Legislative issues that surround the Australian health care system were also examined for 
relevance to the HORSt development.  The key findings are as follows. 
 
The Medicare principles that all state governments must adhere to pertaining to timely and equal 
access for services will not be breached by the Development of the HORSt. 
 
Given the nature of private medicine in Australia, which is dominated by constitutionally protected 
private medicine, taxpayer subsidisation of the MBS and the PBS is not subject to any resource 
distribution mechanism.  As such, this taxpayer subsidisation cannot advance equity or allocative 
efficiency and the state health system is uniquely positioned to do so through resource distribution 
guided by health needs.  
 
Taxpayer subsidies made to private doctors under the MBS fee-for-service and to the PBS which is 
gate-kept by private doctors are important components of the production of health outcomes.  In a 
benchmarked model considering the allocative efficiency of health outcomes, the MBS and PBS will 
be important and necessary resource inputs for the HORSt to consider.  
 
Taxpayer subsidies to the PHI rebate are inefficient.  The literature also demonstrates that they are 
inequitable, tending to favour the more socially advantaged members of the community.  Due to 
their significant inefficiencies and the fact they represent a risk contingency rather than a resource 
that is actively used, it is difficult to apply this variable as a resource input for the production of 
improved health outcomes.  Data are also not available at the small population level required for the 
study (as per outlined in Chapter Five).  The study will therefore not seek to include this variable in 
the development of the HORSt. 
 
The NDIS is a multifaceted insurance model with expected benefits to improve people with 
disabilities lives beyond that of the health sector.  Given this, the NDIS contribution to the 
production of health outcomes is unknown and will not be included in the HORSt benchmark.  
However, variables that represent disability within the population could be relevant predictors of 
the allocative efficiency of desired health outcomes and will be tested as predictors of health need 
within the model. 
 
The enormous variation in out-of-pocket costs faced by Australians represents inefficiency and 
inequity.  It is difficult to know whether this funding transfer from individuals to private doctors 
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represents a resource contribution to health outcomes, or a rent-seeking contribution to abnormal 
profits.  Data on out-of-pocket costs will not be included therefore as a resource input to the HORSt 
benchmark.  However, this data for small populations will be tested for inclusion as a predictor of 
the allocative efficiency of the desirable outcomes to see whether or not the affordability of these 
costs affects outcomes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters reviewed the literature of the underlying key concepts surrounding 
health needs, equity and efficiency, public funding models, governance and funding arrangements 
and the limitations and conditions that Australian federalism imposes upon Australian state health 
systems.  Developed from key findings and gaps in the literature, this chapter provides the 
methodology of the study, which applies the conceptual framework (page 88) underpinning the 
study. 
 
The section below demonstrates that all necessary ethical approvals for this study were achieved.  
Following this, this chapter outlines the methodology for the development of the HORSt in the 
context of NSW as an econometric case study via four areas of discussion, which are: 
1. An overview of the methodological approach underpinning the development of the 
HORSt and justification for the research methodology as a quantitative design. 
2. The methodology supporting the development of the HORSt benchmark to inform the 
allocative efficiency of taxpayer resources expended across the continuum of care to 
produce health outcomes (approximated by measures of population health status). 
3. The methodology for predictive modelling that identifies social determinants that give 
rise to the allocative efficiency of population health status and affect populations’ 
ability to achieve benchmarked outcomes. 
4. The methodology for operationalising the HORSt to inform vertical equity adjustments 
and resource distribution between the state and the LHNs so that equity of health 
funding across the continuum of care can be maximised. 
Justification of data sources required to support the HORSt benchmark, predictive modelling and the 
population structures used for analysis are outlined in Chapter Five.  
 




4.1  ETHICAL APPROVAL 
Consistent with paragraph 5.1.22 of the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) 
National Statement, “research can be exempt from Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) review 
if that research: 
(a) is negligible risk research; and 
(b) involves the use of existing collections of data or records that contain only non-identifiable 
data about human beings.   
In doing so, it needs to be recognised that a decision to exempt a research study from ethical review 
by the HREC is, in effect, a determination that the research meets the requirements of the National 
Statement and is ethically acceptable”  (National Health and Medical Research Council 2015b). 
 
According to the National Statement section the definition of where research is negligible risk is: 
“where there is no foreseeable risk of harm or discomfort; and any foreseeable risk is no more than 
inconvenience.  Where the risk, even if unlikely, is more than inconvenience, the research is not 
negligible risk” (National Health and Medical Research Council 2015a).   
 
In February 2017 a protocol was developed to support an application for the exemption of the study 
from ethical review by the Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) as the study is a negligible risk 
on the basis of that there were no study participants and data to be used is de-identified and 
aggregated by age groups and sex at population levels.  Specifically, the protocol identified the use 
of the following de-identified data: 
 
• NSW aggregated hospitalisation data by age group and sex of the 22 Ambulatory Care 
Sensitive Conditions defined by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, for each NSW SA3 
geographic area for the ten years 2006/07 to 2015/16.   
 
• NSW aggregated hospitalisation data by age group and sex for Charlson-Comorbidities for 
each NSW SA3 geographic area for the ten years 2006/07 to 2015/16.   
 
• NSW aggregated hospitalisation data by age group, sex, NWAUs, costs and program area for 




• Volume and cost of Medicare Benefits schedule categories (1 through 10) based on date of 
processing by age group and sex for each SA3 geographic area for the financial years 2013/14, 
2014/15, 2015/16.   
 
• Total scripts and benefits paid for the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (Normal 
Arrangements PBS and Special Arrangements PBS) for all patient categories based on date of 
processing by age group and sex for each SA3 geographic area for the financial years 2013/14, 
2014/15, 2015/16.   
 
• State health expenditure public hospital expenditure for LHNs and SA3 geographic areas 
measured by NWAUs for the years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16. 
 
• NSW Self-reported health survey data at SA3 level, aggregate by sex, age group and self-
reported health scores (1 through 5) for the last ten years 2006/07 to 2015/16. 
 
On 16 March 2017, Australian Health Services Research Institute (AHSRI) Deputy Director 
A/Professor Rob Gordon, reviewed the research protocol for the study and granted an exemption 
from ethical review by the HREC.  As SWSLHN Epidemiology unit extracted NSW Health data, as a 
courtesy to the SWSLHN, a copy of the research protocol was also supplied to the SWSLHN HREC 
whom agreed that the research satisfies conditions of being exempt from ethical review by the 
HREC.  Appendix 3 provides a copy of the ethics approval.  
4.2  OVERVIEW AND THEORETICAL APPROACH   
The literature reviews gaps, limitations and opportunities culminated in the study’s conceptual 
framework (page 88) to support the study’s aims and research questions.  In response to this, the 
theoretical approach underpinning the HORSt involves three broad stages.  These are: 
1. The development of a measurable benchmark reflecting the allocative efficiency of the 
production of health outcomes for populations relative to the resource inputs across the 
continuum of care for those populations; 
2. Identifying social determinants, that can represent populations’ health needs in terms of 




3. Using the social determinant predictors of allocative efficiency as vertical equity funding 
adjustors that can be applied to populations that cannot achieve the benchmark. 
It might seem counterintuitive to be rewarding populations that do not meet the benchmark with 
vertical equity loadings (a greater share of funding), however such a view does not consider the logic 
that health care funding at the population level cannot create incentives that impact on choices that 
individuals make, particularly in the mixed funding system of Australia.  Furthermore, as 
demonstrated in the review of Governance and Funding arrangements in Chapter Three, 
Commonwealth government subsidised funding of private services under the MBS and the PBS are 
not subject to any distributive equity mechanism for populations and can exacerbate inequity.  The 
overall goal of the HORSt that culminates in the third stage is to guide the allocation of state health 
funding from the state to geographical regions (LHNs).  Funding shares are based on each LHN 
population’s socially determined health needs and the affects these needs have on the LHNs 
populations’ ability to achieve the benchmark, relative to the bulk of taxpayer funded resources 
consumed by the populations across the continuum of care.   
 
The vertical equity loadings are therefore not rewarding inefficiency or poor performance per se; 
they are however compensating populations that have greater capacity to benefit, a greater need, 
which acts as barrier for achieving the benchmarked outcomes and with respect to the total pool of 
available tax payer funded resources which for this study will include MBS, PBS and State Public 
Hospital resources.  Congruent with the literature reviews findings on the purpose of population 
needs-based funding instruments, the purpose of the loadings is to act as an enabler.  The loadings 
represent an equity adjustment and promote allocative efficiency, by creating a more optimal mix of 
resources aligned to the production of more desirable outcomes.  The loadings inform each LHNs 
HORSt need index and when applied to the total pool of available taxpayer funded resources show 
what residual amount is required to be adjusted by the State government so that equity of health 
funding can be maximised.   
 
To reiterate, the HORSt methodology will work as only a first step in the state health funding model.  
ABF, identified in the literature review as being a compatible second step, is used to drive technical 
efficiency between the LHNs and the state health service providers / facilities.  Furthermore, the 
HORSt methodology in supporting the first step in the funding model of guiding allocations from the 




The conceptual approach underpinning the HORSt is somewhat analogous to the Gonski school 
resourcing standard (SRS) which, as depicted in the literature review, identified reference schools as 
a benchmark whereby they have an acceptable level of educational outcomes, measured by NAPLAN 
results and are located within populations that have social determinants aligned to achieving those 
outcomes.  Gonski’s model applies vertical equity loadings applied to schools that do not meet the 
benchmark and have social determinants know to give rise to poorer outcomes (Gonski et al. 2011).   
 
The theoretical application of the HORSt is not unrealistically seeking to eradicate all the differences 
in health so that health is equalised across the population.  The realistic goal to enable maximising 
equity, supported by the literature, should be to reduce or eliminate differences that result from 
factors that are considered avoidable and unfair (NSW Department of Health 2004, p. 1; Whitehead 
1991, p. 220).  Doing so responds to the literature that argues for need to be defined in the context 
of capacity to benefit and takes a vertical equity approach.  This realistic approach is also aligned 
with the Gonski SRS that did not seek to have all students achieve identical outcomes, but rather 
seeks to reduce the avoidable barriers to educational outcomes so students have the same 
opportunities to achieve (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 153).  As such the equity goal in the HORSt 
methodology is aligned with the promotion allocative efficiency with respect to factors that give rise 
to health needs of the population and the benchmark is a function of allocative efficiency, 
representing the health outcomes achieved by populations’ relative to their funding inputs.   
 
The publicly reported limitations of the Gonski model do not apply to the HORSt.  First, a key 
criticism with Gonski is that it has no secondary mechanism (no ABF as in the case of the HORSt) to 
ensure that resource distributions recommended under the formula can be expended efficiently 
(Gannicott 2016, p. 16).  Secondly, whilst Gonski was initially a tool of reallocation of current 
funding, it ultimately recommended more funding (Gannicott 2016, p. 10).  The HORSt by contrast 
will not recommend additional health funding for the system.  The HORSt is designed to act as 
instrument of resource distribution, involving some reallocation, but nonetheless presiding over a 
fiscal neutrality.  Decisions of greater levels of funding are beyond the scope of the HORSt research 
and matters of policy determinations for the state government.  
 
The theoretical foundation of the first stage of the development of the HORSt benchmark is to utilise 
PPHs as a proxy for health outcomes via a measure of health status at the population level.  Doing so 
is an extension of the work of Duckett and Griffiths (2016b) which identifies “hot spots” (p. 3) of 
prolonged poorer health represented by PPHs which as discussed in the literature review are 
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potentially preventable illnesses and representative of sicker patients and are found to be 
persistently high in areas of having lower socioeconomic status, remoteness and indigeneity.  The 
HORSt application of this work is to take an inverse position of Duckett and Griffith’s hot spots and 
consider establishing the benchmark where prolonged ‘cold spots’ exist, (geographical locations 
where population health status is observed to be good) and where the social determinants of health 
for those populations are favourable to achieve better health outcomes. 
 
An alternative proxy of geographical population health status to using PPHs was also considered via 
an application of the Charlson comorbidity index.  As discussed in Chapter Two, whilst primarily used 
as a tool of risk of mortality, the Charlson comorbidity index is a tested measure of health status, 
which has been used to evaluate health outcomes in many clinical settings.  Again revisiting the 
literature review, similar to PPHs, the literature indicates that comorbidity is inversely related to 
socioeconomic status (Chang et al. 2016).  
 
Also congruent with Gonski’s approach that considers all sources of funding inputs to schools from 
private and public sources, the HORSt will consider the majority of funding applied to across the 
continuum of health care Australia.  The publicly subsidised MBS and PBS funding and health funding 
of public hospitals are the most feasible and applicable sources of funding to be included.  The 
inclusion of these variables is discussed further in next chapter encompassing data sources.  These 
funding inputs within the HORSt across the continuum of care represent 73% in 2015-16 of 
Australian Government’s and NSW expenditure in NSW on, Medicare reimbursement of private 
doctors, subsidised prescriptions and public hospitals (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
2018b). 
4.2.1  A quantitative design 
Creswell (2008, pp. 51-5) and Leedy and Ormrod (2010, p. 107) summarise and outline criteria for 
the suitability of either quantitative and qualitative approaches to research design.  Using their 
summary of the literature, the HORSt is justified as a quantitative study as it requires: 
 using quantifiable measures to develop a benchmark for health outcomes relative to health 
funding inputs; 
 a confirmatory / predictive approach; seeking to predict the effect of explanatory variables 
upon a benchmarked level of health outcomes so as to make vertical equity financial 
adjustments; 
 understanding of the quantum of funding required to achieve the benchmark; 
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 measurable levels of adjustments to be made to data of the social determinants of health; 
and; 
 requires an understanding of the relationship between variables and their underlying trends. 
Furthermore, the HORSt benchmark reflects the allocative efficiency of health outcomes using proxy 
variables of population health status relative to funding inputs.  In the second stage the predictive 
model considers variables that can represent population needs that give rise to allocative efficiency 
of the observed health status.  Predictive methods are a subset of descriptive methodologies, which 
can be categorised within quantitative correlation methods (Creswell 2008, p. 359).  These methods 
involve examining the predictive nature of the relationships between variables (McMillan 2010).  
The relevance of predictive methods to the research is demonstrated though abundant literature for 
investigating health needs in the context of funding models to alleviate inequities (Carr-Hill & 
Sheldon 1992; Ho 2001; McDermott et al. 1997; Mooney 2009; Mooney et al. 1991) and from this 
there is an expectation in the literature that operationalised funding determinations are transparent 
and verifiable by accessible quantitative data sets.   
 
The three methodological stages of the HORSt are now appraised and contextualised to the research 
with supporting literature in sections 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.  The population structures within 




4.3  METHDOLOGY FOR THE HORST BENCHMARK – (HORST METHOD STAGE 1) 
To measure the relative allocative efficiency of the health outcomes produced from resources 
applied across the combination of services of the continuum of care to different geographical areas, 
an analysis of the relationship between the combination of health inputs and health outcomes is 
necessary.  Populations that are observed to have the best health outcomes relative to their funding 
inputs can serve as benchmark populations to those populations that are not as relatively efficient.   
 
Within the literature, efficiency at its simplest level can be described as the productivity ratio 
between output and input, where more output per unit of input reflects greater relative efficiency 
(Wilson 1999, p. 918).  In the context of the HORSt design, the outputs in these ratios are not health 
service outputs but proxies of population health status serving as a proxy for population health 
outcomes.  As a ratio representing a fractional relationship, efficiency is logically constrained 
between 0 and 1.  The following equations 1 through 3 expand this fractional relationship in more 
detail mathematically.  
 






Equation 1 outlines the mathematical relationship of efficiency in its simplest form between a single 
output and input.  However, where there are multiple outputs and inputs, efficiency is expressed as 
a weighted ratio as per equation 2 and 3 below.  Weights are required as different outputs and 
inputs will have different contributions to the relative efficiency of each unit assessed (Farrell 1957, 
p. 254; Kao 2016, p. 19). 
 
Equation 2  
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
 
 
Alternatively, for a specific unit (t), this ratio in equation 2 can be expanded to demonstrate 





𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡 =
𝑢1𝑦1𝑡 + 𝑢2𝑦2𝑡 + …+ 𝑢𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑣1𝑥1𝑡 + 𝑣2𝑥2𝑡 + …+ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡
 
where: 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑖 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑖 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑖 
𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑖 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡 
 
Problematically in a multiple output / input model, as depicted in equation 2 and 3, there will be a 
necessity to appropriately assign weights to each side of the simple efficiency ratio so as to 
understand the relative efficiency (Charnes et al. 1978; Sherman & Zhu 2006b, p. 64). 
 
This issue is relevant to the HORSt, where the benchmark sought will be the population/s that has 
the highest relative efficiency of producing desirable health outcomes (proxied by low rates of age 
sex standardised PPHs or Charlson Co-morbidities), given the multiple financial inputs identified in 
the literature across the continuum of care.  The inputs being that of the expenditure of MBS, PBS 
and state health system funding.  The weighting of what role each funding source plays in producing 
the outcomes is problematic and not solved through a simple ratio analysis.   
 
An additional complicating dimension will be how environmental factors (the social determinants of 
health) that affect the relative efficiency are to be assessed.  In order to then redirect funding to 
areas of need, the HORSt will then require a mechanism that predicts / explains the relative 
efficiency so as to make vertical equity financial adjustments on the basis of predictors that reflect 
these social determinants known to affect health outcomes.   
 
An alternative to pursuing a model that considers the allocative efficiency of the bulk of the funding 
inputs across the continuum of care to produce desirable outcomes would be to arbitrarily set a 
benchmark around each population that can be shown to be exhibit prolonged cold spots (low / 
good rates of PPHs or Charlson Co-morbidities) and then consider the financial inputs that typify 
these areas as a benchmarked level of resourcing.  A regression for environmental factors that give 
rise to the rate of PPHs could be conducted to see what adjustments need to be made to each 
population that have social determinants that give rise to poorer health outcomes.  Gonski’s school 
resourcing standard (SRS) used such an approach, identifying reference schools that met a desirable 
level of educational standards (outcomes) and then considered reference school costs to help inform 
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the funding benchmark (Gonski et al. 2011, p. 225).  However, such an approach is far more 
problematic with the HORSt regarding health services.  Both funding for state public schools and 
state public hospitals in Australia have multiple sources of public and private funding, however there 
are some important key differences. In particular, the mixed funding which ultimately contributes to 
schools’ educational outcomes are applied to one layer of educational delivery; schools.  
Contrastingly, the state health system health outcomes are more diversely interconnected to 
financial inputs of the continuum of care spread over multiple health care providers and services, 
many of which are outside the remit of the state health sector and all having different contributions 
to health outcomes.  It is therefore necessary to adopt a model that can consider and weight the 
different inputs contributions across the continuum of care to the efficiency of producing health 
outcomes. 
4.3.1  Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Fortunately, econometrics has a solution that can be aligned to the development of the HORSt.  The 
use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is now a common tool for measuring the relative efficiency 
of multiple entities, called in the DEA literature ‘decision making units (DMUs)’, within a group and 
with the flexibility of multiple outputs and inputs (Hoff 2007).  DMUs can be any entity where the 
focus is upon efficiency and the DEA literature is replete with DMUs across many industries, for 
example: manufacturers (lo Storto 2018); energy providers (Pérez 2017); hospitals and health 
services (Ferrier & Trivitt 2013; Laspa & Priporas 2008); social welfare programs (Habibov & Fan 
2010); banks (Sherman & Zhu 2006a); internationally compared health sectors (Berenguer et al. 
2016); and regional health systems (Carrillo 2017).  In the case of the HORSt, the populations within 
NSW can be considered DMUs.  
 
DEA is a linear programming technique and was specifically developed by Charnes et al. (1978) to 
evaluate non-profit and public sector efficiencies to support benchmarking.  DEA was specifically 
developed to consider multiple outputs and inputs and provided a unique solution to determining 
weights for factors.  Using linear programming for each DMU, DEA determines a unique set of factor 
weights (coefficients) for each DMU which are favourable for the DMU to maximise its efficiency and 
which are feasible for all other DMUs (p. 431).  In doing so, if a DMU is found to be inefficient there 
can be no conjecture regarding the weighting of its factors unduly contributing to the inefficiency.  
This is highly advantageous to the HORSt in avoiding having to arbitrarily set and justify weights for 




The efficiency scores produced are relative efficiency scores, as the linear programing applied to 
each DMU compares their efficiency to all other DMUs.   DEA does this by identifying the best 
practice or relatively efficient units to all other units.  It identifies the scale of inefficiency of the 
inefficient units compared to the best practice units.  DMUs that are relatively efficient have an 
efficiency score of 1 (100%) whereas inefficient DMUs efficiency scores are greater than zero but less 
than 1.  The benchmarked populations found to be the most efficient (100% efficient) are known in 
the DEA literature to be categorised as “peers” and the results of the peers and inefficient DMUs can 
be graphically plotted along a production frontier (Steering Committee for the Review of 
Commonwealth/State Service Provision 1997).  Figure 12 (page 121) illustrates an example plot of 
the frontier.  
 
DEA takes the form of an objective function where the objective is to maximise the efficiency score 
of each DMU, subject to the constraint that, when the same set of weights (coefficients) is applied to 
all other DMUS being compared, no DMU will be more than 100% efficient(≤ 1).  This objective 
function is outlined in the following linear programing example provided by (Sherman & Zhu 2006b, 
p. 64).   
 
DEA linear programing for calculating the relative efficiency score for each DMU 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑀𝑈0 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃𝑜 = 
𝑢1𝑦10 + 𝑢2𝑦20+. . . +𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟0
𝑣1𝑥10 + 𝑣2𝑥20+. . . +𝑣𝑚𝑥𝑚0
 
subject to 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑀𝑈1 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃1 = 
𝑢1𝑦11 + 𝑢2𝑦21+. . . +𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟1
𝑣1𝑥11 + 𝑣2𝑥21+. . . +𝑣𝑚𝑥𝑚1
 ≤ 1; 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑀𝑈2 =  𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃2 = 
𝑢1𝑦12 + 𝑢2𝑦22+. . . +𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟2
𝑣1𝑥12 + 𝑣2𝑥22+. . . +𝑣𝑚𝑥𝑚2
≤ 1, 
….. 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑗 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜃𝑗 = 
𝑢1𝑦1𝑗 + 𝑢2𝑦2𝑗+. . . +𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑟𝑗
𝑣1𝑥1𝑗 + 𝑣2𝑥2𝑗+. . . +𝑣𝑚𝑥𝑚𝑗
 ≤ 1 
 
whereby:  𝑢1𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑟 = 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑟 > 0;  
𝜃𝑜𝑡𝑜 𝜃𝑗 = 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑀𝑈𝑠 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑗; 
𝑦1𝑡𝑜 𝑦𝑟 = 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑟; 
𝑣1𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑚 = 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑟 ≥ 0; and  




The linear programming described above is an extensive set of computations and constraints and as 
such DEA is typically calculated using modern DEA software packages.  The software also helps 
orientate the programming so that DEA can be optimised for maximising efficiency subject to 
minimising the resource inputs or maximising the outputs and for considering economies of scale 
assumptions (Coelli 1996; Emrouznejad & Thanassoulis 2011; Hollingsworth 1997; Iliyasu et al. 
2015). 
 
Input or output orientation determinations for the DEA depend on the context of the study.  Input 
orientated models seek to understand how efficiency can be maximised by using the least of amount 
of inputs for a given level of outputs (input minimisation).  Output orientated models seek to 
understand how efficiency can be maximised by producing the maximum amount of outputs for a 
given level of inputs (output maximisation) (Cooper et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2016; Pascoe et al. 2003).  
Within the context of the HORSt the orientation is an output model, as per aim 1 of the study, the 
objective is to develop the HORSt benchmark so as to represent desirable or best health outcomes 
approximated by health status for LHNs’ populations’ relative to funding inputs across the 
continuum of care.  An output DEA model for maximised positive health outcomes (minimising poor 
health) relative to the service inputs of the continuum of care is logical. 
 
The DEA also needs to consider if efficiency is maximised under an assumption of constant returns to 
scale (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS).  In Figure 12, examples of efficient frontiers under both 
models are plotted.  Assuming in the examples an output-oriented model such as the HORSt, the 
frontiers define the maximum capacity output for the inputs.  Under VRS the production capability 
of DMUs is assumed to exhibit variability, including increasing (IRS), CRS and decreasing returns to 
scale (DRS).  Under CRS the production capability of DMUs is assumed to be constant; that is a 




Figure 12   Example of DEA efficiency frontier under CRS and VRS – output orientation 
 
Figure 12 example adapted from (Cooper et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2016; Pascoe et al. 2003). 
 
In Figure 12, under VRS, the DMUs A, D, F, E make up the VRS frontier (dotted line).  These DMUs are 
efficient peers amongst the set of 8 DMUs (A through H) representing the maximum outputs per 
inputs.  The peers are a relative benchmark for the relatively inefficient DMUs (B, G, C, H).  Under 
CRS only DMU D is efficient being on the CRS frontier which is established proportionally between 
outputs and inputs.  The assumption of CRS implies that a small DMU should be able to operate as 
efficiently as a large one (Santos et al. 2013).  In the context of the HORSt, the returns to scale are 
not known.  Notwithstanding this uncertainty, a priori reasoning is acceptable in the DEA literature 
to assume VRS (Cooper et al. 2011; Pascoe et al. 2003).  In the context of the HORSt, as per the 
literature review and as will be shown in Chapter Five regarding data inputs and outcomes, there are 
observable differences in outcome, inputs, population sizes and access to health services amongst 














4.3.2 The goal and scope of the HORSt DEA 
The goal for the HORSt will be that the data generating process of the DEA measures the relative 
allocative efficiency for each NSW SA310 populations’ health status relative to all other NSW SA3 
populations, subject to taxpayer inputs across the continuum of care.  In doing so, the DEA will 
establish a meaningful benchmark that can be then utilised to examine populations’ social 
determinants of health that affect the achievement of the benchmark.  The DEA derived efficiency 
scores will serve as the dependent variable in the second stage of the methodology.  This is now 
outlined.  
4.4  PREDICTIVE METHODOLOGY FOR IDENTIFYING SOCIAL DETERMINANTS / HEALTH 
NEEDS – (HORST METHOD STAGE 2) 
The DEA in stage one identifies the allocative efficiency of each population’s health status (a proxy of 
population health outcomes) relative to the combination of health service inputs and relative to 
each other populations’ allocative efficiency and populations who are 100% efficient.  The second 
stage involves identifying variables within each population that predict or explain the variation in the 
efficiency scores.  In doing so, the social determinants reflect health needs in the context of each 
population’s potential capacity to benefit.  The literature commonly refers to the combination of 
DEA and predictive modelling, as in the case of the first two stages of the HORSt, as ‘two-stage DEA’   
“where efficiency is estimated in the first stage and then the estimated efficiencies or, in a few cases, 
ratios of estimated efficiencies, are regressed” (Simar & Wilson 2007, p. 32).   
 
This approach for the HORSt will inform development of the need indices and consequently the third 
stage of the HORSt methodology discussed in section 4.5; involving vertical equity funding 
adjustments, based on the regression coefficients found to predict the variation in the DEA efficiency 
scores (the dependent / outcome variable in the regression).   
 
The HORSt construct design that underpins the second stage uses the allocative efficiency of health 
status for each LHN’s geographical populations as a latent variable.  As guided by the literature 
review, two measures of population health status will be considered for the HORSt. These are age-
                                                            
 




standardised rates of PPH and age-standardised rate of comorbidity measured by Charlson scores.  
Chapter Five outlines and justifies which of these data elements will be ultimately used.  
 
The selection of independent / explanatory variables sought to explain the variation in the allocative 
efficiency of health status derived from the DEA need to be considered in terms of whether they give 
rise to or form of the dependent variable or whether or not they reflect it.  Jarvis (2014), 
Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2006) and Bagozzi (2011), explains that the formative or reflective 
nature of a construct depends upon the conceptualisation of the latent variable.  Health status for 
example can be a latent variable within either a formative or reflective construct.  Conceptually for 
example, in a formative construct, illness or disability could be formative indicators, as they give rise 
or form to health status.  In a reflective construct, a person or population’s health status can be 
reflected in for example, the measurement of physical functioning, wellbeing and general health 
perceptions, or in health system costs.  However, in the research construct the population health 
status being sought is a level of health outcomes for populations.  As discussed, it is observed in the 
literature that the  
“social and economic conditions and their effects on people’s lives determine their risk of illness 
(health status) and the actions taken to prevent them becoming ill or treat illness when it occurs” 
(Commission on Social Determinants of Health 2008a).   
 
From this definition, it is apparent that social determinants give rise to or form the risk of illness 
(health status).  As such, a formative construct, as illustrated in Figure 13, is appropriate for the 
HORSt second stage methodology that considers populations’ social determinants that explain the 
variation in the allocative efficiency of health outcomes, approximated by variables that represent 





Figure 13   An example of a formative construct supporting the HORSt second stage methodology 
 
 
Figure 13 adapted from (Petter et al. 2007, p. 626). 
 
The nature of the formative construct is an important consideration for the selection of variables to 
support the predictive modelling to ensure construct validity of the model.  Variable selection is 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
A key challenge for the predictive statistical modelling is that DEA uses a linear programming (non-
statistical / nonparametric) approach.  This means that the DEA scores derived from the linear 
programming are estimated and makes no allowance for error (noise) in sampling variability.  As 
such, DEA cannot afford accuracy of the efficiency estimates being representative of the population 
and regression modelling used for predictive modelling of the estimates is not possible (Assaf & 
Matawie 2010, pp. 3,549).  However, there is a substantial body of literature that demonstrates the 
wide spread use of two-stage DEA that employs regression modelling after estimating confidence 
intervals and statistical parameters for each of the efficiency scores is conducted using a process 
called bootstrapping (Aly et al. 1990; Amold et al. 1997; Banker & Johnston 1994; Barlos 2004; 
Burgess Jr & Wilson 1998; Byrnes et al. 1988; Carrington et al. 1997; Chilingerian 1995; Chilingerian 
& Sherman 2011; Chirikos & Sear 1994; De Borger & Kerstens 1996; Desli & Ray 2004; Dusansky & 
Wilson 1994; Fried et al. 1999; Garden & Ralston 1999; Gillen & Lall 1997; Gonzalez & Barber 1996; 
Kooreman 1994; Lovell et al. 1994; Luoma et al. 1996; McMillan & Datta 1998; Okeahalam 2004; 
Simar & Wilson 1998, 1999).  
 
Coelli et al. (2005, p. 202) contextualising bootstrapping to DEA states that it consists of: 
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“using a random selection of thousands of ‘pseudo samples’ (using simple random sampling with 
replacement) from the observed set of a sample data. ‘Pseudo’ estimates can then be obtained from 
each of these samples. These thousands of pseudo estimates form an empirical distribution of the 
estimator improving the accuracy of DEA-efficiency analysis of interest.  The distribution is then used 
as an approximation of the true underlying sampling distribution”.   
The literature finds that bootstrapping affords valid statistical inference to permit second stage DEA 
predictive modelling and that it also useful for sensitivity analysis of the DEA efficiency estimates 
using the generated confidence intervals (Coelli et al. 2005; Simar & Wilson 1998, 1999, 2007).   
 
Initially the preliminary modelling for this study, guided by the two stage DEA literature, used 
bootstrapped DEA mean efficiency scores for the HORSt.  However, Coelli et al. (2005, p. 203) 
outlines that the use of bootstrapping DEA data is questionable when the whole population data is 
used, rather than a sample.  i.e. 
“For example, when one has data on all hospitals in a particular region or census data, the data is 
noise free as it represents all DMUs in the population and the DEA frontier obtained must be the true 
frontier.  That is, in this case the frontier has been measured and not estimated.  Hence there is no 
need to consider sampling variability” (emphasis added).   
This situation is applicable to the HORSt, whereby the data to be used for the outputs and inputs of 
the DEA, outlined in Chapter Five, is for all populations across NSW.  Given this, bootstrapping is not 
required and will not be used for the DEA efficiency scores.  The resulting scores for each DMU are 
relative measures of allocative efficiency, relative to all other DMUs.  
4.4.1  Regression for the second stage DEA 
Regression analysis is a form of predictive modelling that investigates the explanatory relationship 
between variables.  Specifically, a regression analysis takes the form of a linear model between an 
outcome variable (dependent variable) which is predicted or explained by one or more independent 
variables (Seber & Lee 2003). The linear model takes the form of that shown in equation 4. 
 
Equation 4 - Linear regression model 
 
𝑌𝑖  = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
 
whereby:  𝒀 = the outcome variable;  
𝑿𝒊= the predictor variable(s);  
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𝒃𝟏 = the regression coefficient associated with the predictor;  
𝒃𝟎 = the value of the outcome when the predictor is zero; and 
𝝐𝒊is an error term. 
(Field 2013, p. 883) 
 
The interpretation of the regression coefficient is that as the independent / predictor variable 
increases by one unit, the value of the outcome / dependent variable increases by the value of the 
coefficient.  Where the regression has multiple predictors, the effect of each independent variables 
on the dependent variable is subject to holding the effects of all other covariates constant  (Field 
2013, p. 339).  The error term in the regression model reflects that independent variables will not 
perfectly predict the outcome (Gallo 2015).   
 
A regression model is an appropriate model for the HORSt, investigating factors 𝑿𝒊 that explain the 
variation across DMUs’ (populations’) efficiency scores (the dependent variable Y).  However, there 
are various forms of regression and the “choice often depends on the kind of data you have for the 
dependent variable and the type of model that provides the best fit” (Frost 2018b).  The best fit 
refers to how well the data fits the predicted linear equation (Chatterjee & Simonoff 2013, p. 5), 
depicted in the simple example in Figure 14 as the red line, which is the expected value of Y given 
the value of X.  The dots are data points.   
 
Figure 14   Example of a basic regression between two variables X and Y 
 




A statistic known as R-squared (R2) indicates the fit of the data in the model.  Ogee et al. (2013) 
provides defines R2 as: 
“the percentage of the response variable variation that is explained by a linear model.  
 R-squared = Explained variation / Total variation 
 R-squared is always between 0 and 100%: 
 0% indicates that the model explains none of the variability of the response data around its 
mean. 
 100% indicates that the model explains all the variability of the response data around its 
mean. 
R2 is known as a coefficient of determination and represents the proportion of the variance in the 
dependent variable that is predictable from the independent variable(s).” 
 
It follows from this explanation that a regression model with higher R2 can explain more of the 
variance in the dependent variable from the predictors.  However, caution needs to be applied with 
seeking a higher R2 as a goal for the regression.  This is because R2 will always be larger if more 
predictor variables are added, even if due to random chance alone, so the issue becomes whether or 
not the larger R2 represents a significantly better fit of the data, whereby the regression axioms 
(discussed in the next subsections) are not violated and where the regression significance has been 
established (Field 2013, p. 324; Ogee et al. 2013).  The literature indicates that there is no specific 
rule on how large an R2 ought to be for the regression to be considered useful, as it will largely 
depend on the context of the study and any necessary transformations that have been applied to 
the data to fit the context of the study and or meet necessary regression assumptions (Frost 2017a; 
Nau 2018).   
 
In the context of the HORSt second stage methodology, the regression should represent a 
description of what social determinants effect health outcomes and provide guidance to predictors 
that can be applied in the third stage as vertical equity funding adjustors.  In this context, the HORSt 
will consider statistically significant R2 size alongside how logical the description of the model’s 
independent variables is in describing the underlying relationship with the dependent variable with 
respect to the underlying literature that guides the choice of the independent variables.   
 
Overall, the key objective of the regression for the HORSt will to develop a parsimonious model; a 
model that offers the simplest explanation of predicting the variation in the allocative efficiency 
Page 128 
 
scores of the DMUs, so that the data fits the linear equation.  Typically in a regression, parsimony is 
achieved when the minimum number of independent variables affords an adequate explanation of 
the variation in the dependent variable  (Berenson et al. 2013, p. 536; Vandekerckhove et al. 2015, 
p. 3).  
4.4.2  Linear regression assumptions and test procedures 
Before discussing the underlying data for the regression to be used in Chapter Five, it is important to 
outline the key assumptions that must be met in order to be confident that the results can be 
generalised.  Appendix 7 on page 318 provides a summary of these key assumptions and outlines the 
methodological tests that will be applied to the HORSt regression to ensure that the regression 
results are robust.  The outcomes of these tests for these assumptions will be presented in the 
results section in Chapter Six. 
4.4.3  HORSt Regression 
Within the two-stage DEA literature, the type of second stage regression modelling applied by 
researchers varies.  According to Simar and Wilson’s (2007, p. 33) seminal paper and review of two 
stage DEA methods, they find that most researchers have used Ordinary least Squares (OLS) 
regression, or a Tobit regression, a type of censored regression.  Briefly, these techniques can be 
defined as follows: 
 OLS – the most common form of linear regression, often just known as linear 
regression, provides best estimates of the model when all assumptions for linear 
regression (those defined in the appendix 7 page 318) are met (Frost 2018a). 
 Tobit regression – provides maximum likelihood estimates of linear relationships 
between variables when the dependent variable is either left-and / or right censored 
(restricted) due to measurement constraints.  Examples of censoring include a model 
of data measured from a scientific gauge that provides a range of values of some 
phenomena being measured, where the true measure of some of the data 
observations may lie beyond the range of the gauge yet are recorded at the gauges 
maximum or minimum.  In such cases a regression would require censoring to 
eliminate observations at the maximum and / or minimum. (UCLA Statistical 
Consulting Group 2018). 
The divergence in the literature between these approaches is that some researchers claim that the 
nature of DEA efficiency estimates, bound between 0 and 1 mean that conventional linear 
regression modelling, such as OLS, should not apply and that a Tobit regression is appropriate 
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(Ahmad et al. 2017; McDonald 2009; Simar & Wilson 2007).  However, as argued by Raheli et al. 
(2017), Simar and Wilson (2007), McDonald (2009), Ramalho et al. (2010) a growing body of 
literature indicates that such a position is false, whereby all DEA scores being a fractional 
relationship of outputs to inputs will logically be bound by 0 and 1 and are not censored.  It follows 
that the use of Tobit regression in DEA, despite being widespread is questionable.  Based on this 
literature the HORSt will utilise OLS regression.  The OLS regression will be computed using SPSS v24 
software (IBM Corp 2017). 
4.5  UTILISING SOCIAL DETERMINANTS / HEALTH NEEDS AS VERTICAL EQUITY FUNDING 
ADJUSTORS TO INFORM LHNS SHARE OF STATE HEALTH FUNDING – (HORST METHOD 
STAGE 3) 
The population structures in this study that represent the DMUs are ABS population structures 
known as Statistical Area level 3 (SA3s).  There are 88 of these used in the study that span within and 
across the 15 NSW LHNs.  These are discussed and justified for their selection in the next chapter 
which outlines the data sources for the study.  
 
After the regression equation for the two-stage DEA is established with independent variables that 
represent social determinants that give rise to the allocative efficiency of the health status of the 
population, the predicted efficiency scores are calculated for each DMU / SA3 population.  From this 
calculation, the SA3(s) that are predicted to be the most efficient represent the benchmark.  
Equation 5 shows the calculation of the predicted allocative efficiency scores for each population 
area using the regression with independent variable 𝑥1 to 𝑥𝑛.  The actual number of independent 
variables used in the regression will be ascertained through the regression analysis outlined in the 
results in Chapter Six.  
 
Equation 5- Predicted Allocative Efficiency of each DMU / SA3 
 
?̂? =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑥1 + 𝑏2 𝑥2 + 𝑏𝑛 𝑥𝑛 
 
where:  ?̂?= the predicted efficiency score of each SA3 
𝒃𝟎 = the value of the outcome when the predictor is zero, the regression constant; 
𝒙𝟏= predictor / independent variable 1;  
𝒃𝟏 =  the regression coefficient associated with the predictor / independent variable 1; 
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𝒙𝟐= predictor / independent variable 2;  
𝒃𝟐 =  the regression coefficient associated with the predictor / independent variable 2; 
𝒙𝒏= predictor / independent variable n; and 
𝒃𝒏 =  the regression coefficient associated with the predictor / independent variable n. 
 
A health needs allocative efficiency index, the HORSt needs index for each SA3 (equation 6), is then 
created by computing a ratio of the best predicted efficiency score to the predicted scores of each 
DMU.  Doing so enables a vertical equity funding adjustment to be made to SA3s that have social 
determinants that limit the ability of the health service inputs across the continuum of care to 
achieve allocative efficient desirable health outcomes.   
 





 𝑥 100 
where:   
 𝒏𝒊= The HORSt need index for SA3i; 
 𝑷𝑩 = the highest predicted allocative efficiency score of all SA3 populations (the 
predicted benchmark); and 
 𝑷𝑨𝑬𝒊 = the predicted allocative efficiency score of SA3i.  
The index generated shows the socially determined health needs of each SA3 population as a 
proportional difference to the benchmark.  The index number of 100 represents the benchmark, 
which is the lowest value for the index.  Shown below in equation 7 is a hypothetical example for a 
fictional 𝑆𝐴3𝑧 having a predicted efficiency score derived from the HORSt regression of 75.2 and 
whereby the benchmarked SA3 had the highest predicted efficiency of any SA3 of 98.6.  This yields 
for 𝑆𝐴3𝑧 a need index of 131, having social determined health needs 31% greater than the 
benchmarked SA3 population.  
 
Equation 7- HORSt needs index –hypothetical example 
 
𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑆𝑡 𝑆𝐴3𝑧 = 131 =
 𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 98.6
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝐸 𝑆𝐴3𝑧 75.2




Since NSW SA3 populations can sit wholly within or across multiple LHNs, each LHN’s HORSt need 
index is built up from the SA3 need indices weighted for the SA3’s population proportions that make 
up the LHN.  Equation 8 outlines this which is identical to how needs indices at the LGA level were 
apportioned within the former NSW RDF and EHUIs to LHNs (Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 
2005a; Marshall & Slater 2015).  The HORSt need index for each SA3 is apportioned to each of the 
LHNs whereby the HORSt need index in each SA3 is multiplied by the portion of the SA3’s population 
in the LHN as per the 2016 Australian Census.  Each SA3s need adjusted population portion of the 
LHN is then summed to calculate the HORSt need index for the LHN.   
 
Equation 8 – HORSt need index of LHNs 
 





 (𝑁)𝑡 = the HORSt need index for 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑡; 
 𝑛𝑖 = the HORSt need index for SA3i; and 
 % 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑡 = the portion of the population of SA3i in 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑡  as per the 2016 
Australian Census. 
Table 7 is a worked hypothetical example that utilises equation 8 to apportion six theoretical SA3s 
(SA3i to SA3n) need indices to an LHN(t) where the SA3s are contained wholly or partially within 





Table 7   Example of apportioning SA3 need indices to the LHN  
 
 
Once each of the LHNs have a need index built up from the SA3 indices, these indices can inform 
socially determined needs-based shares of funding to assist with resource allocation decisions from 
the state government to each of the LHNs.  These needs-based shares are calculated through the 
series of equations 9 through 12, which are the same calculations that have been applied in the NSW 
RDF and EHUIs for ascertaining the resource allocation shares from RDF and EHUI need indices 
(Inter-Government & Funding Strategies 2005a; Marshall & Slater 2015).   
 
First, each LHN’s 2016 Australian Census population is multiplied by its need index which derives a 
needs adjusted population (equation 9) which is logically greater than the actual population, inflated 
by the need index.  The sum of all the LHNs needs adjusted populations is then calculated, which is 
the total state needs adjusted population (equation 10).  Again, being needs adjusted this total 
exceeds the actual NSW state population.   
 
Equation 9– LHN needs adjusted population 
 
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖  
where: 
 𝑥𝑖 = needs adjusted population of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖; 
 𝑁𝑖  = HORSt need index of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖; and 
 𝑃𝑖  = 2016 Australian Census population of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖. 
 
LHN(t) A B C = A x B  D = C / Sum of C H
HNI =the sum of (H x D) for each SA3 in the 




Pop share of SA3 in LHN (t) 2016 Census




in LHN (t) = 
Population 
share of 
SA3 in LHN 




for LHN in each 
SA3 = SA3 
population in LHN 
(t)/ Sum of SA3 
population in LHN
HORSt need 
index of SA3s 
in the LHN (i 
to n)
HORSt Need index of each SA3 x 
Proportion of Total Population for LHN in 
the SA3 = need index
i 0.277% 72073 199.80 0.0005 125.479 0.0618
j 100.000% 77934 77934.00 0.1922 144.997 27.8636
k 100.000% 92470 92470.00 0.2280 133.960 30.5439
l 99.978% 133292 133262.69 0.3286 122.923 40.3917
m 100.000% 101617 101617.00 0.2506 132.265 33.1407





Equation 10– State needs adjusted population 
 




 𝜎 = NSW state needs adjusted population  
 𝑥𝑖  = 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖  needs adjusted population 
 
The individual LHN needs adjusted populations are then normalised back to the actual state 
population by calculating their proportional share of the state needs adjusted population, by 
dividing each LHNs needs adjusted population by the state needs adjusted population and then 
multiplying by the actual NSW state population from the 2016 Australian Census (equation 11).    
 
Equation 11– LHN needs normalised population to 2016 Census population 
 
 𝛼𝑖 =  
(𝑥𝑖)
𝜎
 x 𝑆 
where: 
  𝛼𝑖 =needs normalised population of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖  
 𝑥𝑖  = 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖  needs adjusted population 
 𝜎 = NSW State needs adjusted pop 
 𝑆 =  NSW 2016 Australian Census population 
 
Finally, each LHNs socially determined health needs share of resources, their HORSt share, is 
calculated by then dividing the LHNs needs normalised adjusted population by the NSW population 
from the 2016 Australian Census (equation 12).  The HORSt LHN shares of resources will be subject 
to comparison to the currently used EHUIs and the LHNs populations currently reported use of 
resources.   
 
Equation 12– LHN HORSt share of resources  
 







 (𝜖) = HORSt share of resources for 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖; 
  𝛼𝑖 =needs normalised population of 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑖  
 𝑆 =  NSW 2016 Australian Census population 
 
4.5.1 Resource Allocation guidance using the HORSt 
Once the HORSt share of funding is known for every LHN, representing the health needs of the LHNs, 
resource allocation decisions between the State and LHNs can be guided by summing the total MBS, 
PBS and state health public hospital resources together and comparing what each LHN’s share of 
these resources are compared to what they would be if the HORSt shares were applied.  The 
difference between the actual consumption of resources across these three inputs of the continuum 
of care and that guided by the HORSt is the quantum of funds required to be adjusted by the state 
health system in order to maximise equity.  As discussed, the HORSt informs the state health funding 
requirement as a residual adjustment after the taxpayer subsidisation from other relevant 
Commonwealth government funding has been considered.  In other words, the HORSt represents 
what the state needs to spend for population equity, given that the state cannot control the 
Commonwealth contribution spending in the private sector.   
4.6  CHAPTER SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY APPLIED 
This chapter has outlined and justified the methodology for the development of the HORSt. 
In summary: 
The HORSt benchmark methodology makes use of:  
 Utilising DEA whereby the data generating process of the DEA measures the relative 
allocative efficiency for each NSW SA3 populations’ health status relative to all other 
NSW SA3 populations, subject to taxpayer inputs across the continuum of care; 
 The DEA model to support the benchmark is an output orientated model that seeks to 
maximise output relative to inputs and assumes based on a priori reasoning variable 
returns to scale; 
 Population health status is the DEA output variable, which can be approximated by 




 The main taxpayer funding inputs across the continuum of care from Commonwealth 
and NSW government for MBS, PBS and state public health outputs will be used as the 
resource inputs in the DEA (discussed in further detail in Chapter Five). 
 
The HORSt predictive modelling methodology makes use of:  
 An ordinary least squares regression; 
 The measured DEA allocative efficiency scores for each NSW SA3 populations’ health 
status will be the dependent variable; 
 Testing explanatory variables from the Australian 2016 census and reputable secondary 
data sources that are demonstrated in the literature to represent social determinants 
of health and can give rise or form in a formative construct to the allocative efficiency 
of populations’ health status. 
 
The HORSt informs LHNs shares of funding using vertical equity loadings.  These loadings and LHN 
shares are constructed using: 
 The regression coefficients to calculate the predicted allocative efficiency for all 
populations’; 
 The ratio of individual predicted allocative efficiency scores for each SA3 population 
compared to the most efficient SA3 population inform need indices for each SA3 
population; and 
 Population weighted need indices for each SA3 population as proportions of the LHNs 
that contain them inform LHN needs-based shares of funding. 
The HORSt results for LHNs shares of funding will be compared to the current LHNs shares of state 
health inpatient resources by area of residence and will also be compared to the current EHUIs 
shares of resources.  
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CHAPTER FIVE - DATA SOURCES 
5.1  DATA SOURCES 
This chapter outlines and justifies the data sources and their application used in the study.  First the 
population level structures are outlined for inclusion, with limitations examined due to the 
availability of Commonwealth Government supplied data.  DEA data inputs and output data are then 
justified in alignment with data availability and the literature presented.  Data standardisation and 
applicable transformations required to support the methodology are outlined and justified.  Finally, 
variables to be considered for inclusion in the regression analysis are appraised. 
5.2  POPULATION LEVEL STRUCTURES 
As the HORSt ultimately will inform resource distribution for LHNs from the state government, it is 
logical and necessary to utilise population level data structures that can support the DEA and 
regression analysis.  As indicated in the previous chapter, the population structure will inform the 
DMUs of the DEA.  The ABS data that will be utilised in this study is available at different levels of 
aggregation for populations and geographies.  Since 2011 the ABS use Australian Statistical 
Geography Standard (ASGS) and within this is an ABS structure which provides a hierarchy of 
geographical areas developed for the release of ABS statistical information.  Figure 15 depicts the 
ABS Structures, showing the hierarchy of areas and their component statistical areas and how they 
interrelate.  The ABS main population and census structures are stable for 5 years (Australian Bureau 











Figure 15   The ASGS ABS Structure 
 
Figure 15 source: ABS website Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS) (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2017d) 
 
Small population clusters are sensible structures to study to inform geographical health needs.  For 
example, the previous NSW Health Needs Indices (EHUIs) study used Statistical Area Level 2 (SA2) 
ABS geographies (Health Policy Analysis 2014b, p. 14).   These generally have a population range of 
3,000 to 25,000 persons and have an average population of about 10,000 persons.  SA2s in remote 
and regional areas generally have smaller populations than those in urban areas (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2016c).  In addition, the ABS definition SA2 geographies:  
“aim is to represent a community that interacts together socially and economically” (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2016c). 
 
As identified in the literature and methodology chapter, core resource data for assessing the publicly 
provided and subsidised resources across the continuum of care includes MBS and PBS data and 
these will be utilised as DEA inputs variables discussed in section 5.3.2.  However, the Australian 
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Government Department of Human services have stated following requests for this data, that the 
smallest geographical level that they supply de-identified aggregated data by age and sex is the 
Statistical Area Level 3 (SA3) level (Slater 2017).   
 
Across Australia, SA3 ABS geographies typically have population sizes of between 30,000 and 
130,000 people, though there are some exceptions.  The ABS states that the SA3s: 
“provides a standardised regional breakup of Australia.  The aim of SA3s is to create a standard 
framework for the analysis of ABS data at the regional level through clustering groups of SA2s that 
have similar regional characteristics.  SA3s are built from whole SA2s.  Whole SA3s aggregate directly 
to SA4s in the Main Structure.  SA3s do not cross state / territory borders” (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2016c, 2016d). 
 
Given the restriction that the smallest geographical structure for the provision of MBS and PBS data 
is SA3, this study utilises SA3 geographies for this study.  There are two versions of SA3 geographies 
since the commencement of ASGS, 2011 and 2016 with some minor changes between the two and 
mapping available between them (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016b, 2017d).  The MBS and PBS 
data were supplied with the 2011 version which forms the basis of the SA3 geographies used in the 
study.  All variables identified for consideration in this study, outlined in this chapter, are available or 
able to be derived at the 2011 SA3 level (hereafter referred to as SA3/s).  As per the ABS definition 
above, SA3s are wholly contained within states borders.  In NSW there are 91 SA3 geographical areas 
having an average population of about 83,000 people (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016d).  A 
discussion of the virtues of using SA2 data in the future is included in Chapter Seven. 
 
It is important to note that 34 SA3 geographies do not fit precisely within the boundaries of the 15 
NSW Health LHN boundaries.  The NSW LHNs are defined by 2011 Statistical Local Areas (SLAs) (SLHD 
Planning Unit 2013) which are contained either wholly or partially within Local Government Areas 
(LGAs) boundaries (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001).  LGAs are not part of the ABS ASGS that 
commenced in 2011, but were part of the ABS Australian Standard Geographical Classification 
(ASGC) prior (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017d).  However the ABS has available “Non-ABS 
Structure LGA Boundaries and Correspondences” for 2011 boundaries (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2012), which allows for concordance mapping between structures.   
 
To support the third stage of the HORSt methodology outlined in section 4.5 (page 129) which 
informs resource distribution shares for each LHN and to provide an understanding of the resource 
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inputs and outcomes for LHNs, the HORSt results for the 15 NSW LHNs are built up from NSW SA3 
geographies and apportioned to LHNs on the basis on each SA3’s population needs and the 
population proportion of each SA3 within each LHN.  The portion of SA3 populations found within 
each LHN is based on the 2011 ABS LGA and SA3 structures and 2011 ABS concordance mapping 
showing the LGA population apportioning to corresponding SA3 geographies (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2012).  The most recent population projections of SA3s from the 2016 Census (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2017g) have been used for this apportioning task.  An alternative contemporary 
population projection that could be used in lieu of the census is to use the NSW Department of 
Planning Projections (NSW Department of Planning and Environment 2017).  Given the timing of the 
release of the 2016 Census results in 2017 concurrent with the timing of this thesis, the 2016 ABS 
Census has been used.   
 
Of the 91 NSW SA3s, 88 were used in the study as 3 found to have extremely low population 
numbers (two had less than 10 people and one had less than 400). These SA3s were also missing 
input data to support the DEA.  These were excluded.  The excluded SA3s by code and name are as 
follows: 
 12402 Blue Mountains – South (population less than 10 individuals); 
 10702 Illawarra Catchment Reserve (population less than 10 individuals); and 
 10803 Lord Howe Island (inconsistent and very low PBS data and population of 382).  
According to the 2016 Census, the 88 SA3s used in the study have populations ranging from 12,737 
in the Lower Murray Area of Murrumbidgee LHN, to 230,326 in the Sydney Inner City Area which 
straddles South Eastern Sydney and Sydney LHNs (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017g).  Table 8 
(page 140) shows a summary of the 88 NSW SA3s of the study and their proportional population 
mapping to build up the 15 NSW LHNs.  Equation 13 outlines the mapping employed to apportion 
the SA3 populations to LHNs.  An almost identical method of apportioning LGAs to SLAs and NSW 




Table 8   88 DMUs (NSW SA3 populations) used in DEA with population portions of each LHN 
 
Sources:  (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001, 2012, 2016d, 2017g; SLHD Planning Unit 2013). 
  


















10601 Lower Hunter 100.00% 89,621    11701 Botany 100.00% 49,169        
10602 Maitland 100.00% 76,134    11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham 0.04% 57,574        
10603 Port Stephens 100.00% 73,036    11703 Sydney Inner City 94.36% 230,326      
10604 Upper Hunter 100.00% 30,877    11801 Eastern Suburbs - North 100.00% 136,152      
10801 Great Lakes 100.00% 31,895    11802 Eastern Suburbs - South 100.00% 149,266      
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 0.12% 49,005    11903 Hurstville 93.89% 132,733      
10804 Port Macquarie 0.02% 79,929    11904 Kogarah - Rockdale 100.00% 145,493      
10805 Taree - Gloucester 100.00% 54,761    12703 Liverpool 0.57% 122,238      
11001 Armidale 100.00% 38,098    12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah 100.00% 114,106      
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield 100.00% 38,858    12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote 100.00% 111,321      
11003 Moree - Narrabri 100.00% 26,452    10704 Wollongong 0.02% 133,292      
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah 100.00% 82,379    11402 Southern Highlands 99.85% 49,059        
11101 Lake Macquarie - East 100.00% 123,536  11901 Bankstown 99.09% 178,409      
11102 Lake Macquarie - West 100.00% 77,075    11902 Canterbury 5.84% 141,819      
11103 Newcastle 100.00% 169,571  12301 Camden 100.00% 64,212        
10104 South Coast 0.28% 72,073    12302 Campbelltown (NSW) 100.00% 162,845      
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla 100.00% 77,934    12303 Wollondilly 100.00% 42,215        
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour 100.00% 92,470    12403 Penrith 4.72% 143,452      
10704 Wollongong 99.98% 133,292  12501 Auburn 0.91% 94,077        
11401 Shoalhaven 100.00% 101,617  12503 Merrylands - Guildford 22.72% 157,512      
11402 Southern Highlands 0.15% 49,059    12701 Bringelly - Green Valley 100.00% 106,378      
10402 Coffs Harbour 99.48% 87,943    12702 Fairfield 99.06% 193,076      
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 99.88% 49,005    12703 Liverpool 99.43% 122,238      
10804 Port Macquarie 99.98% 79,929    10101 Goulburn – Yass 73.11% 73,003        
10101 Goulburn – Yass 26.89% 73,003    10102 Queanbeyan 100.00% 59,472        
10302 Lachlan Valley 10.61% 56,416    10103 Snowy Mountains 100.00% 19,740        
10901 Albury 100.00% 62,504    10104 South Coast 99.72% 72,073        
10902 Lower Murray 28.76% 12,737    11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 0.01% 14,686        
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury 100.00% 42,542    11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham 99.96% 57,574        
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West) 100.00% 49,464    11703 Sydney Inner City 5.64% 230,326      
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 99.99% 14,686    11901 Bankstown 0.91% 178,409      
11303 Wagga Wagga 100.00% 95,644    11902 Canterbury 94.16% 141,819      
10301 Bathurst 0.04% 47,783    11903 Hurstville 6.11% 132,733      
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 45.88% 47,572    12001 Canada Bay 100.00% 89,595        
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 0.34% 27,076    12002 Leichhardt 100.00% 59,540        
11503 Hawkesbury 100.00% 25,165    12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield 100.00% 159,133      
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill 31.65% 34,081    10301 Bathurst 99.96% 47,783        
12401 Blue Mountains 100.00% 78,496    10302 Lachlan Valley 89.39% 56,416        
12403 Penrith 95.28% 143,452  10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 54.12% 47,572        
12404 Richmond - Windsor 100.00% 37,469    10304 Orange 100.00% 58,991        
12405 St Marys 100.00% 55,427    10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 100.00% 25,059        
12702 Fairfield 0.94% 193,076  10503 Dubbo 100.00% 71,138        
10401 Clarence Valley 100.00% 50,961    11501 Baulkham Hills 81.57% 148,761      
10402 Coffs Harbour 0.52% 87,943    11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 50.64% 27,076        
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal 100.00% 80,412    11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill 68.35% 34,081        
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland 100.00% 71,294    11601 Blacktown 100.00% 139,391      
11203 Tweed Valley 100.00% 93,458    11602 Blacktown - North 100.00% 95,745        
11501 Baulkham Hills 18.43% 148,761  11603 Mount Druitt 100.00% 115,220      
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 49.02% 27,076    12501 Auburn 99.09% 94,077        
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove 100.00% 117,824  12502 Carlingford 89.55% 68,864        
12102 Hornsby 100.00% 83,456    12503 Merrylands - Guildford 77.28% 157,512      
12103 Ku-ring-gai 100.00% 123,474  12504 Parramatta 100.00% 146,708      
12104 North Sydney - Mosman 100.00% 100,152  12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 15.61% 49,288        
12201 Manly 100.00% 44,994    12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill 2.51% 140,873      
12202 Pittwater 100.00% 63,504    10201 Gosford 100.00% 173,257      
12203 Warringah 100.00% 157,846  10202 Wyong 100.00% 162,052      
12502 Carlingford 10.45% 68,864    10502 Broken Hill and Far West 100.00% 20,598        
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 84.39% 49,288    10902 Lower Murray 71.24% 12,737        
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill 97.49% 140,873  87,942        
78,215        
12,737        
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Equation 13 – Apportioning / mapping SA3 populations to NSW LHNs 
 




Where:  𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 = 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 
           % 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 = 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖  𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝐻𝑁 
5.3  DEA DATA 
As a relative concept DEA does not require all of the outputs and inputs of DMUs, requiring only a 
sensible choice of variables that express the performance of DMUs (Morita & Avkiran 2009, p. 164; 
Sherman & Zhu 2006b).  Contextually for the HORSt, the financial inputs identified in the literature 
review (MBS expenditure, PBS expenditure, state public hospitals expenditure) that represent the 
majority of taxpayer funding inputs across the continuum of care, around 73% in 2015-16 (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare 2017a), are a sensible choice for inclusion in the DEA.  All are 
available at the SA3 population level.   
 
The governance review in Chapter Three also identified that out-of-pocket patient costs for non-
hospital Medicare subsidised services are now available for SA3 populations.  Whilst this data could 
be used as a financial input in the DEA, a decision was made not to do so on the basis that of the 
literature presented surrounding the fact that out-of-pocket costs represent health inequity; where 
people forgo or delay access to private treatment due to unaffordability of costs and run the risk of 
worsening their health.  As such out-of-pocket cost will be more appropriately considered for 
inclusion in the HORSt as a predictor variable in the HORSt regression.  Furthermore, given the 
widespread variations in out-of-pocket costs which are determined by private doctors’ profit-making 
motives, it is difficult to understand the resource contribution that out-of-pocket costs make to the 
production of health outcomes across the continuum of care.  This is especially so when out-of-
pocket costs in acting as a barrier to private services: 
 can lead to people to utilising higher costing taxpayer provided, free of charge services, 
in the public sector; or 
 cause people to delay treatment exacerbating heath conditions leading to poorer 




The outputs identified in the literature review, PPHs and Charlson Co-Morbidities can be used as 
proxies of population health outcomes via population health status.  As such, the relative efficiency 
scores produced from an output orientated VRS DEA will reflect the appropriate mix of health 
services inputs to produce effective health outcomes (allocative efficiency).  SA3 populations that 
are found to be relative allocative efficient (100%) compared to all other SA3s (the efficient peers) 
will establish the benchmark for the HORSt.   
 
In keeping with the literature that underpins the use of prolonged high rates of PPHs amongst 
populations as hot spots of poor health / cold spots in the case of the HORSt to represent good 
health and in using PPHs as a proxy variable of population health status, the objective of the DEA for 
the HORSt is concerned with representing the typical relative efficiencies of each of the populations’ 
health status.  The work of Duckett and Griffiths (2016b, pp. 5-6) in defining hot spots using PPHs, 
which is not a DEA study, used a minimum persistence threshold of three years’ data to identify a 
hotspots within 10 years data.  It follows that if a similar methodology could be employed with 
HORSt using the available population data to identify prolonged good health status; a question arises 
of which years’ measured frontier would represent the norm sufficient enough to inform resource 
distribution in any given year?   
 
Given that there are resource limitations to this study pertaining to costs of purchased data required 
for the DEA inputs, limited to three successive years, a measure of central tendency of three years’ 
output and inputs data will be used in the DEA to represent the typical output and resource usage of 
each DMU.  The median or middle score is recognised in the literature as a useful measure of central 
tendency as it is stable and not distorted by any outliers (Manikandan 2011; Ott 1988, p. 39).  As 
such the median of the data will be used.  Doing so with the population data for the three years 
represents the measured median allocative efficiency scores for the DMUs and as discussed 
according to Coelli et al. (2005, p. 203) pertaining to the use of the whole populations’ data this does 
not require bootstrapping.  The individual years and the median data for the DEA outputs and inputs 
are tabled in the following sections.  The data over the three years can be demonstrated to be very 
stable.   
 
The goal of developing the HORSt in this study is to demonstrate a workable proof of concept model 
that answers the research questions and can inform resource distribution from state to LHNs and 
this is by no means compromised by utilising the methodology outlined herein that is constrained by 
practical limitations of the resources available.  As discussed in section 4.5, the third stage of the 
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HORSt methodology requires a measure of the relative efficiencies of each DMU to the efficient 
DMUs.  This can be entirely satisfied by the methodology above utilising the median population 
data. 
5.3.1  DEA OUTPUT DATA 
The two alternative measures identified in the literature to proxy population health outcomes via 
representing markers of population health status; PPHs and Charlson Co-morbidities are now 
examined in terms of their data sources for suitable inclusion in the study as the output variable in 
the DEA.  Methodology for their extraction from NSW Health data sources are examined, along with 
quality assurance measures that can be applied. Standardising the variables for age and casemix 
complexity is also examined.  Given that both variables represent a proxy of poor health status and 
the DEA model’s linear programming is designed to consider maximising desirable outcomes, a 
methodology for translating the poor (undesirable) health status for use in the DEA computations is 
also examined.  
5.3.1.1  DEA Outputs Data – Age-standardised and casemix adjusted PPHs 
As discussed in the literature review there are 22 PPHs.  Upon reviewing the ethics approval for this 
study, the SWSLHD Epidemiology accessed NSW hospital data from the NSW Secure Analytics for 
Population Health Research and Intelligence (SAPHaRI) data bases (Centre for Epidemiology and 
Evidence 2017).  Prior to understanding that MBS and PBS expenditure data was only affordable for 
three years and the study therefore only utilised three years’ worth of data, the data extracted from 
the NSW hospital data bases comprised ten years’ of PPHs to 2016/17 using the identifying and 
definitional attributes of the 2016 National Healthcare Agreement: PI 18–Selected PPHs (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare 2017b), which is tabled in appendix 1.  These attributes show how 
PPHs are identified within hospital data sets.  These are classified by the National Health Care 
agreement across three broad categories, of Chronic, Acute and Vaccine Preventable.  For the HORSt 
all three categories of PPHs are included so as to represent a broad level of population health status 
for each DMU.  
 
The data extract from the NSW for PPHs was conducted for each hospital separation.  A hospital 
separation is defined by the AIHW as the: 
“process by which an episode of care for an admitted patient ceases.  A separation may be formal or 
statistical.  Formal separation: The administrative process by which a hospital records the cessation 
of treatment and/or care and/or accommodation of a patient.  Statistical separation: The 
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administrative process by which a hospital records the cessation of an episode of care for a patient 
within the one hospital stay” (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018f). 
 
To represent the health status of each SA3 population, the separations data extracted were from the 
patient’s demographic location of residence (their SA3 population), not the hospital in which they 
were treated.  Data elements included in the extract for each separation included: 
 diagnosis codes that support identification of the separation being an PPH;  
 patient demographics; 
o SA3 location, gender, five-year age groups from 0-4, to 80-84 and 85 years and over; 
and 
 resource intensity data; 
o Australian Refined Diagnosis Related Group (AR-DRG), National Weighted Activity 
Units (NWAU).  
These data elements above support the data extraction to be expressed as an age-standardised rate 
adjusted for patient resource complexity, casemix.   
 
According to the AIHW, age standardisation is: 
“A method of adjusting the crude rate to eliminate the effect of differences in population age 
structures when comparing crude rates for different periods of time, different geographic areas 
and/or different population sub-groups (e.g. between one year and the next and/or States and 
Territories, Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations).  Adjustments are usually undertaken for 
each of the comparison populations against a standard population (rather than adjusting one 
comparison population to resemble another). Sometimes a comparison population is referred to as a 
study population” (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005).   
 
Age standardisation can be taken a step further by including gender, in order to calculate an age 
gender standardised rate.  Doing so allows for an adjustment to eliminate any effect on the 
difference in compared populations attributed to sex.  The data extracted and ethics approval 
enables this age gender standardisation to occur and the underpinnings for including sex in the 
extraction in the planning phase for the study was somewhat guided by the developments of the 
former NSW RDF, which considered a segmented approach of specific health programs whereby the 
effects of sex were more pronounced on health needs such as obstetrics (Inter-Government & 
Funding Strategies 2005b).  However,  the AIHW (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005) 
states that standardisations extended to include an adjustment for sex is usually not undertaken and 
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congruent with the health program approach taken by the former NSW RDF done so only when the 
study outcome is specifically interested in sex specific affects as for example; considering rates of 
caesarean sections.  Conversely the HORSt development in this study is to demonstrate a proof of 
concept model for resource distribution amongst whole populations and is not health program 
specific.  As such, sex standardisation was not conducted.  Further discussion on feasibility and 
limitations for refining the HORSt at the program level is included in Chapter Seven.  
 
According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2005); Naing (2000), there are two 
established methods of age standardisation: 
 a direct method which is generally used for comparisons between study groups; and  
 an indirect method which is recommended when the age-specific rates for the population 
being studied are unknown  
The method used for the HORSt employs the direct method, as the comparative rate between the 
study groups is sought and the entire populations’ rates being studied are derived from the extract.  
The direct method is used also used by NSW Health for PPH separations with the rate expressed per 
100,000 people (Epidemiology and Evidence 2017).  The AIHW provides guidelines for the direct 
method shown below in equation 14: 
 
Equation 14 - Direct Method of Standardisation 
 





SR  = the age-standardised rate for the population being studied; 
ri  =the age-group specific rate for age group i in the population being studied; 
Pi  =the population of age group i in the standard population* ; and 
Σ(𝑟𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖) = is the expected number of events in the population being studied 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2005). 
* “The ABS and AIHW recommend that the 30 June 2001 standard population should be used for age-
standardisation until a new standard population becomes available after the 2026 Census” 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013). 
 
PPHs differ between conditions and the patients presenting with these in hospitals can logically have 
different levels of complexity / severity and associated resource intensity even amongst the patients 
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having the same PPHs.  If PPHs were simply subject to age standardisation, the severity and resource 
intensity of the patients would not be represented in the data and comparison of population health 
status across populations so as to identify cold or hot spots may be distorted.  A remedy for this 
situation is to use the casemix data contained within each separation’s record, using the NWAU.  
 
“An NWAU is a measure of health service activity expressed as a common unit.  It provides a way of 
comparing and valuing each public hospital service (whether it is an admission, emergency 
department presentation or outpatient episode), by weighting it for its clinical complexity.  The 
average hospital service is worth one NWAU – the most intensive and expensive activities are worth 
multiple NWAUs, the simplest and least expensive are worth fractions of an NWAU” (Administrator 
National Health Funding Pool 2018).  
 
To support the inclusion of patient severity and resource intensity with the PPH data to be used in 
the DEA for the HORSt, the data extraction of separations was summarised by total NWAUs for each 
age group of each SA3 population. This data was then subjected to direct standardisation so as to 
derive an age-standardised casemix adjusted rate of PPHs for each SA3 (each DMU) per 10,000 
people.  The DEA output expressed as an age-standardised rate, along with DEA inputs, do not cause 
a problem for DEA with numerous examples in the literature expressed this way (Cordero et al. 
2015; Liu et al. 2010).   
 
The NSW Health Stats website publishes data on the volume and age adjusted rates of PPHs at the 
LHN level (Epidemiology and Evidence 2017) and the AIHW publishes PPHs the same data at the SA3 
level (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a).  These published data rates are not adjusted 
for patient severity and resource intensity as per the methodology for this study outlined above 
using NWAUs.  In addition, the AIHW data shows a greater volume of separations compared to the 
NSW Health Stats published data and that extracted from the NSW Health data, with the AIHW data 
including PPHs occurring at private hospitals (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a) 
 
Quality assurance checking of the data extract can be conducted by comparison to the officially 
published rates per 100,000 people and volumes of PPHs on the NSW Health Stats website.  In order 
to do so, the data extract was summarised by total separations for each age group for each SA3 and 
the direct method of age standardisation (excluding an NWAU adjustment) was applied.  The 
extracted data was then required to be mapped to the LHN level.  To do so the PPH standardised 
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rates apportioning used the same methodology of that in equation 13.  This is shown as follows in 
equation 15. 
 
Equation 15 – Apportioning / mapping SA3 standardised rates of PPHs to NSW LHNs 
 






𝑆𝐴3 𝑃𝑃𝐻 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 100𝑘𝑖  𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 = 𝑃𝑃𝐻 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 100,000 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖  𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 
           % 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝐻𝑁𝑛 = 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐴3 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖  𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐿𝐻𝑁 
 
There are some minor differences between the data extract and the official published figures.  
However, these are not manifestly different to warrant questioning the validity of the data extract 
for its use with this study, whereby the volume of separations in the extract compared with 
published figures are no more than 3% larger in any of the three years.  Importantly the 
proportionality of the volume and size of the age-standardised rates amongst the LHNs are the 
same.  Furthermore, there are several reasons that explain these differences.  These are: 
 the nature of the extract at SA3 level to support the HORSt analysis requires apportioning / 
mapping by SA3s to LHNs to allow the quality assurance comparison as per previously 
discussed, whereas the NSW Health Stats published data did not have to undergo this 
apportioning; 
 the NSW Health Stats data estimates the NSW patients with PPHs receiving treatment 
interstate, whereas the extract counts the patient volume of these patients;  
 the NSW Health Stats data excludes PPH separations that are categorised as rehabilitation, 
whereas the HORSt in wanting to capture a broad view of health status approximated by 
these separations does not exclude these separations; and  
 the NSW Health Stats data for LHNs are point estimates bound by upper and lower 
confidence intervals with some very low counts of PPHs in some LHNs excluded, whereas the 
extract simply takes the volume of patient separations for PPHs and calculates an age-
standardised rate 




The following graphs (figures 16 through 21) summarises differences between the extract and the 
NSW Health Stats published data, showing the very small differences between the data extract ages 
sex standardised rates and volumes of PPHs from 2013/14 through to 2015/16.  With minor 
differences explainable, the quality assurance testing finds that the data extract is consistent with 
the official published figures.  As such the extract PPHs data will be used with HORSt.  
 
Figure 16   Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published age-standardised rates for 2013/14  
 






























2013/14 PPHs age standardised rate per 100k population by LHN 
- Extract from NSW Health data vs NSW Health Stats Published data
Extract p/100k NSW Health Stats Per 100k
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Figure 17   Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published volume of separations for 2013/14  
 
Figure 17:  (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2017; Epidemiology and Evidence 2017). 
Figure 18   Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published age-standardised rates for 2014/15 
 


























2014/15 PPHs age standardised rate per 100k population by LHN 
- Extract from NSW Health data vs NSW Health Stats Published data
Extract p/100k NSW Health Stats Per 100k
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Figure 19   Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published volume of separations for 2014/15 
 
Figure 19: (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2017; Epidemiology and Evidence 2017). 
Figure 20   Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published age-standardised rates for 2015/16 
 


























2015/16 PPHs age standardised rate per 100k population by LHN 
- Extract from NSW Health data vs NSW Health Stats Published data
Extract p/100k NSW Health Stats Per 100k
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Figure 21   Comparison of PPHs extracted vs NSW Health published volume of separations for 2015/16 
 
Figure 21: (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2017; Epidemiology and Evidence 2017). 
 
5.3.1.2  DEA Outputs Data Alternative – Age-standardised Charlson Co-morbidity  
As an alternative to using the age and casemix adjusted rates of PPHs as the output variable in the 
HORSt DEA, guided by the literature review, Charlson Co-morbidities could be used as a proxy for 
each SA3’s / DMU’s population health status.  The Charslon Co-morbities of each separation have a 
weighting assigned, a score, that can be used to reflect complexity of the patient and or the 
associated NWAU of the separation could also be used.   
 
There is some overlap between Charlson Co-morbidties and the PPHs where some PPHs separations 
will also have a Charlson score and the Charlson Co-morbidity can be a predictor of PPHs (Eggli et al. 
2014; Saver et al. 2014)  Given that, the intent to use the Charlson Co-morbities as an alternative 
standalone proxy of health status in place of PPHs, there was no need for the Charlson Co-
morbidties extract to exclude separations that also were found to be PPHs.   
 
The data extract followed the literature of Sundararajan et al. (2004) which identified the Charlson 
Co-morbidities separations and assigned a score using secondary diagnosis codes in each separation.  
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A complete list of the codes is available in appendix 2, which uses the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision, Australian Modification (ICD-
10-AM), (Australian Consortium for Classification Development 2018).   
 
Similar to the extract of PPHs / PPHs, SWSLHD Epidemiology extracted the data from the NSW 
SAPHaRI data sets.  However, the extracts were found upon inspection to be somewhat unreliable.  
Significant volumes of separations around 7% to 10% across each SA3 that should have had positive 
Charlson scores were found to have zero scores, with many of the ICD-10-AM codes found to have 
decimal place errors that were affecting the assignment of the scores.  Due to these errors, the use 
of the Charlson Co-morbidities as an alternative to PPHs were considered to be unreliable for the 
purposes of this study and were not pursued further.   
5.3.1.3  Transforming the DEA Outputs Data for use with the DEA 
The HORSt DEA output in this model is expressed by age-standardised and case mix adjusted rates of 
PPHs per 10,000 people.  Importantly in the context of the HORSt DEA the goal is to maximise 
outputs and, in this case, maximum health outcomes are approximated by health status represented 
by low rates of PPHs.  This means that the PPHs need to be mathematically transformed as higher 
rates are bad and lower rates are desirable and, in the DEA, required to be maximised.  In the DEA 
literature, outcomes that need this transformation are termed undesirable outcomes and similarly 
inputs requiring transformation are called undesirable inputs (Aminuddin et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2010; 
Valdmanis et al. 2008).   
 
The literature has multiple methods for transforming undesirable variables for use in DEA.  A critique 
of the literature by Liu et al. (2010, p. 178) examine the three main established published peer 
reviewed methodologies and concluded that the type of transformation applied is very much a 
matter of the context of the individual study.  With respect to this, the operationalisation of the 
HORSt and the study’s resources, the key requirements for the treatment of the undesirable output 
for the HORSt is that the method:  
 does not overly complicate the interpretation of the DEA objectives as a meaningful 
benchmark as outlined in the previous chapter (page 122); 
 does not alter the ranking and identification of efficient and inefficient DMUs; and 
 from a practical point of resourcing for this study, allows transformed variables to be 
calculated using the purchased DEA software for this study, namely PIM-DEA and 
Frontier Analyst.  
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A critique of the transformation methodologies is outlined in equations 16 through 18.  These are 
examined along with a non-transformation methodology for the HORSt output data.  The 
methodology to be used for the study is then justified and outlined in equation 18, with an example 
shown in equation 19.  The transformed data for each DMU is then presented in Table 9 and the 
distribution of the transformed results is presented in Figure 26. 
 
Equation 16 – Additive inverse for transforming undesirable DEA variables 
 
𝑓 (𝑈 )  =  −𝑈  
Where 𝑈 = the data to be transformed  
 
Equation 16 demonstrates the approach by Koopmans (1951, p. 35).  This simply transforms the 
undesirable output by adding a negative sign to the data to be transformed, an additive inverse 
approach.  The simplicity of this approach is that it maintains the absolute differences between the 
DMUs’ data that is transformed.  However, the transformed data becomes negative.  Liu et al. (2010, 
p. 178) and Sarkis (2002, p. 119) argues that whilst negative data can be used it is problematic and 
very complicated in the computation of efficiency scores.  Moreover a number of DEA software 
packages, PIM-DEA and Frontier Analyst for example, cannot handle negative data (Avkiran 2002, p. 
11; Emrouznejad & Thanassoulis 2011; Hollingsworth 1997).  For these reasons, this methodology 
was rejected for use with the HORSt DEA undesirable output. 
 
Equation 17 – Multiplicative transverse for transforming undesirable DEA variables 
 
𝑓 (𝑈 )  =  1/𝑈  
Where 𝑈 = the data to be transformed  
 
The approach outlined in equation 17 involves taking the multiplicative inverse of the data 
(Francisco et al. 2012; Golany & Roll 1989, p. 241; Knox Lovell et al. 1995, p. 510).  This avoids the 
conversion of the variable to negative numbers.  However, in doing so it converts the data to a 
fractional number.  Doing so is problematic as it does not preserve the absolute differences between 
the values of the DMUs’ variables as it is a nonlinear transformation.   This does not preserve the 
linearity and convexity of the DEA frontier (its overall shape as depicted by example in Figure 12 
(page 121)  and the approach has been therefore criticised as to its effects on the resulting efficiency 
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scores of the DMUs (Liu et al. 2010, p. 178).  For these reasons, this methodology was rejected for 
use with the HORSt DEA undesirable output. 
 
Liu et al. (2010) also highlights that the treatment of undesirable DEA variables could remain 
untransformed where undesirable outputs could be simply treated as desirable inputs and vice versa 
thus reversing the ratio studied.  For the HORSt, experiments were conducted with PIM-DEA 
software and Frontier Analyst software for swapping the undesirable output to be treated as a 
desirable input and vice versa with the DEA inputs now treated as outputs.  Problematically, both 
the software products produced results that were difficult to interpret whereby some of the worst 
and best performing DMUs in terms of low and high ages standardised PPHs were found to be 100% 
efficient peers to each other, regardless of the resources (treated as an output) they consumed.   
The spread of efficiency scores made very little intuitive sense with all DMUs scores clustered within 
10% of each other.  Furthermore, both the software packages using identical data produced vastly 
different results for the same DMUs.  As such this methodology was not pursued further.  
 
As Cordero et al. (2015, p. 238) points out the problems encountered with swapping inputs and 
outputs are not surprising as: 
“this method does not truly reflect the real production process and the scale and intervals of original 
variables are affected by the data transformation”. 
Furthermore, as  Liu and Sharp (1999) outline, the nature of the output-input relationship and the 
DEA’s model orientation is altered.  The explanation of this reversal of outputs and inputs somewhat 
overcomplicates the parsimonious approach of the already defined scope for the HORSt DEA being 
an output orientated model (page 120).  Therefore, this transformation methodology was rejected 
for use with the HORSt DEA undesirable output. 
 
Equation 18 –Translational linear decreasing monotone approach for transforming undesirable DEA 
variables 
 
𝑓 (𝑈 ) =  −𝑈 + 𝑘  
Where 𝑈 = the data to be transformed 
𝑘 = a positive integer greater than the highest value of the undesirable variable to be 




According to Liu et al. (2010) review, the approach shown in equation 18 has become widely used, 
with most literature using this method citing Seiford and Zhu’s (2002) examination of this method.  
The work of Seiford and Zhu (2002) built on that of Ali and Seiford (1990), demonstrates through 
experimentation of multiple DEA transformations that this process maintains the linearity and 
convexity of the frontier, the rankings of efficiencies scores between DMUs and the identification of 
efficient and inefficient DMUs.  Setting the size of 𝑘 however just above the maximum value of the 
output variable does have an effect of the corresponding DMU’s efficiency score, with a very low 
DEA score expected.   
 
Similar to the transformation required for the HORSt using age-standardised rates of PPHs, Cordero 
et al. (2015) used this approach with age-standardised rates of ACSCs as an output to be minimised 
so as to act as a proxy of maximising health outcomes.  The paper showed the area with the highest 
age-standardised rate of ACSCs was 474.22 per 10,000 people.  This study set the size of 𝑘 = 500 
and did not explain the rationale for this.  The lead author was e-mailed on 11 June 2018, seeking 
clarification as to whether 𝑘 had been set as the nearest hundred up from the maximum rate of 
ACSCs per 10,000 people, as this seemed logical.  An e-mail confirmation (appendix 5 page 295) was 
received on 12 June 2018 that this was indeed the case, with the maximum rate not used to avoid 
having a DMU with a zero value (Cordero 2018).   
 
This method will be utilised for the HORSt.  In summary justification for doing so is based on:  
 the literature’s finding of stability of this method to preserve the DMU efficiency rankings 
and the linearity and convexity of the DEA frontier;  
 an example in peer reviewed literature of the transformation of the same output statistic 
(age-standardised rates of ACSCs / PPHs); 
 there being no required change in the justified output orientated DEA model to support the 
HORSt; and 
 there being no DEA software problems with the transformed results.  
 
Specifically drawing upon the work of Cordero et al. (2015) in setting the size of 𝑘, with respect to 
age-standardised PPHs as the nearest hundred above the maximum rate, an examination of the 
median of the three years age-standardised PPH rates found that the highest DMU rate was 550 per 
10,000 people.  The next hundred up from this is 600.  For the HORSt 𝑘  was therefore set at 600.  
The output data was transformed accordingly using equation 18 and this value.  The transformed 
Page 156 
 
DEA output represents a desirable output, a proxy of the health status of each DMU whereby higher 
rates are desirable, transformed from the lowest rates of age-standardised PPH and vice versa. 
 
Table 9 (page 157) shows a summary of the transformed DEA outputs data to be used in the study.  
The table shows that the median rate of PPHs for each SA3 population (DMU) compared to the 
individual years are a good measure of the populations’ normal rate of PPHs with very little variation 
over the years.  The highest median rate of PPHs, expressed as age-standardised NWAUs per 10,000 
people was for the SA3 ‘10501 Bourke – Cobar –Coonamble’ with 550.10.  Using equation 18 where 
(𝑘) = 600, the transformed value of this 49.90, as equation 19. 
 
Equation 19 – PPHs - Transformed example for SA3 ‘10501 Bourke – Cobar –Coonamble’ 
 
𝑓 (𝑈 ) =  −550.10 + 600 = 49.9  
 
Similarly, the SA3 with the best median rate of PPHs NWAUs per 10,000 people is that of ‘12103 Ku-
ring-gai’ with 149.15, transformed to 450.85.  
 
Both these rates reasonably reflect the extremes of health outcomes via population health status.   
The Bourke – Cobar – Coonamble area is remote and there is little access to services.  The area has a 
higher at need indigenous population.  The area is typified by very poor socioeconomic status, social 
determinants that give rise to very poor health outcomes.  The Ku-ring-gai area is at the opposite 
end of the scale to these attributes (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2018; Centre for 
Epidemiology and Research 2010; Western NSW Local Health District & Western NSW Medicare 
Local 2013).   
 
Figure 22 (page 159) shows comparison histograms of the frequency of the median rates of PPHs 
(NWAUs) per 10,000 people and that of the transformed data for use as the DEA output. Figure 23 
(page 159) shows each of the three years’ rates of PPHs (NWAUs) per 10,000 people, showing little 
difference in the rates over time.  Nonetheless, as per the statistical literature (Manikandan 2011; 
Ott 1988, p. 39) the use of the median is a sensible choice to be representative of the DMUs three 
years data in the analysis and be transformed as a desirable output in the HORSt DEA.
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10101 Goulburn – Yass 285.35 285.35 303.86 285.35 314.65
10102 Queanbeyan 194.02 192.69 194.02 194.02 405.98
10103 Snowy Mountains 154.96 182.42 150.86 154.96 445.04
10104 South Coast 267.40 296.07 267.40 267.40 332.60
10201 Gosford 199.95 199.95 231.05 199.95 400.05
10202 Wyong 256.57 256.57 272.66 256.57 343.43
10301 Bathurst 179.28 179.28 251.57 179.28 420.72
10302 Lachlan Valley 285.37 287.04 285.37 285.37 314.63
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 229.43 229.43 240.59 229.43 370.57
10304 Orange 243.69 243.69 289.68 243.69 356.31
10401 Clarence Valley 312.79 322.08 312.79 312.79 287.21
10402 Coffs Harbour 281.66 281.66 296.15 281.66 318.34
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 550.10 550.10 579.00 550.10 49.90
10502 Broken Hill and Far West 289.41 272.73 289.41 289.41 310.59
10503 Dubbo 295.60 295.60 304.21 295.60 304.40
10601 Lower Hunter 267.29 273.53 267.29 267.29 332.71
10602 Maitland 278.24 289.34 278.24 278.24 321.76
10603 Port Stephens 212.75 212.75 241.63 212.75 387.25
10604 Upper Hunter 270.12 270.12 329.54 270.12 329.88
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla 315.31 315.31 348.52 315.31 284.69
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour 266.81 266.81 271.40 266.81 333.19
10704 Wollongong 262.01 264.91 262.01 262.01 337.99
10801 Great Lakes 217.75 258.02 217.75 217.75 382.25
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 349.14 349.14 436.35 349.14 250.86
10804 Port Macquarie 231.51 231.51 231.65 231.51 368.49
10805 Taree - Gloucester 247.18 244.37 257.92 247.18 352.82
10901 Albury 232.45 255.67 232.45 232.45 367.55
10902 Lower Murray 278.86 281.60 278.86 278.86 321.14
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury 261.43 266.99 261.43 261.43 338.57
11001 Armidale 219.17 219.17 236.55 219.17 380.83
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield 284.29 284.29 305.84 284.29 315.71
11003 Moree - Narrabri 282.33 282.33 351.82 282.33 317.67
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah 298.14 298.14 354.25 298.14 301.86
11101 Lake Macquarie - East 200.29 200.29 208.03 200.29 399.71
11102 Lake Macquarie - West 231.06 231.06 235.52 231.06 368.94
11103 Newcastle 248.29 248.29 252.30 248.29 351.71
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal 181.07 181.07 185.00 181.07 418.93
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland 282.11 282.11 305.51 282.11 317.89
11203 Tweed Valley 215.62 215.62 230.99 215.62 384.38
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West) 323.11 323.11 342.68 323.11 276.89
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 326.81 326.81 368.41 326.81 273.19
11303 Wagga Wagga 317.84 317.84 335.67 317.84 282.16
11401 Shoalhaven 259.83 259.83 295.35 259.83 340.17
11402 Southern Highlands 187.03 191.92 187.03 187.03 412.97
11501 Baulkham Hills 160.90 160.90 173.34 160.90 439.10
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 165.76 220.39 165.76 165.76 434.24
11503 Hawkesbury 209.54 284.94 189.42 209.54 390.46
SA3 Code &Name
age standardised per 10,000 people
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Table 9 continues on next page 





















11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill 200.62 200.62 201.22 200.62 399.38
11601 Blacktown 321.79 321.79 364.72 321.79 278.21
11602 Blacktown - North 234.71 253.89 218.45 234.71 365.29
11603 Mount Druitt 532.18 532.96 532.18 532.18 67.82
11701 Botany 242.69 242.69 278.85 242.69 357.312 Marrickville - Sydenham - 
Petersham 253.90 252.83 288.12 253.90 346.10
11703 Sydney Inner City 289.00 297.28 289.00 289.00 311.00
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North 192.59 192.59 208.86 192.59 407.41
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South 216.42 216.42 244.11 216.42 383.58
11901 Bankstown 267.86 285.26 267.86 267.86 332.14
11902 Canterbury 281.43 281.43 308.15 281.43 318.57
11903 Hurstville 208.46 219.43 208.46 208.46 391.54
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale 235.36 246.00 235.36 235.36 364.64
12001 Canada Bay 170.88 170.88 182.41 170.88 429.12
12002 Leichhardt 211.39 211.39 221.23 211.39 388.61
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield 205.30 205.30 222.85 205.30 394.70
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove 164.07 164.07 192.34 164.07 435.93
12102 Hornsby 176.32 176.32 189.16 176.32 423.68
12103 Ku-ring-gai 149.15 153.30 149.15 149.15 450.85
12104 North Sydney - Mosman 186.13 204.57 186.13 186.13 413.87
12201 Manly 175.34 205.91 175.34 175.34 424.66
12202 Pittwater 154.74 154.74 189.23 154.74 445.26
12203 Warringah 177.42 177.42 190.62 177.42 422.58
12301 Camden 196.60 219.88 196.60 196.60 403.40
12302 Campbelltown (NSW) 317.51 317.51 334.24 317.51 282.49
12303 Wollondilly 198.81 198.81 221.72 198.81 401.19
12401 Blue Mountains 217.45 217.45 218.80 217.45 382.55
12403 Penrith 259.59 242.53 285.57 259.59 340.41
12404 Richmond - Windsor 390.92 407.33 390.92 390.92 209.08
12405 St Marys 326.84 359.27 326.84 326.84 273.16
12501 Auburn 270.11 273.55 270.11 270.11 329.89
12502 Carlingford 210.72 210.72 253.27 210.72 389.28
12503 Merrylands - Guildford 303.01 303.01 335.16 303.01 296.99
12504 Parramatta 267.73 267.73 283.96 267.73 332.27
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 153.91 153.91 154.91 153.91 446.09
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill 186.45 186.45 199.98 186.45 413.55
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley 255.74 255.74 286.49 255.74 344.26
12702 Fairfield 257.73 257.73 272.78 257.73 342.27
12703 Liverpool 292.75 292.75 334.98 292.75 307.25
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah 166.26 166.26 210.16 166.26 433.74
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote 189.14 189.14 220.77 189.14 410.86
Maximum 550.10 550.10 579.00 550.10 450.85
Minimum 149.15 153.30 149.15 149.15 49.90
Mean 247.94 253.07 264.18 247.94 352.06
Median 245.44 253.36 259.67 245.44 354.56
SD 69.03 68.51 74.38 69.03 69.03
SA3 Code & Name
age standardised per 10,000 people
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Figure 22   Histograms of the median rate of PPHs standardised for age and casemix and the Transformed output 
variable for use in the HORSt DEA 
  
Figure 22 Histograms derived using SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017). 
 






Figure 23 Histograms derived using SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017)  
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5.3.2  DEA INPUTS DATA  
As discussed, the DEA inputs represent the primary sources of taxpayer funded expenditure across 
the continuum of care.  There are three DEA inputs being,  
1. MBS expenditure for all residents of NSW;  
2. PBS expenditure for all residents of NSW; and 
3. State Health administered taxpayer expenditure for NSW public hospitals. 
5.3.2.1  MBS and PBS data 
MBS and PBS data were purchased for 3 years (2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16) costing $5,375.56.  This 
cost was generously funded by SWSLHD for dual purposes of supporting an internal SWSLHD project 
that was subject to a secondary ethics approval and this study.  Additional years would be 
significantly more expensive and was not pursued.   
 
Given that the HORSt is seeking to represent a broad measure of health status of the population, the 
resources that contribute to the health of the population were similarly sort from inputs that 
represent a broad contribution to the continuum of care.  For the MBS the data purchased was for 
all categories based on date of processing by age group for each SA3 geographic area for the 
financial years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16: 
 Category 1 - Professional Attendances 
 Category 2 - Diagnostic Procedures and Investigations 
 Category 3 - Therapeutic Procedures 
 Category 4 - Oral and Maxillofacial Services (by Approved Dental Practitioners) 
 Category 5 - Diagnostic Imaging Services 
 Category 6 - Pathology Services 
 Category 7 - Cleft Lip and Cleft Palate 
 Category 8 - Miscellaneous Services 
 Category 9 - Dentist, Dental Specialist and Dental Prosthetists. 
 Category 10 - Dental Benefits Schedule 
It is important to note that in June 2018, the AIHW published MBS expenditure for SA3 populations 
for GP and special attendances on the newly established “My Healthy Communities” website. This 
information is age-standardised (AIHW 2018a) .  However, the data is limited to GP and specialist 
attendances, Category 1 of the above list (AIHW 2018b; Australian Government 2017).  As a proof of 
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concept study, the DEA could have used this data, although it would be somewhat narrower in its 
resource coverage of the continuum of care than that purchased.   
 
Total scripts and benefits paid for the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (Normal Arrangements PBS 
and Special Arrangements PBS) for all patient categories based on date of processing by age group 
for each SA3 geographic area for the financial years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16 were purchased.  
The included areas of PBS expenditure purchased are:  
 General - Ordinary 
 Concessional - Ordinary 
 General - Safety Net 
 Concessional - Free Safety Net 
The purchased MBS and PBS data was age-standardised using the same direct method of that of the 
PPHs data as per equation 14 (page 145), so that every SA3 / DMU had an age-standardised rate of 
MBS and PBS expenditure per 10,000 people.  Congruent with the treatment of the DEA output, the 
median of the three years age-standardised rate for each DMU for the MBS and PBS was calculated.  
The median rates for MBS and PBS per 10,000 people were then used as inputs for the DEA.  
 
Table 10 (page 162) and Table 11 (page 164) show a summary of the age-standardised MBS and PBS 
data to be used as inputs in the study.  The tables show that the median costs $’000 per 10,000 
people for each SA3 population (DMU) compared to the individual years are a good measure of the 
populations’ normal rate of consumption of MBS and PBS resources with very little variation over 
the years.   
 
The highest age-standardised median MBS costs per 10,000 people was for the SA3 ‘11502 Dural – 
Wisemans Ferry’ with $11,097,900. Contrastingly, the lowest age-standardised median MBS costs 
per 10,000 people were for the SA3 ‘10103 Snow Mountains’ with $4,281,700. 
 
The highest age-standardised median PBS costs per 10,000 people was for the SA3 ‘11703 Sydney 
Inner City’ with $6,243,600. Contrastingly, the lowest age-standardised median PBS costs per 10,000 
















10101 Goulburn – Yass 7348.8 7703.4 7853.2 7703.4
10102 Queanbeyan 6099.7 6635.6 6885.3 6885.3
10103 Snowy Mountains 3935.6 4042.5 4281.7 4281.7
10104 South Coast 6834.7 7468.6 7796.1 7796.1
10201 Gosford 9169.0 9526.8 9843.4 9843.4
10202 Wyong 9162.5 9593.5 9851.8 9851.8
10301 Bathurst 7044.2 7374.3 7704.2 7704.2
10302 Lachlan Valley 7874.1 8413.4 8750.9 8750.9
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 7641.9 7927.8 7963.8 7963.8
10304 Orange 7784.2 8252.3 8432.5 8432.5
10401 Clarence Valley 8535.1 8665.8 8918.1 8918.1
10402 Coffs Harbour 8278.5 9069.9 9155.7 9155.7
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 7575.0 8298.1 9102.5 9102.5
10502 Broken Hill and Far West 8185.9 8948.3 9686.2 9686.2
10503 Dubbo 8332.1 8701.0 8787.9 8787.9
10601 Lower Hunter 8152.7 8606.1 8966.6 8966.6
10602 Maitland 7833.6 8576.3 8725.2 8725.2
10603 Port Stephens 8342.2 8827.8 9457.8 9457.8
10604 Upper Hunter 7614.0 8262.8 8602.7 8602.7
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla 9637.6 10200.5 10654.5 10654.5
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour 9434.4 9909.7 10127.8 10127.8
10704 Wollongong 9235.0 9737.5 10035.4 10035.4
10801 Great Lakes 8911.7 9181.5 9297.5 9297.5
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 8594.4 9289.7 9362.6 9362.6
10804 Port Macquarie 9240.1 9713.3 9829.8 9829.8
10805 Taree - Gloucester 8243.4 8596.1 8593.6 8593.6
10901 Albury 7968.7 8469.5 8471.2 8471.2
10902 Lower Murray 6847.1 7809.4 8081.6 8081.6
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury 7808.7 8235.8 8301.7 8301.7
11001 Armidale 6583.3 6956.0 7119.6 7119.6
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield 6511.4 6681.9 7104.7 7104.7
11003 Moree - Narrabri 6645.9 7316.2 7651.8 7651.8
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah 6086.5 6516.6 6880.1 6880.1
11101 Lake Macquarie - East 8788.9 9156.6 9797.6 9797.6
11102 Lake Macquarie - West 8965.6 9426.4 9870.1 9870.1
11103 Newcastle 8494.9 8867.4 9386.8 9386.8
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal 6011.8 6383.6 6386.7 6386.7
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland 7816.1 8006.6 8463.2 8463.2
11203 Tweed Valley 8942.7 9463.6 9963.1 9963.1
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West) 8288.9 8606.1 8394.0 8394.0
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 8240.7 8821.6 8689.4 8689.4
11303 Wagga Wagga 8379.0 8837.8 8684.2 8684.2
11401 Shoalhaven 8472.6 8703.6 8848.4 8848.4
11402 Southern Highlands 8264.8 8692.2 8794.7 8794.7
11501 Baulkham Hills 9722.9 10008.1 10413.0 10413.0
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 10527.8 10906.8 11097.9 11097.9
11503 Hawkesbury 8806.0 8938.2 9429.1 9429.1
SA3 Code & Name
$'000 age standardised per 10,000 people
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11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill 10060.4 10544.3 10610.2 10544.3
11601 Blacktown 10435.3 10865.6 11086.9 10865.6
11602 Blacktown - North 9788.2 10125.1 10159.0 10125.1
11603 Mount Druitt 9888.1 10158.2 10467.2 10158.2
11701 Botany 8846.3 8932.3 9015.6 8932.3
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham 9430.2 9745.7 10026.1 9745.7
11703 Sydney Inner City 9829.8 9937.3 9785.7 9829.8
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North 8692.6 8899.7 9002.6 8899.7
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South 8865.4 9123.9 9033.7 9033.7
11901 Bankstown 9953.0 10294.6 10627.8 10294.6
11902 Canterbury 10311.9 10527.9 10704.1 10527.9
11903 Hurstville 9173.2 9523.8 9422.8 9422.8
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale 8135.1 8322.1 8230.3 8230.3
12001 Canada Bay 9248.1 9587.4 9686.9 9587.4
12002 Leichhardt 9396.1 9735.7 9693.1 9693.1
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield 9042.6 9291.5 9226.5 9226.5
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove 8902.5 9174.9 9155.0 9155.0
12102 Hornsby 8908.9 9163.2 9553.2 9163.2
12103 Ku-ring-gai 9654.7 10006.7 10097.5 10006.7
12104 North Sydney - Mosman 10194.4 10485.4 10463.9 10463.9
12201 Manly 8790.9 9272.8 9261.7 9261.7
12202 Pittwater 8910.9 9301.2 9452.8 9301.2
12203 Warringah 8839.0 9115.3 9210.5 9115.3
12301 Camden 9629.1 10184.0 10405.5 10184.0
12302 Campbelltown (NSW) 10538.9 10937.5 10856.0 10856.0
12303 Wollondilly 8286.1 8980.9 9184.9 8980.9
12401 Blue Mountains 8200.1 8467.0 8753.8 8467.0
12403 Penrith 9853.9 10210.8 10429.8 10210.8
12404 Richmond - Windsor 9420.7 9576.5 9972.6 9576.5
12405 St Marys 8428.9 8735.8 9379.5 8735.8
12501 Auburn 8778.5 8893.9 8889.8 8889.8
12502 Carlingford 9096.4 9323.2 9619.6 9323.2
12503 Merrylands - Guildford 9775.8 10054.4 10376.6 10054.4
12504 Parramatta 9924.7 10240.6 10517.8 10240.6
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 9315.3 9594.3 9642.4 9594.3
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill 8864.9 9191.6 9330.7 9191.6
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley 9428.7 9776.6 9614.3 9614.3
12702 Fairfield 9815.3 10104.0 10323.9 10104.0
12703 Liverpool 9825.6 10310.5 10184.5 10184.5
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah 10076.0 10415.2 10566.7 10415.2
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote 10244.8 10662.6 10985.2 10662.6
Maximum 10538.92 10937.46 11097.89 11097.89
Minimum 3935.62 4042.55 4281.71 4281.71
Mean 8659.27 9046.83 9244.34 9172.90
Median 8842.62 9159.86 9371.08 9279.58
SD 1177.798 1157.562 1149.498 1111.625
SA3 Code & Name
$'000 age standardised per 10,000 people
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Table 11   PBS age-standardised costs $’000 per 10,000 people for each NSW SA3 population 
 









10101 Goulburn – Yass 4012.9 4000.5 4863.0 4012.9
10102 Queanbeyan 3439.0 3342.6 3955.5 3439.0
10103 Snowy Mountains 1827.1 1782.9 2075.3 1827.1
10104 South Coast 4298.1 4309.7 5668.7 4309.7
10201 Gosford 4067.6 3982.3 4676.3 4067.6
10202 Wyong 4659.2 4427.9 5067.6 4659.2
10301 Bathurst 3885.4 3732.1 4189.7 3885.4
10302 Lachlan Valley 4198.6 4125.8 4620.5 4198.6
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 3855.3 3917.6 4611.0 3917.6
10304 Orange 4079.0 4010.5 4692.8 4079.0
10401 Clarence Valley 4565.4 4592.4 5356.4 4592.4
10402 Coffs Harbour 3835.9 3804.4 4949.3 3835.9
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 4331.2 4210.2 4407.1 4331.2
10502 Broken Hill and Far West 4803.6 4881.9 5267.0 4881.9
10503 Dubbo 4303.4 4151.5 4560.8 4303.4
10601 Lower Hunter 4273.5 4149.1 4668.6 4273.5
10602 Maitland 3852.1 3680.1 3892.3 3852.1
10603 Port Stephens 4052.8 4029.1 4484.9 4052.8
10604 Upper Hunter 3672.1 3653.6 4083.6 3672.1
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla 4688.5 4600.1 4950.6 4688.5
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour 4303.7 4331.5 4601.7 4331.5
10704 Wollongong 4143.9 3958.2 4395.5 4143.9
10801 Great Lakes 4471.0 4300.3 5424.4 4471.0
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 4861.7 4789.6 5814.5 4861.7
10804 Port Macquarie 4448.8 4225.3 4727.8 4448.8
10805 Taree - Gloucester 4263.7 4481.1 5200.2 4481.1
10901 Albury 4086.6 3935.3 4430.2 4086.6
10902 Lower Murray 3844.9 3588.7 4469.4 3844.9
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury 4175.8 4305.8 4738.0 4305.8
11001 Armidale 3818.1 4084.3 4513.2 4084.3
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield 4016.0 3807.7 4658.8 4016.0
11003 Moree - Narrabri 3726.6 3871.4 4150.3 3871.4
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah 3516.4 3479.6 4076.2 3516.4
11101 Lake Macquarie - East 4274.6 4209.8 4947.7 4274.6
11102 Lake Macquarie - West 4367.1 4232.6 4988.1 4367.1
11103 Newcastle 4355.6 4232.8 4852.9 4355.6
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal 1992.1 1870.3 2271.5 1992.1
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland 4413.6 4006.5 5033.7 4413.6
11203 Tweed Valley 4103.3 3996.3 5017.6 4103.3
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West) 4308.2 4244.4 4418.4 4308.2
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 4242.4 4142.4 4630.0 4242.4
11303 Wagga Wagga 4307.3 4217.6 4329.6 4307.3
11401 Shoalhaven 4556.8 4343.4 4979.2 4556.8
11402 Southern Highlands 4091.6 4218.8 4508.2 4218.8
11501 Baulkham Hills 3221.9 3222.7 3588.8 3222.7
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 3358.6 3393.8 3551.5 3393.8
11503 Hawkesbury 3393.7 3159.9 4104.7 3393.7
SA3 Code & Name
$'000 age standardised per 10,000 people
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11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill 3374.3 3337.0 3517.3 3374.3
11601 Blacktown 4151.1 3774.5 4463.1 4151.1
11602 Blacktown - North 3269.8 3208.8 3640.5 3269.8
11603 Mount Druitt 4270.9 4046.9 4454.8 4270.9
11701 Botany 3850.7 3646.5 4486.4 3850.7
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham 4581.2 4253.9 5660.4 4581.2
11703 Sydney Inner City 6243.6 5910.2 7829.2 6243.6
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North 1983.8 1899.6 2059.8 1983.8
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South 3668.4 3433.0 4291.2 3668.4
11901 Bankstown 4711.1 4636.1 5283.5 4711.1
11902 Canterbury 4496.4 4376.0 5117.9 4496.4
11903 Hurstville 4071.4 4442.6 4522.9 4442.6
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale 2781.8 2882.2 2504.0 2781.8
12001 Canada Bay 3220.2 3125.8 3848.9 3220.2
12002 Leichhardt 3568.8 3276.2 4283.0 3568.8
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield 3471.6 3309.1 4032.6 3471.6
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove 2965.7 2897.3 3365.1 2965.7
12102 Hornsby 3370.0 3322.8 3577.0 3370.0
12103 Ku-ring-gai 3015.6 3041.7 3366.2 3041.7
12104 North Sydney - Mosman 2858.0 2758.3 3361.1 2858.0
12201 Manly 2872.4 2782.2 3365.2 2872.4
12202 Pittwater 2974.7 2811.1 3169.0 2974.7
12203 Warringah 3300.6 3063.3 3677.2 3300.6
12301 Camden 3920.4 3830.5 4415.7 3920.4
12302 Campbelltown (NSW) 4528.9 4297.8 4948.7 4528.9
12303 Wollondilly 3737.3 3569.9 4342.0 3737.3
12401 Blue Mountains 3137.2 3107.2 3405.7 3137.2
12403 Penrith 3828.1 3855.6 4105.5 3855.6
12404 Richmond - Windsor 4267.9 4011.4 4343.6 4267.9
12405 St Marys 2592.8 2566.0 2810.9 2592.8
12501 Auburn 3821.4 3536.5 4092.0 3821.4
12502 Carlingford 3756.6 3478.4 4103.4 3756.6
12503 Merrylands - Guildford 4489.7 4207.2 4782.5 4489.7
12504 Parramatta 4245.2 3960.0 4267.7 4245.2
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 3108.9 3126.5 3357.7 3126.5
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill 3287.5 3276.0 3634.0 3287.5
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley 4234.9 3893.9 4372.7 4234.9
12702 Fairfield 4858.2 4524.1 5383.7 4858.2
12703 Liverpool 3938.6 3657.5 4069.2 3938.6
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah 3508.9 3595.1 4013.8 3595.1
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote 3759.7 3866.6 4229.7 3866.6
Maximum 6243.56 5910.22 7829.16 6243.56
Minimum 1827.09 1782.88 2059.81 1827.09
Mean 3880.21 3779.88 4341.11 3900.26
Median 4014.42 3905.78 4417.01 4034.36
SD 685.9373 666.073 848.2218 691.6004
SA3 Code & Name
$'000 age standardised per 10,000 people
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Figure 24 and 25 show histograms of the frequency of the age-standardised median MBS and PBS 
costs per 10,000 people and that of the three years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16.  It is apparent from 
tables 10 and 11 and the graphical presentation of the histograms that there is some small variation 
in the later years’ MBS and PBS costs being somewhat higher than the earlier two years and again as 
per the statistical literature (Manikandan 2011; Ott 1988, p. 39) the use of the median is a sensible 
choice to represent the three years in the analysis.  
 
Figure 24   Histogram of the median rate of age-standardised MBS costs for the 88 DMUs used as an input 
variable in the HORSt DEA and the three years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 
  
  
Figure 24 Histograms derived using SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017)
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Figure 25   Histogram of the median rate of age-standardised PBS costs for the 88 DMUs used as an input variable 
in the HORSt DEA and the three years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 
  
  
Figure 25 Histograms derived using SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017). 
5.3.2.2  State health expenditure 
Taxpayer funded state health expenditure in NSW is part funded by NSW and Commonwealth 
governments (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017a).  For the purposes of the DEA as a 
funding input, it is a source of taxpayer funding administered by the NSW State government.  
 
The NSW State health expenditure was expressed by the calculation of an age-standardised cost 
ratio (SCRs) of inpatient public hospital separations.  An extract of all inpatient hospital separations 
by SA3 of residence of the patient was conducted for the years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16 from the 
NSW Health planning tool FlowInfo V17.0 (Clinical Services Planning Analytics 2018).  The extract was 
conducted by 5-year age group and included the NWAU of each separation reflecting the casemix / 
resource intensity of the patient.   It could be contended that this extract of all inpatient hospital 
separations which also includes PPH separations reflects double counting, given that PPHs are an 
output for the DEA.  However, this is not the case.  DEA as discussed is a relative concept that only 
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requires a sensible choice of variables that express the performance of DMUs (Morita & Avkiran 
2009, p. 164; Sherman & Zhu 2006b).  The PPHs are representing markers, indicators of health status 
/ outcomes, adjusted for resource and patient complexity.  These markers as an output are relative 
to the inputs, whereas the SCRs are reflecting the public hospital sector resource contribution to the 
continuum of care to the performance of health outcomes / health status at the population level.  
 
Likewise, to the MBS and PBS data, the SCR were age-standardised using the direct method detailed 
in equation 14 (page 145).  Every DMU had an age-standardised rate per 10,000 people calculated 
for each of the three years.  The median of the three years’ rates was then used as an input for the 
DEA.  
 
Table 12 (page 169) shows a summary of the age-standardised median NWAUs data to be used as 
input representing state health costs in the study.  The table shows that the median NWAUs per 
10,000 people for each SA3 population (DMU) compared to the individual years are a good measure 
of the populations’ normal rate of consumption of inpatient hospital utilisation with very little 
variation over the years.   
 
The highest age-standardised median of NWAUs per 10,000 people was for the SA3 ‘10501 Bourke – 
Cobar –Coonamble’ with 4,710.17.  This SA3 had the poorest population health status represented 
by aged standardised PPH (NWAUs) per 10,000 people, which is logical given that PPHs are a 
function of inpatient hospital use SCRs.  Contrastingly, the lowest age-standardised median of 
NWAUs per 10,000 people were for the SA3 ‘12601 Pennant Hills - Epping’ with 2,068,91. 
 
Figure 26 (page 171) shows histograms of the frequency of the age-standardised median SCR 
(NWAUs) per 10,000 people and that of the three years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16.  It is apparent 
from the tables and the graphical presentation of the histograms that there is some small variation 
in the across the years and again as per the statistical literature (Manikandan 2011; Ott 1988, p. 39) 
the use of the median is a sensible choice to represent the three years in the analysis.
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10101 Goulburn – Yass 2891.26 3039.80 2965.15 2965.15
10102 Queanbeyan 2132.54 2329.13 2347.25 2329.13
10103 Snowy Mountains 1934.03 2953.96 2259.46 2259.46
10104 South Coast 3292.83 3309.97 3229.65 3292.83
10201 Gosford 2884.16 2903.96 3049.63 2903.96
10202 Wyong 3148.57 3208.55 3339.84 3208.55
10301 Bathurst 2922.49 2952.64 3222.89 2952.64
10302 Lachlan Valley 3564.20 3559.09 3915.82 3564.20
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 2878.62 3182.27 3104.86 3104.86
10304 Orange 3348.17 3541.87 3632.20 3541.87
10401 Clarence Valley 3497.06 3570.28 3669.09 3570.28
10402 Coffs Harbour 3505.45 3719.81 3748.30 3719.81
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 4506.21 4710.17 4926.36 4710.17
10502 Broken Hill and Far West 2445.55 3502.09 3790.40 3502.09
10503 Dubbo 3615.59 3783.41 3899.25 3783.41
10601 Lower Hunter 3308.45 3246.73 3190.74 3246.73
10602 Maitland 3514.38 3344.39 3346.04 3346.04
10603 Port Stephens 2936.28 3059.56 3222.52 3059.56
10604 Upper Hunter 3077.77 3308.89 3525.90 3308.89
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla 3377.10 3292.76 3425.92 3377.10
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour 2924.76 3010.07 2947.40 2947.40
10704 Wollongong 2885.58 2854.95 2845.40 2854.95
10801 Great Lakes 3374.67 3318.42 3282.27 3318.42
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 3835.34 4098.64 4039.81 4039.81
10804 Port Macquarie 3072.79 3099.80 3097.72 3097.72
10805 Taree - Gloucester 3325.94 3304.30 3450.75 3325.94
10901 Albury 2841.99 2928.26 2983.57 2928.26
10902 Lower Murray 2828.66 3390.24 3318.34 3318.34
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury 2997.41 2956.49 2885.56 2956.49
11001 Armidale 2879.75 3029.69 2966.68 2966.68
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield 3468.99 3257.49 3650.91 3468.99
11003 Moree - Narrabri 3316.02 3469.19 3602.61 3469.19
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah 3750.38 3773.26 3723.93 3750.38
11101 Lake Macquarie - East 2918.90 2838.45 2944.62 2918.90
11102 Lake Macquarie - West 3062.96 2970.91 3198.02 3062.96
11103 Newcastle 2957.81 2984.85 3059.88 2984.85
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal 2280.49 2311.81 2319.63 2311.81
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland 3397.10 3257.82 3321.11 3321.11
11203 Tweed Valley 2323.55 2467.30 2388.35 2388.35
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West) 3545.82 3672.72 3585.09 3585.09
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 3395.18 3433.67 3818.23 3433.67
11303 Wagga Wagga 3407.29 3461.55 3545.70 3461.55
11401 Shoalhaven 3291.60 3425.96 3442.09 3425.96
11402 Southern Highlands 3041.83 3059.06 3030.82 3041.83
11501 Baulkham Hills 2302.52 2351.46 2298.76 2302.52
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 2678.05 2687.06 2691.53 2687.06
11503 Hawkesbury 2770.69 2796.87 2946.76 2796.87
SA3 Code & Name
age standardised per 10,000 people
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11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill 2429.77 2708.98 2624.82 2624.82
11601 Blacktown 3680.13 3700.87 3886.93 3700.87
11602 Blacktown - North 2672.12 2675.56 2784.97 2675.56
11603 Mount Druitt 4505.91 4725.46 4560.64 4560.64
11701 Botany 3091.76 3218.97 3475.23 3218.97
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham 3252.22 3148.49 3202.41 3202.41
11703 Sydney Inner City 3096.82 3021.09 2961.36 3021.09
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North 2567.24 2325.36 2420.70 2420.70
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South 3181.24 3185.67 3162.16 3181.24
11901 Bankstown 2935.48 2970.96 2959.19 2959.19
11902 Canterbury 3100.23 3126.35 3256.37 3126.35
11903 Hurstville 2424.31 2434.85 2420.14 2424.31
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale 3153.38 3311.58 3127.59 3153.38
12001 Canada Bay 2405.76 2375.70 2400.87 2400.87
12002 Leichhardt 2636.30 2709.68 2710.78 2709.68
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield 2402.09 2523.00 2534.04 2523.00
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove 2339.62 2449.20 2331.55 2339.62
12102 Hornsby 2445.19 2513.13 2552.90 2513.13
12103 Ku-ring-gai 2242.85 2322.87 2235.24 2242.85
12104 North Sydney - Mosman 2990.68 2860.77 2934.54 2934.54
12201 Manly 2674.25 2595.77 2764.93 2674.25
12202 Pittwater 2651.90 2593.19 2797.69 2651.90
12203 Warringah 2595.32 2605.32 2666.35 2605.32
12301 Camden 2742.87 2873.99 3060.90 2873.99
12302 Campbelltown (NSW) 3751.19 3798.85 3817.98 3798.85
12303 Wollondilly 2857.50 2935.96 2966.01 2935.96
12401 Blue Mountains 2756.11 2903.32 3015.68 2903.32
12403 Penrith 3422.74 3342.68 3584.90 3422.74
12404 Richmond - Windsor 3186.49 3335.90 3531.55 3335.90
12405 St Marys 4585.00 4380.97 4420.26 4420.26
12501 Auburn 3053.76 3104.24 3248.59 3104.24
12502 Carlingford 2524.61 2617.51 2572.65 2572.65
12503 Merrylands - Guildford 3007.22 3023.43 3091.05 3023.43
12504 Parramatta 2930.10 3001.50 2903.88 2930.10
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 2090.73 2068.91 2031.83 2068.91
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill 2546.03 2665.42 2562.42 2562.42
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley 3192.15 3109.49 3248.71 3192.15
12702 Fairfield 2710.90 2783.47 2713.31 2713.31
12703 Liverpool 3519.86 3387.08 3323.53 3387.08
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah 2647.47 2734.24 2744.65 2734.24
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote 2677.94 2657.25 2853.89 2677.94
Maximum 4585.00 4725.46 4926.36 4710.17
Minimum 1934.03 2068.91 2031.83 2068.91
Mean 3015.16 3085.87 3132.50 3073.11
Median 2974.25 3034.75 3094.39 3032.63
SD 509.1432 499.5848 538.5081 506.0761
SA3 Code & Name
age standardised per 10,000 people
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Figure 26   Histogram of the median rate of age-standardised SCR (NWAUs) for the 88 DMUs used as an input 




Figure 26 Histograms derived using SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017). 
5.4  REGRESSION -DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
As discussed in the previous chapter (page 122) regarding two-stage DEA, the dependent variable for 
the regression will be the allocative efficiency scores of population health status measured by the 
DEA for the 88 DMUs / SA3 populations.   
5.5  REGRESSION - INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
The independent variables considered for the HORSt regression are informed by the literature of 
social determinants that are known in a formative construct to give rise to health inequalities and 
therefore logically can give rise or form to the allocative efficiency of health status measured by the 
DEA allocative efficiency scores.  As correlation methods such as regression models do not indicate 
the direction of interaction between variables, it is important for the research to accurately consider 
Page 172 
 
the nature of the construct’s direction in the selection of explanatory variables (Leedy & Ormrod 
2010, p. 185).  If the direction of interaction between the variables is misspecified in a correlation 
model, variables thought to be associated may not be and correlation coefficients in predictive 
models may be in error (Jarvis 2014; Roy et al. 2012).  Formative constructs imply that correlating 
variables would give form to the construct, whereas reflective constructs imply that correlating 
variables are reflected from the construct (Coltman et al. 2008; Diamantopoulos & Siguaw 2006; 
Jarvis 2014).   
 
As outlined by Field (2013, p. 321) independent variable selection should be judicious, parsimonious 
and be based on sound theoretical knowledge and well conducted research.  In particular, to 
contextualise the model to Australian data sources, the data sources of predictor variables of former 
NSW RDF and development of the latest iteration the NSW Expected Health Utilisation Need Indices 
(EHUIs) were considered along with the underlying literature.  As outlined in the literature review 
the former RDF and EHUIs utilised formative constructs; both sought variables that give rise to 
inpatient utilisation as a measure of health need.   
 
Variables that represent seven categories of social determinants that are demonstrated in the 
literature to give rise to health inequalities that affect health outcomes for individuals and within 
populations are to be tested in the HORSt regression analysis.  These are: 
1. lower socioeconomic status; 
2. living in rural and remote communities; 
3. indigenous status; 
4. living with a disability 
5. living with mental illness;  
6. migrants with low levels of English; and 
7. affordability / financial barrier of access to private primary care services. 
Ultimately the regression model will not feature variables for all of these categorises as there is 
overlap amongst these categories.  Furthermore, as this section will show there is overlap amongst 
some of the variables representing them.   Seeking a parsimonious robust regression that fits the 
data, the regression analysis will consider the combined linear predictive effects of independent 
variables to explain the variation in the DEA allocative efficiency scores.  Doing so, the regression 
analysis will eliminate variables that are not significant and ultimately reduce the number of 




The first six categories listed above were introduced in Chapter One and are well supported 
contextually in the Australian literature as social determinants of health (Allan et al. 2007; Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare 2016a; NSW Department of Health 2004; Palmer & Short 2014; 
Turrell et al. 2006).   
 
A seventh category will consider out-of-pocket expenses at the population level that represent the 
affordability and / or financial barriers to access private predominately primary care services.  
Inclusion of this is fourfold.  First, as discussed in the literature review, it is well established that 
delays in treatment due to financial constraints may give rise to worst health inequalities and poorer 
health outcomes (Kraft et al. 2009; Mollborn et al. 2005; Prentice & Pizer 2007).  Second, at the time 
of this research, Australians are facing more than ever growing out-of-pocket costs for private health 
care, around 20% of the total Australian Health Care expenditure, which is higher than the OECD 
average of 19% (OECD 2015),  which has resulted in an Australian Government Senate inquiry 
(Community Affairs References Committee 2014).  Third, in response to the second, the Australian 
Government has made available for the first time variables reflecting out-of-pocket consumer costs 
at the population level including SA3s for non-hospital Medicare subsided treatment (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare 2018d).  Fourth, as proven in the literature it is entirely likely that 
populations that cannot afford private sector access will eventually substitute the lack of private 
sector access with public sector services such as the ED in public hospitals and at higher costs to the 
tax payer (Eckermann 2014a, 2014b; Eckermann et al. 2016).  It would seem therefore logical that 
vertical equity financial loadings informed by the HORSt regression analysis should consider the 
significance of out-of-pocket costs on the benchmarked allocative efficiency of health outcomes.  
 
The former NSW RDF and EHUI considered and used variables comprising the first six social 
determinant categories listed above but also included premature standardised mortality ratios 
(SMRs) less than 70 years of age (Health Policy Analysis 2014a, 2014b; Inter-Government & Funding 
Strategies 2005b; Marshall & Slater 2015).  However, using SMRs is problematic for the formative 
construct validity of the former RDF, the EHUIs and the HORSt.  Premature deaths data as per the 
SMR does not give rise to health status or health utilisation, rather SMRs logically reflect these.  
Therefore, the use of SMR data in a reflective construct would be correctly specified but incorrectly 
specified in a formative construct.   For the HORSt it is difficult to see how deaths data could give rise 
to the allocative efficiency or inefficiency of health status measured by PPHs.  As such SMR data will 




Independent variable selection for the HORSt regression analysis for each of the seven categories 
identified will utilise data from established secondary data sources for the SA3 populations.  It is 
likely that there will be correlations between the independent variables as there are obvious 
intersections between the social determinant categories, such as people of lower socioeconomic 
status living with a disability etc.  The regression analysis will ultimately test each of the variables 
consistent with the axioms outlined in the previous chapter (page 128) and develop a parsimonious 
model of best fit with far fewer predictors than the variables that are now critiqued.   
5.5.1 Socioeconomic variables from the 2016 ABS Census 
Utilising census data, the ABS develops Socioeconomic Indices for Areas (SEIFA) that ranks 
geographical areas by the relative socioeconomic advantage and disadvantage of their collective 
populations.  The SEIFA indices are for collective populations, not individuals and are established 
from census data (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 4,6).  There are four key socioeconomic 
variables that are produced by the ABS being: 
 Index of Relative Socio-economic Disadvantage (IRSD); 
 Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage (IRSAD); 
 Index of Education and Occupation (IEO); and 
 Index of Economic Resources (IER). 
The current version is for the 2016 census. The indices overtime a broadly comparable with previous 
versions, of other censuses of 2001, 2006 and 2011 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 4).   
 
The indices produced are ordinal rankings and at the lowest population level applied (SA1), 1,000 
represents the mean of the rankings.  Higher scores represent higher socioeconomic ranking and 
vice versa.  However, the produced index numbers are not proportionally comparable.  For example 
an area having an index of 1,100 is not twice that as socioeconomically advantaged as an area having 
an index of 550 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 18, 30).   
 
All are indices constructed from multiple data collected at the census and utilise principal 
component analysis, a method to reduce a large number of correlated data into uncorrelated  
principal components (meaningful dimensions) that are useful for supporting each indices 
assessments of the population socioeconomic advantage and disadvantage (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2018d, p. 15).  The dimensions identified and included for use in the indices are 
summarised in the Table 13.  As each individual index contains some of the same principal 
components and some of the same underlying variables these indices correlate with each other.  
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With the HORSt regression bi-variate correlation analysis will demonstrate the extent of the 
correlations.  Regression options modelled will not contain multiple SEIFA indices due to the 
multicollinearity. 
 
Table 13   Principal components / dimensions used with 2016 ABS SEIFA indices 
Dimension 2016 SEIFA Indices 
IRSD IRSAD IER IEO 
Income     
Education     
Employment     
Occupation     
Housing     
Other     
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 39). 
 
The ABS definitions of the four SEIFA indices are presented herein.  Accompanying tables showing 
the included census measures aligned to the six dimensions of each index are provided.  Variable 
weightings are applied by the ABS to construct a single index number of each SA1 and SA2 
population.  The individual census variable weightings that make up the index for each population 
area not relevant to the HORSt and are not presented.  By contrast, the index numbers for each of 
the four SEIFA indices for the population levels are relevant and, importantly, the ABS only compile 
the four indices at SA1 and SA2 population levels.  However, within the ABS Technical paper there is 
a formula designed to permit the calculation of these indices at SA3 and higher levels, which is 
required to support the HORSt regression analysis.  This ABS formula depicted in equation 20 was 
utilised so as to compute SEIFA indices for each SA3 population.   
 
Equation 20 – ABS formula for creating higher geographical level SEIFA indices from SA1 to SA3 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑆𝐴3(𝑖) =  
∑ (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑆𝐴1(𝑖)
𝑛




INDEXSA1(i) = index score for each SA1 
POP SA1(i)  = Population for each SA1 
POP SA3(i)  = Population for the SA3 
n = Total number of SA1s with index scores in SA3(i) 
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(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 18). 
 
It is important to note that at higher calculated levels, such as the SA3, that the indices do not have 
the same average around 1,000 as that of the SA1 levels as the higher levels are not standardised in 
this way (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 18).   
 
It could be argued that the calculated indices at the higher population levels do not have the same 
level of visibility of socioeconomic advantage or disadvantage in small areas as per the SA1 levels.  
However, the SA3 indices derived from the ABS formula designed to do so, nonetheless represent 
the socioeconomic rankings of the SA3 populations that take into account the SA1 socioeconomic 
index rankings weighted for the SA1 populations that make up the SA3.   
 
Given the literature’s findings of socioeconomic status being associated with health outcomes and in 
particular PPHs, it is expected that for each of the SEIFA indices, high socioeconomic status will be 
associated with high rates of population health status and higher rates of allocative efficiency 
associated with the production of desirable health outcomes and vice versa.   
 
The individual SEIFA indices are now outlined in detailed.    
 
IRSD 
“The IRSD summarises variables that indicate relative disadvantage.  This index ranks areas on a 
continuum from most disadvantaged to least disadvantaged.  A low score on this index indicates a 
high proportion of relatively disadvantaged people in an area ” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2018d, p. 6).   
 




Table 14   IRSD with component census variables  
Dimension Variable Description 
Income % People with stated annual household equivalised income between $1 and $25,999 (approx. 1st 
and 2nd deciles). 
Education % People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education is Year 11 or lower. Includes 
Certificate I and II. 
% People aged 15 years and over who have no educational attainment. 
Employment % People (in the labour force) unemployed. 
Occupation % Employed people classified as labourers. 
% Employed people classified as Machinery Operators and Drivers. 
% Employed people classified as Low Skill Community and Personal Service Workers. 
Housing % Occupied private dwellings paying rent less than $215 per week (excluding $0 per week). 
% Occupied private dwellings requiring one or more extra bedrooms (based on Canadian 
National Occupancy Standard). 
Other % Families with children under 15 years of age who live with jobless parents. 
% One parent families with dependent offspring only. 
% Occupied private dwellings with no cars. 
% People aged under 70 who have a long–term health condition or disability and need assistance 
with core activities. 
% People who do not speak English well. 
% People aged 15 and over who are separated or divorced. 
% Occupied private dwellings with no internet connection. 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 19-20). 
 
IRSAD  
“The IRSAD summarises variables that indicate either relative advantage or disadvantage.  This index 
ranks areas on a continuum from most disadvantaged to most advantaged.  An area with a high 
score on this index has a relatively high incidence of advantage and a relatively low incidence of 
disadvantage” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 6-7).   
 




Table 15   IRSAD with component census variables  
Dimension Variable Description 
Income % People with stated annual household equivalised income between $1 and $25,999 (approx. 1st 
and 2nd deciles). 
% People with stated annual household equivalised income greater than $78,000 (approx. 9th and 
10th deciles). 
Education % People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education is Year 11 or lower. Includes 
Certificate I and II. 
% People aged 15 years and over who have no educational attainment. 
% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of educational attainment is a certificate III or 
IV qualification. 
% People aged 15 years and over at university or other tertiary institution. 
% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education attainment is a diploma 
qualification. 
Employment % People (in the labour force) unemployed. 
Occupation % Employed people classified as labourers. 
% Employed people classified as Machinery Operators and Drivers. 
% Employed people classified as Low Skill Community and Personal Service Workers. 
% Employed people classified as Low Skill Sales. 
% employed people classified as Managers. 
% Employed people classified as Professionals. 
Housing % Occupied private dwellings paying rent less than $215 per week (excluding $0 per week). 
% Occupied private dwellings requiring one or more extra bedrooms (based on Canadian National 
Occupancy Standard). 
% Occupied private dwellings with four or more bedrooms. 
% Occupied private dwellings paying rent greater than $470 per week. 
% Occupied private dwellings paying mortgage greater than $2,800 per month. 
Other % Families with children under 15 years of age who live with jobless parents. 
% One parent families with dependent offspring only. 
% Occupied private dwellings with no cars. 
% People aged under 70 who have a long–term health condition or disability and need assistance 
with core activities. 
% People aged 15 and over who are separated or divorced. 
% Occupied private dwellings with no internet connection. 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 20-1). 
 
IER 
 “The IER summarises variables relating to the financial aspects of relative socio-economic advantage 
and disadvantage.  These include indicators of high and low income, as well as variables that 
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correlate with high or low wealth. Areas with higher scores have relatively greater access to 
economic resources than areas with lower scores” (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 7).   
Table 16 shows a summary of the census variables included in the IER index. 
Table 16   IER with component census variables  
Dimension Variable Description 
Income % People with stated annual household equivalised income between $1 and $25,999 (approx. 1st 
and 2nd deciles). 
% People with stated annual household equivalised income greater than $78,000 (approx 9th and 
10th deciles). 
Employment % People aged 15 years and over who are unemployed 
Housing % Occupied private dwellings paying rent less than $215 per week (excluding $0 per week). 
% Occupied private dwellings requiring one or more extra bedrooms (based on Canadian National 
Occupancy Standard).  
% Occupied private dwellings owning dwelling without a mortgage. 
% Occupied private dwellings with four or more bedrooms. 
% Occupied private dwellings paying mortgage greater than $2,800 per month. 
Other % Dwellings with at least one person who is an owner of an unincorporated enterprise. 
% One parent families with dependent offspring only. 
% Occupied private dwellings with no cars. 
% Occupied private dwellings who are group occupied private dwellings. 
% Occupied private dwellings who are lone person occupied private dwellings. 
Source: (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, pp. 21-2). 
IEO 
“The IEO summarises variables relating to the educational and occupational aspects of relative socio-
economic advantage and disadvantage.  This index focuses on the skills of the people in an area, both 
formal qualifications and the skills required to perform different occupations. A low score indicates 
that an area has a high proportion of people without qualifications, without jobs and/or with low 
skilled jobs.  A high score indicates many people with high qualifications and/or highly skilled jobs” 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 7).  
 





Table 17   IEO with component census variables  
Dimension Variable Description 
Education % People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education is Year 11 or lower. Includes 
Certificate I and II. 
% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of educational attainment is a certificate III or 
IV qualification. 
% People aged 15 years and over at university or other tertiary institution. 
% People aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education attainment is a diploma 
qualification. 
Employment % People (in the labour force) unemployed. 
Occupation % Employed people who work in a Skill Level 1 occupation. 
% Employed people who work in a Skill Level 2 occupation. 
% Employed people who work in a Skill Level 4 occupation. 
% Employed people who work in a Skill Level 5 occupation. 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018d, p. 22). 
5.5.2 Accessibility and Remoteness Index of Australia (2011 ARIA)  
The literature indicates that people living in rural and remote areas face high rates of health 
inequalities related to the access of health services and have poorer health outcomes than people in 
more urbanised areas (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2007, 2016a, 2016b).  In Australia 
access to services and remoteness are measured by the Accessibility and Remoteness Index of 
Australia (ARIA) which classifies geographical areas of Australia into five classes of remoteness being: 
1. Major cities; 
2. Inner regional; 
3. Outer regional; 
4. Remote; and 
5. Very Remote 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018c).   
 
ARIA is produced by the Hugo Centre for Migration and Population Research at the University of 
Adelaide who can supply ARIA at cost scores for all ABS geographies (including SA3s) and non-ABS 
geographies such as LGAs.  The scores ranging from 0 to 15 and calculated to two decimal places 
whereby lower scores represent great access to services and vice versa.  The scores themselves are 
calculated based on road distances of populations’ locations to nearest service centre (major 
settlement) within each of the five remoteness categories and divided by the national average in 
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each category.  The version of ARIA applicable to the 2011 version SA3 geographies used in the 
HORSt is called ARIA+ (Hugo Centre for Migration and Population Research 2018a). 
 
The inclusion of this variable in the regression analysis is logically sensible and supported by the 
literature including the former NSW RDF and EHUIs that used it (Health Policy Analysis 2014b; Inter-
Government & Funding Strategies 2005b).  However, there is no guarantee that the variable would 
be a significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency scores in a regression model 
containing other variables.  Given this risk and due to financial limitations of this study, the costs of 
purchasing the ARIA data for the NSW SA3s were deemed prohibitive.   
 
A free version demonstration version of the ARIA+ scores at SA3 level is available for download.  This 
data lacks the precision of the purchased scores to two decimal places and provides the ARIA+ to the 
nearest whole number (Hugo Centre for Migration and Population Research 2018b).  Given the 
literature’s strong position on ARIA being a social determinant of health the downloaded data which 
requires a separate download for each SA3 was nonetheless pursued and the ARIA+ scores to the 
nearest whole number were included in the regression analysis for assessment.  
5.5.3 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples (2016 Census) 
The health inequalities faced by indigenous Australians in particular are a blunt contrast to 
Australian norms.  For example, in 2011-12 the average life expectancy for indigenous Australian 
males and females was 10.6 and 9.5 years less respectively compared to non-indigenous Australians 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2018, p. 104).  In addition to reduced life 
expectancy, indigenous Australians have higher rates of associated morbidity than non-indigenous 
Australians and higher rates of social disadvantage.  For example:  
“Blinding cataract is 12 times more common in indigenous Australians adults than non-Indigenous 
adults but the rates of cataract surgery are seven times lower.  Cataracts cause 32% of blindness in 
indigenous Australians adults and 27% of low vision.  94% of vision loss for indigenous Australians 
Islander people is preventable or treatable, but only 65% of those with vision loss caused by cataracts 
have received surgery”(Holland 2014, p. 9). 
 
A key initiative of Australian Government’s, Closing the Gap, was established in 2008 to tackle these 
serious health inequalities of indigenous Australians.  This initiative remains a priority of all levels of 




Given the poor health outcomes of the indigenous Australian community, the proportion of people 
who identify as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people amongst SA3 populations will be included 
in the regression analysis.  It would be expected that populations that have higher rates of 
indigenous Australians would have poorer health outcomes and lower rates of allocative efficiency 
associated with those outcomes.  The latest 2016 Census data of “Estimates of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Australians, June 2016” will be utilised for this purpose (Australian Bureau of Statistics 
2018b). 
5.5.4 Disability – Assisted Needs Population (2016 Census) 
People living with disabilities are known to have poorer health outcomes and have lower 
socioeconomic means (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2010, 2016b).  The key Census 
statistic for assessing people living with disabilities is the ‘Core Activity Need for Assistance (ASSNP)’ 
variable (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017e).  The 2016 Census data for SA3s is available via the 
ABS online data base ‘Table builder’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017a).  This data was 
downloaded as a portion of the 2016 population for inclusion in the regression.   
 
Given the literature, it is expected that populations that have higher proportions of people requiring 
assistance, will have poorer health outcomes and lower rates of allocative efficiency associated with 
those outcomes.  However, with due consideration to the SEIFA variables discussed, elements of the 
population with assisted needs under 70 years are included in the IRSD and IRSAD indices.  Given this 
and the literature noted above, it is possible that in a regression analysis the Assisted Needs variable 
might give rise to multicollinearity problems with the SEIFA indices and or be a non-significant linear 
predictor of the DEA Allocative efficiency score in a regression containing a SEIFA index.  
Nonetheless, the literature indicates that variable is well worth assessment in the regression 
analysis.  
5.5.5  Health and wellbeing and risk of Mental illness – Lone Person Households (2016 
Census) 
According to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2015a), there are a number of risk 
factors for health and wellbeing and mental health associated with people living on their own.  
Specifically, people living alone: 
 are more than twice as likely to have three or more social determinants that lead to 
poorer health than couples or families;  
 have an increased risk of developing mental health problems; and 
 15% of people living with mental illness live in single person households. 
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Furthermore, according to de Vaus and Qu (2015), lone person households were more likely to 
engage in excessive alcohol and tobacco consumption than households containing couples and 
families.  Given that living alone is a risk factor to health outcomes, this variable will be included in 
the regression analysis, where it could be expected that higher numbers of lone person households 
yield poorer health outcomes and lower rates of allocative efficiency associated with those 
outcomes. 
  
The SEIFA index IER includes lone person dwellings and there maybe issues of significance for this 
variable in a regression model containing IER or another SEIFA index that correlates with or 
represents social determinants known in the literature to be associated with people living alone.  
 
The number of lone person households is collected on the Census via questions regarding Family 
Composition (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017f).  The data was extracted via the ABS Stat 
database for SA3 populations (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017c). 
5.5.6 Migrant populations - No or Poor English (2016 Census) 
“Immigrants from English-speaking countries were found to have advantages related to physical 
health, mental health and self-assessed health.  English proficiency had an effect on the difference in 
health between populations, as a language barrier could hinder an individual’s access to health 
services. It can also have an impact on employment, which has broader socioeconomic implications” 
(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a). 
 
Given the literature relating to hindered access of services due to poor English proficiency, it could 
be expected that populations that have higher rates of poor English proficiency have poorer health 
outcomes and lower rates of allocative efficiency associated with those outcomes. 
 
The SEIFA index IRSD includes people who cannot speak English very well and there maybe 
significance problems in a regression for this variable, where the regression also contains IRSD or 
another SEIFA index that covers broader socioeconomic issues that the literature documents as 
having an association with migrants with poor English.  Nonetheless the variable will be assessed in 
the regression analysis.  
 
The Census statistic for assessing peoples’ English proficiency is the ‘Proficiency in Spoken English 
(ENGP)’ variable (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017h).  The 2016 Census data for SA3s is available 
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via the ABS online data base ‘Table builder’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017b).  Two categories 
of English proficiency, ‘no-English’ or ‘poor English’, were downloaded and combined as a portion of 
the 2016 population for inclusion in the regression analysis. 
5.5.7 Out-of-pocket health expenses (AIHW) 
The systematic public reporting of out-of-pocket health expenses by ABS geographical areas is 
relatively new in Australia.  In 2018, the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare released 
information at the SA3 level via report (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018c) and via 
downloaded data (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a).  The reports and data show 
out-of-pocket costs for non-hospital Medicare subsidised services for:  
 GP services;  
 Specialists; 
 Obstetrics; 
 Diagnostics and Imaging; and 
 A total of the above. 
At the time of this study the AIHW data is only available for the 2016/17 financial year.  The data is 
reported for populations as the percentage of patients with out-of-pocket costs, the median out-of-
pocket costs of patients and the out-of-pocket costs of patients of the 90th percentile for each SA3 
are available (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2018a).   
 
For assessment in the regression analysis, data will include the portion of the populations with out-
of-pocket costs for: GP services; Specialists; Diagnostics and Imaging; and the total of all these 
categories which also includes obstetrics.  Obstetrics out-of-pocket costs will not be assessed on its 
own as unlike the other categories it covers a very narrow specific area of health, whereas the 
HORSt is seeking a broad view of the overall health status of the community.  However, due to the 
nature of the proportional population data available, Obstetrics costs are already included in the 
total proportions and will not be able to be removed so it is not possible to consider a total 
proportion for GPs, Specialists and Diagnostic and Imaging together.  
 
As per the literature that finds out-of-pocket costs act as a barrier to private non-admitted primary 
care services, it is expected that populations’ that have higher portions of patients with out-of-
pocket costs will have better health outcomes and in turn better allocative efficiency associated with 
those outcomes as the costs incurred represent an ability to pay for access to private services.  
Contrastingly, populations with lower portions of out-of-pocket costs will have a lower ability to pay 
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to access private services, which may result through delay in worsening health outcomes, 
compromising allocative efficiency.   
 
Importantly, the underlying logic of the use of out-of-pocket costs in the regression is not saying that 
individuals within populations with out-of-pocket costs do not face financial burdens to pay.  
However, at the population level it is reasonable to assume that populations with higher portions of 
out-of-pocket costs have a greater capacity and or willingness to pay to access private services than 
those populations with lower portions.  Furthermore, this logic is not saying that higher portions of 
out-of-pocket costs cause better health outcomes and improve allocative efficiency associated with 
those outcomes. The logic underpinned by the literature is positioning out-of-pocket costs as 
representative of the financial ability of populations to access private primary care services.  If the 
financial access to private primary care services that populations require is lower, it is reasonable to 
expect that the health outcomes of those populations could be compromised along with the 
accompanying allocative efficiency of those outcomes.  
5.5.8  Summary of Independent Variables for each SA3 to be assessed for the HORSt 
regression 
Table 18 shows that for 2016 that: 
 SA3 12702 Fairfield has the lowest IRSD and IEO of 860.9 and 883.9 respectively; 
 SA3 11730 Sydney Inner City had the lowest IER 884.6 and highest amount of lone 
person households 32,415; 
 SA3 10802 Kempsey Nambucca had the lowest IRSAD 884.6; 
 SA3 12103 Ku-ring-gai had the highest IRSD and IRSAD 1121.0 and 1166.6 respectively, 
 SA3 12104 North Sydney - Mosman had the highest IEO 1192.9; 
 SA3 11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill had the highest IER 1154.8 and lowest number of 
lone person households 976; 
 the highest ATSI proportion was at SA3 10501 Bourke – Cobar - Coonamble almost 30% 
of the population;  
 SA3 10801 Great lakes had the highest assisted needs proportion almost 9% of the 
population; and 
 SA3 12501 Auburn had the highest population portion with no or little English 18.4%; 
 11603 Mount Druitt has the lowest population portion with non-admitted Medicare 




Table 18   Summary table of independent / explanatory variables to be tested in the HORSt regression analysis by NSW SA3 area 
 
Table continues on next page 
SA3 Code and Name IRSD IRSAD IER IEO ARIA % of pop ATSI
% of pop 
Assisted Needs




% Out of pocket 
costs ALL
% Out of pocket 
costs GPs
% Out of pocket 
costs Specialists
% Out of pocket costs 
Diagnostics & Imaging
10101 Goulburn – Yass 982.6 970.4 1007.4 968.9 2 3.02% 6.41% 0.40% 7247 58.35% 44.10% 73.20% 29.45%
10102 Queanbeyan 1053.4 1056.3 1059.4 1045.1 2 3.02% 3.84% 1.28% 5264 68.30% 61.60% 75.40% 39.10%
10103 Snowy Mountains 1004.9 980.9 998.8 985.0 4 2.39% 4.43% 0.43% 2242 60.90% 48.10% 75.40% 20.30%
10104 South Coast 968.8 943.6 975.7 953.8 4 4.69% 6.92% 0.29% 8695 62.40% 47.90% 76.30% 32.20%
10201 Gosford 1013.1 1005.0 1014.4 1007.9 1 2.58% 5.79% 0.54% 16968 56.00% 33.80% 78.60% 31.90%
10202 Wyong 962.1 943.6 985.7 929.9 0 4.28% 7.12% 0.44% 14987 50.00% 25.50% 75.30% 28.70%
10301 Bathurst 984.1 970.8 994.6 973.0 2 4.81% 4.93% 0.32% 4395 50.80% 30.70% 67.80% 36.30%
10302 Lachlan Valley 941.4 928.5 968.0 938.2 5 9.21% 6.29% 0.22% 6269 47.30% 24.70% 72.20% 24.10%
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 942.3 926.0 971.8 912.4 3 4.98% 5.89% 0.33% 5233 46.50% 25.10% 69.70% 20.80%
10304 Orange 988.5 977.1 1001.0 975.4 2 5.40% 5.24% 0.55% 5618 56.20% 38.30% 71.80% 39.60%
10401 Clarence Valley 926.0 907.4 953.3 917.9 3 6.67% 8.41% 0.21% 5679 61.50% 37.00% 75.00% 44.00%
10402 Coffs Harbour 966.7 953.6 973.6 964.4 4 4.59% 6.16% 0.77% 8776 53.60% 37.50% 76.40% 15.10%
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 892.1 902.1 916.4 940.9 11 29.45% 5.16% 0.42% 2808 27.70% 11.10% 47.50% 23.10%
10502 Broken Hill and Far West 897.9 889.0 917.4 903.2 11 12.04% 7.47% 0.36% 2817 25.90% 16.00% 25.60% 9.40%
10503 Dubbo 953.7 942.4 975.6 950.2 5 16.15% 6.00% 0.27% 6768 46.70% 26.70% 58.50% 36.40%
10601 Lower Hunter 949.1 929.4 987.9 897.9 2 5.04% 6.36% 0.24% 7338 50.70% 33.90% 74.50% 15.00%
10602 Maitland 989.5 972.2 1009.9 946.7 0 3.82% 5.66% 0.35% 5705 60.80% 48.70% 76.00% 19.90%
10603 Port Stephens 978.4 957.3 998.6 938.6 1 4.17% 6.48% 0.30% 6639 51.20% 32.00% 71.70% 18.60%
10604 Upper Hunter 951.5 936.1 983.2 905.2 4 5.49% 4.81% 0.40% 3009 52.30% 34.50% 71.90% 23.20%
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla 949.2 938.8 977.4 919.7 0 3.20% 7.57% 3.39% 6402 39.20% 11.90% 69.90% 14.60%
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour 996.7 981.0 1016.3 959.2 1 3.05% 6.19% 1.20% 6517 44.30% 17.70% 74.30% 20.50%
10704 Wollongong 1012.3 1020.2 988.8 1042.3 0 2.00% 5.75% 2.45% 12469 52.90% 29.80% 74.90% 21.50%
10801 Great Lakes 930.1 910.3 956.0 918.4 2 4.57% 8.75% 0.24% 4109 60.00% 37.00% 79.80% 19.30%
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 895.4 884.4 935.4 901.6 4 11.05% 8.43% 0.21% 5574 46.40% 23.60% 73.20% 16.90%
10804 Port Macquarie 975.9 958.0 985.2 964.7 3 3.85% 7.38% 0.20% 8815 50.00% 17.10% 79.60% 32.20%
10805 Taree - Gloucester 922.1 907.1 951.3 916.9 3 6.16% 7.89% 0.24% 6037 59.30% 38.60% 78.10% 19.00%
10901 Albury 973.7 957.7 969.0 963.3 2 2.62% 5.88% 0.66% 6955 61.90% 49.50% 77.50% 26.00%
10902 Lower Murray 951.9 937.9 973.5 940.3 7 9.57% 5.03% 0.55% 1275 48.30% 24.10% 65.60% 32.20%
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury 968.6 946.9 979.5 945.7 4 2.74% 5.88% 0.26% 5031 64.10% 47.80% 80.90% 19.40%
11001 Armidale 985.9 979.3 969.5 1015.0 4 7.38% 5.09% 0.66% 3814 58.60% 46.40% 70.80% 38.40%
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Table 18– continued  
 
Table continues on next page 
SA3 Code and Name IRSD IRSAD IER IEO ARIA % of pop ATSI
% of pop 
Assisted Needs




% Out of pocket 
costs ALL
% Out of pocket 
costs GPs
% Out of pocket 
costs Specialists
% Out of pocket costs 
Diagnostics & Imaging
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield 914.0 906.0 947.7 929.0 5 7.44% 6.73% 0.28% 4509 54.60% 40.60% 72.50% 33.20%
11003 Moree - Narrabri 939.0 932.1 958.9 937.3 6 19.04% 4.25% 0.33% 2529 52.90% 43.80% 65.60% 15.60%
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah 955.3 941.3 977.5 936.9 4 10.52% 5.65% 0.25% 8241 61.60% 51.70% 72.10% 35.60%
11101 Lake Macquarie - East 1001.4 986.5 1004.6 977.4 0 3.04% 6.24% 0.45% 11256 58.80% 42.90% 72.20% 18.00%
11102 Lake Macquarie - West 984.2 965.0 1003.9 948.3 0 4.05% 7.28% 0.37% 6213 51.60% 32.50% 72.20% 17.40%
11103 Newcastle 993.6 992.7 966.5 1012.6 0 3.15% 5.99% 1.22% 18245 61.60% 49.40% 71.10% 22.50%
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal 997.9 988.6 993.2 1013.2 1 3.04% 5.45% 0.33% 8400 64.80% 47.30% 76.90% 25.00%
11202 Richmond Valley - 933.6 921.5 953.5 937.4 2 6.11% 6.89% 0.41% 7729 61.60% 46.20% 71.50% 39.40%
11203 Tweed Valley 973.3 956.3 984.9 959.5 1 4.02% 7.14% 0.37% 10106 52.10% 30.70% 71.40% 23.20%
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee 954.6 939.1 974.4 922.3 6 6.79% 5.42% 2.14% 4341 57.30% 40.10% 71.00% 31.40%
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 951.1 933.4 977.9 927.0 3 4.62% 4.89% 0.37% 1575 44.70% 16.80% 84.60% 35.00%
11303 Wagga Wagga 983.6 966.4 989.1 966.2 3 5.00% 5.31% 0.53% 9129 59.30% 41.90% 81.80% 47.10%
11401 Shoalhaven 963.6 943.1 981.6 949.2 2 5.50% 7.68% 0.36% 10895 56.60% 37.00% 70.20% 22.50%
11402 Southern Highlands 1034.6 1021.8 1046.0 1024.8 1 2.09% 5.64% 0.31% 4642 61.60% 47.50% 71.70% 32.00%
11501 Baulkham Hills 1106.2 1133.9 1128.1 1113.9 0 0.34% 3.72% 2.93% 5613 50.50% 27.30% 79.60% 20.20%
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 1091.4 1104.0 1137.4 1073.0 1 0.60% 4.25% 1.33% 1111 58.50% 34.10% 83.60% 29.40%
11503 Hawkesbury 1061.7 1049.5 1108.8 1005.9 2 2.03% 3.65% 0.30% 1199 51.00% 27.60% 78.80% 18.10%
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill 1098.4 1116.7 1154.8 1059.2 0 1.01% 2.80% 1.23% 976 43.30% 18.00% 77.40% 15.10%
11601 Blacktown 984.9 986.5 989.1 971.0 0 2.32% 5.46% 4.92% 7628 27.70% 5.60% 60.00% 6.70%
11602 Blacktown - North 1076.8 1096.6 1117.6 1051.5 0 1.57% 3.28% 2.49% 2767 34.80% 9.60% 72.30% 11.00%
11603 Mount Druitt 913.1 916.3 951.5 896.0 0 5.37% 6.23% 4.42% 5083 18.50% 2.60% 49.20% 3.30%
11701 Botany 1001.2 1028.5 967.9 1028.4 0 1.85% 4.90% 5.86% 3783 40.80% 19.00% 67.70% 17.30%
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - 1034.8 1078.0 979.4 1101.6 0 1.91% 5.05% 7.13% 5511 47.90% 28.90% 68.70% 20.30%
11703 Sydney Inner City 1028.2 1096.2 884.6 1149.6 0 1.66% 2.44% 3.68% 32415 53.90% 39.10% 71.80% 27.30%
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North 1101.6 1151.3 1031.5 1174.5 0 0.39% 2.78% 1.26% 14082 68.90% 54.30% 81.00% 42.00%
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South 1051.7 1095.5 983.6 1118.5 0 1.73% 3.81% 3.27% 13098 52.10% 32.10% 71.70% 23.10%
11901 Bankstown 941.1 963.9 971.3 966.3 0 0.92% 7.03% 9.36% 10163 32.20% 9.50% 65.40% 7.00%
11902 Canterbury 930.8 958.2 943.1 966.6 0 0.55% 6.27% 13.45% 7681 28.80% 6.70% 62.10% 7.00%
11903 Hurstville 1007.0 1032.3 992.1 1039.8 0 0.70% 5.24% 8.84% 8582 42.40% 19.40% 70.90% 13.10%




Table 18– continued  
 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017g, 2018a, 2018b).  
 
SA3 Code and Name IRSD IRSAD IER IEO ARIA % of pop ATSI
% of pop 
Assisted Needs




% Out of pocket 
costs ALL
% Out of pocket 
costs GPs
% Out of pocket 
costs Specialists
% Out of pocket costs 
Diagnostics & Imaging
12001 Canada Bay 1070.8 1108.6 1026.1 1121.0 0 0.45% 4.26% 4.49% 6944 51.90% 25.60% 76.30% 23.60%
12002 Leichhardt 1089.7 1142.1 1041.6 1169.1 0 1.19% 3.40% 1.87% 6102 63.10% 45.70% 78.00% 34.40%
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - 1023.5 1059.9 966.3 1083.8 0 0.68% 4.82% 8.45% 11696 38.20% 15.60% 67.60% 12.30%
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove 1092.7 1142.0 1047.7 1162.3 0 0.24% 3.28% 4.23% 9277 60.10% 43.80% 81.60% 40.40%
12102 Hornsby 1079.4 1101.1 1065.4 1106.1 0 0.51% 3.89% 3.66% 5099 54.80% 33.80% 81.90% 41.30%
12103 Ku-ring-gai 1121.0 1166.6 1110.2 1169.7 0 0.16% 3.63% 2.31% 6161 67.10% 51.70% 85.20% 49.40%
12104 North Sydney - Mosman 1110.1 1160.7 1025.9 1192.9 0 0.22% 2.41% 1.49% 13539 76.20% 67.70% 84.50% 55.20%
12201 Manly 1110.7 1158.7 1077.0 1169.2 0 0.34% 2.43% 0.92% 3678 73.60% 61.00% 85.40% 44.90%
12202 Pittwater 1100.5 1120.5 1074.1 1108.4 0 0.51% 3.68% 0.60% 4127 72.70% 60.80% 87.00% 46.80%
12203 Warringah 1084.2 1109.0 1089.9 1094.5 0 0.49% 4.01% 1.78% 11328 64.40% 46.90% 83.00% 39.10%
12301 Camden 1055.2 1053.2 1100.9 1004.3 0 2.32% 4.50% 0.61% 2719 44.70% 19.80% 78.30% 12.70%
12302 Campbelltown (NSW) 951.3 948.5 977.6 932.3 0 3.80% 5.85% 2.87% 9237 29.00% 5.60% 66.30% 7.00%
12303 Wollondilly 1039.2 1026.4 1088.8 976.5 0 2.86% 4.70% 0.42% 2036 41.00% 14.60% 75.60% 13.70%
12401 Blue Mountains 1045.3 1042.5 1038.6 1069.9 1 2.06% 5.50% 0.42% 7353 54.20% 30.10% 74.80% 9.40%
12403 Penrith 991.4 989.2 1025.0 953.1 0 2.83% 5.03% 1.06% 9064 35.20% 10.30% 70.70% 7.30%
12404 Richmond - Windsor 993.0 975.9 1012.1 946.1 0 4.38% 5.69% 0.66% 2928 48.10% 24.10% 76.80% 16.00%
12405 St Marys 964.6 948.7 989.5 905.1 0 3.74% 5.52% 2.38% 3192 25.70% 3.40% 62.80% 5.30%
12501 Auburn 936.7 979.1 930.9 986.7 0 0.72% 4.45% 14.80% 4443 23.30% 4.60% 58.80% 6.80%
12502 Carlingford 1033.8 1058.5 1023.9 1070.1 0 0.78% 4.73% 7.05% 4018 38.80% 15.90% 72.60% 17.20%
12503 Merrylands - Guildford 914.3 941.3 946.2 944.0 0 0.96% 6.65% 9.63% 8978 25.40% 4.70% 58.20% 7.20%
12504 Parramatta 1022.4 1040.9 963.5 1057.8 0 0.98% 4.69% 6.42% 10042 32.30% 9.50% 65.40% 12.30%
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 1096.9 1133.1 1077.2 1144.7 0 0.29% 3.48% 4.67% 2435 51.40% 31.40% 80.90% 28.50%
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill 1061.1 1093.1 1018.7 1113.0 0 0.39% 4.69% 5.64% 10927 48.90% 27.30% 76.80% 24.20%
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley 1033.8 1058.5 1023.9 1070.1 0 0.00% 5.62% 6.58% 3545 30.10% 6.00% 69.40% 7.50%
12702 Fairfield 860.9 899.9 949.1 883.9 0 0.81% 8.37% 18.40% 8078 26.70% 4.70% 62.10% 5.20%
12703 Liverpool 957.5 977.3 994.0 968.2 0 1.55% 6.36% 7.33% 6201 30.40% 6.60% 68.40% 6.90%
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - 1073.6 1083.6 1067.5 1067.6 0 0.95% 4.36% 1.23% 9804 57.60% 31.70% 82.60% 24.60%
12802 Sutherland - Menai - 1086.4 1091.5 1100.5 1063.3 0 0.91% 4.21% 1.01% 6212 58.30% 33.50% 83.10% 23.70%
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5.6  CHAPTER SUMMARY OF DATA SOURCES APPLIED TO THE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
This chapter has outlined and justified the data to be used to support the methodology outlined in 
Chapter Four for the development of the HORSt. 
 
The HORSt benchmark methodology makes use of:  
 88 NSW SA3 populations defined by the ABS. 
 The decision to use the SA3 populations is determined by the availability of MBS and 
PBS data at this level. 
 Population health status is the DEA output variable and is measured by the transformed 
median rate of age-standardised and casemix adjusted (NWAUs) per 10,000 people for 
PPHs for the years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16; 
 The median age-standardised rates of MBS and PBS costs per 10,000 people for the 
years 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16, are DEA inputs representing Commonwealth 
government taxpayer funded inputs; and   
 The median age-standardised and casemix (NWAUs) adjusted rate per 10,000 people 
(SCRs) is a DEA input representing state health administered taxpayer funded inputs. 
 
The HORSt regression modelling methodology makes use of:  
 The measured DEA allocative efficiency scores for the population health status of each 
NSW SA3 populations will be the dependent variable; 
 Testing explanatory variables from the Australian 2016 census and reputable secondary 
data include:  
o The 4 ABS SEIFA variables IRSD, IRSAD, IER, IEO (in separate regression models) 
along with variables that: represent location (ARIA); the indigenous population; 
disability (portion of people requiring assistance); people with poor levels of 




CHAPTER SIX – RESULTS 
6.0  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results for the HORSt.  Aligned with the previous methodology chapter the 
results are organised into three sections.  These are: 
1. The DEA allocative efficiency scores of the SA3 populations;   
2. The regression analysis that identifies variables that predict the allocative efficiency 
scores of the SA3 populations’; and 
3. The vertical equity adjusted needs-based shares for SA3 populations and ultimately the 
LHNs that can be used to guide resource allocation decisions between the NSW state 
government and regions.  
6.1  DEA RESULTS 
The DEA allocative efficiency scores for each DMU / SA3 are summarised in Table 19.  Heat maps for 
these scores are shown for NSW and the metropolitan and surrounding areas of Sydney in figures 27 
and 28 respectively.  A descriptive analysis is also provided for these results, where the DEA 
efficiency scores are the dependent variable in the regression analysis.  As outlined in Chapter Four 
there is no requirement for the data of the dependent variable to be normally distributed to support 
the regression, the requirement is for the standardized regression residuals for the dependent 
variable to be normal.  The distribution shown for the data in Figure 29 shows extremely low scores 
of two DMUs below 20 are clearly visible.  These are for the SA3 areas Bourke – Cobar – Coonamble 
and Mount Druitt having scores of 11.13 and 15.08 respectively.  Figure 30 shows a stem and leaf 
plot.  Both areas are known to have very poor health outcomes and challenging social determinants 
that give rise to these outcomes (Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2018; Centre for 
Epidemiology and Research 2010; McNab & Gillespie 2015; Western NSW Local Health District & 
Western NSW Medicare Local 2013). 
 
Assessment of the DEA scores is conducted by considering the top and bottom 5 ranked DMUs / SA3 
populations in terms of their allocative efficiency scores and with respect to their ranked health 
status that was used as the DEA output and their ranked use of input resources.  Table 20 shows a 
summary of the efficiency scores compared to ranked health status, Table 21 shows a summary 
compared to ranked resource intensity.  
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Figure 27   Heat map of NSW DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores for the 88 DMUs / SA3 NSW populations 
 
Note –the legend above shows efficiency scores bound between 0 through to 100% clustered into deciles. Areas shaded in white are the ACT, and the SA3’s excluded for very low populations 
(discussed on page 139).   
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Figure 28   Heat map of NSW DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores for the metropolitan DMUs / SA3 NSW populations around Sydney 
 
Note –the legend above shows efficiency scores bound between 0 through to 100% clustered into deciles.  
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Table 20   Highest and Lowest ranked DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores and health status (DEA output) 
 
 
Table 21   Highest and Lowest ranked DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores and DEA resource inputs 
 
 
As outlined in Chapter Four, the DEA allocative efficiency scores are relative to the output and input 
variables.  Within an output orientated DEA model like the HORSt, it is reasonable to expect that the 
areas that have the best and worst outputs would be somewhat ranked towards the top and bottom 
extremes of the DEA scores, subject of course to their input resource usage compared to the other 
areas.  Tables 20 and 21 indicate that the DEA results make intuitive sense when the five highest and 
lowest ranked allocative efficiency scores of DMUs are considered alongside the health status of 
these populations (their DEA output) and their corresponding taxpayer provided resource usage 
(their DEA inputs).  Moreover, the DEA results are reasonably consistent with the underlying health 
status and social determinants of these populations that are routinely monitored by health 
authorities.  The lowest 5 have some of the worst outcomes and challenging social determinants.  

















(from best to worst health 
status as measured by the 
ACSCs rate and DEA 
Transformed output)
Eq 1 3 10103 Snowy Mountains 100 445 155 4
Eq 1 66 12103 Ku-ring-gai 100 451 149 1
Eq 1 82 12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 100 446 154 2
4 69 12202 Pittwater 98.83 445 155 3
5 45 11501 Baulkham Hills 97.34 439 161 5
1 13 10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 11.13 50 550 88
2 51 11603 Mount Druitt 15.08 68 532 87
3 76 12404 Richmond - Windsor 46.39 209 391 86
4 24 10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 55.74 251 349 85
5 41 11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 60.71 273 327 83
Lowest
Highest
DEA Results - Highest and Lowest Efficiency
DEA Output  and Health Status ranking for each DMU 























Eq 1 3 10103 Snowy Mountains 100 4,282          88 1,827          88 2,259          86
Eq 1 66 12103 Ku-ring-gai 100 10,007        22 3,042          79 2,243          87
Eq 1 82 12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 100 9,594          34 3,126          78 2,069          88
4 69 12202 Pittwater 98.83 9,301          43 2,975          80 2,652          71
5 45 11501 Baulkham Hills 97.34 10,413        10 3,223          75 2,303          85
1 13 10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 11.13 9,103          52 4,331          22 4,710          1
2 51 11603 Mount Druitt 15.08 10,158        16 4,271          30 4,561          2
3 76 12404 Richmond - Windsor 46.39 9,577          36 4,268          31 3,336          24
4 24 10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 55.74 9,363          41 4,862          3 4,040          4
5 41 11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 60.71 8,689          66 4,242          33 3,434          18




DEA Results - Highest and Lowest Efficiency
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Centre for Epidemiology and Evidence 2018; Centre for Epidemiology and Research 2010; McNab & 
Gillespie 2015; Western NSW Local Health District & Western NSW Medicare Local 2013). 
 
In terms of the DEA output, Table 20 shows that the DMUs / SA3s that have the five highest ranking 
DEA allocative efficiency scores also were the five best ranked areas for health status as measured 
by the five lowest rates of age-standardised and casemix adjusted PPHs (NWAUs) per 10,000 people 
and highest transformed DEA output variable.  By contrast, the five lowest ranked DEA allocative 
efficiency scores belong to areas that occupy the bottom four and sixth worst ranked areas for 
health status.   
 
Table 21 shows the underlying rankings of DEA input resource contributions to the DEA efficiency 
results and reinforce the logic of the DEA results.  The top 3 DMUs; Snowy Mountains; Ku-ring-gai; 
Pennant Hills Epping; all being efficient (allocative efficiency = 100%).  A contributing factor for these 
top three efficiency scores were not only did that they had the best outputs (health status) as per 
Table 19, they also used the least public inpatient hospital resources to do so.  Furthermore, Snowy 
Mountains had also the lowest MBS and PBS resource usage.  Ku-ring-gai and Pennant Hills Epping 
was somewhat different however, having higher ranked rates of MBS resource usage 22nd and 34th 
highest respectively, although their PBS resource usage ranked 79th and 78th respectively is the 9th 
and 10th lowest for the state.   
 
Table 21 also shows that the two lowest areas for allocative efficiency; Bourke – Cobar – Coonamble 
and Mount Druitt had the two highest rates of age-standardised inpatient public hospital resource 
usage of the state (ranking 1 and 2) and at the same time had relative lower rates of MBS and PBS 
resource usage.  These results also reinforce the logic of the DEA results.  The technical efficiency 
contribution of these relatively high public hospital inputs to the allocative efficiency of these 
populations’ health status appears to be somewhat ineffectual.  However, the state provided 
hospital resource input contribution cannot be considered on its own.  The appropriate mix of 
resources across the continuum of care for these populations may well be sub optimal and being 
compromised by access to private primary care, compromising the observed allocative efficiency.  
For example, the MBS usage for Bourke – Cobar – Coonamble is the 52nd lowest for the state.  
 
With the DEA results making intuitive sense relative to the DEA output and inputs, the second stage 




6.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
A matrix of Pearson’s bi-variate correlations was initially produced to assess whether or not the 
independent variables identified in chapter five had a linear relationship with the dependent 
variable; the DEA allocative efficiency scores.  Doing so follows a reductionist methodology to 
eliminate variables that will not be useful for the regression.   
 
The matrix shown in Table 22 is also useful at providing preliminary indications of possible 
multicollinearity between independent variables where the correlation between independent 
variables are high.  Correlations range between 0 and 1, 1 representing a perfect correlation.   
 
The results indicate variables that do not have a significantly linear relationship with the dependent 
variable and these will be eliminated from the analysis.  Shown in the shaded section of Table 22, 
these are: 
 The proportion of the population that has No English and or poor English proficiency; 
and  
 Lone person households. 
A summary of the variables found to have a significant linear relationship with the dependent 
variable, listed in order of absolute value of strength of the correlation is as follows: 
1. Index of Relative Socioeconomic Disadvantage (IRSD) 0.691; 
2. Index of Relative Socioeconomic Advantage / Disadvantage (IRSAD) 0.638; 
3. The portion of the population that are indigenous Australians (ATSI) -0.607 (a negative 
relationship); 
4. Index of Education and Occupation (IEO) 0.602; 
5. Index of Economic Resources (IER) 0.601; 
6. Out-of-pocket costs Specialists 0.586; 
7. Out-of-pocket costs ALL (includes GPs, Specialists, Diagnostics and Imaging and 
Obstetrics) 0.519; 
8. Out-of-pocket costs GPs 0.425; 
9. The portion of the population that are living with a disability and require assistance 
(Assisted Needs) -0.412 (a negative relationship); 
10. Geographical location measured by the accessibility and remoteness index (ARIA) -
0.406 (a negative relationship); and  
11. Out-of-pocket costs Diagnostics and Imaging 0.320.   
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Table 22   Correlations Matrix – HORSt dependent variable and independent variables 
 




































1 .691** .638** .601** .602** .519** .425** .586** .320** -.412** -0.037 0.054 -.607** -.406**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0 0.73 0.618 0 0
Pearson Correlation .691** 1 .965** .825** .898** .442** .357** .613** .372** -.802** -0.105 0.066 -.568** -.521**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.328 0.54 0 0
Pearson Correlation .638** .965** 1 .726** .963** .329** .269* .512** .317** -.829** 0.1 0.145 -.587** -.561**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.011 0 0.003 0 0.352 0.179 0 0
Pearson Correlation .601** .825** .726** 1 .555** .321** .213* .586** .239* -.579** -0.198 -.297** -.450** -.416**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.046 0 0.025 0 0.065 0.005 0 0
Pearson Correlation .602** .898** .963** .555** 1 .369** .330** .457** .384** -.784** 0.128 .253* -.513** -.475**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0 0 0 0.235 0.017 0 0
Pearson Correlation .519** .442** .329** .321** .369** 1 .958** .720** .789** -.247* -.582** 0.149 -0.11 0.02
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0.002 0.002 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.166 0.314 0.857
Pearson Correlation .425** .357** .269* .213* .330** .958** 1 .554** .764** -.259* -.539** 0.154 -0.02 0.11
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0.001 0.011 0.046 0.002 0 0 0 0.015 0 0.153 0.893 0.306
Pearson Correlation .586** .613** .512** .586** .457** .720** .554** 1 .527** -.351** -.312** 0.073 -.475** -.412**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.003 0.502 0 0
Pearson Correlation .320** .372** .317** .239* .384** .789** .764** .527** 1 -.315** -.449** 0.1 0.044 0.144
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0 0.003 0.025 0 0 0 0 0.003 0 0.355 0.682 0.182
Pearson Correlation -.412** -.802** -.829** -.579** -.784** -.247* -.259* -.351** -.315** 1 0.005 -0.022 .296** .273*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.96 0.841 0.005 0.01
Pearson Correlation -0.037 -0.105 0.1 -0.198 0.128 -.582** -.539** -.312** -.449** 0.005 1 0.111 -.369** -.393**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.73 0.328 0.352 0.065 0.235 0 0 0.003 0 0.96 0.305 0 0
Pearson Correlation 0.054 0.066 0.145 -.297** .253* 0.149 0.154 0.073 0.1 -0.022 0.111 1 -.213* -.298**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.618 0.54 0.179 0.005 0.017 0.166 0.153 0.502 0.355 0.841 0.305 0.046 0.005
Pearson Correlation -.607** -.568** -.587** -.450** -.513** -0.108 -0.015 -.475** 0.044 .296** -.369** -.213* 1 .828**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0.314 0.893 0 0.682 0.005 0 0.046 0
Pearson Correlation -.406** -.521** -.561** -.416** -.475** 0.02 0.11 -.412** 0.144 .273* -.393** -.298** .828** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0 0.857 0.306 0 0.182 0.01 0 0.005 0
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). N = 88 for all pairs




Out of pocket costs GPs
Out of pocket costs 
Specialist
Out of pocket costs 
Diagnostics Imaging
Assist Need prop
No / Poor English prop
Lone person households






Out of pocket costs ALL
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Figures 29 through 39 are scatter plots of the 11 independent variables that have a significant linear 
relationship with the dependent variable.  For each correlation depicted the direction of association, 
positive or negative is shown, as well as simple regression R-squared coefficient of determination.  
As outlined in the methodology, the R-squared shows how much of the variation of the dependent 
variable is explained by independent variable.  For these simple single variable regressions derived 
from each bi-variate correlation, the R-squared indicated is derived by squaring the independent 
variables’ Pearson correlation coefficients.  
 
Figure 31, 32, 33 and 34 illustrates that there is a positive linear relationship between the DEA 
allocative efficiency scores and the SEIFA variables IRSD, IRSAD, IER and IEO.  When the value of 
these indices increases, which represents more advantageous socioeconomic status, the predicted 
value of the DEA allocative efficiency scores also increase and vice versa.  This is consistent with the 
literature examined, whereby advantageous socioeconomic status is associated with better health 
outcomes and vice versa.  Each of these SEIFA indices explains 47.8%, 40.7%, 36.1% and 36.3% 
respectively of the variation in DEA allocative efficiency scores.   
 








Figure 32   Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the IRSAD  
 
 













Figures 35 through 38 shows that the DEA allocative efficiency scores have a positive linear 
relationship with the percentage of patients with non-hospital / non-admitted Out-of-pocket costs.  
This is consistent with the underlying theory expressed in the methodology chapter that the 
expressed demand measured by the portion of patients with these out-of-pocket costs at the 
population level represents an affordability of access to private services, predominately primary 
care.  Populations with a high percentage of patients that have paid out-of-pocket costs have by the 
nature of this expressed demand, a high percentage of patients accessing private primary care and 
the positive relationship of the correlation coefficients indicates that this high access is associated 
with higher DEA allocative efficiency scores.  Contrastingly, populations with lower percentages of 
out-of-pocket costs exhibit lower DEA allocative efficiency scores.  
 
Specifically, out-of-pocket costs for all non-admitted / non hospital categories explain 26.9% of the 
variation in the DEA efficiency scores.  Non-admitted / non hospital out-of-pocket costs associated 
with GPs, Specialists and Diagnostic and Imaging services each explain 18%, 34.3% and 10.2% 




Figure 35   Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and all categories of Out-of-pocket 
Costs for non-admitted Medicare reimbursed services 
 
 
Figure 36   Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and GP Out-of-pocket Costs for non-






Figure 37   Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and Specialist Out-of-pocket Costs for 




Figure 38   Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and Diagnostic and Imaging Out-of-






Figure 39 shows that the DEA allocative efficiency scores have a negative linear relationship with the 
percentage of the population living with a disability requiring assistance.  This is congruent with the 
literature and underlying theory for this variable presented in the methodology chapter whereby 
higher portions of disability expressed through higher portions of the community requiring assisted 
needs correlate with lower rates of health status / health outcomes at the population level which in 
turn is associated with lower rates for allocative efficiency for those health outcomes.  Specifically, 
the percentage of the population requiring assistance explains 17% of the variation in the DEA 
efficiency scores.  
 
Figure 40 illustrates that the DEA allocative efficiency scores have a negative linear relationship with 
the percentage of the population that are indigenous Australians.  This is aligned to the literature 
demonstrating the appalling health outcomes of indigenous Australians.  At the population level 
higher percentages of indigenous Australians correlate with lower rates of health status / health 
outcomes which are associated with commensurate lower rates of allocative efficiency.  Specifically, 
the percentage of the population that are indigenous Australians explains 36.8% of the variation in 
the DEA efficiency scores.    
 
Figure 39   Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the portion of the population that 
lives with a disability and requires assistance  
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Figure 40   Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the portion of the population that 




Figure 41 illustrates that the DEA allocative efficiency scores have a negative linear relationship with 
the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA).  This too is aligned to the literature 
demonstrating that access issues in rural and remote areas to health services can compromise 
health outcomes.  When the ARIA+ score is higher, indicating more remoteness and less access, the 
correlated DEA efficiency scores are lower and vice versa.  Specifically, the ARIA score of populations 
explains 16.5% of the variation in the DEA efficiency scores.  
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Figure 41   Correlation relationship between DEA allocative efficiency scores and the Accessibility/Remoteness 




As outlined in the methodology chapter, the Pearson bi-variate correlations matrix (Table 22, page 
198) provides guidance to the combinations of independent variables that should be considered in 
the regression analysis.  For example, as discussed, to be somewhat expected is that all SEIFA indices 
show strong correlations amongst each other and therefore separate regression models containing a 
single SEIFA index will be assessed.  Doing so will avoid an obvious problem of multicollinearity that 
would exist if multiple SEIFA indices were combined in a regression.   
 
The correlation results also indicate potential multicollinearity problems with combining multiple 
independent variables of out-of-pocket expenses.  Logically all out-of-pocket costs variable shows 
high correlations with that of out-of-pocket costs GPs, Specialists, Diagnostics and Imaging, having a 
correlation of 0.958, 0.720 and 0.789 respectively.  For parsimony in the regression analysis the 
broadest category Out-of-pockets ALL (referred to as simply out-of-pocket costs for the remained of 
this thesis) will be utilised representing a broad potential financial barrier to private primary care.   
 
Furthermore, there are potential multicollinearity problems with the strong correlation between the 
Assisted Needs variable and the IRSD, IRSAD and IER variables, having correlations of 0.802, 0.829 
and 0.784 respectively.  As outlined in the methodology section the IRSD and IRSAD SEIFA indices 
include Assisted Needs via the percentage of people aged less than 70 years of age that have a long–
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term health condition or disability and need assistance with core activities.  Nonetheless the 
regression analysis will thoroughly test the value of including the Assisted Needs variable. 
 
Multicollinearity is also likely to be an issue between ARIA+ and ATSI having a correlation with each 
other of 0.828.  It’s likely that a regression model should consider only one of these variables and 
not both.  The bi-variate relationships and R-squared results of the correlations produced in Figures 
38 and 39 outlines that the ATSI variable has 50% more explanatory value of the dependent variable 
than the ARIA+.   Given this and the study’s resource limitation of not being able to purchase the 
ARIA+ variable at a much higher degree of precision to two decimal places as opposed to the freely 
available downloadable whole number measure used in the study, ATSI will be used in developing 
the regression model. 
 
Based on the assessment of the Pearson Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients, parsimony of variables 
and data availability, variables that are potentially useful as explanatory variables in the regression 
are each of the four SEIFA variables, ATSI, Assisted Needs and out-of-pocket costs.  These are 
summarised in Table 23.  The table shows the R-squared value for each variable, determined by 
squaring the Pearson’s correlation coefficient.  This shows how much variation in DEA allocative 
efficiency can be attributed to each variable on its own.  For example, if IRSD was used as the sole 
independent variable in a regression with the DEA Allocative efficiency scores, IRSD would explain 




Table 23   Summary of potential independent explanatory variables to be used in the regression 
 
 
Multiple regression analysis with these variables identified as potentially useful for explaining the 
variation in the DEA allocative efficiency scores was then conducted.  As there is known 
multicollinearity between the SEIFA variables multiple regression analysis will contain no more than 
four variables being: 
1. A single SEIFA / socioeconomic variable; 
2. The portion of the population that are indigenous Australians, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander (ATSI) peoples;  
3. A variable representing the percentage of the population that has out-of-pocket costs 
representing at the population level financial barriers to private primary care access; 
and  
4. The portion of the population that are living with a disability and require assistance 
(Assisted Needs) where the inclusion of this variable will depend to some degree upon 
the multicollinearity interaction of the SEIFA variable. 
6.2.1  Regression Analysis Modelling Results Summary 
Stepwise regression is a common automated approach to selecting independent variables for 
regression analysis.  This functionality is built into statistical software packages and is well known 
amongst consultants, researchers and academics.  It is a technique popular with data miners.  
However, it is important to state that this approach was not used for this study based on a plethora 
of literature that highlights significant problems with it and makes recommendations not to use it 
(Altman & Andersen 1989; Derksen & Keselman 1992; Smith 2018; Thompson 1989, 1995; 
Whittingham et al. 2006).    









Assisted Needs -0.412 0.170
Out of Pocket Costs 0.519 0.269
Summary of Pearson Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients with the Dependent 




A good description of Stepwise regression and a summary of its pitfalls can be found in Field’s (2013) 
916-page comprehensive text on “Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics” where he donates 
less than 2 pages to it, deliberately does not detail the SPSS software functionality of it and 
dedicates this space to strongly encouraging researchers to not undertake it.  Fields states that 
Stepwise regression selects variables based on mathematical criteria.  Variable inclusion is 
influenced strongly on the order of variables already in the model.  Key problems noted with this 
approach in the literature are variables excluded as bad predictors only because of variables already 
included in the model (under fitting the model), and potentially having too many variables in the 
model that are included due to their success of explaining small remaining variances (over fitting the 
model).   This leads to unreliable R-squares that are biased and too high.  The methodology also has 
been shown to increase the risk of making a Type II error, excluding an important predictor(s) that 
actually does predict the outcome.  Most importantly this method detracts from the researcher 
being involved in critical assessment and decision making regarding variable selection (pp. 322-4).  
 
For the HORSt, multiple regression analysis was undertaken using SPSS V24 software (IBM Corp 
2016) to explore the development of regression models that best fit the data and explain the 
variations in DEA Allocative efficiency.  In direct contrast to the automated Stepwise regression 
approach, twelve modelled options were developed and evaluated, three each for each of the four 
SEIFA indices with different combinations of the other independent variables (ATSI, Assisted Needs, 
out-of-pocket costs).   
 
A summary of the modelling is presented first, outlining the combinations of variables assessed 
under each option.  The results of the modelling are then summarised, outlining the preferred model 
to be used with the HORSt.  Detailed individual regression analysis of the preferred model is then 
presented, demonstrating how the model meets all the requirements for regression.  Detailed 
analysis of the other eleven models that were evaluated is provided in appendix 6, commencing 
page 297. 
 
Table 24 outlines a summary of the included variables modelled under each option.  In all models 1 
through 4 each of the SEIFA indices were combined initially with the three other independent 
variables.  In all cases these regression models with four independent variables were invalid as the 
Assisted Needs variable was found to be non-significant at the 5% threshold (Sig)> 0.05 when 
applied in conjunction with any of the SEIFA variables and ATSI and out-of-pocket costs.  Assisted 
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needs was also found to be non-significant at the 5% threshold in models 2a, 3a and 4a, when 
combined with IRSAD and ATSI, IER and ATSI, or IEO and ATSI.  Full details of this modelling and 
results are found in appendix 6 (page 297). 
 
Table 24   HORSt multiple regression models evaluated  
 
 
A summary of the regression models that were found to be valid using three independent variables 
and conforming to all the necessary axioms of robust regression that were outlined in Chapter Four 
(page 128) is provided in Table 25.  Table 25 demonstrate that models 1b and 3b are almost identical 
in predicting the variation in the DEA Allocative efficiency scores, explaining 63.2% and 63.3% 
respectively.  Models 2b, 4b and 1a explain 62%, 61% and 57.2% respectively.  All these multiple 
regression models explain the variation in DEA scores better than the individual variables as shown 
in Table 23 on page 208. 
 
Table 25   HORSt multiple regression model results 
 
 
Table 25 shows a summary of the regression models found to be robust and parsimonious predictors 
of the DEA Allocative Efficiency scores.  What is apparent from the five models is that they all have 
around the same level of prediction of the dependent variable, around 60%, irrespective of the SEIFA 
variable chosen and with one exception, Assisted Needs in model 1a, the SEIFA variable is the only 
variable of difference.  Given that all the models meet all of the assumptions required for regression 
(as per demonstrated in appendix 6 and the following section), there is no reason not to select the 
model that has the highest coefficient of determination (R-square) for use in the HORSt being Model 
Model 1 Model 1a Model 1b Model 2 Model 2a Model 2b Model 3 Model 3a Model 3b Model 4 Model 4a Model 4b
IRSD IRSD IRSD IRSAD IRSAD IRSAD IER IER IER IEO IEO IEO
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Model 2 SEFIA =IRSAD Model 3 SEFIA =IER
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b
R-square 0.572 0.632 0.620 0.633 0.610
Adjusted R-square 0.557 0.619 0.606 0.620 0.596
IRSD IRSD IRSAD IER IEO
ATSI ATSI ATSI ATSI ATSI
Assisted 
Needs
Out of Pocket 
Costs
Out of Pocket 
Costs
Out of Pocket 
Costs






3b.  The next section presents the preferred model.  This will be utilised for calculating the HORSt 
share of resources amongst NSW populations and the NSW LHNs.   
6.2.2 HORSt Regression Model –analysis of Model 3b (preferred model) 
Table 26  Regression Model 3b (IER + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs) 
 
 
Table 26 shows that IER, ATSI and Out-of-pocket Costs, in a regression model together are all 
significant linear predictors of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score.  This model meets all the 
requirements of robust regression outlined in appendix 7, commencing on page 318.  The regression 
model is significant as per the F statistic in the ANOVA section.  There is no indication of 
multicollinearity as per the VIFs.  This model explains 63.3% of the variation in the DEA Allocative 
Efficiency scores, 62% adjusted for the number of independent variables included.  Proof of this 
model (3b) meeting all the other regression assumptions for robust regression is now presented.  
 
The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 1.927 in Table 26 is demonstrating the model exhibits no auto-serial 
correlations.  As per the appendix 7 section A7.5 (page 323) as d 1.927>1.6990 (the critical value 
from the Durbin Watson table), the 𝐻0 is not rejected and the residuals are independent.  In 
addition, Figure 42 shows a line graph of regression unstandardized residuals.  Between case 
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numbers there is no discernible pattern of association so independence for the errors can be 
confirmed and therefore there is no autocorrelation or serial correlation observed. 
 
Figure 42   Line Graph of Regression Residuals -Model 3b (IER + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs) 
 
 
Figure 43 is a scatter plot that tests for heteroscedasticity.  There is no discernible pattern to indicate 
any association with standardised predicted values on the x axis with the regression residuals on the 
y axis so we can conclude that the model meets the assumption of homoscedasticity as discussed in 
appendix 7, section 7.4 (page 322).  
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Figure 44 shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and 
Figure 45 is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line).   It 
can be concluded from this that regression residuals meet the requirement of being normally 
distributed as discussed in appendix 7, section 7.2 (page 319).  
 










It can therefore be concluded that regression Model 3b containing IER, ATSI and Out-of-pocket Costs 
is a robust and parsimonious option for the HORSt regression.   
Model 3b is summarised in equation 21. 
 
Equation 21 
?̂? =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑥1 + 𝑏2 𝑥2 + 𝑏3 𝑥3 
?̂? =  −17.088 + (0.078 ×  𝑥1) + (−153.117 ×  𝑥2) + (45.3577 × 𝑥3) 
 
where:   
 ?̂?= the predicted efficiency score of each DMU (SA3) 
 𝒃𝟎 = the value of the outcome when the predictors are zero, the regression constant -
17.088; 
 𝒙𝟏= predictor / independent variable IER;  
 𝒃𝟏 =  the regression coefficient for IER 0.078; 
 𝒙𝟐= predictor / independent variable the percentage of the population that is ATSI;  




 𝒙𝟑= predictor / independent variable the percentage of the population with Out-of-
pocket Costs value for each DMU; and 
 𝒃𝟑 =  the regression coefficient for the percentage of the population with Out-of-pocket 
Costs 45.3577 
 
The interpretation of the regression coefficients is as follows:  
 For every additional unit of increase in a DMU’s IER, (with no change in the percentage 
of the population that is ATSI or the percentage of the population that has non-
admitted out-of-pocket costs), the predicted DEA Allocative Efficiency Score is expected 
to increase by 0.078%;    
 For every additional unit of increase in a DMU’s percentage of the population that is 
ATSI, (with no change in the IER and no change in the percentage of the population that 
has non-admitted out-of-pocket costs) the predicted DEA Allocative Efficiency Score is 
expected to decrease by 1.53%; and 
 For every additional unit of increase in a DMU’s percentage of the population that paid 
Out-of-pocket Costs (with no change in the IER and no change and no change in the 
percentage of the population that is ATSI), the predicted DEA Allocative Efficiency Score 
is expected to decrease by 0.46%. 
 
The predicted allocative efficiency scores of each DMU (SA3) calculated using equation 21 are 
presented in Table 27.  Table 27 also provides the corresponding measured DEA Allocative Efficiency 
scores for comparison.  A summary of the top and bottom five predicted scores and the DEA scores 
is provided in Table 28.   
 
The predicted allocative efficiency scores and rankings of these scores for the DMUs are to be 
expected to be different from the DEA Allocative Efficiency scores.  This is because both are 
calculated differently: the predicted scores are generated from a regression of expressed needs, the 
social determinants found to give rise to the allocative efficiency of desirable health status as 
measured by the DEA allocative efficiency scores; and the DEA allocative efficiency scores are the 
measured weighted ratio of desirable populations’ health status output relative to populations’ 
resourcing inputs.  Furthermore, the regression modelling does not predict all the variation in the 
DEA scores, with the preferred model predicting 63.3%.  However, because the social determinants 
that influence the DEA scores in the regression are demonstrated in the literature to also give rise to 
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the health status and health outcomes at the population level used in the DEA, it is reasonable to 
expect that results of the regression predicted scores are somewhat indicative of the DEA measured 
scores and vice versa.  The results in tables 27 and 28 illustrate that this is indeed the case.  This 
result validates the HORSt methodology.    
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Table 27   Predicted Allocative Efficiency Scores derived from the regression equation  
 
Table continues over.















10101 Goulburn – Yass 1007 3.02% 58.4% 83.52 70.21
10102 Queanbeyan 1059 3.02% 68.3% 92.09 90.70
10103 Snowy Mountains 999 2.39% 60.9% 84.95 100.00
10104 South Coast 976 4.69% 62.4% 80.32 74.26
10201 Gosford 1014 2.58% 56.0% 83.66 88.79
10202 Wyong 986 4.28% 50.0% 76.10 76.12
10301 Bathurst 995 4.81% 50.8% 76.34 93.90
10302 Lachlan Valley 968 9.21% 47.3% 65.94 70.09
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 972 4.98% 46.5% 72.35 82.64
10304 Orange 1001 5.40% 56.2% 78.39 79.25
10401 Clarence Valley 953 6.67% 61.5% 75.12 63.83
10402 Coffs Harbour 974 4.59% 53.6% 76.31 70.66
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 916 29.45% 27.7% 22.03 11.13
10502 Broken Hill and Far West 917 12.04% 25.9% 47.94 69.12
10503 Dubbo 976 16.15% 46.7% 55.64 67.60
10601 Lower Hunter 988 5.04% 50.7% 75.42 74.07
10602 Maitland 1010 3.82% 60.8% 83.59 71.63
10603 Port Stephens 999 4.17% 51.2% 77.82 86.04
10604 Upper Hunter 983 5.49% 52.3% 75.10 73.46
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla 977 3.20% 39.2% 72.20 63.19
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour 1016 3.05% 44.3% 77.79 73.85
10704 Wollongong 989 2.00% 52.9% 81.14 74.99
10801 Great Lakes 956 4.57% 60.0% 77.88 84.86
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 935 11.05% 46.4% 60.17 55.74
10804 Port Macquarie 985 3.85% 50.0% 76.71 81.65
10805 Taree - Gloucester 951 6.16% 59.3% 74.75 78.52
10901 Albury 969 2.62% 61.9% 82.73 81.88
10902 Lower Murray 974 9.57% 48.3% 66.28 71.53
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury 980 2.74% 64.1% 84.37 75.46
11001 Armidale 970 7.38% 58.6% 73.99 85.06
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield 948 7.44% 54.6% 70.38 70.59
11003 Moree - Narrabri 959 19.04% 52.9% 52.71 70.94
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah 977 10.52% 61.6% 71.16 67.49
11101 Lake Macquarie - East 1005 3.04% 58.8% 83.47 88.86
11102 Lake Macquarie - West 1004 4.05% 51.6% 78.60 81.92
11103 Newcastle 966 3.15% 61.6% 81.59 78.25
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal 993 3.04% 64.8% 85.29 93.99
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland 954 6.11% 61.6% 76.04 70.83
11203 Tweed Valley 985 4.02% 52.1% 77.38 85.25
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West) 974 6.79% 57.3% 74.68 61.64
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 978 4.62% 44.7% 72.55 60.71
11303 Wagga Wagga 989 5.00% 59.3% 79.48 62.71
11401 Shoalhaven 982 5.50% 56.6% 76.90 75.61
























11501 Baulkham Hills 1128 0.34% 50.5% 93.49 97.34
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 1137 0.60% 58.5% 97.45 96.23
11503 Hawkesbury 1109 2.03% 51.0% 89.62 86.68
11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill 1155 1.01% 43.3% 91.29 88.47
11601 Blacktown 989 2.32% 27.7% 69.25 61.64
11602 Blacktown - North 1118 1.57% 34.8% 83.66 80.93
11603 Mount Druitt 952 5.37% 18.5% 57.47 15.08
11701 Botany 968 1.85% 40.8% 74.25 79.35
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham 979 1.91% 47.9% 78.28 76.76
11703 Sydney Inner City 885 1.66% 53.9% 73.97 68.99
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North 1031 0.39% 68.9% 94.20 91.30
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South 984 1.73% 52.1% 80.80 85.33
11901 Bankstown 971 0.92% 32.2% 72.04 73.61
11902 Canterbury 943 0.55% 28.8% 68.85 70.73
11903 Hurstville 992 0.70% 42.4% 78.62 87.03
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale 977 0.63% 40.0% 76.46 81.25
12001 Canada Bay 1026 0.45% 51.9% 85.98 95.21
12002 Leichhardt 1042 1.19% 63.1% 91.14 86.31
12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield 966 0.68% 38.2% 74.74 87.74
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove 1048 0.24% 60.1% 91.70 96.86
12102 Hornsby 1065 0.51% 54.8% 90.28 94.19
12103 Ku-ring-gai 1110 0.09% 67.1% 100.00 100.00
12104 North Sydney - Mosman 1026 0.22% 76.2% 100.00 91.98
12201 Manly 1077 0.34% 73.6% 99.97 94.41
12202 Pittwater 1074 0.15% 72.7% 99.63 98.83
12203 Warringah 1090 0.49% 64.4% 96.57 93.98
12301 Camden 1101 2.32% 44.7% 85.70 89.36
12302 Campbelltown (NSW) 978 3.80% 29.0% 66.67 62.53
12303 Wollondilly 1089 2.86% 41.0% 82.26 89.12
12401 Blue Mountains 1039 2.06% 54.2% 85.54 85.22
12403 Penrith 1025 2.83% 35.2% 74.68 75.39
12404 Richmond - Windsor 1012 4.38% 48.1% 77.14 46.39
12405 St Marys 989 3.74% 25.7% 66.20 60.83
12501 Auburn 931 0.72% 23.3% 65.16 73.35
12502 Carlingford 1024 0.78% 38.8% 79.37 86.38
12503 Merrylands - Guildford 946 0.96% 25.4% 66.93 65.85
12504 Parramatta 964 0.98% 32.3% 71.38 73.61
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 1077 0.29% 51.4% 89.99 100.00
12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill 1019 0.39% 48.9% 84.13 91.96
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley 1024 0.00% 30.1% 76.61 76.34
12702 Fairfield 949 0.81% 26.7% 67.97 75.83
12703 Liverpool 994 1.55% 30.4% 72.03 68.07
12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah 1067 0.95% 57.6% 91.04 96.23
12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote 1101 0.91% 58.3% 94.00 91.13
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The results indicate that the DMUs (SA3s) of 12103 Ku-ring-gai and 12104 North Sydney – Mosman 
have efficient predicted scores of 100.00.  These two DMUs had DEA Allocative Efficiency scores 
ranked 4th and 15th.  These two populations represent the benchmarked level of predicted 
maximised allocative efficiency subject to social determinants of the population.   
 
The 3rd, 4th and 5th ranked predicted allocative efficiency scores were 12201 Manly (99.97), 12202 
Pittwater (99.63) and 11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry (97.45) which had DEA Allocative Efficiency 
scores of 94.41 (10th), 96.23 (rank 7th) and 93.98 (rank 4th) respectively.   In summary, the top five 
ranked predicted allocative efficiency scoring DMUs featured in the top 15 for DEA Allocative 
Efficiency Scores.   
 
The bottom 5 predicted allocative efficiency scores feature the two DMUs with the lowest 
corresponding DEA Allocative Efficiency scores: 10501 Bourke – Cobar –Coonamble and 11603 
Mount Druitt.  Of the bottom five Mount Druitt is the only metropolitan area, the others being rural 




6.3  VERTICAL EQUITY LOADINGS AND HEALTH NEED INDICES 
Using the methodology and equations outlined in section 4.5 (page 129), need indices were 
calculated for each SA3s using the ratio of the predicted benchmark allocative efficiency score (100) 
to each predicted allocative efficiency scores for each SA3.  The results are shown in Table 29. 
Table 29   HORSt need indices for each SA3 population in NSW 
 
DMUs / SA3s Code and Name
SA3 HORSt 
Need index DMUs / SA3s Code and Name
SA3 HORSt 
Need index
10101 Goulburn – Yass 119.74 11501 Baulkham Hills 106.97
10102 Queanbeyan 108.59 11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 102.61
10103 Snowy Mountains 117.71 11503 Hawkesbury 111.59
10104 South Coast 124.50 11504 Rouse Hill - McGraths Hill 109.54
10201 Gosford 119.53 11601 Blacktown 144.41
10202 Wyong 131.40 11602 Blacktown - North 119.53
10301 Bathurst 130.99 11603 Mount Druitt 174.02
10302 Lachlan Valley 151.64 11701 Botany 134.68
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 138.22 11702 Marrickville - Sydenham - Petersham 127.74
10304 Orange 127.57 11703 Sydney Inner City 135.19
10401 Clarence Valley 133.13 11801 Eastern Suburbs - North 106.16
10402 Coffs Harbour 131.04 11802 Eastern Suburbs - South 123.77
10501 Bourke - Cobar - Coonamble 454.02 11901 Bankstown 138.81
10502 Broken Hill and Far West 208.58 11902 Canterbury 145.23
10503 Dubbo 179.72 11903 Hurstville 127.19
10601 Lower Hunter 132.59 11904 Kogarah - Rockdale 130.79
10602 Maitland 119.63 12001 Canada Bay 116.30
10603 Port Stephens 128.51 12002 Leichhardt 109.72
10604 Upper Hunter 133.16 12003 Strathfield - Burwood - Ashfield 133.79
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla 138.50 12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove 109.05
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour 128.55 12102 Hornsby 110.77
10704 Wollongong 123.24 12103 Ku-ring-gai 100.00
10801 Great Lakes 128.41 12104 North Sydney - Mosman 100.00
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 166.18 12201 Manly 100.03
10804 Port Macquarie 130.35 12202 Pittwater 100.37
10805 Taree - Gloucester 133.79 12203 Warringah 103.55
10901 Albury 120.88 12301 Camden 116.68
10902 Lower Murray 150.88 12302 Campbelltown (NSW) 149.98
10903 Upper Murray exc. Albury 118.52 12303 Wollondilly 121.57
11001 Armidale 135.15 12401 Blue Mountains 116.91
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield 142.09 12403 Penrith 133.90
11003 Moree - Narrabri 189.72 12404 Richmond - Windsor 129.63
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah 140.52 12405 St Marys 151.05
11101 Lake Macquarie - East 119.81 12501 Auburn 153.48
11102 Lake Macquarie - West 127.23 12502 Carlingford 125.99
11103 Newcastle 122.57 12503 Merrylands - Guildford 149.41
11201 Richmond Valley - Coastal 117.25 12504 Parramatta 140.09
11202 Richmond Valley - Hinterland 131.50 12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 111.12
11203 Tweed Valley 129.22 12602 Ryde - Hunters Hill 118.87
11301 Griffith - Murrumbidgee (West) 133.91 12701 Bringelly - Green Valley 130.53
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 137.83 12702 Fairfield 147.12
11303 Wagga Wagga 125.82 12703 Liverpool 138.83
11401 Shoalhaven 130.04 12801 Cronulla - Miranda - Caringbah 109.85
11402 Southern Highlands 111.82 12802 Sutherland - Menai - Heathcote 106.38
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The need indices represent vertical equity loadings, representing each SA3 populations’ capacity to 
benefit given their social determinants that give rise to their ability to efficiently achieve desirable 
health outcomes (approximated by health status) with respect to the MBS, PBS and state health 
provided tax payer resource inputs across the continuum of care.   
 
The SA3 HORSt Needs Indices were then apportioned to each LHN so as to inform each LHNs need 
index.  A summary of the LHN HORSt need indices is provided in Table 30 below.  A breakdown of 
the construction of these LHN need indices with the supporting calculations that were outlined in 
the methodology section 4.5 is provided in Table 31.   
 
Table 30   Summary of the HORSt LHN Need Indices for all NSW LHNs 
 
 
LHD LHD HORSt Need Index
Central Coast 125.27
Far West 190.93
Hunter New England 129.97
Illawarra Shoalhaven 129.09
Mid North Coast 138.74
Murrumbidgee 126.11
Nepean Blue Mountains 130.50
Northern NSW 127.20
Northern Sydney 106.55
South Eastern Sydney 122.39







Table 31   HORSt need indices for each NSW LHN 
 
Table continues over. 
A B C  = A x B
D = C / Total of C  for LHN 
(Total of SA3s populations 
in the LHN)
H
LHN HNI = the sum 
of (H x D) for each 
SA3 in the LHN
10201 Gosford 100.00% 173,257 173,257 51.67% 119.53 61.76
10202 Wyong 100.00% 162,052 162,052 48.33% 131.40 63.50
335,309 100.00%
Central Coast HORSt 
Need Index
125.27
10502 Broken Hill and Far West 100.00% 20,598 20,598 69.42% 208.58 144.79
10902 Lower Murray 71.24% 12,737 9,074 30.58% 150.88 46.14
29,672 100.00%
Far West HORSt 
Need Index
190.93
10601 Lower Hunter 100.00% 89,621 89,621 9.82% 132.59 13.02
10602 Maitland 100.00% 76,134 76,134 8.34% 119.63 9.98
10603 Port Stephens 100.00% 73,036 73,036 8.01% 128.51 10.29
10604 Upper Hunter 100.00% 30,877 30,877 3.38% 133.16 4.51
10801 Great Lakes 100.00% 31,895 31,895 3.50% 128.41 4.49
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 0.12% 49,005 57 0.01% 166.18 0.01
10804 Port Macquarie 0.02% 79,929 14 0.00% 130.35 0.00
10805 Taree - Gloucester 100.00% 54,761 54,761 6.00% 133.79 8.03
11001 Armidale 100.00% 38,098 38,098 4.18% 135.15 5.64
11002 Inverell - Tenterfield 100.00% 38,858 38,858 4.26% 142.09 6.05
11003 Moree - Narrabri 100.00% 26,452 26,452 2.90% 189.72 5.50
11004 Tamworth - Gunnedah 100.00% 82,379 82,379 9.03% 140.52 12.69
11101 Lake Macquarie - East 100.00% 123,536 123,536 13.54% 119.81 16.22
11102 Lake Macquarie - West 100.00% 77,075 77,075 8.45% 127.23 10.75
11103 Newcastle 100.00% 169,571 169,571 18.59% 122.57 22.78
912,364 100.00%
Hunter New England 
HORSt Need Index
129.97
10104 South Coast 0.28% 72,073 200 0.05% 124.50 0.06
10701 Dapto - Port Kembla 100.00% 77,934 77,934 19.22% 138.50 26.61
10703 Kiama - Shellharbour 100.00% 92,470 92,470 22.80% 128.55 29.31
10704 Wollongong 99.98% 133,292 133,263 32.86% 123.24 40.50
11401 Shoalhaven 100.00% 101,617 101,617 25.06% 130.04 32.58





10402 Coffs Harbour 99.48% 87,943 87,482 40.44% 131.04 52.99
10802 Kempsey - Nambucca 99.88% 49,005 48,948 22.62% 166.18 37.60
10804 Port Macquarie 99.98% 79,929 79,915 36.94% 130.35 48.15
216,345 100.00%
Mid North Coast 
HORSt Need Index
138.74
10101 Goulburn – Yass 26.89% 73,003 19,627 6.67% 119.74 7.99
10302 Lachlan Valley 10.61% 56,416 5,985 2.03% 151.64 3.09
10901 Albury 100.00% 62,504 62,504 21.25% 120.88 25.69
10902 Lower Murray 28.76% 12,737 3,663 1.25% 150.88 1.88








11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 99.99% 14,686 14,685 4.99% 137.83 6.88





10301 Bathurst 0.04% 47,783 17 0.00% 130.99 0.01
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 45.88% 47,572 21,826 5.93% 138.22 8.20
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 0.34% 27,076 92 0.02% 102.61 0.03
11503 Hawkesbury 100.00% 25,165 25,165 6.84% 111.59 7.64




12401 Blue Mountains 100.00% 78,496 78,496 21.34% 116.91 24.95
12403 Penrith 95.28% 143,452 136,683 37.17% 133.90 49.77
12404 Richmond - Windsor 100.00% 37,469 37,469 10.19% 129.63 13.21
12405 St Marys 100.00% 55,427 55,427 15.07% 151.05 22.77

















SA3 code and name with LHNLHN
Population 
share of SA3 










SA3 population proportion in 
the LHN  = Each SA3 
population in the LHN / Total 
of SA3s populations in the 
LHN
HORSt need index of 
each SA3 in the LHN
HORSt Need Index 
of each SA3 x SA3 
pop proportion that 
makes up the LHN
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Table 31 continued. 
 
Table continues over
A B C  = A x B
D = C / Total of C  for LHN 
(Total of SA3s populations 
in the LHN)
H
LHN HNI = the sum 
of (H x D) for each 
SA3 in the LHN
10401 Clarence Valley 100.00% 50,961 50,961 17.18% 133.13 22.87
10402 Coffs Harbour 0.52% 87,943 461 0.16% 131.04 0.20








11203 Tweed Valley 100.00% 93,458 93,458 31.51% 129.22 40.72
296,586 100.00%
Northern NSW HORSt 
Need Index
127.20
11501 Baulkham Hills 18.43% 148,761 27,413 2.99% 106.97 3.19
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 49.02% 27,076 13,273 1.45% 102.61 1.48
12101 Chatswood - Lane Cove 100.00% 117,824 117,824 12.83% 109.05 14.00
12102 Hornsby 100.00% 83,456 83,456 9.09% 110.77 10.07
12103 Ku-ring-gai 100.00% 123,474 123,474 13.45% 100.00 13.45
12104 North Sydney - Mosman 100.00% 100,152 100,152 10.91% 100.00 10.91
12201 Manly 100.00% 44,994 44,994 4.90% 100.03 4.90
12202 Pittwater 100.00% 63,504 63,504 6.92% 100.37 6.94
12203 Warringah 100.00% 157,846 157,846 17.19% 103.55 17.80
12502 Carlingford 10.45% 68,864 7,196 0.78% 125.99 0.99
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 84.39% 49,288 41,594 4.53% 111.12 5.03





11701 Botany 100.00% 49,169 49,169 4.69% 134.68 6.32




11703 Sydney Inner City 94.36% 230,326 217,330 20.73% 135.19 28.03
11801 Eastern Suburbs - North 100.00% 136,152 136,152 12.99% 106.16 13.79
11802 Eastern Suburbs - South 100.00% 149,266 149,266 14.24% 123.77 17.63
11903 Hurstville 93.89% 132,733 124,619 11.89% 127.19 15.12
11904 Kogarah - Rockdale 100.00% 145,493 145,493 13.88% 130.79 18.15
12703 Liverpool 0.57% 122,238 694 0.07% 138.83 0.09









South Eastern Sydney 
HORSt Need Index
122.39
10704 Wollongong 0.02% 133,292 29 0.00% 123.24 0.00
11402 Southern Highlands 99.85% 49,059 48,987 5.07% 111.82 5.67
11901 Bankstown 99.09% 178,409 176,784 18.30% 138.81 25.40
11902 Canterbury 5.84% 141,819 8,289 0.86% 145.23 1.25
12301 Camden 100.00% 64,212 64,212 6.65% 116.68 7.76
12302 Campbelltown (NSW) 100.00% 162,845 162,845 16.86% 149.98 25.28
12303 Wollondilly 100.00% 42,215 42,215 4.37% 121.57 5.31
12403 Penrith 4.72% 143,452 6,769 0.70% 133.90 0.94
12501 Auburn 0.91% 94,077 853 0.09% 153.48 0.14
12503 Merrylands - Guildford 22.72% 157,512 35,793 3.71% 149.41 5.54
12701 Bringelly - Green Valley 100.00% 106,378 106,378 11.01% 130.53 14.37
12702 Fairfield 99.06% 193,076 191,269 19.80% 147.12 29.13
12703 Liverpool 99.43% 122,238 121,544 12.58% 138.83 17.47
965,968 100.00%
South Western 
Sydney HORSt Need 
Index
138.26
SA3 population proportion in 
the LHN  = Each SA3 
population in the LHN / Total 
of SA3s populations in the 
LHN
HORSt need index of 
each SA3 in the LHN
HORSt Need Index 
of each SA3 x SA3 
pop proportion that 
makes up the LHN
Calculation 
LHN SA3 code and name with LHN
Population 
share of SA3 





















Table 31 continued. 
 
 
Table 31 demonstrates that there can be quite a lot of intra-LHN variation in the health needs 
expressed by the individual SA3 populations’ HORSt need indices.  For example, as discussed on 
pages 190 and 196, the SA3 11603 - Mount Druitt, experiences very high public hospital usage, very 
low MBS and PBS usage, has some of NSW’s poorest health outcomes.  Mount Druitt’s population 
faces significant socioeconomic barriers to the achievement of good health outcomes.  It has a 
HORSt need index of 174.02 (74% higher than the benchmark SA3 populations within Northern 
Sydney) and represents 12.2% of the Western Sydney LHN population.  The SA3 11501 - Baulkham 
Hills is a similar sized population portion of this LHN (12.9%).  It has far better outcomes and its 
A B C  = A x B
D = C / Total of C  for LHN 
(Total of SA3s populations 
in the LHN)
H
LHN HNI = the sum 
of (H x D) for each 
SA3 in the LHN
10101 Goulburn – Yass 73.11% 73,003 53,376 26.11% 119.74 31.26
10102 Queanbeyan 100.00% 59,472 59,472 29.09% 108.59 31.59
10103 Snowy Mountains 100.00% 19,740 19,740 9.65% 117.71 11.36
10104 South Coast 99.72% 72,073 71,873 35.15% 124.50 43.76
11302 Tumut - Tumbarumba 0.01% 14,686 1 0.00% 137.83 0.00
204,462 100.00%
Southern NSW HORSt 
Need Index
117.97
11702 Marrickville - Sydenham 
- Petersham 99.96% 57,574 57,552 11.02% 127.74 14.08
11703 Sydney Inner City 5.64% 230,326 12,996 2.49% 135.19 3.37
11901 Bankstown 0.91% 178,409 1,625 0.31% 138.81 0.43
11902 Canterbury 94.16% 141,819 133,530 25.58% 145.23 37.15
11903 Hurstville 6.11% 132,733 8,114 1.55% 127.19 1.98
12001 Canada Bay 100.00% 89,595 89,595 17.16% 116.30 19.96
12002 Leichhardt 100.00% 59,540 59,540 11.40% 109.72 12.5112003 Strathfield - Burwood - 
Ashfield 100.00% 159,133 159,133 30.48% 133.79 40.78
522,084 100.00%
Sydney HORSt Need 
Index
130.25
10301 Bathurst 99.96% 47,783 47,766 17.11% 130.99 22.42
10302 Lachlan Valley 89.39% 56,416 50,431 18.07% 151.64 27.40
10303 Lithgow - Mudgee 54.12% 47,572 25,746 9.22% 138.22 12.75
10304 Orange 100.00% 58,991 58,991 21.13% 127.57 26.96




10503 Dubbo 100.00% 71,138 71,138 25.49% 179.72 45.80
279,131 100.00%
Western NSW HORSt 
Need Index
176.08
11501 Baulkham Hills 81.57% 148,761 121,348 12.86% 106.97 13.76
11502 Dural - Wisemans Ferry 50.64% 27,076 13,711 1.45% 102.61 1.49




11601 Blacktown 100.00% 139,391 139,391 14.78% 144.41 21.34
11602 Blacktown - North 100.00% 95,745 95,745 10.15% 119.53 12.13
11603 Mount Druitt 100.00% 115,220 115,220 12.21% 174.02 21.26
12501 Auburn 99.09% 94,077 93,224 9.88% 153.48 15.17
12502 Carlingford 89.55% 68,864 61,668 6.54% 125.99 8.24
12503 Merrylands - Guildford 77.28% 157,512 121,719 12.90% 149.41 19.28
12504 Parramatta 100.00% 146,708 146,708 15.55% 140.09 21.79
12601 Pennant Hills - Epping 15.61% 49,288 7,694 0.82% 111.12 0.91





SA3 population proportion in 
the LHN  = Each SA3 
population in the LHN / Total 
of SA3s populations in the 
LHN
HORSt need index of 
each SA3 in the LHN
HORSt Need Index 
of each SA3 x SA3 
pop proportion that 
makes up the LHN
Southern NSW
Sydney
LHN SA3 code and name with LHN
Population 
share of SA3 
















population has more advantageous socioeconomic status.  It has a HORSt need index just 6% higher 
than the benchmark.  The variations at the intra–LHN level demonstrates the importance of 
calculating needs for smaller geographical structures below the LHN level and building these up to 
LHN based needs indices.  States wishing to adopt the HORSt as an outcomes-based commissioning 
tool should endeavour to consider the variation in needs at smaller population levels.  This may 
assist with more strategically targeted commissioning amongst LHNs and also within LHNs to address 
specific levels of needs.  The intra-LHN variation also helps explain final needs based shares of 
funding at the LHN level across the state.   
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6.4  LOCAL HEALTH DISTRICTS SHARE OF FUNDING UNDER THE HORSt 
To inform state health resource distribution to NSW LHNs, the HORSt LHN shares are applied to the 
LHN’s population as a needs adjusted population and then this inflated needs adjusted population is 
normalised proportionally back to the NSW State population.  The methodology for doing so was 
outlined in section 4.5, and a worked example was provided in table7 page 132).  The results are 
provided in Table 32 below which show the HORSt needs adjusted share of resources.   
 
Table 32   HORSt LHN needs adjusted share of resources 
 
 
Table 33 applies the same methodology used with the HORSt in Table 32 to the last published 
version of the NSW EHUIs Acute need index (Health Policy Analysis 2014a, 2014b; Marshall & Slater 
2015) to show that if the EHUIs were used with the 2016 Census what each LHNs EHUIs based share 
of resources would be compared to that of the HORSt.  The results are somewhat similar shares of 
resources and given that both the EHUIs and HORSt are primarily made up from social determinants 
that give rise to health needs (albeit that the health needs are assessed very differently) one would 
expect that the differences in shares of resources would not be too vast.  
LHN HORSt Need index 
LHN population 
2016 census
HORSt need adjusted 
population




pop to 2016 
census 
= (HORSt need 
adjusted 
population / 
total NSW HORSt 
need adjusted 
population) x 







pop for each 
LHN / total NSW 
pop
Central Coast 125.27 335,309 420,025 324,075 4.19%
Far West 190.93 29,672 56,654 43,712 0.56%
Hunter New England 129.97 912,364 1,185,774 914,897 11.82%
Illawarra Shoalhaven 129.09 405,555 523,518 403,926 5.22%
Mid North Coast 138.74 216,345 300,151 231,585 2.99%
Murrumbidgee 126.11 294,114 370,895 286,168 3.70%
Nepean Blue Mountains 130.50 367,767 479,929 370,295 4.78%
Northern NSW 127.20 296,586 377,257 291,077 3.76%
Northern Sydney 106.55 918,056 978,220 754,756 9.75%
South Eastern Sydney 122.39 1,048,585 1,283,361 990,192 12.79%
South Western Sydney 138.26 965,968 1,335,562 1,030,468 13.31%
Southern NSW 117.97 204,462 241,212 186,109 2.40%
Sydney 130.25 522,084 680,033 524,687 6.78%
Western NSW 176.08 279,131 491,507 379,228 4.90%
Western Sydney 138.51 943,267 1,306,559 1,008,090 13.03%




Table 33   Acute EHUIs needs-based share of resources  
 
EHUI Source: (Health Policy Analysis 2014a, 2014b; Marshall & Slater 2015). 
6.4.1  Resource allocation funding adjustments to maximise equity of health funding 
across the continuum of care 
The HORSt represents health needs in the context of social determinants that underpin populations’ 
capacity to benefit.  Health funding equity can be maximised when financial adjustments are made 
in alignment with each LHNs proportional health needs so as to provide a financial opportunity of 
populations to benefit.  As outlined in the methodology and the core aims for this study, the HORSt 
identifies the quantum of funding adjustments from the current pool of resources across the 
continuum of care that is required to maximise equity of health funding.  Given that the state cannot 
control the Commonwealth contribution of spending in the private sector, represented in the study 
by MBS and PBS expenditure, the adjustments are a residual adjustment applied to state health 
funding, after the total pool of resources for populations including the MBS and PBS Commonwealth 
subsidisation is considered.  Table 34 (page 229), as per the methodology outlined in section 4.5.1 
(page 134) shows these results.   
 
Table 34 demonstrates the results of the HORSt for 2015-16.  This provides each LHN populations’ 





EHUI need adjusted 
population 




pop to 2016 
census 
= (EHUI need 
adjusted 
population / 
total NSW EHUI 
need adjusted 
population) x 








pop for each 






Central Coast 107.69 335,309 361,104 361,814 4.68% 4.19%
Far West 129.81 30,084 39,052 39,128 0.51% 0.56%
Hunter New England 108.29 912,364 987,959 989,903 12.79% 11.82%
Illawarra Shoalhaven 102.94 405,555 417,468 418,290 5.40% 5.22%
Mid North Coast 111.09 216,345 240,333 240,806 3.11% 2.99%
Murrumbidgee 113.77 294,114 334,626 335,284 4.33% 3.70%
Nepean Blue Mountains 103.31 367,767 379,943 380,691 4.92% 4.78%
Northern NSW 106.76 296,586 316,647 317,270 4.10% 3.76%
Northern Sydney 85.19 918,056 782,101 783,639 10.13% 9.75%
South Eastern Sydney 89.90 1,048,173 942,257 944,111 12.20% 12.79%
South Western Sydney 102.29 965,977 988,051 989,995 12.79% 13.31%
Southern NSW 101.51 204,462 207,550 207,959 2.69% 2.40%
Sydney 92.64 522,084 483,634 484,586 6.26% 6.78%
Western NSW 122.51 279,131 341,967 342,640 4.43% 4.90%
Western Sydney 95.56 943,267 901,385 903,158 11.67% 13.03%
Total 7,739,274 7,724,077 7,739,274 100.00% 100.00%
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This is the total pool of included taxpayer resources in the study and the focus of the HORSt for 
maximising needs-based equity for populations’ share of these resources.  
 
The public hospital costs in the pool are the dollar value of the total NWAUs for the clinical streams 
of Acute, Emergency Department, Sub Acute and Non-Acute Services, Acute Mental Health and Non-
admitted services by LHN of residence for that year multiplied by the state price.  In 2015-16 
according to the NSW Health Activity Based Management (ABM) portal there was 2,467,947 NWAUs 
across these streams  (NSW ABF Taskforce 2019).  The 2015-16 NSW state price per NWAU was 
$4,569 (ABF Taskforce 2016, p. 22).   
 
The total pool of resources included in this study for 2015-16 MBS, PBS and State Public Hospital 
costs is $22.2 billion.  Each LHN populations share of this resource pool is calculated and then 
compared to the HORSt’s health needs share of these resources.  The difference between the shares 
represents the quantum of vertical equity adjustments, a residual adjustment that the state can 
make to align the HORSt so health funding equity can be maximised with respect to the total pool of 
resources and the underlying population health needs.  Note that that column C in Table 34, the 




Table 34   Quantum of funding adjustments and shares of funding required for maximising health funding equity 
 
Sources: MBS and PBS purchased data (Department of Human Services 2017); NWAUS – NSW ABM Portal Quick Report by LHN of Residence (NSW ABF 
Taskforce 2019). 























2015-16 Share of 
Total Resources 






















from resource pool 
shares
$Mil
Central Coast $360 $187 $737 $1,284 5.48% 4.19% $981 -$303
Far West $29 $17 $79 $125 0.53% 0.56% $132 $8
Hunter New England $856 $470 $1,713 $3,040 12.98% 11.82% $2,768 -$271
Illawarra Shoalhaven $425 $210 $836 $1,471 6.28% 5.22% $1,222 -$249
Mid North Coast $239 $138 $519 $897 3.83% 2.99% $701 -$196
Murrumbidgee $264 $144 $415 $824 3.52% 3.70% $866 $42
Nepean Blue Mountains $349 $150 $600 $1,099 4.69% 4.78% $1,120 $21
Northern NSW $311 $175 $570 $1,056 4.51% 3.76% $881 -$175
Northern Sydney $878 $332 $1,076 $2,286 9.76% 9.75% $2,284 -$3
South Eastern Sydney $960 $458 $1,252 $2,670 11.40% 12.79% $2,996 $326
South Western Sydney $936 $437 $1,540 $2,913 12.44% 13.31% $3,118 $205
Southern NSW $160 $108 $331 $599 2.56% 2.40% $563 -$36
Sydney $479 $217 $894 $1,590 6.79% 6.78% $1,588 -$3
Western NSW $248 $136 $564 $947 4.05% 4.90% $1,147 $200
Western Sydney $894 $346 $1,376 $2,616 11.17% 13.03% $3,050 $434
Total $7,389 $3,524 $12,503 $23,417 100.00% 100.00% $23,417 $0
2015-16 Resource Pool HORSt share and Quantum of adjustments 
LHN
𝐸 = 
𝐿𝐻𝑁 𝑠  𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐷
Σ 𝐷 𝐻𝑆 = 𝐻 𝑥  Σ 𝐷 
𝑅 = 𝐻𝑆 −  𝐷 
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6.5  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented and discussed the results for the HORSt.  A summary of the results are as 
follows. 
 
The HORSt DEA produces meaningful results for each region’s measured allocative efficiency of 
health outcomes relative to the use of MBS, PBS and state health resources.  The findings from the 
regression stage successfully predict the measured allocative efficiency of the DEA, indicating that 
the most advantageous and disadvantageous social determinants give rise to the best and worst 
levels of allocative efficiency of health outcomes 
 
The results demonstrate that populations’ ability to achieve allocative efficiency in the production of 
desirable health status is affected by: 
 Socioeconomic status, measured by the SEIFA index IER (index of economic resources); 
 The proportion of the population that is indigenous; 
 The proportion of the population that has an ability to pay out-of-pocket costs.  
These three attributes were found to explain in the regression 63.3% of the variation in the DEA 
allocative efficiency scores.  These results are in complete congruence with the findings of the 
literature, that social determinants are the single largest barrier to achieving health outcomes. 
 
Weighting the DEA predicted scores for each LHN population to inform the HORSt shares of 
resourcing finds that the proportional shares for each LHN are somewhat similar to that of the EHUI, 
a need index derived from acute hospital utilisation as proxy of need.  The application however of 
the HORSt to the pool of resources spanning Commonwealth and State funding does indicate 
adjustments that could be made, prior to adjusting for patient flows, to improve funding equity.  The 




CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSIONS  
7.0  INTRODUCTION 
This concluding chapter begins by demonstrating that the study’s findings achieve all the aims and 
research questions.  Throughout the chapter, the study findings are contextualised to the literature 
review and conceptual framework. 
 
Reflections of the study’s aims, methods and results are then discussed.  The strengths and 
limitations of the research are examined.  The unique and significant contributions of the research 
are revisited.  Operationalising the HORSt for resource distribution is outlined. 
 
Commentary of the applicability of the HORSt beyond establishing needs-based shares of state 
health resources is then provided.  Finally, recommendations for the implementation of future 
policies in similar settings are outlined. 
 
7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS - ADDRESSING THE STUDY’S AIMS AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
The study’s findings achieve the aims of the study and the research questions.  These are now 
presented in three subsections for each of the aims.  
7.1.1 - Satisfying aim 1 of the study 
Aim 1 - Develop the HORSt as a parsimonious, measurable and consistent benchmark of desirable 
health outcomes for states’ LHNs’ populations, relative to funding inputs across the continuum of 
care, so as to promote allocative efficiency and equity across populations. 
 
The HORSt results outlined in the previous chapter demonstrate that the underlying methodology 
for the HORSt achieves the first aim of the study completely.  The HORSt benchmark is parsimonious, 
representing a metric of the best outcomes for the resource mix of health service inputs at a macro 
level for populations.  The HORSt DEA results for each population in comparison to the benchmark 
validate the aims for the development of the instrument.  Populations experiencing poorer health 
are found to have low levels of allocative efficiency relative to the benchmark.  These results are 
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predicted by social determinants that inhibit better health outcomes.  The reverse is also evident in 
the results for populations that have the best population health status, having far fewer social 
barriers to the achievement of health outcomes and therefore being able to achieve greater 
allocative efficiency from the mix of health services resource they consume.   
 
Research question 1: 
What measures / data of health status can best represent an acceptable level of desirable health 
outcomes for populations that can inform a benchmark? 
 
The population health status data used to approximate health outcomes in the benchmark, the age-
standardised rates of PPHs is a good proxy for the heath per se for the populations.  The use of PPHs 
was justified in the literature review, whereby PPHs reflect poorer health, are statistics that are 
collected routinely by all state health authorities in Australia, reflect three of four of the Bradshaw 
axioms of social need.  Furthermore, addressing these metrics of poor health outcomes are national 
health priorities.   
 
The decision to include PPHs as the outcome variable in the DEA benchmark is validated in the 
results.  The DEA produces meaningful and understandable results, prior to any explanatory 
regression analysis of the social determinants that predict the variations in allocative efficiency 
amongst populations.  The DEA results themselves indicate that communities that face significant 
social barriers to the achievement of good health outcomes, having poor levels of health status in 
their population, had the poorest allocative efficiencies and vice versa.   
 
Age-standardised rates of PPHs are representative of sicker patients and ill health in the population.  
As such, rates of PPHs as a metric of population health status to support the benchmark represent 
better health status when minimised.  Contrastingly the benchmark within an output orientated DEA 
model that seeks to maximise output relative to inputs is established around the most advantageous 
health status.  This situation requires transformation of the PPH metric so that low rates represent 
the output to be maximised.  The transformation supported by established methodology in the DEA 
literature was not practically difficult to achieve and the transformation itself is not conceptually 
difficult to understand within the construction of the benchmark.   
 
Research question 2: 




As supported by the DEA literature presented, it is not necessary to include all of the input variables 
that make up the production function of the outputs (outcomes in the case of the HORSt).  The DEA 
is a relative measure of efficiency for each DMU, relative to all other DMUs and subject to the 
included input and output variables.  However, in order for the HORSt to guide what shares of 
funding ought to be provided by the state subject to the resources applied across the continuum of 
care, a comprehensive set of measurable inputs was sought and included in the HORSt.   
 
The health service funding inputs used within the DEA, being the MBS, PBS and state health 
expenditure (SCRs), representing 62% of total health expenditure in Australia and 92% of total 
governments tax payer funded health expenditure at the time of the study (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare 2017a, pp. 22-30) are the most suitable for inclusion in the DEA calculation of 
the relative allocative efficiency of the desirable low levels of PPHs.  These variables constitute the 
bulk of the mix of resources across the continuum of care.  The literature review in Chapter Two and 
the review of funding and governance arrangements in Chapter Three have identified these funding 
inputs as routinely collectable and accurate.   These inputs across the continuum of care contribute 
to the sensible results obtained by the DEA.   
 
The advantages of the HORSt in considering the majority of resources across the continuum of care 
is that it affords resource allocation decision makers the ability to position the HORSt LHN shares in 
the context of funding for the overall mixed private / public system.  Applying the HORSt to the pool 
of MBS, PBS and state health resources, informs what the state needs to spend to achieve funding 
equity.  The governance and funding of the MBS and PBS, where private medical practitioners act as 
gatekeepers and there is no resource distribution mechanism to promote equity, warrants these 
funding inputs to also be included in the pool of resources.  This makes the HORSt unique compared 
to previous public sector resource allocation models.  Doing so helps determine what the state 
health system share of resource ought to be so as to enable funding equity for improved health 
outcomes with respect to the interactions of health service resources across the continuum of care.  
 
Out-of-pocket costs, identified in Chapter Three as a relatively newly collected metric at the 
population level of the 88 DMUs of the study, have been demonstrated via the literature to be more 
aligned to supernormal rent-seeking profits than a factor of production.  As demonstrated in the 
regression results, this metric is best represented as an explanatory variable in the second stage of 
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the DEA, representing an economic barrier to access, which can affect the allocative efficiency of 
achieving the desirable levels of population health status. 
 
The productive role of PHI was determined in Chapter Three to be difficult to ascertain.  Data 
regarding PHI coverage for the 88 DMUs (ABS SA3 level) is not currently available.  The PHI rebate 
has been demonstrated in the literature examined in Chapter Three to be regressive, exacerbating 
inequities and inefficient.  Furthermore, as an insurance contingency rather than an expended 
resource it remains not suitable for inclusion in the HORSt as an input for the benchmark.   
 
Research question 3: 
What methodology should be applied to derive the benchmark? 
 
Corresponding with the study’s first aim, populations that are allocative efficient in the production of 
desirable health outcomes can serve as benchmark.  Resource distribution can be informed by 
redistributing funding to populations that have poor allocative efficiency compared to the 
benchmark, due to poor social determinants of health that affect allocative efficiency.  Doing so 
represents a funding enabler on the basis of capacity to benefit and is congruent to social justice 
theories by Rawls and Daniels, both of which are as demonstrated in the literature review in Chapter 
Two as palatable approaches to resource distribution by the Australian public.  Both theories are 
also compatible with the goals of Medicare.  
 
The use of DEA to establish the benchmark represents a unique and significant contribution to the 
literature surrounding population needs-based funding models and instruments.  The results for the 
entire NSW population represent a relative measure of the allocative efficiency for each of the 88 
NSW DMUs.   
 
In the context of establishing a benchmark, the methodological literature outlined in Chapter Five 
demonstrates the value of the DEA’s ability to do so as the tool of choice.  The two-stage DEA 
employed allows an empirical measure of the allocative efficiency of desirable health outcomes from 
the mix of key health service inputs to be calculated, whereby the weighting of inputs can be 
determined through optimisation of the relative outputs using linear programming techniques.  The 
latter stage reveals for each population area the social determinants that predict the ability of 
populations to achieve the benchmark and inform the vertical equity adjustments for each LHN to 




7.1.2  Satisfying aim 2 of the study 
Aim 2 - Identify and incorporate measures of local geographical population health needs that can be 
used in resource allocation decisions. 
 
Research question 4:  
What are appropriate measures of population need that could be applied to support the HORSt? 
 
The literature review highlighted that the mainstay methodology for assessing population needs in 
population needs-based instruments was via using utilisation as a proxy for need.  The utilisation 
approach does not require the development of a benchmark.  Placing utilisation on a par with need 
requires a rationale and an explanation as to what predictors of utilisation can inform the potential 
use of the health system.  Such an approach, which largely in the literature has been used as a risk 
capitation model, ignores the interactions of the mix of services across the continuum of care to 
produce favourable health outcomes.   
 
In direct response to the gaps in the literature the HORSt sought a different approach to population 
health needs assessment, via explicitly considering each population’s capacity to benefit from 
resources across the continuum to produce desirable health outcomes.  The distance each 
population is from achieving the benchmark represents their need via their relative capacity to 
benefit.  In the mixed private-public Australian health care sector (described in Chapter One) the 
ever-increasing goal of state health systems are to keep people healthy and out of hospital.  The 
interaction of resources across the continuum of care in this regard cannot be ignored.   
 
For the HORSt, twelve regression models explored a combination of variables that could best explain 
population health needs to be used in resource allocation decisions.  Seven models were eliminated 
due to not meeting the axioms of robust regression.  The results of the DEA regression (Table 25, 
reproduced as Table 35 below) show the 5 models that were found to meet all statistical axioms for 
robust regression.  Population health needs in 4 out of the 5 models (models 1b, 2b, 3b and 4b) were 
best represented by three variables.  These are: 
1. A composite measure of populations’ socioeconomic status; 
2. The proportion of the population that is indigenous; and 
3. The proportion of the population that can pay out-of-pocket costs. 
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Model 1a is the exception because the proportion of the population with disabilities requiring 
assistance “Assisted Needs” constitutes the third variable instead of out-of-pocket costs.  
 
Table 35   HORSt multiple regression model results (from Table 25) 
 
 
The only difference between the four models spanning the same three key areas listed above was 
the type of composite socioeconomic indicator.  The Index of Economic Resources (IER) is the 
composite indicator in the preferred model 3b.  Given that these four models via their r-squared 
results all predict around 60% of the variation in needs these three measures can be relied upon to 
inform the construction of LHN shares and resource allocation.  
 
Whilst there are key differences in how needs are expressed in population needs-based models 
using utilisation as needs and the HORSt, both are guided by the literature to explain needs via 
enumerating how social determinants predict need.  Table 36 shows a comparison of the HORSt and 
EHUI models approaches to informing need indices. 
  
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b
R-square 0.572 0.632 0.620 0.633 0.610
Adjusted R-square 0.557 0.619 0.606 0.620 0.596
IRSD IRSD IRSAD IER IEO
ATSI ATSI ATSI ATSI ATSI
Assisted 
Needs
Out of Pocket 
Costs
Out of Pocket 
Costs
Out of Pocket 
Costs






Table 36   Comparative approach to health needs - HORSt methodology and preferred regression model compared to the 
NSW acute EHUI  
Need 
HORSt EHUI acute 
DEA:  
Output: Transformed age-standardised and casemix 
adjusted rate of PPHs  





Variable for Need 









IEO (quintiles 1 and 2) 








Predicted DEA efficiency score for each DMU 
Expected Utilisation rate 
– used as need index Need indices 
Ratio of: 
𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐸𝐴 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝐸𝐴 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝐷𝑀𝑈 (𝑆𝐴3 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎)
 
= each SA3 population’s capacity to benefit 
Source EHUI: (Health Policy Analysis 2014a, p. 26) 
 
For the EHUI the composite socioeconomic index used as an independent predictor of utilisation was 
the IEO.  However, to fit the model the EHUI developed dummy variables of this index, using quintile 
scores to demarcate the index into 4 groups and then used the upper and lower halves as two 
independent variables.  The other variables used were the ARIA scores; the ATSI population 
proportion; the SMR for persons under 75 years of age (SMR75); the percentage of the population 
over 65 years that is living alone (%LONE65); and the percentage of the population born in a country 
group with higher utilisation rates (%COB_HIGH_UTIL).   
 
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter Two and again in the methodological section 
regarding construct validity, the use of a mortality measure (as per the EHUI) in conjunction with 
other independent variables that predict utilisation in a formative construct is problematic.  The 
other issue with the EHUI regression is that having seven variables to predict need and the division 
of the socioeconomic composite indicator into four dummy variables to then be combined 
effectively back into two, could be consider as overtly complicated, whereby as documented in the 




Of comparative interest between the two regression models approaches to health needs is the 
HORSt regression considered lone person households for inclusion and excluded this as a non-
significant correlation with the DEA Allocative efficiency score (page 198).  This is a nuanced 
difference to that included in the EHUI which was lone person households over 65 years.   
7.1.3 Satisfying aim 3 of the study 
Identify the share and quantum of taxpayer resources provided by the state to geographical 
populations to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care so as to act as an 
enabler to improve equity of health outcomes. 
 
Research question 5:  
What share of funding is required for each geographical population to adjust for population health 
needs so as to maximise equity of health funding across the continuum of care? 
 
The share of funding required to adjust for population health needs to maximise equity of health 
funding across the continuum of care is guided by the regression coefficients for each of the 88 SA3 
level populations in NSW.  As outlined in Chapter Four, literature pertaining to other population 
needs-based resourced distributions formulas guides this methodology.  Once the variables that 
explain the variation in need have been identified through the regression, the coefficients applied to 
the corresponding regression variables for each of the populations derives the predicted allocative 
efficiency scores for each population.   
 
The ratio of the benchmarked allocative efficiency to each population’s predicted score informs the 
population’s need index; their capacity to benefit relative to the benchmark.  Weighting the results 
for each of the SA3’s population proportions in each LHN informs the LHNs need index.  Applying 
each LHNs need index to their populations, calculates a needs adjusted population and normalising 
the sum total of all LHNs needs adjusted populations to the state population derives each LHNs 
share of funds under the HORSt.   
 
The NSW LHNs HORSt shares of funding as portions of funding are summarised in Table 37.  For  
comparison purposes, shares that would be derived under the NSW acute EHUI need indices, if the 
acute EHUI was used for resource distribution are also provided, utilising calculations from Table 33 
(page 227).  Importantly, the application of the EHUIs is not the same as the HORSt.  To reiterate, 
from Chapter One (page 26), the EHUIs is a small component of a range of adjustments applied to 
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historically determined utilisation and population growth and punitive performance adjustments to 
determine the quantity of activity to be funded / purchased in each LHN.  The EHUI does not 
establish resource distribution shares. 
 
EHUI shares shown in Table 37 are therefore only computed as a resource distribution share in this 
research to demonstrate a comparison to the HORSt.  If applied to a traditional resource distribution 
formula these shares would apply only to resources from the state budget.  In contrast, the HORSt 
informs resource distribution amongst LHNs from the state, after considering the Commonwealth 
government’s subsidisation of each LHN’s population’s use of MBS and PBS services.  Nonetheless 
the comparative shares are weighted to the population as percentages and are comparable in the 
context of both being weighted population needs-based shares.  
 
To allow fair comparison both sets of shares are based upon the respective need indices for the 
LHNs resident populations and are not resourcing shares adjusted for flows where patients are 
treated in other LHNs.   
 










Central Coast 4.19% 4.68% 
Far West 0.56% 0.51% 
Hunter New England 11.82% 12.79% 
Illawarra Shoalhaven 5.22% 5.40% 
Mid North Coast 2.99% 3.11% 
Murrumbidgee 3.70% 4.33% 
Nepean Blue Mountains 4.78% 4.92% 
Northern NSW 3.76% 4.10% 
Northern Sydney 9.75% 10.13% 
South Eastern Sydney 12.79% 12.20% 
South Western Sydney 13.31% 12.79% 
Southern NSW 2.40% 2.69% 
Sydney 6.78% 6.26% 
Western NSW 4.90% 4.43% 
Western Sydney 13.03% 11.67% 
Total  100.00% 100.00% 




As flagged in the literature review, one would expect somewhat similar shares of resources on the 
basis that both methods, as different as they are (illustrated in Table 36), find commonality in that 
the needs-based shares are heavily influenced in both methodologies by how well variables 
representing the social determinants of health predict each models respective proxies of health 
need.  In this regard there can be a degree of comfort in the similarity of the LHN shares produced 
by the HORSt.  A comparison of shares is perhaps the only method of verification open to this 
research.  As an entirely new method for establishing population needs-based resource allocation, 
the HORSt would suffer credibility problems if the proportional differences in shares were 
significantly larger. 
 
Research question 6: 
What quantum of funding is required to be adjusted by the state from the existing pool of resources 
used by each geographical population? 
 
Determining the quantum of funding to be adjusted by the state for each of the LHNs requires first 
calculating what is the current resource share of resources are across the pool of funds from the 
MBS, PBS and SCRs by area of residence.  The difference between this share of the total pool of 
funds and what the share would be if the whole pool was allocated accordingly to the LHNs HORSt 
share is the adjustment the state would need to make, to enable funding equity.  This is illustrated in 
Table 34 on page 229.   
 
At the time of the study design (2016), the quantum of funding required to be adjusted by the state 
from the existing pool of resources used by each geographical population was as follows.  Seven of 
the 15 NSW LHNs receive a positive adjustment of resources being: 
 Western Sydney $434 million; 
 South Eastern Sydney $326 million; 
 South Western Sydney $205 million; 
 Western NSW $200 million; 
 Murrumbidgee $42 million; 
 Nepean Blue Mountains $21 million; and 
 Far West NSW $8 million. 
Eight of the 15 NSW LHNs receive a negative adjustment of resources being: 
 Northern Sydney -$3 million; 
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 Sydney -$3 million; 
 Southern NSW -$36 million; 
 Northern NSW -$175 million; 
 Mid North Coast $196 million; 
 Illawarra Shoalhaven -$249 million; 
 Hunter New England -$271 million; and 
 Central Coast -$303 million. 
Importantly, these shares of funding are for the needs of the populations within each LHN of 
residence.  The operationalisation of the HORSt (outside the scope of this research) will require 
adjustments for patient flows, between LHNs. These adjustments do not include these flows.  This is 
discussed in section 7.2.   
 
The vertical equity adjustments in terms of quantum of dollars are directly attributed to the HORSt 
assessment of individual population health needs within each LHN, and comparing this to funds 
already used by their populations via MBS, PBS, and state health funding allocations.  Caution needs 
to be taken in interpreting these adjustments, positive or negative, as indicators of higher or lower 
needs.  For example, Western Sydney and Central Coast have adjustments of a $434 million increase, 
and a $303 million decrease respectively.  Their respective HORSt need indices are 138.51 and 
125.27 (see table 31, page 222), indicative of being 38.51% and 25.27% more needy than the 
benchmark SA3 populations that are within the Northern Sydney LHN.  However, Central Coast’s 
current share of resources is 5.48%, whilst its HORSt share of resources, which is determined by its 
HORSt need index weighted for population, is 4.19% (see table 34 page 229).  This means Central 
Coast is actually over funded relative to its needs determined by the HORSt.  Contrastingly, Western 
Sydney is currently under funded, having a share of resources of 11.17% and HORSt needs based 
share of 13.03%.   
 
The example above demonstrates that the positive and negative adjustments in dollars shown are 
indicative of the corrective action of the HORSt proportional shares to the current use and 
distribution of MBS, PBS, and state health funds respectively.  The quantum of adjustments should 
not be taken on their own as a measure of relative needs between LHNs.  The proportionality of 
shares shown as a percentage in column H of table 34, page 229 is indicative of more and less needy 
LHNs.  Moreover, the HORSt need indices for LHNs and the smaller geographies of SA3s (summarised 
in table 31, page 222) that construct the proportional shares transparently outline areas of higher 
and lower relative needs.   
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7.2  DISCUSSION - REFLECTIONS OF THE AIMS, METHODS AND RESULTS OF THE 
RESEARCH  
This section is a discussion that reflects upon the findings and results of the research contextualised 
to the conceptual framework that generated the aims and research questions that underpinned the 
methodology developed.  Discussion comprises:  
 outlining the unique and significant contributions of the research achieved; 
 comparing the use and value of the HORSt methodology as an alternative population 
needs-based resource distribution tool to traditional models; 
 recognising the study’s limitations and strengths; 
 operationalising the research to inform state health resource distribution to regional 
areas; and 
 applications of the research methodology beyond the state health system. 
 
7.2.1 The unique and significant contributions of the research achieved 
The unique contributions and innovations achieved through this research are significant for a 
number of reasons.  These are now summarised and discussed.   
 
First, as outlined in the first three chapters, taxpayer provided and subsidised health funding in 
Australia is siloed across layers of government and amongst public and private sectors (Eagar et al. 
2001, p. 26; Gadiel 2015; Lairson et al. 1995, p. 475).  In Australia, funding is firmly aligned to the 
production of health outputs rather than health outcomes.  Evidence for this is the widespread use 
of ABF for public hospitals and the nature of fee-for-service private funding.  Contrastingly, the 
HORSt represents a significant change in focus via considering funding in the context of the 
appropriate mix and volume of taxpayer funded and subsidised outputs to produce an acceptable 
benchmarked level of health outcomes for geographical populations that seek to maximise equity 
across the continuum of care.   
 
Second, in moving away from a siloed approach to funding, the HORSt advises on what the ideal 
level of state taxpayer funding should be as each LHNs share of state funding, relative to the total 
tax payer funding across the continuum of care for each LHN population, adjusted for social 
determinants that give rise to health outcomes.  State health funding in this context is an essential 
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residual adjustment component, after the taxpayer subsidisation from other relevant 
Commonwealth government funding has been considered.  In other words, the HORSt represents 
what the state needs to spend for population funding equity, given that the state cannot control the 
Commonwealth contribution spending in the private sector.  This aligns Medicare to its original 
purpose, as a “mechanism to fund two key provider groups: hospitals and doctors” (Duckett 2000, p. 
34).  The HORSt represents regional level Medicare.   
 
Third, the HORSt does not require regulatory reform.  As outlined in the third chapter, health reform 
in Australia that has contemplated regulatory change has faced pronounced challenges.  Boxall and 
Gillespie (2013); Maiden (2010); Milne (2010), all document that many attempts of health funding 
reform have involved rancour between different levels of government and also medical 
professionals.  The HORSt can disrupt the status quo of health funding of inputs and outputs by 
making the focus on health outcomes (albeit via a proxy variable of health status of the population) 
but it does so within the current regulatory rules of the game.  It does not require constitutional 
change for any layer of government to abrogate or exceed their funding or governance 
arrangements for health.   
 
Fourth, the HORSt, whilst considering a population needs-based approach to resource distribution, is 
significantly different to the former Australian state health population needs-based funding models.  
The former NSW and Queensland models primarily considered health service utilisation as a proxy 
for population health needs, with the goal being equalisation of financial access (Ho 2001; Inter-
Government & Funding Strategies 2005b; Kirigia 2009), an instrument of horizontal equity.  
Contrastingly, the HORSt primarily considers need in terms of capacity to benefit via vertical equity.  
In doing so, the HORSt recognises inequity in the health system by explicitly considering the social 
determinants in geographical populations that give rise to the production of poor health outcomes 
and not through utilisation.  The HORSt successfully measures the contributions of resourcing across 
the continuum of care whereas former models only considered resource distribution in the context 
of state health budget funding. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that other population needs-based resource allocation models such 
as that used in the NHS in the UK (documented in Table 6 in the literature review, page 62) have 
used at times a health outcomes based approach, via considering factors that give rise to premature 
mortality so as to address inequities (Barr et al. 2014).  Whilst part of the HORSt is somewhat similar 
to this, save for other variables that may be used to approximate geographical population health 
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status which do not involve mortality data, the HORSt is significantly different via the inclusion of a 
productivity assessment of proxied health outcomes as per the two-stage DEA approach.   
 
Fifth, unlike any previous population needs-based funding model that assumes implicit 
improvements in allocative efficiency, the HORSt measures the allocative efficiency of desirable 
health outcomes for populations, represented by age-standardised rates of PPHs and established a 
benchmark.  The three social determinants that were found to affect populations’ ability to achieve 
the benchmark were then used to inform resource distribution weighted population shares of 
funding.   
 
Finally, the HORSt is designed to be compatible with ABF.  The previous population needs-based 
models in NSW and QLD did operate alongside episode funding models (ABF models) (Hindle 2002; 
NSW Health 2005, p. 4; Schneider 2005, p. 5).  As such, the equity goal of the HORSt is not in a trade-
off with efficiency.  The HORSt is complementary to the ongoing advancement of technical efficiency 
that occurs with output-based purchasing models like the ABF.  The HORSt is significant in this role 
as it makes explicit and transparent for state governments and their local geographical populations 
what the fair distribution of resources ought to be to advance health outcomes and maximise equity 
before decisions regarding how best to purchase public health outputs are made at the local level 
using ABF.   
7.2.2  Comparing the use and value of the HORSt methodology as an alternative 
population needs-based resource distribution tool to traditional models 
As the differences between the HORSt and EHUI shares of funding to LHNs (outlined in Table 37) are 
not that large, it might be argued that perhaps utilisation (the need proxy of EHUIs) could be used as 
the proxy of health status to inform the needs-based benchmark used in the HORSt, or perhaps that 
traditional models that simply use utilisation as the proxy for need should be used.  This section 
discusses the value in applying the HORSt or alternatives to support resource distribution decision 
making.  
 
As per the logic of population needs-based models discussed in the literature, higher and lower rates 
of utilisation for example could reflect higher and lower rates of need.  Doing so however, would 
make the construction of the benchmark utilising the HORSt DEA approach conceptually difficult.  
This is because utilisation remains an important input for the DEA, measured by MBS, PBS and state 
health resources using the SCRs.  Furthermore, it would be illogical to have a benchmark where the 
outcome is health system use, especially when the benchmark is seeking a measure of allocative 
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efficiency of producing outcomes given the mix of resources and use thereof across the continuum 
of care.   
 
Within a DEA approach, if utilisation was to be the output, the DEA would be a function of the 
technical efficiency of the production of the utilisation.  Moreover, if utilisation was pursued as an 
outcomes measure for a benchmark, this would pose a conceptual question of what would the 
inputs be?  In addressing that question in the Australian context of this research, state health 
resource distribution, the inputs to hospital and community service outputs logically could not 
include the MBS and PBS resources which would be outside the production of these outputs.    
 
As outlined in the literature review and illustrated in Table 6 (page 62), several population needs-
based funding formulae that have used utilisation as need, have customised their formulae to inform 
localised resource allocation for specific health program budget areas.  Specific health needs for 
program budget areas have been developed, using utilisation from specific health program areas 
and explanatory variables that predict the utilisation delivered under specific health program.  In the 
case of the former NSW RDF, total needs-based shares are then the sum of the individual health 
program shares.   
 
If individual need indices and needs-based shares for health program areas are desired by the state 
health authority in the same light, using a HORSt approach would require more program specific 
health status or outcome measures pertaining to the outputs of the program areas.  Doing so may 
require multiple benchmarks and separate two-stage DEAs for the outcomes of individual program 
areas, so as to generate program specific need indices.  This would require not only considering 
variables to best represent the health outcomes of individual programs but would require 
assessment of corresponding input variables.  This would pose difficulties as this approach would 
somewhat ignore the interactions of the other services across the continuum of care.  
 
A further complicating factor to this limitation of not being able to calculate the HORSt at the state 
health program level also involves a mismatch between typical health programs used by states and 





Table 38   Disconnection between the MBS and PBS categorisation of data and state health program areas 
MBS / PBS categories Typical state health program areas (NSW 
used for example) 
MBS  
Category 1 - Professional Attendances 
Category 2 - Diagnostic Procedures and 
Investigations 
Category 3 - Therapeutic Procedures 
Category 4 - Oral and Maxillofacial Services 
(by Approved Dental Practitioners) 
Category 5 - Diagnostic Imaging Services 
Category 6 - Pathology Services 
Category 7 - Cleft Lip and Cleft Palate 
Category 8 - Miscellaneous Services 
Category 9 - Dentist, Dental Specialist and 
Dental Prosthetists. 
Category 10 - Dental Benefits Schedule 
 
PBS 
General - Ordinary 
Concessional - Ordinary 
General - Safety Net 
Concessional - Free Safety Net 
 






Mental Health  
Obstetrics 
Oral Health - Adult (Caries) 
Oral Health - Adult (Dentures) 




Primary & Community Based Care 
Rehabilitation and Extended Care 
Sub-Acute 
Non-admitted patients 
Teaching & Research 
 
(ABF Taskforce 2016). 
 
It is clear from this research that the construction of the HORSt whereby needs are assessed by 
populations ability to achieve a benchmark of allocative efficiency of the production of desirable 
health outcomes is a very different approach to traditional utilisation-based needs formulas.  As 
alluded to in the literature review, context and practicality will be the ultimate arbiter as to the 
appropriateness and value of use of either method.  Where health systems require resource 
distribution instruments to consider population health needs as a form of risk adjustment for 
informing regionalised budgets, or program budget areas, the utilisation needs-based models will 
continue to have merit.  The implicit nature of improving funding equity and promoting allocative 
efficiency through a better distribution of resources via a utilisation approach still holds.  However, 
where more specific equity objectives are required that consider the funding across the whole 




7.2.3  Study limitations and strengths  
 
7.2.3.1 Study limitations 
State health program needs indices and resource-based shares 
Drawing upon the previous section, a key study limitation is that the HORSt utilising an approach 
that seeks to include the allocative efficiency of health system inputs across the continuum of care 
to produce desirable levels of health outcomes will inevitable find difficulty in calculating health 
need indices to inform resource allocation of specific health programs within the LHNs funding 
envelopes.  This limitation confines the HORSt as a top-level macro barometer of health needs.  The 
HORSt is not designed to, nor can, answer questions as to what the mix of health service delivery 
ought to be.  These are questions that are answered through policy and clinical improvements 
pertaining to models of care.   
 
Population structures determined by Medicare Australia 
The study’s use of SA3 level population and socioeconomic data was completely determined by 
Medicare Australia’s data policy, whereby the SA3 population level is the lowest level of population 
aggregated data that can be released for the key inputs MBS and PBS.  As discussed, typically 
population needs-based models are built up from small measurable populations that can inform an 
accurate and comprehensive representation of the populations of interest in the study.  The NSW 
EHUIs and former RDF used data built up from SA2 and LGA populations respectively.   
 
There is no way of telling what affect smaller units of population and socioeconomic data would 
have on the results of the HORSt.  However, smaller data units should they become available will not 
change the methodology established for determining the HORSt need indices for these smaller 
populations, or the apportioning methodology of the smaller units to the LHNs need indices. 
 
Health outcomes proxy measure 
The study’s use of age-standardised and casemix adjusted rates of PPHs as performance measure of 
health outcomes and proxy of population health status has been well justified in this research via the 
literature and the results generated.  However, one of the limitations deliberately applied to the DEA 
methodology, was the use of this metric as a single output measure in the DEA.   This is completely 
satisfactory for a proof of concept development model that was seeking a parsimonious approach.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, the DEA can accommodate multiple outputs as well as the multiple 
inputs used.   Future research may find approximating health needs in the context of health 
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outcomes at the population level could comprise multiple metrics, whereby the linear programming 
of the DEA can appropriately weight the output contributions towards the calculation of allocative 
efficiency.  
 
7.2.3.2  Study’s strengths 
Congruent with the achievement of the study’s unique and significant contributions already 
discussed, the study’s key strengths are summarised below. 
 
As demonstrated in the development of and results achieved, the HORSt represents at a top level a 
robust and reliable barometer of population health needs.  It successfully draws upon gaps in the 
research to develop health needs for local populations with LHNs that enable resource allocation to 
be aligned with populations capacity to benefit.   It successfully measures the ability of populations 
to achieve desirable levels of health outcomes subject to the allocative efficiency of the bulk of 
publicly funded and subsidised health care in Australia.  In doing so it informs state governments of 
what they need to redistribute to enable funding equity. 
 
The core strength of the HORSt is synonymous with the Gonski models approach to education.  The 
HORSt is the first model of this kind to explicitly make a link between health outcomes and 
expenditure and does so in an environment that has been consistently dominated by the funding 
and organisation of the production of health outputs.   
 
7.2.4 Operationalising the HORSt for state health resource distributions  
The HORSt was developed as a proof of concept using a case study for NSW, circa 2016.  However, 
the methodology is designed to be applied to any recurrent year of funding.  The long stability of the 
secondary data sources collected in the census cycle means that there is no requirement of the 
HORSt to be recalibrated annually.  The HORSt needs-based shares can be used to guide resource 
allocation recurrently for each year between census data updates.  Like the previous RDF and EHUIs 
the HORSt should be updated after each ABS census is complete.  
 
The application of LHNs shares should as per the previous RAWP in the UK and former RDF in NSW, 
be applied to growth funding and not the recurrent budget per se.  Doing so would avoid creating 
too much disruption of established service delivery patterns, over the short term, however this 
would lead to longer term improvements in funding equity.  On this point, state health systems 
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wanting to enable greater funding equity and allocative efficiency should be prepared to consider 
the HORSt as a long-term perpetuating initiative.   The dismantling of the NSW RDF and the resulting 
erosion in funding equity that can occur once the commitment to a needs-based funding tool is 
abandoned was demonstrated in Chapter Two, Figure 7, page 57.  
 
The goals of the HORSt were deliberately kept as a proof of concept model and the complications of 
patient flows in the planning of this research was excluded to focus on the core methodology being 
developed.  Nonetheless, the HORSt shares calculated could be initially distributed to LHNs who hold 
a portion of the funds for redistribution of patient flows to other LHNs that treat the patients.  The 
payment of net flows between LHNs could be conducted entirely with a transfer of NWAUs via ABF, 
guided by weightings aligned to population needs informed by the HORSt.  A similar mechanism 
could apply to the flow transfers from LHNs to speciality networks that have state-wide service 
functions, such as speciality tertiary services, for example, paediatric child and maternal services.  A 
flows adjusted share of funding could be calculated via weighting each of the LHNs populations 
HORSt shares for where each population is treated.  However, there are endless possibilities as to 
how patient flows could be treated.  Ultimately patient flows are a policy matter for state health 
authorities.  
 
This study has used NSW as a case study.  In the first chapter it was suggested that, based on the 
literature pertaining to the strong links between social determinants of health and outcomes, the 
HORSt is logically going to be more applicable in states that face more dispersed and 
socioeconomically different populations, where inequalities and inequities are more apparent and 
where the supply of services are scarcer.  The outcomes of the regression for NSW are specific for 
that state’s data and are not directly translated to other states.  Nonetheless the HORSt 
methodology can be applied to other states, where different predictors to the three identified for 
NSW may be revealed.   
 
7.2.5 Applying the HORSt methodology beyond state health resource distribution to 
regional areas  
Whilst this thesis’ scope has been focused on the state health system’s distribution of funding to 
local populations, the application of the HORSt methodology can be applied to other population 
needs-based determinations, such as informing fairer and more allocatively efficient shares of 
funding for specific purpose payments from Commonwealth to states via the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission.  Further, the national health funding model used to administer Commonwealth and 
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State funding pools could be similarly influenced by a HORSt methodology so as to promote equity 
and allocative efficiency across the continuum of care and with respect to the influence that social 
determinants have upon health outcomes.   
 
The HORSt has been ultimately developed to guide the recurrent resource distribution between 
states and LHNs.  Capital planning is outside the scope of this research.  Nonetheless capital decision 
making could be informed by the HORSt need indices so as to plan for resources that are established 
in areas of greater need. 
 
7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research set out to demonstrate a different way of distributing resources compared to the 
business as usual approach that all states and territories have adopted since the commencement of 
nation-wide ABF.  This process disappointingly has not seen an advancement in enabling funding for 
better health outcomes or alleviating inequity and has perpetuated the status quo.  Whilst ABF has 
been successful in driving technical efficiency (a very good thing) the public health system in 
Australia has been left somewhat wanting for improvements in allocative and dynamic efficiency.  
IHPA’s quote on page 2 of this thesis in this regard is timely and telling for the need for the HORSt 
namely:    
“Whilst Activity Based Funding models have been effective in driving technical efficiency in the 
delivery of public hospital services, the current pricing models designed by IHPA do not necessarily 
provide incentives to maximise allocative and dynamic efficiency” (IHPA 2019, p. 30). 
 
The HORSt developed and demonstrated in this research not only responds to gaps in the literature 
regarding the technical approaches used to approximate health needs but has also responded to the 
growing view that public resources should be demonstrated to being applied to the betterment of 
outcomes.  The HORSt makes transparent in the context of health outcomes the differences 
between good and poor health status and then makes explicit the taxpayer inputs and the social 
determinants that contribute to the achievement of those outcomes.  It does so without requiring 
legislative reform.  Importantly in this later regard, it does not seek to disrupt ABF’s role as a 
purchasing currency or driver of technical efficiency.  The HORSt positioned as the first step in the 




Policy and Practice Recommendations 
The contextualised use of the HORSt will fundamentally determine whether or not it should be 
pursued in place of population needs-based models based on utilisation.  For example, the HORSt 
could simply be used as per the proof of concept model as per this thesis, to inform an overall first 
step in the funding model, informing population needs-based resource allocation to LHNs at a very 
broad level, defining the overall resource distribution envelope for LHNs funding.  To promote equity 
and allocative efficiency this is recommended.  It is a substantial improvement on business as usual 
which essentially is commissioning for history plus growth.  The mix of services to be purchased by 
the LHN amongst their facilities could be left purely as a cost and casemix decision with respect to 
existing infrastructure, informed by cost and ABF factors and clinical innovation of models of care.  
Doing so would not require any further sophistication of refining the HORSt for specific health 
program resource allocation.   
 
This research has contextualised the use of traditional population needs-based models that use 
utilisation as a proxy for need.  Whilst these models by design will focus on outputs rather than 
health outcomes, if policy requires oversight for resource distribution congruent with risk capitation 
arising from need at a health program level, then these traditional approaches as extensively 
outlined in the literature are sound.  As demonstrated in the literature such approaches remain 
compatible with ABF / episode funding, which will always be a logical second payment stage in the 
funding model.   
 
The recommendations for the use of the HORSt are: 
1. utilise the HORSt methodology to establish the top level commissioning / funding 
envelope for state health funding determinations to LHNs;  
a. adjusting the HORSt LHNs populations needs-based shares of funding for 
fixed cost factors associated with facilities and patient flows;  
2. use ABF as the payment currency for purchasing of health system outputs within 
each LHN. 
 
Recommendations for further research  
Operationalising the HORSt could involve a mix of methods.  For the reasons outlined in this thesis 
and benefits associated with dealing with the gaps in the literature, as recommended the HORSt 
should be used for top level resource allocation guidance to local areas.  However, factors that 
determine utilisation of health programs could be calculated separately.  The nexus of how such a 
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mix would operate is beyond the scope of this research, however this would be an opportunity for 
further research.   
 
Further research could seek to address the limitation outlined with using the HORSt methodology for 
specific health programs, whereby the HORSt DEA represents a relative measure of the productivity 
of inputs across the continuum care.  The use of a single output in the HORSt DEA (PPHs) and the 
inputs selected could be refined in further research agenda.  As outlined, DEA does support multiple 
outputs alongside multiple inputs. 
 
There is potential for the HORSt methodology to act as top-level sounding for capital works 
expansion and health technology innovations.  HORSt determined health needs indices could be 
considered for infrastructure developments so as to not make structural funding inequities.   
However, as patient flows are indicative of the fact that it is not practical for each LHN to supply all 
facilities to address population need (such as tertiary and quaternary facilities for example), further 
research would be required to consider how the HORSt methodology could be practically applied.   
 
Ultimately, the use of the HORSt, particularly as identifying the residual funding component from 
within the continuum of care, may lead to political discourse between Commonwealth, states and 
private practitioners.  However, the transparency afforded under the HORSt, may contribute to 
greater understanding by taxpayers as to the structural funding inequities that perpetuate in the 
constitutionally protected private layers of the Australian health care system.  Specifically, IHPA, in 
seeking to address its quest for improving allocative efficiency, could consider developing the HORSt 
at a national level to guide the distribution of quantum of NWAUs from Commonwealth to states.  
Doing so may require further research so as to consider what appropriate NWAU targets for each 
state ought to be.  
 
The recommendations for future research surrounding the HORSt are as follows: 
1. Consider using the HORSt to establish the top level outcomes-based commissioning / 
funding envelope for state health funding determinations to LHNs (as above) and consider 
state health program needs-based approaches within this envelope for localised 
commissioning of health programs.  Patient flows / cost factor adjustments and the use of 
ABF as the currency in the second stage of the model still applies. 
2. Consider alternative outputs and inputs to consider refinements to the HORSt and 
developing the methodology for specific health program areas.  
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3. Consider how the HORSt methodology could be practically applied to capital expansions and 
health technology innovations. 
4. IHPA could consider developing the HORSt at a national level to guide the distribution of the 
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APPENDIX 1  SUMMARY OF POTENTIALLY PREVENTABLE HOSPITALISATIONS 
(PPHs) AND IDENTIFYING ATTRIBUTES  
Source: (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017b) 
 








Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
A08.0 Rotaviral enteritis In any diagnosis.
A35 Other tetanus In any diagnosis.
A36 Diphtheria In any diagnosis.
A37 Whooping cough In any diagnosis.
A80 Acute poliomyelitis In any diagnosis.
B01 Varicella [chicken pox] In any diagnosis.
B05 Measles In any diagnosis.
B06 Rubella [German measles] In any diagnosis.
B16.1
Acute hepatitis B with delta-agent 
(coinfection) without hepatic coma
In any diagnosis.
B16.9
Acute hepatitis B without delta-agent and 
without hepatic coma
In any diagnosis.
B18.0 Chronic viral hepatitis B with delta-agent In any diagnosis.
B18.1
Chronic viral hepatitis B without delta-
agent
In any diagnosis.
B26 Mumps In any diagnosis.
G00.0 Haemophilus meningitis In any diagnosis.
Chronic PPHs
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude children aged less than 4 years.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude children aged less than 4 years.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with the following cardiac procedure codes:
Blocks 600-606, 608-650, 653-657, 660-664, 666, 669-682, 684-691, 
693, 705-707, 717 and codes 33172-00[715], 33827-01[733], 34800-
00[726], 35412-00[11], 38721-01[733], 90217-02[734], 90215-
02[732].
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with the following cardiac procedure codes:
Blocks 600-606, 608-650, 653-657, 660-664, 666, 669-682, 684-691, 
693, 705-707, 717 and codes 33172-00[715], 33827-01[733], 34800-
00[726], 35412-00[11], 38721-01[733], 90217-02[734], 90215-
02[732].
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with the following cardiac procedure codes:
Blocks 600-606, 608-650, 653-657, 660-664, 666, 669-682, 684-691, 
693, 705-707, 717 and codes 33172-00[715], 33827-01[733], 34800-
00[726], 35412-00[11], 38721-01[733], 90217-02[734], 90215-
02[732].
E10.0–E10.9 Type 1 diabetes mellitus As principal diagnosis.
E11.0–E11.9 Type 2 diabetes mellitus As principal diagnosis.
E13.0–E13.9 Other specified diabetes mellitus As principal diagnosis.





hypertensive heart diseased with 
(congestive) heart failure
J81 Pulmonary oedema






ICD-10-AM, 7th edition codes used for identifying potentially preventable hospitalisations
Pneumonia and influenza 
(vaccine-preventable)
J10
Influenza due to other identified 
influenza virus
J11 Influenza, virus not identified
J13
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Appendix Table 1 continues on next page 
  
As principal diagnosis.
Only with additional diagnoses of J41, J42, J43, J44.
J41
Simple and mucopurulent chronic 
bronchitis
As principal diagnosis.
J42 Unspecified chronic bronchitis As principal diagnosis.
J43 Emphysema As principal diagnosis.
J44
Other chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease
As principal diagnosis.
J47 Bronchiectasis As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
Only with additional diagnosis of J47.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases according to the list of procedures excluded from the 
Congestive cardiac failure category above.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases according to the list of procedures excluded from the 
Congestive cardiac failure category above.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases according to the list of procedures excluded from the 
Congestive cardiac failure category above.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases according to the list of procedures excluded from the 
Congestive cardiac failure category above.
D50.1 Sideropenic dysphagia As principal diagnosis.
D50.8 Other iron deficiency anaemias As principal diagnosis.
D50.9 Iron deficiency anaemia, unspecified As principal diagnosis.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with procedure codes according to the list of 
procedures excluded from the Congestive cardiac failure category 
above.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with procedure codes according to the list of 
procedures excluded from the Congestive cardiac failure category 
above.
E40 Kwashiorkor As principal diagnosis.
E41 Nutritional marasmus As principal diagnosis.
E42 Marasmic kwashiorkor As principal diagnosis.
E43
Unspecified severe protein-energy 
malnutrition
As principal diagnosis.
E55.0 Rickets, active As principal diagnosis.
E64.3 Sequelae of rickets As principal diagnosis.
I00
Rheumatic fever without mention of heart 
involvement
As principal diagnosis.
I01 Rheumatic fever with heart involvement As principal diagnosis.
I02 Rheumatic chorea As principal diagnosis.
I05 Rheumatic mitral valve diseases As principal diagnosis.
I06 Rheumatic aortic valve diseases As principal diagnosis.
I07 Rheumatic tricuspid valve diseases As principal diagnosis.
I08 Multiple valve diseases As principal diagnosis.





I10 Essential (primary) hypertension
I11.9





Coronary thrombosis not resulting in 
myocardial infarction
I24.8
Other forms of acute ischaemic heart 
disease
I24.9
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Appendix Table 1 continues on next page 
Acute PPHs
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
In any diagnosis.
Exclude people under 2 months.
N10 Acute tublo-interstitial nephnitis As principal diagnosis.
N11 Chronic tublo-interstitial nephritis As principal diagnosis.
N12
Tubolo-interstitial nephritis, not 
specified as acute or chronic
As principal diagnosis.
N13.6 Pyonephrosis As principal diagnosis.
N15.1 Renal and perinephric abscess As principal diagnosis.
N15.9




Disorders of kidney and ureter, 
unspecified
As principal diagnosis.
N39.0 Urinary tract infection, site not specified As principal diagnosis.
N39.9 Disorder or urinary system, unspecified As principal diagnosis.
K25.0 Gastric ulcer, acute with haemorrhage As principal diagnosis.
K25.1 Gastric ulcer, acute with perforation As principal diagnosis.
K25.2












Gastric ulcer, chronic or unspecified with 
both haemorrhage and perforation
As principal diagnosis.
K26.0 Duodenal ulcer, acute with haemorrhage As principal diagnosis.
K26.1 Duodenal ulcer, acute with perforation As principal diagnosis.
K26.2












Duodenal ulcer, chronic or unspecified 
with both haemorrhage and perforation
As principal diagnosis.
K27.0








Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, acute with 
both haemorrhage and perforation
As principal diagnosis.
K27.4
Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, chronic or 




Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, chronic or 




Peptic ulcer, site unspecified, chronic or 
























Gastrojejunal ulcer, chronic or 









J15.3 Pneumonia due to streptococcus, group B
J15.4 Pneumonia due to other streptococci
J15.7
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Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to 
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00, 
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the 
only l isted procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to 
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00, 
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the 
only l isted procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to 
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00, 
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the 
only l isted procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to 
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00, 
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the 
only l isted procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to 
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00, 
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the 
only l isted procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to 
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00, 
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the 
only l isted procedure.
As principal diagnosis.
Exclude cases with any procedure except those in blocks 1820 to 
2016, or if procedure is 30216-00, 30216-01, 30216-02, 30676-00, 
30223-01, 30223-02, 30064-00, 90660-00, 90661-00, and this is the 
only l isted procedure.
N70 Salpingitis and oophoritis As principal diagnosis.
N73




Other female pelvic inflammatory 
disorders in diseases classified 
elsewhere
As principal diagnosis.
H66 Suppurative and unspecified otitis media As principal diagnosis.
J02 Acute pharyngitis As principal diagnosis.
J03 Acute tonsil l itis As principal diagnosis.
J06
Acute upper respiratory infections of 
multiple and unspecified sites
As principal diagnosis.
J31.2 Chronic pharyngitis As principal diagnosis.
K02 Dental caries As principal diagnosis.
K03 Other diseases of hard tissues of teeth As principal diagnosis.
K04 Diseases of pulp and periapical tissues As principal diagnosis.
K05 Gingivitis and periodontal diseases As principal diagnosis.
K06








Other cysts of oral region, not elsewhere 
classified
As principal diagnosis.
K09.9 Cyst of oral region, unspecified As principal diagnosis.
K12 Stomatitis and related lesions As principal diagnosis.
K13 Other diseases of l ip and oral mucosa As principal diagnosis.
K14.0 Glossitis As principal diagnosis.
G40 Epilepsy As principal diagnosis.
G41 Status epilepticus As principal diagnosis.
R56 Convulsions, not elsewhere classified As principal diagnosis.
Eclampsia O15 Eclampsia As principal diagnosis.
R02 Gangrene, not elsewhere classified In any diagnosis.
I70.24




Impaired glucose regulation with 
peripheral angiopathy, with gangrene
As principal diagnosis.
Gangrene
L98.3 Eosinphilic cellulitis [Wells]
Pelvic inflammatory disease






















ICD-10AM codes used to identify Charlson Co-morbidities in separations data 















1 I60, I61, I62, I63, I65, I66,G450, G451, G452, G458, G459, G46, I64, G454, I670, 
I671, I672, I674, I675, I676, I677 I678, I679, I681, I682, I688, I69  




1 J40, J41, J42, J44, J43, J45, J46, J47, J67, J44, J60, J61, J62, J63, J66, J64, J65 
Connective 
tissue disorder  
 
1 M32, M34, M332, M053, M058, M059, M060, M063, M069, M050, M052, 
M051, M353  
Peptic ulcer 1 K25, K26, K27, K28 
Liver disease 1 K702, K703, K73, K717, K740, K742, K746, K743, K744, K745 
Diabetes  
 




2 E102, E112, E132, E142 E103, E113, E133, E143 E104, E114, E134, E144  
Paraplegia 2 G81 G041, G820, G821, G822 
Renal disease  
 
2 N03, N052, N053, N054, N055, N056, N072, N073, N074, N01, N18, N19, N25  
Cancer  
 
2 C0, C1, C2, C3, C40, C41, C43, C45, C46, C47, C48, C49, C5, C6, C70, C71, C72, 
C73, C74, C75, C76, C80, C81, C82, C83, C84, C85, C883, C887, C889, C900, 
C901, C91, C92, C93, C940, C941, C942, C943, C9451, C947, C95, C96  
Metastatic 
cancer 





3 K729, K766, K767, K721 
HIV 6 B20, B21, B22, B23, B24 
Adapted from (Sundararajan et al. 2004, pp. 1,290).  
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APPENDIX 3  ETHICS APPROVAL  
From: Rob Gordon [mailto:robg@uow.edu.au]  
Sent: Thursday, 16 March 2017 2:17 PM 
To: Kathy Eagar 
Cc: John Slater; Silvia Mendolia 
Subject: RE: Amended Protocol to support HREC exemption 
  
John, Kathy, Sylvia, 
  
My apologies for the delay in replying.  John, I have read your Research Protocol and agree that the 
research you are undertaking can be classified as negligible risk. On this basis, I approve your 





Associate Professor Rob Gordon 
Deputy Director 
Australian Health Services Research Institute 












APPENDIX 5  CONFIRMATION E-MAIL EXCHANGE REGARDING TRANSLATIONAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF DEA OUTPUTS DATA  
From: Jose Manuel Cordero Ferrera <jmcordero@unex.es> 
Sent: Tuesday, 12 June 2018 7:55 PM 
To: John Slater 




Thanks for your interest in our research. Regarding your question, you are right. We decided 
to use the whole hundred up from the maximum value (474,22). There is no further 
computation beyond that. We also thought about the possibility of using the maximum value, 





Jose Cordero  
 
 
De: "John Slater" <jmrs561@uowmail.edu.au> 
Para: jmcordero@unex.es 
Enviados: Lunes, 11 de Junio 2018 13:24:34 
Asunto: Efficiency assessment of primary care providers: A conditional nonparametric 
approach 
 
Dear Professor Jose 
 
I'm a PhD (DBA) student in Australia and Health Economist.  I'm researching ACSCs as an 
undesirable variable in DEA.  I very much enjoyed your paper on the efficiency assessment 
of primary care providers. 
 
I am very interested in how you transformed the undesirable ACSCs output.  I note in your 
paper with interest that you followed the Seiford and Zhu (2002) method and you set the 
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value of your transformation parameter at k=500.  I was wondering if this was done as the 
maximum rate of ACSCs per 10,000 in your paper was 474.22?  I was thinking that you have 
assigned the parameter at the next whole hundred up from this Figure. This seemed logical 









APPENDIX 6  HORSt DEA REGRESSION MODELLING, ALTERNATE MODELS TO THE 
PREFERRED MODEL  
A6.1 Regression Model 1 (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs + Assisted Needs) 
Regression analysis commenced with including the IRSD variable, the ATSI variable, out-of-pocket 
costs and the Assisted Needs variable.  Several combinations were tested.  The results are presented 
herein.  





The coefficients panel of Table A6.1.1 shows the significance of each variable at the 5% significance 
level depicted by (Sig.).  At the 5% significance level the Assisted Needs proportion (Sig 0.209>0.05) 
is not a significant linear predictor of the DEA allocative efficiency score in a model that also includes 




Whilst Assisted Needs was not a significant linear predictor of the DEA allocative efficiency score in a 
model that contained out-of-pocket costs, further analysis was conducted where Assisted Needs 
were included and the out-of-pocket costs was removed.  Table A6.1.2 shows the resulting 
regression (labelled Model 1a) finds that Assisted Needs in a regression with IRSD and ATSI and 
without out-of-pocket costs is a significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score.  
IRSD and ATSI are also significant linear predictors in this model.  
 
Table A6.1.2 –Regression Model 1a – IRSD + ATSI + Assisted Needs 
 
 
The overall regression of Model 1a is significant as shown by the F value and Sig values in the ANOVA 
(analysis of variance) section of the table.  The coefficient of determination (R-square 0.572) for the 
model with these variables explains 57.2% of the variation in the DEA Allocative efficiency score, or 
55.7% when adjusted for the number of independent variables.  As discussed in the preceding 
section regarding the bi-variate correlations, the VIF statistic shows potential multicollinearity 
between IRSD and Assisted Needs, although the VIF statistics are below 5, which as discussed in the 




Notwithstanding a potential issue of multicollinearity, the model depicted in Table A6.1.2 meets all 
the required regression axioms outlined in the methodology chapter.  Results of testing these 
required assumptions are now outlined.   
 
The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 1.719 in Table A6.1.2 is demonstrating the model exhibits no auto-
serial correlations.  Hypothesis testing the Durbin Watson statistic (d) tests for autocorrelation and 
serial correlation was conducted. i.e. 
 
𝐻0: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝐻𝐴: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
Using critical values of 1.60709 and 1.69990 from the Durbin Watson tables (Savin & White 1977) 
with 88 observations (DMUs / SA3s) and 3 independent variables,  the decision rule for hypothesis 
testing is: 
 Reject 𝐻0: if  d<1.60709  or (4-d)< 1.60709; 
 Do not reject 𝐻0: if d>1.69990 or (4-d)> 1.69990; and 
 Test inconclusive if: 1. 60709<d<1. 69990 and 1.60709<(4-d)<1.69990. 
As d (1.719>1.69990), we do not reject 𝐻0 and find the residuals are independent.  
 
In addition to the Durbin Watson statistic Figure A6.1A shows a line graph of regression 
unstandardized residuals.  The fact that between case numbers there is no discernible pattern of 
association it can be concluded that the errors are independent and no autocorrelation or serial 
correlation is observed.   
 
Figure A6.1.2 is a scatter plot that test for heteroscedasticity.  If the standardised errors on the y axis 
can be seen to be associated with standardised predicted values on the x, we can conclude that part 
of the error term is influencing the deterministic part of the model.  This is not the case.  Therefore, 




Figure A6.1A – Line Graph of Regression Residuals – Model 1a (IRSD + ATSI + Assisted Needs)  
 
 
Figure A6.1B – Scatter plot of regression standardised residuals versus regression – Model 1a (IRSD 
+ ATSI + Assisted Needs) 
 
 
Figure A6.1.C shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and 
Figure A6.1.D is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line).   















As an alternative to Model 1a, Model 1b, adds in the out-of-pocket costs variable and removes the 
Assisted Needs.  Table A6.1.3 shows that in regression Model 1b containing IRSD, ATSI, out-of-pocket 
costs, that all these variables are significant linear predictors of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score.  
Furthermore, the regression model is significant as denoted by the F value and Sig values in the 
ANOVA (analysis of variance) part of the table.  The Model Summary section of the table indicates 
via the coefficient of determination (the R-square 0.632) that the model with these variables 
explains 63.2% of the variation in the DEA Allocative efficiency scores or 61.9% when adjusted for 
the three independent variables.   
 
Table A6.1.3 –Regression Model 1b (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs) 
 
 
In contrast to Model 1a, where there is a suggestion of multicollinearity via the VIF statistics, the 
values in model 1b are clear enough to avoid any inference.  Model 1b also meets all the required 
regression assumptions.  Proof is now presented. 
 
The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 1.949 in Table A6.1.3 is demonstrating the model exhibits no auto-
serial correlations.  As per the previous section as d (1.949)>1.6990 (the critical value from the 
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Durbin Watson table), the 𝐻0 is not rejected and the residuals are independent.  In addition, Figure 
A6.1.E shows a line graph of regression unstandardized residuals.  Between case numbers there is no 
discernible pattern of association so independence for the errors can be confirmed and therefore 
there is no autocorrelation or serial correlation observed. 
 
Figure A6.1E – Line Graph of Regression Residuals - Model 1b (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs) 
 
Figure A6.1F is a scatter plot that test for heteroscedasticity.  If the standardised errors on the y axis 
can be seen to be associated with standardised predicted values on the x, we can conclude that part 
of the error term is influencing the deterministic part of the model.  This is not the case.  Therefore, 




Figure A6.1G– Scatter plot of regression standardised residuals versus regression – Model 1b (IRSD 




Figure A6.1H shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and 
Figure A6.1J is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line).   
It can be concluded from this that regression residuals meet the requirement of being normally 




Figure A6.1H – Histogram of regression residuals– Model 1b (IRSD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs) 
 
 




It can therefore be concluded that both models 1a and 1b are robust and parsimonious options to 
represent the HORSt regression.  Similar analysis is now presented for other regression models that 




A6.2 Regression Model 2 IRSAD + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs + Assisted Needs 
Preliminary regression modelling with the inclusion of the IRSAD SEIFA index included ATSI, out-of-
pocket costs ALL and Assisted Needs.  Doing so is a logical extension to the results of the analysis 
conducted to first model.  Results are shown in Table A6.2.1. 
Table A6.2.1 – Preliminary Independent Variable Assessment Regression Model 2 using IRSAD as 




Table A6.2.1 shows that there is again a potential problem of multicollinearity between the SEIFA 
index IRSD and Assisted Needs, VIFs being 5.826 and 3.934 respectively.  Moreover, Assisted Needs 
(sig .379>0.05) is not a significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score in a 
regression also including IRSAD, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs.   
 
Model 2a explores the removal of out-of-pocket costs to see whether or doing so would contribute 
to Assisted Needs being a significant predictor.  Table A6.2.2 is a summary of this model and shows 
that this is not the case with Assisted Needs (sig .211>0.05) also being a non-significant linear 
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predictor in regression containing IRSAD and ATSI.  Also, in this model there is very little change in 
the VIFs for the IRSAD and Assisted Needs.  Given these issues surrounding the Assisted Needs 
variable an alternative model is now pursued replacing Assisted Needs with out-of-pocket costs. 
 




Table A6.2.2 is a summary of Model 2b, which consists of the IRSAD, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs 
variables.  All of these variables when combined in a regression are significant linear predictors of 
the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score.  This model meets all the requirements of robust regression.  
The regression model itself is significant as per the F statistic in the ANOVA section.  There is no 
indication of multicollinearity as per the VIFs.  This model explains 62% of the variation in the DEA 
Allocative Efficiency scores, 60.6% adjusted for the number of independent variables included.  Proof 
of model 2b meeting all the other regression assumptions for robust regression is now presented.  
 
The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 1.984 in Table A6.2.3 is demonstrating the model exhibits no auto-
serial correlations.  As per the previous section as d 1.984>1.6990 (the critical value from the Durbin 
Watson table), the 𝐻0 is not rejected and the residuals are independent.  In addition, Figure A6.2A 
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shows a line graph of regression unstandardized residuals.  Between case numbers there is no 
discernible pattern of association so independence for the errors can be confirmed and therefore 
there is no autocorrelation or serial correlation observed. 




Figure A6.2B is a scatter plot that test for heteroscedasticity.  There is no discernible pattern to 
indicate any association with standardised predicted values on the x axis with the regression 
residuals on the y axis so we can conclude that the model meets the assumption of 
homoscedasticity.   
 
Figure A6.2C shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and 
Figure A6.2D is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line).   
It can be concluded from this that regression residuals meet the requirement of being normally 
distributed.   
 
It can therefore be concluded that regression Model 2b containing IRSAD, ATSI and out-of-pocket 
costs is a robust and parsimonious option for the HORSt regression.  
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Figure A6.2B – Scatter plot of regression standardised residuals versus regression – Model 2b (IRSD 


















A6.3 Regression Model 3 IER + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs + Assisted Needs 
Preliminary regression modelling with the inclusion of the IER SEIFA index included ATSI, out-of-
pocket costs ALL and Assisted Needs.  Results are shown in Table A6.3.1.  Assisted Needs (sig .645> 
0.05) in a regression model containing IER, ATSI, out-of-pocket costs is a non-significant linear 
predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores.  Whilst this is similar to the previous modelling 
conducted with IRSD and IRSAD, there appears however to be no preliminary indications of 
multicollinearity given the VIFs.  Aligned to the previous modelling logic, two further iterations of 
modelling were conducted with IER:  
1. Model 3a containing IER, ATSI and Assisted Needs summarised in Table A6.3.2; and  
2. Model 3b containing IER, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs, presented and analysed in 
chapter 6 page 211.  This is the preferred model for the HORSt). 





Table A6.3.2 shows that Assisted Needs (sig .438 > 0.05) in a model with IER and ATSI is a non-
significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency score.   
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A6.4 Regression Model 4 IEO + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs + Assisted Needs 
Consistent with analysis of the previous modelling, preliminary regression modelling with the 
inclusion of the IEO SEIFA index included ATSI, out-of-pocket costs ALL and Assisted Needs.  Results 
are shown in Table A6.4.1.  Assisted Needs (sig .931> 0.05) in a regression model containing IEO, 
ATSI, out-of-pocket costs is a non-significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores.  
IEO (sig .096>0.05) in a regression model containing ATSI, out-of-pocket costs and Assisted Needs 
was also found to be a non-significant linear predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Scores.  
 
There appears be no preliminary indications of multicollinearity given the VIFs.  Whilst the 
preliminary four variable model indicated non significance of IEO with the three other variables, IEO 
was pursued in further modelling aligned to the previous modelling logic. As such two further 
iterations of modelling were conducted with IEO:  
1. Model 4a containing IEO, ATSI and Assisted Needs summarised in Table A6.4.1; and  
2. Model 4b containing IEO, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs summarised in Table A6.4.2.   
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Model 4a presented in Table A6.4.2 shows that in this model IEO is a significant linear predictor of 
the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score, although Assisted Needs is not.   
  
Table A6.4.3 shows that in Model 4b, IEO, ATSI and out-of-pocket costs are significant linear 
predictor of the DEA Allocative Efficiency Score.  This model meets all the requirements of robust 
regression.  The regression model itself is significant as per the F statistic in the ANOVA section.  
There is no indication of multicollinearity as per the VIFs.  This model explains 61% of the variation in 
the DEA Allocative Efficiency scores, 59.6% adjusted for the number of independent variables 
included.  Proof of this model (4b) meeting all the other regression assumptions for robust 
regression is now presented.  
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Table A6.4.2 –Regression Model 4a (IEO + ATSI + Assisted Needs) 
 
 
The Durbin Watson statistic (d) 2.026 in Table A6.4.3 is demonstrating the model exhibits no auto-
serial correlations.  As per the previous section as d 2.026>1.6990 (the critical value from the Durbin 
Watson table), the 𝐻0 is not rejected and the residuals are independent.  In addition, Figure A6.4A 
shows a line graph of regression unstandardized residuals.  Between case numbers there is no 
discernible pattern of association so independence for the errors can be confirmed and therefore 











Table A6.4.3 –Regression Model 4b (IEO + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs) 
 
 






Figure A6.4B is a scatter plot that test for heteroscedasticity.  There is no discernible pattern to 
indicate any association with standardised predicted values on the x axis with the regression 
residuals on the y axis so we can conclude that the model meets the assumption of 
homoscedasticity.   
 
Figure A6.4C shows a histogram indicating pictorially that the residuals are normally distributed and 
Figure A6.4D is a graph that shows the residuals are very close to perfect normality (a straight line).   
It can be concluded from this that regression residuals meet the requirement of being normally 
distributed.   
 
It can therefore be concluded that regression Model 4b containing IEO, ATSI and Out-of-pocket Costs 
ALL is a robust and parsimonious option for the HORSt regression.   
 
Figure A6.4B – Scatter plot of regression standardised residuals versus regression – Model 4b (IEO 










Figure A6.4C – Histogram of regression residuals– Model 4b (IEO + ATSI + Out-of-pocket Costs ALL) 
 
 
Figure A6.4C– Normal P-P plot of regression standardised residuals– Model 4b (IEO + ATSI + Out-











APPENDIX 7  SUMMARY OF KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL TESTS 
APPLIED TO THE HORST REGRESSION ANALYSIS  
A7.1  Linear and additivity relationship 
The outcome / dependent variable should have a significant linear relationship to the independent / 
predictor variables.  Further, where there are multiple predictors their combined effects best 
describe the linear relationship when added together.  Independent variables that are found to not 
have a linear statistical correlation with the dependent variable are unreliable predictors and require 
elimination from the regression analysis (Field 2013, p. 309). 
 
The literature indicates that scatter plots can be used to assess this assumption for the individual 
predictors and the dependent variable (Field 2013, pp. 309-11).  In addition, the Pearson’s co-
efficient of correlation, known as Pearson’s r, provides an indication of any bivariate linear 
relationship with the dependent variable and amongst variables themselves (Lind et al. 2013, p. 
394).  Pearson’s r is outlined in equation A7.1.  This test shows the direction of the association as 
positive or negative and the statistical strength of the correlation as an absolute value between 0 
and 1:  1 being perfect linear correlation; 0 indicating no linear relationship whatsoever (Babbie et al. 
2018, pp. 245-6).   
 
Equation A7.1 - Pearson’s r – coefficient of correlation  
 
𝑟 =  
𝑁Σxy − (Σx)(Σy)
√([𝑁Σ𝑥2 − (Σx)2][𝑁Σ𝑦2 − (Σy)2])
 
where N = number of pairs 
𝛴𝑥 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑥 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 
𝛴𝑦 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 
𝛴𝑥2 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑥 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 
𝛴𝑦2 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 
𝛴𝑥𝑦 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 




SPSS software V24 (IBM Corp 2017) will be used with the HORSt data in Chapter Four to generate 
scatter plots and a matrix of bivariate correlations between potential independent variables and the 
dependent variable using the Pearson’s R coefficient of correlation. 
A7.2  Multivariate normality 
In regression analysis the vertical distances between the data points and the regression model are 
known as residuals or errors.  This is illustrated by example in Figure 14 by the distances of the blue 
data points vertically above and below the red regression model line.  It is an important assumption 
for the regression that these residuals are random and are normally distributed with a mean of zero 
(where zero implies zero distance to the regression line).   Non-normally distributed residuals can 
invalidate confidence intervals and tests of significance for the predictor variables (Field 2013, p. 
311).  Importantly it is the distribution of regression residuals that need to meet this assumption and 
not the distribution of the predictor variables themselves.  As such SPSS software will be used to 
generate a histogram and normal probability plot of the regression standardised residuals.  These 
area the standard procedures required to test this assumption (Perera 2017, p. 137).   
 
The following examples show a histogram (Figure A7.2a) and probability plot (Figure A7.2b) when 
indicating multivariate normality.  Figure A7.2a is indicative of a normal distribution bell curve and 
Figure A7.2b is indicative of the data points close to the ideal diagonal line, whereas discussed above 
the residuals are random and are normally distributed with a mean around zero.  Both graphs will be 




Figure A7.2a   Example histogram of multivariate normality of regression standardized residuals 
 
Figure A7.2 adapted from (Perera 2017, p. 141).   
Figure A7.2b   Example probability plot illustrating multivariate normality of regression 
standardized residuals 
 




Regression Standardized Residual 








A7.3  No or little multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when some of the predictor variables in the model are highly correlated with 
each other.  This creates a problem in that it can become difficult to isolate the individual effect of 
these explanatory variables on the dependent variable.  In such cases the regression coefficients for 
the correlated variables may fluctuate, depending on which variables are included in the regression.  
More seriously multicollinearity can diminish the accuracy of the coefficients, which weakens the 
statistical power of the regression model (Frost 2017b; Ott 1988, p. 492).   
 
The Pearson’s R statistic previously discussed, showing correlation coefficient values between 0 and 
1 can logically be used to assess the correlations between pairs of independent variables, with 
coefficient values closer to 1 (perfect correlation) being indicative of strong correlations, with a 
general rule that correlations between -0.70 and 0.70 are not likely to be problematic (Lind et al. 
2013, p. 466).  However, a precise test, known as the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) shown in 
equation A7.3 is useful in diagnosing multicollinearity. 
 
Equation A7.3 - Variance Inflation Factor 





2 is the coefficient of determination from a regression equation where the selected 
independent variable to test for multicollinearity is used as a dependent variable and the remaining 
independent variables are included as independent variables (Lind et al. 2013, p. 466).   
 
According to Field (2013, p. 325) there is no precise threshold for when VIF determines a problem 
with multicollinearity.  For example a VIF greater than 10 according to some literature is considered 
to be unsatisfactory (Lind et al. 2013, p. 466; Marquardt 1980; Myers 1990, p. 370), whilst other 
literature suggest that a VIF greater than 5 is problematic (Snee 1973), whilst less than 5 is perfectly 
satisfactory (Frost 2017b).  Moreover, Bowerman and O'Connell (1990); Field (2013, p. 886) argue if 
the average VIF of the independent variables are greater than 1 in a regression multicollinearity may 
be biasing the model.  
 
Hamburg and Young (1994, p. 528) assert that if a suspected collinear variable is deleted from a 
regression and the R2 increases the deletion is justified.  This approach will be adopted for the HORSt 
assessment of multicollinearity using SPSS software V24, considering the VIF values for independent 
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variables below a value of 5 and whether or not the effect on the coefficient of determination (R2) by 
considering their deletion increases.   
A7.4  Homoscedasticity 
This assumption requires that the spread of errors (residuals) in a regression model is constant 
across the range of values the regression model predicts.   Homoscedasticity is required for the 
regression as the predictive relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable 
should not be constrained amongst a limited range of the independent values.  If the model has an 
inconsistent spread of residuals that increase with the predicted values of the dependent variable, 
the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated and heteroscedasticity exists.  The presence of 
heteroscedasticity makes the predictive purpose of the regression untrustworthy (Hair et al. 2010, p. 
74; Lind et al. 2013, p. 465).   
 
The HORSt regression will utilise SPSS V24 software to produce scatterplots of the regression 
standardised residuals and the standardized predicted values so as to map patterns in the data that 
can reveal whether or not the spread of the residuals increase with increases in the predicted value.   
Doing so is a valid test for the homoscedasticity assumption being met (Perera 2017, pp. 9/13-9/5).  
Figure A7.4 is an example of two scatter plots showing homoscedasticity on the left-hand side and 
heteroscedasticity on the right-hand side.  Note that for heteroscedasticity as the regression fitted 
values increase the residuals increase too. 
 
Figure A7.4   Example scatter plots of regression standardised residuals and standardized 
predicted values (fitted values) 
 
 
Figure A7.4 adapted from: (Analytics Vidhya Content Team 2016). 



























Example of scatter plot indicating 
homoscedasticity





A7.5  No serial or auto-correlation 
A key assumption for the regression is that successive residuals should be independent of each other 
(Lind et al. 2013, p. 468).  If this is violated residuals may be influencing one another, causing the 
predictive power of the regression to be questionable (Hamburg & Young 1994, p. 529).  In the case 
of time series data, which is not going to be used for the HORSt, auto correlation can be a significant 
issue, where data in one-time period may not be too dissimilar to data in the next and so forth 
(Berenson et al. 2013).  Moreover, serial correlation can arise in non-time series data, whereby 
adjacent residuals are correlated (Field 2013).  
 
There are two standard approaches to assessing whether or not serial or auto correlations are 
present in a regression.  The first involves the use of the Durbin-Watson statistic shown in equation 
A7.5 and subject to hypothesis testing.  The second involves analysing the pattern of unstandardized 
residuals to see whether or not adjacent residuals defy the assumption of independence.  Both will 
be used to check the HORSt regression in Chapter Four using SPSS Software V24.  These approaches 
are now outlined.  
 
Equation A7.5 – Durbin-Watson (d) statistic 
 
𝑑 =  
Σ𝑖=2






where:   𝑑 = 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖𝑛 − 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 
 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑖 
           𝑢𝑖−1 = 𝑎 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑖 
(Hamburg & Young 1994, p. 529) 
 
To understand the operation of the Durbin-Watson statistic, Berenson et al. (2013, p. 434) outline 
from equation 7 that: 
 “the numerator, 𝛴𝑖=2
𝑛 (𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖−1)
2 is the squared difference between two successive 
residuals summed from the second to nth values;  
 the denominator, 𝛴𝑖=2
𝑛  𝑢𝑖
2 is the sum of the squared residuals;  




 where successive residuals are negatively auto/ serial correlated the value of d will approach 
will be greater than 2 or approach its maximum value of 4; and 
 where the residuals are not correlated the value of d will be close to 2.” 
In order to interpret whether or not values either side of 2 are significant to conclude positive or 
negative auto/ serial correlation, or no correlation, critical values are found from the Durbin-Watson 
tables (Savin & White 1977)  showing a level of statistical significance (α), the sample size (n) and 
upper (𝑑𝑈) and lower (𝑑𝐿) critical values (Berenson et al. 2013, p. 435; Perera 2017, pp. 131-2).   
 
Once calculated and the tabular critical upper and lower values are obtained the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is used in hypothesis testing whereby: 
𝑁𝑢𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 =  𝐻0: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ℎ𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 =  𝐻𝐴: 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 
The determining criteria for the hypothesis testing are: 
  If 𝑑 <  𝑑𝐿   𝑂𝑅 (4 − 𝑑) <  𝑑𝐿   reject the null hypothesis, conclude that there is positive 
autocorrelation; 
 If 𝑑 >  𝑑𝑈 𝑂𝑅 (4 − 𝑑) >  𝑑𝑈   do not reject the null hypothesis, conclude the residuals are 
independent; and 
 If 𝑑𝐿 < 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑈 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑑𝐿 > (4 − 𝑑) > 𝑑𝑈 ,   the test is inconclusive.  
Note:  the value of 4 above in the three criteria denotes the maximum value of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. 
(Berenson et al. 2013, pp. 434-5; Hamburg & Young 1994, p. 530; Perera 2017, pp. 131-2) 
 
A secondary method for the HORSt to check for auto-serial correlation will be a simple line plot of 
the residuals (Perera 2017, p. 131).  Figure A7.5 below which show an example where there is no 




Figure A7.5   Examples of Line graph of residuals to detect auto-serial correlation 
 
Figure A7.5, is Figure 9-14 from (Perera 2017, p. 131).   
